


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
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HISTORY SERIES



VOLUME IV
1915-1918

177161
27/12/22

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BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

NO. 844

HISTORY SERIES, VOL. 4, NO. 1, PP. 1-120

HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR MILITARY
PENSIONS, 1861-1885

BY

JOHN WILLIAM OLIVER

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1915

MADISON, WISCONSIN

1917

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CHAPTER I

THE CIVIL WAR DECADE

Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 the subject of military and naval pensions had attracted no unusual attention in this country. The national Government had quite early recognized the justice of a pension system, and had wisely provided for the invalids, widows, and orphans made dependent by the earlier wars. By general or special legislation, pensions were being paid to those affected by the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Indian wars, and the War with Mexico. At the close of the year in 1860, there were 11,284 names borne upon the pension rolls, and it required but slightly over a million dollars a year for their payment. Since the organization of the Government, down to 1861, the grand total paid out for pensions had amounted to approximately \$89,000.00.¹

Under ordinary conditions the country would have witnessed a gradual decrease, both in the number of pensions admitted to the roll, and in the amount required to pay their claims. In his annual report for 1860, the Commissioner of Pensions announced that the clerical force of his Office, which consisted of 71 clerks, could now be reduced, and suggested to the Secretary of Interior that a portion of them be given employment elsewhere. The belief was, that the pension system would henceforth gradually decrease in importance. Attention was called to the fact that the pensioners of the Revolution were rapidly passing away, "and in a brief period would live only in the memory of a grateful country."²

But with the outbreak of the Civil War the whole pension system had to be reorganized. A volunteer army of a half million men was to be put in the field before the close of another year. Never before had such an experiment been undertaken, and our democratic government was put to a test, the like of which few nations have had to meet. With-

¹ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions, 1860. Sen. Doc. 36th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 1, p. 469.*

² *Ibid.* p. 467.

out a creditable standing army, and lacking the power to compel men to enter upon military service, our Government had to resort to the policy of persuasion. The most natural as well as the most effective step that could be taken was that of guaranteeing to those men who entered the service voluntarily, the same benefits, if wounded or disabled, that were granted to the members of the regular army.

This was done by an act of Congress passed on July 22, 1861. After authorizing the President to accept the services of volunteers, not exceeding five hundred thousand, the following guarantee was inserted. Any volunteer who should be wounded or disabled while in the service, "shall be entitled to the same benefits which have been or may be conferred on persons disabled in the regular service, and the widow, if there be one, and if not, the legal heirs of such as die, or may be killed in service, in addition to all arrears of pay and allowances, shall receive the sum of one hundred dollars."³ No discussion whatever attended this provision when it was introduced, and the readiness with which it was accepted, illustrates the attitude of Congress toward offering inducements for volunteering. This act marks the beginning of the Civil War pension legislation. Within the next half century our country was to witness the enactment and operation of a series of pension laws, the liberality and expense of which have no parallel in the history of any nation.

The act of July 22, 1861, was soon found to be inadequate. The summer campaign for that year resulted in rather heavy losses for the Union side, and in the fall of 1861 Commissioner Barrett stated that applications of soldiers disabled in the existing war, and on behalf of the widows and children of those who had died in the service, were coming in rapidly for adjudication. A large number of claims had already been admitted. But the uncertainty of pension rates that should be allowed in each case, and the apparent discrepancies in the laws under which the Pension Bureau was working, led the Commissioner to recommend that further and more explicit legislation be speedily enacted by Congress.⁴

³ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 13, p. 270.

⁴ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions*, 1861. *Sen. Doc.* 37th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 1, p. 836.

This demand became all the more imperative because of the disturbed condition of the pension system in the southern states. Shortly after hostilities began in the spring of 1861 Commissioner Barrett ordered the payment of pensions to be suspended at all the different agencies located in those states then in rebellion. And by an act passed on February 4, 1862, the Secretary of Interior was directed to strike from the pension rolls the names of all such persons who had taken up arms against the United States Government, or who had "in any manner encouraged the rebels or manifested a sympathy with their cause."⁵ Thereafter, when money was appropriated for the payment of pensions, a provision was always inserted to the effect that no part of it was to be paid to disloyal persons. During the first year of the war, over two thousand pensioners living in the southern states were dropped from the rolls. After the Union forces regained control of certain points in these states, the pension agencies were reëstablished, and provision was made for paying those who were justly entitled to a pension. In order to have their names restored to the rolls, persons had to prove by act and sympathy, their continued loyalty to the Union. At the close of the year 1865, agencies had been reopened in Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Each successive year saw new agencies opened at other points throughout the South, and finally by 1872 the pension system was again in operation in every southern state.

To meet the situation in 1861, Congress decided to act upon the Commissioner's recommendation. The first step taken was to ascertain exactly what laws were then in operation governing the payment of pensions. Neither the Commissioner of Pensions nor the Secretary of Interior was able to furnish the information desired; but the latter called upon Attorney-General Bates for an interpretation of certain acts then found on the statute books. He was first asked to place a construction upon the act of July 22, 1861, and in addition give an opinion upon the following points:

1. Were the volunteers then enlisted entitled to a pension, under provisions of the acts of January 29, and August 2, 1813, in case they should become wounded or disabled?

⁵ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 13, p. 337.

2. Did the act of July 4, 1836, guarantee pensions to the widows and orphans of volunteers who should die while in the service or from wounds received?
3. Did the act of July 22, 1861, entitle the widows of those soldiers killed in service, to a pension in addition to the bounty provided for them?
4. Were there any provisions allowing pensions to those volunteers who responded to the President's call of April 15, 1861, in case they were disabled while serving in the line of duty?⁶

After making an examination of the statutes in question, Attorney-General Bates submitted his opinion. The first three questions he answered in the negative. As to the fourth, he held that "any militiaman" called into the service of the United States by the President's proclamation of April 15, 1861, and disabled by wounds received while in that service, was entitled to a pension under the provisions of the act of August 2, 1813. But in concluding his opinion, Mr. Bates called attention to the uncertainty and obscurity of the many pension laws found upon the statute books. In numerous cases, the exact intent of the acts could not be determined. He therefore earnestly recommended "that the attention of Congress be called to the propriety of enacting laws which may be easily understood, and which may comprehend all that the emergency requires."⁷

The recommendation was soon acted upon. Within three weeks, the House called upon the Attorney-General for a copy of his opinion, and began to consider legislation designed to meet the needs that he had pointed out.⁸ On April 30, Mr. Goodwin, of the Committee on Invalid Pensions, reported a bill granting pensions to the officers and soldiers of the army, and the widows and children of those who had died in the service.⁹ It was called up in the House two days later, and was supported by the Committee on Invalid Pensions, the Commissioner of Pensions, and endorsed by the Secretary of Interior. Its chief spokesman, Mr. Goodwin of Maine, explained the provisions of the bill,

⁶ *House Exec. Doc.* 37th Cong. 2nd sess. No. 98, pp. 2-4.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 5.

⁸ *Cong. Globe.* 37th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 1480.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 1886.

and asked for its immediate passage. Although encountering but slight opposition, it brought forth considerable debate. The chief discussion centered about the first section, that of providing a higher pension rate for officers than for privates. There was a feeling, shared in by several members of Congress, that in an army made up of citizen soldiers rather than mercenaries, it would be an unjust discrimination to pension an officer at a higher rate than a private. The theory was advanced that in a volunteer army, the men who fought in the ranks were the equal in intellect and ability to those placed in command, that they suffered the same dangers, endured the same hardships, and hence should share equally in receiving the nation's bounty.

While this view was held by several congressmen, a majority nevertheless felt that some discrimination should be made in favor of the ranking officers and commissioned men. Their duties were greater than those of a private, and it was pointed out that many of them had spent some years in the study of military tactics and discipline. From the standpoint of justice, therefore, a discrimination was made in their behalf.¹⁰ After having been amended in a few particulars, the bill passed the House on May 13, 1862.

In the Senate it met no opposition whatever. Only one important change was made. In the House, a five dollar fee had been agreed upon as the proper amount that a pension agent should charge in making application for arrears of pensions. The Senate felt that the terms should be left to the mutual agreement of the agent and the pensioner, and so the above provision was stricken out.¹¹ But the House refused to accept this amendment, and due to the opposition of Mr. Holman of Indiana it was rejected in a conference of the joint committees. On July 14, 1862, President Lincoln signed the bill and it became a law.¹²

The act of 1862 marks a new chapter in the history of the pension system. As characterized by the Commissioner of Pensions in his annual report for that year, "it is by far the most liberal pension law ever enacted by this government." Secretary of Interior J. P. Usher pronounced it the wisest

¹⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 2101-2106.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 3138.

¹² *U. S. Statutes at Large.* vol. 12, pp. 566-569.

and most munificent enactment of the kind ever adopted by any nation.¹³ Its provisions extended back to March 4, 1861, and included every branch of the military and naval service of the United States. Officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, privates, regulars, volunteers, militiamen, musicians, seamen, marines, clerks, pilots, or other persons in the navy or marine corps, were all embraced in its provisions. Wounds received or disease contracted by any of the persons enumerated, while in the service or line of duty, entitled them to a pension. The rates to be paid varied according to the position or rank held by the claimant, ranging from thirty dollars per month for captains, down to eight dollars per month for privates.

In case of death of those entitled to a pension, the widow of such a person—or if there was no widow—the children, were entitled to receive the same pension which the husband or father would have received in case of total disability. The pension was to date from the death of the husband or father, “and to continue to the widow during her widowhood, or to the child or children until they severally attained the age of sixteen years, and no longer.”¹⁴

The next section, according to Commissioner Barrett, provided for two classes of pensioners, hitherto unknown in our pension legislation, namely, mothers and orphan sisters, dependent upon a deceased officer or soldier for support. They were to receive the same pension as the officer or soldier would have been entitled to, had they been totally disabled. Neither the mother nor sister, however, could receive but one pension at a time. The mother’s right to a pension terminated in case she remarried, and the sister’s right ceased upon reaching the age of sixteen years. Strict prohibition was also placed upon widows, children, or heirs who had in any way aided the rebellion.

All pensions provided for by the act of 1862 were to commence from the day of discharge, provided the application was filed within one year. In the case of widows, dependent mothers, and sisters, the pension was to date from the death of the soldier or officer on whose account it had been granted. Should the application for a pension not be filed within one

¹³ *House Exec. Doc.* 38th Cong. 2nd sess. 1864–1865. vol. 5, p. 11.

¹⁴ Sec. 2 of Act.

year, the pension, if granted, was to commence from the day upon which it was filed. As will be pointed out in a later chapter, the action of Congress in placing a limitation upon the time within which applications must be filed, led to an endless controversy on the part of the Pension Bureau and the claimants. It finally resulted in the passage of the Ar-rears Act of 1879.

Concerning the administrative side of the act, there were several important provisions. The fees which pension agents and attorneys were to receive for their services in aiding a claimant to secure a pension had caused considerable discussion during the passage of the bill. The claim agents had shown unusual interest in the provisions of the act. While it was pending in the House, Mr. Dawes of Massachusetts described them as crowding into Washington from all quarters, "and establishing themselves in every street and byway."¹⁵ They apparently felt that they could induce Congress to omit any provision fixing the fee that should be charged, and thereby leave the way open for them to collect what they could. The Senate was favorable to this idea, but the House felt that it would offer too great a temptation to unscrupulous attorneys and that they would take undue advantage of the pensioners. So a fixed rate of five dollars was inserted in the bill. Where additional testimony and affidavit were required by the Commissioner of Pensions, the attorneys could charge one dollar and fifty cents extra for filing the same. Any agent or attorney who should demand or receive a fee in excess of the amount stipulated, was liable to a \$300 fine or imprisonment for two years, or both. The Commissioner of Pensions was authorized to appoint civil surgeons to make biennial examinations of the pensioners, and to make a special examination of applicants when the Commissioner deemed it necessary. Heretofore these officials had received their commissions from the local judges of the courts, and were not responsible to the head of the Pension Bureau. After 1862 they were appointed directly by him, or the medical referee of the Bureau, and became officials of that department. The fee for each examination was fixed at one dollar and fifty cents, payable by the person examined.

¹⁵ *Cong. Globe*. 37th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 3214.

Provision was also made for the appointment of a special agent to assist in detecting and prosecuting persons found guilty of committing frauds against the pension laws. This was a new experiment undertaken by the Bureau. Prior to this time, the Commissioner of Pensions had simply delegated certain of the clerks in the Office to go out from time to time and investigate suspected fraudulent claims. It was now felt that a special agent should be kept in the field who should give his entire time to hunting down suspicious cases. This provision of the act, however, never proved satisfactory, and two years later was repealed.

The last section of the act repealed all laws inconsistent with its provisions.¹⁶

The act of 1862 found practically every member of Congress anxious to provide for the soldiers of the army and navy, and those dependent upon them. Not only were they in sympathy with the principle of the act, but a few of them, even at this early date, began to take advantage of the political power that lay in the hands of the soldiers' vote. Mr. Holman of Indiana was perhaps the most active in this respect. He was always on the floor when the bill was under discussion, and time and again praised the five thousand men from his own constituency "who gave up the charmed circle of their homes to maintain the old flag of the Union."¹⁷ He wanted to see the privates and officers placed on the same level, so far as pension rates were concerned. And in a frantic plea to the House, he urged that no discrimination be made in behalf of those men who, by chance "held commissions or wore the epaulets." His whole attitude was characterized by Mr. McKnight of Pennsylvania, as that of a Congressman who was attempting to gain glory at home by making appeals in behalf of poor soldiers, "in the shape of Buncombe speeches." Mr. McKnight added that he had no doubt but that such speeches would read well among his constituents at home, but for himself, he refused to be put in such a category, and then proceeded to discourage such practices on the part of his fellow-congressmen.¹⁸

The act went into operation at once, and the wounded and

¹⁶ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 12, pp. 566-569.

¹⁷ *Cong. Globe*, 37th Cong. 2nd sess. pp. 2102-2104.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 2102-2103.

disabled soldiers soon took advantage of its liberal provisions. Within four months following its enactment, a total of 10,804 pension applications had been filed in accordance with its provisions.¹⁹ Commissioner Barrett had anticipated a great rush upon the Bureau, and had outlined in detail the exact steps to be taken by those seeking a pension. Full instructions were given as to how they should procure the necessary evidence, from whom it should be presented, time, place, and occasion of injury received, extent of disability, etc., etc.²⁰ With these instructions, he declared that any person of ordinary intelligence and education could apply directly to the Office, establish the claim and secure its admission without any aid except that of making an oath before a magistrate.

On the whole, the administrative features of the act of 1862 appear to have been handled with efficiency. Within a year, more than 600 examining surgeons were appointed in the different states and territories to conduct the examination of pension applicants. They acted under uniform instructions throughout the country, and were by oath under obligations to the Pension Bureau. The Commissioner announced that selections were made, not only with regard to their professional skill and standing, but also because of their integrity and impartiality.²¹ Because of the dual capacity in which they served, that of protecting the Government on the one hand and of helping the claimant to secure a pension on the other, the examining surgeons presented one of the most difficult problems with which the Pension Bureau had to deal.

The exact cost imposed upon the Government by reason of the act of 1862 cannot be determined. But within two years it was holding the center of attention for all pension claims. In his annual report for 1864 Commissioner Barrett reported that "the chief labor now devolved upon the Pension Office is that arising under the Act of July 14, 1862, and to this mainly will attention necessarily be directed in the future."²² In that year, the total amount paid out for

¹⁹ *House Exec. Doc.*, 37th Cong. 3rd sess. vol. 2, p. 577.

²⁰ *Instructions and Forms for Army Pensions*. Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1863.

²¹ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions*, 1862.

²² *House Exec. Doc.*, 38th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 5, p. 655.

pensions was \$4,506,903.31, of which more than \$3,500,000 was paid for those claims admitted under this act alone. The total number of pensioners on the rolls June 30, 1864, was 51,135, and of these, more than 48,000 had been placed there because of service in the pending war. An appropriation of more than \$7,000,000 was asked for to pay the claims already allowed.²³

As the war continued, Congress manifested a keen interest in the welfare of the Union soldier. Every season's campaign added a great number to the pension list, and the unexpected duration of the struggle developed a spirit of revenge throughout the North. It was officially proposed, upon more than one occasion, to create a large pension fund for the Union soldiers by confiscating southern property and using the proceeds arising therefrom. In his annual report for 1864, the Secretary of Interior, Mr. J. P. Usher, urged upon Congress the consideration of such a policy. It seemed eminently proper, he stated, "that some of the means derived from these sources (confiscated property) should be applied to the establishment of homes for those who have been, or may hereafter be, permanently disabled and rendered helpless by reason of their service during the existing war."²⁴ The Commissioner of Pensions also favored the idea, and suggested that such funds were needed to meet the heavy demands for the payment of pensions. While this idea may have been shared in by several members of Congress, no such provisions were ever enacted into law.

However, just before adjourning for the summer in 1864, Congress passed another important pension act. It was an act to supplement the law of 1862. In it are to be found many new provisions dealing with the administrative side of the pension system. Biennial examinations were to be made only by a surgeon duly appointed by the Commissioner. The object was to prohibit entirely the examination of pension claimants by civil surgeons as provided for under the old law of 1859. The fees paid for the medical examination were to be refunded to the pensioner, out of the money appropriated for the payment of pensions. In order to

²³ *Ibid.* pp. 655-656.

²⁴ *Annual Rep't: Sec. of Interior.* 1864. p. 12.

accommodate those claimants who lived some distance from a pension agency or county seats, the Commissioner of Pensions was authorized to appoint Pension Notaries in localities more than 25 miles distant from places where Courts of Record were held, before whom the applicant could appear, make his declaration, and present testimony. Within the next two years the Commissioner had appointed 31 such officials for the convenience of the pensioners. In Maine and New York there were 8 each, 4 in Pennsylvania, 3 each in Michigan and Wisconsin, and 1 each in Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Vermont.²⁵

A provision was made whereby none of those claims then on file, unless prosecuted to a successful issue within three years after the passage of this act, and no future claims, unless successfully prosecuted within five years, were to be allowed. Exception was made for those who could produce satisfactory record evidence from the War Department to establish their case. Claims that had been pending for more than three years, if allowed thereafter, were to commence from the date of filing the last papers by the party prosecuting the case. The object of this section of the act was to force claimants, after they had made application, to push through their cases as soon as possible and have them decided upon one way or the other. The practice of filing a claim, and then letting it drag along for months and years without furnishing sufficient evidence to warrant its allowance, was one of the most provoking and difficult problems with which the Bureau had to deal. This was the first attempt made by Congress to force an early settlement of cases, after they had once been filed.

The question had frequently arisen in the administration of the pension system as to whether those persons who had volunteered and had been disabled in the service, even though they had not been regularly enlisted, were entitled to a pension. By section 8 of the act of 1864 it was decided to extend to such soldiers, their widows and dependents, the same benefits that would accrue to those who had been regularly mustered into service. Should a person entitled to a pension die while the application was pending, and the

²⁵ *House Exec. Doc.* 2nd sess. 39th Cong. 1866-67. p. 537.

claim later be allowed, it was paid to the widow or dependents of the deceased. Payments were to commence on the same date at which the invalid's pension would have commenced had he survived.

The provisions of the pension laws were also extended so as to include the widows and children of colored soldiers. The laxity of the marriage laws among the negroes was recognized, and a provision was inserted, declaring that the parties should be considered as legally married if they had lived together for two years immediately preceding the soldier's enlistment, and had habitually recognized each other as man and wife. In case the parties lived in a state where colored marriages were legally solemnized, then they had to present the usual evidence required to establish a pension claim.

One of the rather remarkable provisions of the act was that which permitted claim agents and attorneys to charge a ten dollar fee instead of five, for their services in prosecuting pension claims. Just what prompted this increase is not known. There was no discussion whatever attending its passage, nor is there any evidence that such an increase was favored either by the Secretary of Interior or the Commissioner of Pensions. No part of the fee, however, was to be demanded or received by the attorney until the claimant had secured the first payment on his pension.

The most important section of the act of 1864 had to do with the fixing of rates for certain specific disabilities. This was a new principle in the administration of the pension system. Under the act of 1862, the rates had been arranged upon the basis of total disability; and for inferior disabilities, an amount proportionate to the injury was to be allowed. The examining surgeon would report the nature of the disability and the extent of the wound of each pensioner examined to the Bureau. Upon these reports, the rates would be determined. Such a system lacked uniformity and was subject to endless abuses by unscrupulous surgeons.

To correct this, it was decided to establish a standard system of rates for certain specific disabilities, and apply them uniformly in all such cases. When this principle was first introduced in 1864, provision was made for only three

classes of injuries: the loss of both feet, both hands, and both eyes. For the first mentioned disability, a pension of \$20 per month was granted, and for the other two classes, the amount was fixed at \$25 per month.²⁶ The number of specific disabilities later added to the group, the numerous classifications that have been made, and the remarkable increase in rates since 1864, have caused this feature of the pension system to approach the point of absurdity.²⁷

By the close of the year 1864, the subject of pensions was playing a large part in national affairs. Within two years, Congress had passed two important and far-reaching pension laws. In his annual report for 1864, Commissioner Barrett stated: "No other nation has provided so liberally for its disabled soldiers and seamen, or for the dependent relatives of the fallen."²⁸ Commenting upon the great development which the pension system had undergone since the War of Independence, he added: "In place of laws for particular emergencies, cautiously limited to retrospective action, we have now a statute which puts on an equal footing each arm of the service, embracing the future as well as the present in its scope, and providing for regulars, volunteers, and militia alike."²⁹ In the administration of the Bureau, Mr. Barrett was attempting to bring about a definite and systematic procedure. His long term of service—from 1861 to 1868—was marked with activity and efficiency. His reports usually contained recommendations and suggestions looking toward the improvement of the pension system. Especially was he interested in simplifying the method whereby applicants could obtain their own pensions. He supplied them with blanks upon which they could fill out their own vouchers and draw their pay without the aid of any third party, except some one to administer the oath.

For those who resided at some distance from places where Courts of Record were held, and especially for the sick and infirm in such localities, he showed great sympathy. For their convenience, he requested that still greater freedom be given him in the appointment of Pension Notaries to attend

²⁶ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 13, p. 387.

²⁷ For a table showing all the rates established for specific disabilities during the period between 1864 and 1865, see p. 19.

²⁸ *House Exec. Doc.* 38th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 5. 1864-65. p. 656.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

to their claims. During the year of 1864, six additional pension agencies were established: one in each of the following states—Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Delaware.³⁰

The rapid and continued growth of the pension system led Mr. Barrett to view with some apprehension its future development. He felt the need of a very effective and complete system of administration. To this end, he recommended in 1865, that a study be made of the pension systems in Europe. The information could be secured through the consular agents residing abroad, or better still, he added, by appointing a special commission for that particular purpose. It was felt that "the cost would be trivial compared to the benefits to be anticipated from such observation properly made and reported."³¹ While Congress complied with practically every other recommendation made by the Commissioner, it, however, failed to sanction this move, and he was left free to devise such plans as he deemed best.

On March 3, 1865 another pension act was passed which contained two rather important provisions. The first of these applied to the Civil Service employees. Any person employed in the Government service and who was receiving full pay or salary for his services, was denied the right of drawing a pension during the time he was thus employed. This provision brought forth a great complaint on the part of the pensioners, and scarcely had the next session of Congress opened in December, 1865, when Mr. Thaddeus Stevens introduced a joint resolution asking for its repeal. A petition, bearing the signatures of the disabled soldiers employed in the various departments of the Government, was also presented to Congress, praying for its repeal.³² A provision to this effect was inserted in the act that passed Congress on June 6, 1866.³³

The other section worth noting in the act of 1865 was passed for the benefit of the children of deceased pensioners. Under the act of 1862, it will be remembered, the pension received by a soldier was, at the time of his death, to be paid

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 658.

³¹ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions, 1865. House Exec. Doc. 39th Cong. 1st sess. vol. 2, p. 793.*

³² *Cincinnati Commercial.* Dec. 6, 1865.

³³ *U. S. Statutes at Large.* vol. 14, p. 57.

to his widow. It was now provided, that in case the widow should die or remarry before any part of the pension had been paid to her, it was to be awarded to the child or children under 16 years of age. If the pension had already been paid to the widow, then upon her death or remarriage, the child or children were entitled to the remainder of the payments until "they severally reached the age of 16 years, and no longer."³⁴

When Congress met in December, 1865, the war which had given rise to the great mass of pension claims had been brought to an end. The Union soldiers had been mustered out, and the vast majority had returned to their homes and adopted the life of peaceful citizens. Many of them had been reduced to utter poverty. Those who had suffered from wounds or disability were especially in need of assistance, and under such conditions it was but natural that they should turn to the Government for aid.

In the Thirty-ninth Congress, the soldiers found a responsive body of men. While the immediate problem that faced this session of Congress was of course "reconstruction," nevertheless they showed almost an equal interest in the welfare of those who had recently saved the nation. An illustration of this interest is gathered from a practice engaged in by the House during the opening weeks of this session. According to a statement of one of their own members, it became a custom frequently to declare a recess in order to allow the Representatives to meet those Generals of the late war who came to Washington.³⁵

The liberality of the House became apparent quite early. President Johnson, in his annual message of December, 1865, stated that "a grateful people will not hesitate to sanction any measures having for their object the relief of soldiers mutilated and families made fatherless in the efforts to preserve our national existence."³⁶ On December 14, during the second week of the session, Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania urged upon the House the need of a revision in the pension laws. He was especially anxious to have the Government

³⁴ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 13, pp. 499-500.

³⁵ *Cong. Globe*, 39th Cong. 1st sess. p. 3355.

³⁶ Richardson's *Messages and Papers*. vol. 6, 1861-1865. p. 363.

provide pensions for a greater number of specific disabilities, and also increase rates for those included in the act of 1864.³⁷

Thaddeus Stevens announced that he would willingly support such a measure if introduced, and would favor paying the amount out of the forfeited estates of those who created the necessity for such pensions. In a public address given at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, on September 9, 1865, he had proposed a plan whereby he hoped the Government would realize over three and a half billions of dollars by confiscating southern property. Of the total, \$300,000,000 should be invested in six per cent government bonds, and the interest used in paying pensions.³⁸ On December 20, he presented a bill in Congress, in which he proposed to double all pensions caused by the late war, and the funds to pay for the increase were to be raised by a plan similar to the one just mentioned. Although no such a measure ever became a law, it reveals the attitude which certain members of the House had toward the question of pensions.

The bill that finally became a part of the statutes was introduced on March 23, 1866, by Mr. Perham, chairman of the Committee on Invalid Pensions. In presenting the measure he announced that there were a great number of specific disabilities, in addition to the loss of eyes, hands, and feet, for which pensions should be granted. The measure was endorsed by Commissioner Barrett who had recommended in his last two annual reports that a new classification of disabilities, and a new system of ratings be adopted. To this end, Mr. Perham submitted his measure. It passed both Houses without serious opposition, and became a law on June 6, 1866.³⁹

The act provided pensions for 14 new specific disabilities. The following table is here inserted to show the rates and disabilities provided for by this, and all other acts between 1861 and 1885.⁴⁰

³⁷ *Cong. Globe*. 39th Cong. 1st sess. p. 59.

³⁸ Woodburn, J. A. *Life of Thaddeus Stevens*. p. 526.

³⁹ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 14. pp. 56-58.

⁴⁰ *Annual Rep't*, 1902. p. 163.

Rates and Disabilities Specified by Law	From July 4, 1864	From March 3, 1865	From June 6, 1866	From June 4, 1872	From June 4, 1874	From Feb. 28, 1877	From June 17, 1878	From March 3, 1879	From March 3, 1883	From March 3, 1885
Loss of both hands.....	\$25			\$31.25	\$50		\$72			
Loss of sight of both eyes.....	25			31.25	50		72			
Loss of both feet.....	20			31.25	50		72			
Loss of sight of one eye, the sight of other lost before enlistment.....			\$25	31.25	50		72			
Total disability in both hands.....			25	31.25	50		72			
Regular aid and attendance (first grade).....			25	31.25	50		72			
Periodical aid and attendance.....			25	31.25	50		72			
Loss of a leg at hip joint.....			15	24.00			\$37.50			
Loss of an arm at shoulder joint.....			15	18.00	24				\$30	\$37.50
Loss of an arm at or above elbow, or a leg at or above knee.....			15	18.00	24				30	
Loss of a leg above the knee causing inability to wear an artificial limb.....			15	24.00					30	
Loss of one hand and one foot.....		\$20		24.00		\$36				
Total disability in one arm and one leg.....			15	18.00					24	
Total disability in one hand and one foot.....			20	24.00		\$36				
Total disability in both feet.....			20	31.25						
Loss of a hand or a foot.....			15	18.00					24	
Total disability in one hand or one foot.....			15	18.00					24	
Incapacity to perform manual labor.....			20	24.00					30	
Total deafness.....				13.00						
Disability equivalent to the loss of a hand or a foot.....			15	18.00					24	

In addition to the specific disabilities provided for, the Act of June 6, 1866, contained another very liberal section. The benefits of the pension laws were broadened so as to include the father and the orphan brothers, under 16 years of age, as well as the mother and orphan children, who were dependent upon a deceased pensioner.

The remaining sections of the act applied chiefly to administrative problems. They bear evidence of a strong desire on the part of Congress to protect the pensioners from unscrupulous attorneys and claim agents. Section 2 of the act prohibited the sale, assignment or transfer of any claim or interest in a pension to another party. Attorneys who assisted the pensioner in securing their regular payments were compelled to state under oath that they had no interest in the money by reason of any pledge, mortgage, sale, assignment, or transfer of the claim. Under no condition could the money due a pensioner become liable for attachment. The fee allowed to claim agents or other persons for assisting the pensioner to receive his semiannual payments was fixed at twenty-five cents; and a fifteen-cent fee was allowed for administering the oath.

The three-year limitation was reënacted, and if claims were not filed within the time specified, the pension if granted, was to commence from the date upon which the last papers were filed.

Scarcely had the above law gone into operation before a second pension act was passed. It contained a very liberal provision for widows who had children dependent upon them for support. Their pensions were increased two dollars per month for each child under 16 years of age. This was a very worthy and meritorious provision. It was later characterized by Mr. Cutcheon of Michigan as the most beneficial pension law ever enacted, and due to its provisions, he declared that 18,000 widows had received immediate relief.⁴¹

In case the widow had died or remarried, and had left more than one child, then the children were to be given a pension equal to the same amount which the widow would have received if living and entitled to a pension. No person, however, was to receive more than one pension.

The only other important section was that which extended the provisions of the act of July 14, 1862, and acts supplementary to it, so as to include all pensioners except those arising from the Revolutionary War.

Thus during the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and within an interval of six weeks, two very liberal pension laws had been passed. Pension applications for specific disabilities, and on behalf of dependent widows, fathers, and orphans, began to pour into the Pension Bureau. When Commissioner Barrett submitted his annual report four months later, he found it necessary to ask Congress for a larger increase in the clerical force of his office. In the appropriation bill of March 2, 1867, \$41,000 was set aside for this purpose.⁴² The increase of applications continued, and by June 30, 1867, these two acts had practically doubled the work of the Bureau. More than 33,000 pension claims had been increased, and the annual amount now expended for pensions exceeded \$18,000,000.⁴³

During the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, an act was passed which is important, both because of its

⁴¹ *Cong. Record*. 50th Cong. 1st Sess. Appendix, p. 322.

⁴² *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 14, p. 447.

⁴³ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions*, 1867.

administrative provisions, and because of the very interesting sidelight it throws upon the rivalry that existed between President Johnson and the members of Congress. While the measure was originally presented in good faith, it turned out to be a piece of legislative retaliation.

In January, 1866, Senator Lane of Indiana, chairman of the Committee on Invalid Pensions, had introduced a bill in which it was proposed to have all pension agents appointed by the President, subject to the approval of the Senate.⁴⁴ Since the organization of the Department of Interior, the pension agents had been appointed by the Secretary of that Department. Before the Civil War, they were looked upon as minor officials, and attracted little or no attention. But by 1866 there were 52 pension agencies scattered throughout the states and territories, and they were handling upwards of \$13,000,000 every year. While allowed no stated salary, they received a percentage upon the amount paid out from their offices, and the maximum income was fixed at \$4,000.

As the pension system expanded, and as the amounts disbursed through the different agencies became larger, the positions were sought after with much avidity. Due to this fact, and the growing political importance of the offices, it was proposed to place the appointment of the agents in the hands of the President and make them pass the scrutiny of the Senate. The measure was supported by the Secretary of Interior, Mr. James Harlan, and passed the Senate on January 20, 1866.⁴⁵

But the House did not take any action upon it during this session.

As soon as Congress adjourned in the summer of 1866, President Johnson began to use the agencies of the Pension Bureau for political purposes. He appointed a new Secretary of Interior, Mr. Orville H. Browning of Illinois, who entered upon his official duties September 1, 1866. The President apparently expected Mr. Browning to assist him in the campaign of that year. Officials whom he suspected as being more favorably inclined toward the congressional policy of reconstruction than his own, were to be removed. To what extent old pension agents were replaced by newly appointed

⁴⁴ *Cong. Globe*. 39th Cong. 1st sess. p. 212.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 333-334.

ones, friendly toward the administration, is not known. But the activity of the pension officials during the campaign of 1866 was such as greatly to displease the members of Congress. And on the third day following its convening in December of that year, the bill that had passed the Senate was called up in the House. An amendment was introduced which made it a much more retaliatory measure than when originally introduced. It provided that all those pension agents who had been appointed since January 1, 1866, should resign their office within thirty days after the passage of this act. The President was instructed to nominate to the Senate, within fifteen days, pension agents to fill all vacancies. By this means, Congress hoped to punish President Johnson, and to give the Senate final control over the new appointees. With this amendment, the bill passed the House by a vote that leaves no doubt as to the feeling of that body toward the President's actions—117 to 29.⁴⁶

On January 7, 1867, the bill, including the amendment, was called up in the Senate. The debates accompanying its passage reveal a bitterness of sentiment against the President and his recent actions equal to that expressed in the House. Senator Lane, who had originally introduced the bill, declared that "honest, faithful, and competent men," had been removed simply because they stood by Congress and refused to bow to executive dictation. Their displacement could be attributed to no other fact, he added, than that of being Republicans and Union men, who opposed the policy of the President.⁴⁷ Secretary Browning was referred to as "the most responsible of the bad advisers of the President, and one of the most accountable for the unfortunate differences that have occurred between the executive and legislative departments of the Government."⁴⁸

There was some uncertainty in the minds of a few of the Senators as to whether or not Congress had the power to remove officials who had already been legally appointed. The question brought forth an interesting little debate between Senators Trumbull, Fessenden, and Saulsbury. Mr. Trumbull maintained that such action as provided for

⁴⁶ *Cong. Globe*. 39th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 51.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 327.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 632. Senator Conness of Cal.

in the amendment was perfectly constitutional, and cited as a precedent an act passed May 15, 1820, whereby Congress had arbitrarily fixed the date upon which certain offices mentioned in the act should be vacated.⁴⁹ Senators Fessenden and Saulsbury contended that the laws were not analogous, and refused to support the amendment.

But the temper of the Senate was not to be cooled by a mere legal technicality. The members of the Thirty-ninth Congress had become accustomed to high-handed legislation, and were just now on the eve of passing the Tenure of Office Act. It would be considered a double victory if they could go still further and unseat certain of the political friends of Andrew Johnson. Senator Sumner tried to amend the act so as to make it apply to every appointment made by the President, or by the head of any Department since July 1, 1866. He would compel all such officials, whose salary exceeded \$1,000 a year—except clerks—to resign within thirty days, and have all new appointments confirmed by the Senate. His object was to restore those Republicans whom the President had “kicked out of office, following his eccentric journey to the West . . . ”⁵⁰

Senator Sumner's amendment was not accepted. The only change made in the bill as it came from the House, was that which substituted the word “July” for “January.” The act as finally passed, compelled all pension agents who had been appointed since July 1, 1866, to vacate their offices within thirty days. All new appointments were to be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The amended bill passed both Houses, and strange as it may seem, was signed by President Johnson, February 5, 1867.⁵¹

The act authorized the President to establish pension agencies wherever, in his judgment, the public interests and the convenience of the pensioners required it. No state or territory, however, was to have more than three. As already stated, the term of office for all pension agents appointed since July 1, 1866, was to expire within thirty days. For all other agents, the term was fixed at four years, and the appointments were to be made by the President, sub-

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 631.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 404.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 1000.

ject to the approval of the Senate.⁵² Whether or not this resulted in obtaining a better class of pension agents is not known. No comment whatever can be found as to the character of appointments made, or the services which they rendered. Nevertheless, Congress had won its fight, and for once had forced President Johnson to yield.

In his annual report for 1867, Commissioner Barrett stated that he believed no important extension of the very liberal pension laws would now be contemplated by Congress. It was expected by those in charge of the Pension Bureau that the two liberal acts of June and July, 1866, had completed all legislation that would be required for some years to come. Due to their provisions, over 33,000 pensions were increased during the next year, and upwards of 36,000 new names were added to the rolls.

But in the face of this astounding growth, the liberality of Congress continued. In December, 1867, the second session of the Fortieth Congress met for an eight months' session. That it would adjourn without doing something to aid the pensioners' cause was hardly to be doubted. Upon actual count of all the bills introduced in the House, it is discovered that of the 1307 reported, 428, or about one out of every three, were bills asking for pensions and relief. This large number of requests for private claims apparently led Congress to believe that the pension laws were still somewhat defective. Just before adjourning in the summer of 1868 another important act was passed.

It was introduced by Mr. Perham, on June 6, 1868, and passed the House almost without debate. In the Senate, Mr. Van Winkle took charge of the bill, and again it received no opposition. Its object, according to Senator Van Winkle, was to correct certain misconstructions in the law, supply some omissions, and make other corrections "in order to prevent such a flood of pension bills being thrown upon Congress as has been at this session."⁵³ When passed, the act contained sixteen sections. Most of them were concerned with the administrative side of the pension system.⁵⁴

The first section defined the order in which pensions were

⁵² *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 14, p. 391.

⁵³ *Cong. Globe*. 40th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 4228.

⁵⁴ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 15, pp. 235-237.

to be paid to dependent relatives. It was provided that in case a pensioner died and left neither a widow nor children entitled to a pension, it should be paid to the dependent relatives in the following order: First, mothers; secondly, fathers; thirdly, orphan brothers and sisters under sixteen years of age, who should be pensioned jointly if there be more than one. Should the mother's death occur before the father's, then the latter was entitled to the pension, commencing from her death. Following the death of both parents, the dependent children were to receive the pension jointly until they severally reached the age of sixteen years. Pensions granted previous to the passage of this act were not to be affected by its provisions.

The second section provided that pensions were to be granted for wounds received or disease contracted *only* while in the line of duty or while actively engaged in either the military or naval service of the United States. This was a return to the same demands exacted of pensioners prior to the Civil War.

The third section specified that in case pensions were not claimed within three years, it would be deemed as presumptive evidence that the pension had legally terminated. The pensioner could have his name restored, however, if he could furnish satisfactory evidence accounting for the failure to claim the pension.

Section four related to the children of a deceased soldier by a former wife. Before the passage of this act, the widow was entitled to a pension of two dollars per month for each child under sixteen years, but not for those children which the deceased soldier may have had by a former wife. It was now provided that she could receive the two dollars per month for them as well as her own children. And according to section five, the widows or guardians of minor children who were inmates of any charitable institution, were not to be deprived of the two dollars a month pension because of that fact. The law of 1866 had specifically stated that the pensions were to be paid to the children; but the Commissioner of Pensions had declined to pay those who were being cared for in orphanages and asylums. Senator Van Winkle announced that his committee had been in receipt

of many letters asking that the pension be paid to the mothers or guardians of such children, and the provision was inserted.

Sections six and seven contained the most liberal provisions of the act. They related to the payment of arrears of pension. According to the act of 1862 invalids had to make application for their pensions within one year from the date of discharge in case they expected to receive full arrears of pensions. The act of June 6, 1866, extended the time to three years. The same limitation was placed upon the claims filed by dependent mothers or minor children. But many of them had delayed making the application within the time specified. As stated by Mr. Perham, there were many instances in which persons were missing during the war, "and their friends were hoping against hope that they would finally return, until the time expired within which the application should have been made."⁵⁵ The result was, that if the pension was granted at some later period, payments were made only from the date of application.

The period within which applications could be filed was now extended to five years, and if allowed, its payments dated back to the time of discharge. The Commissioner of Pensions was instructed to give public notice of these provisions in all pension agencies throughout the country. Persons entitled to the benefits of arrears were to be paid at once. Claim agents and attorneys were prohibited from receiving any compensation for their services in securing the payment of arrears.

The other provisions of the act are relatively unimportant. Another specific disability was added to the list already mentioned. Persons who had but one eye, and lost it while in the line of duty, or in consequence of wounds received while engaged in the service, were entitled to a pension of twenty-five dollars per month. Officers of the army and navy who had lost an arm or leg while in the service were to be given an artificial limb. All pensions granted by special acts of Congress were made subject to the provisions of this law.

While the act of 1868 was by no means an epoch-making piece of legislation, it nevertheless reveals the continued

⁵⁵ *Cong. Globe*. 40th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 2876.

liberality with which Congress viewed the whole question of pensions. In almost every provision there is evidence of a growing interest in the ex-soldier and the families of the deceased. That the benefits provided for the pensioners should be fairly and properly meted out to them was the next desire of Congress.

On July 28, 1868, the day following the passage of the above act, Commissioner Barrett was replaced by a new Commissioner of Pensions, Mr. Chris C. Cox of Maryland. Mr. Barrett's long term of service—from 1861 to 1868—had been marked with unusual efficiency. He had been forced to devise and put in operation numerous plans for the adjudication of pension claims. His chief aim seems to have been that of constantly improving the administrative side of the system. He had repeatedly asked Congress to make provisions for a larger clerical force, and to permit a reorganization of the entire system of receiving and allowing claims. Especially was he interested in the adoption of a plan that would result in a more frequent and direct payment of pensions. These same views were shared in by his successors, Mr. Chris C. Cox, who held the office from July 28, 1868, until May, 1869, and Mr. Henry Van Aernam, who served as Commissioner until April 20, 1871. All three commissioners agreed that the system of semiannual payments, one in March and one in September, imposed undue hardships upon the pensioners. Most of the time they found themselves without money, and in this condition were forced to borrow in advance. In order to render this unnecessary, more frequent payments were proposed. Some advocated paying them every two months, others quarterly.

To this end the Forty-first Congress directed its attention in the spring and summer of 1870. Not only was there a desire to provide for more frequent payments, but it was also felt that the whole system by which the pensions were paid should be amended. The fifty-nine agencies scattered throughout the country were characterized as being inefficient and unnecessarily expensive. Several attempts were made to abolish them. One proposal was to the effect that all payments be made through the money-order offices of the

country, supervised by the Post-office Department. Another provided that they be paid directly from the Pension Bureau in Washington. And still a third bill was introduced, proposing that they be paid by the federal assessors and deputy collectors throughout the country.⁵⁶

None of these proposals, however, met with the approval of the Committee on Invalid Pensions. The chief objection was that the Department of Interior had no supervision over or connection with the assessors, deputy collectors, or postmasters of the country. The anomaly of having subjects in one department responsible to the head of an entirely different department did not appear at all practicable. Nevertheless the Committee felt that some change in the administrative system was necessary. To this end a bill was prepared in conference with Commissioner Van Aernam, and introduced on January 10, 1870. After undergoing a few amendments, it passed both Houses, and was signed by President Grant on July 8, just one week before Congress adjourned for the summer recess.⁵⁷

As an administrative measure, the act was very important. Instead of continuing the old system of semiannual payments, it was now provided that they be made quarterly. The pension agents were instructed to prepare and mail a voucher, within fifteen days preceding the 4th of March, June, September, and December of each year, to all pensioners payable at their agency. When properly filled out, it was returned to the local agent. A check for the proper amount was then drawn upon the United States Treasury by the agent, and mailed directly to the petitioner. A fee of thirty cents was allowed for filling out and mailing each voucher.

Inasmuch as the vouchers were now to be issued quarterly it meant that the annual fees of the agents for this particular work would be increased from eighty cents to one dollar and twenty cents.⁵⁸ This provision had occasioned a very bitter debate during the consideration of the bill. Several members of Congress desired to abolish outright the whole system of

⁵⁶ *Cong. Globe*. 41st Cong. 2nd sess. p. 341; 582.

⁵⁷ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 16. pp. 193-196.

⁵⁸ Under the old plan the fee was forty cents a voucher, or eighty cents a year.

pension agencies.⁵⁹ They were attacked for their inefficiency and for the enormous cost which they imposed upon the government and pensioners alike. Tables were produced, showing that the 59 agents were paid a commission of \$250,000 a year.⁶⁰ This amount, it was argued, should be used to aid the pensioners themselves, rather than fatten the salaries of the agents.

The charge was also made that the agents were becoming too much interested in certain phases of pension legislation. Mr. Lawrence of Ohio insinuated that during their convention, held in Washington in December, 1869, they practically dictated the bill that was later submitted by the Committee on Invalid Pensions. Especially were they charged with being responsible for the increased fee. "One object (of that convention) was to suggest to Congress the propriety of providing by law that pensions should not be paid to claim agents; but they did not forget also to consider that it would be to their own advantage to secure to themselves in *all cases* a fee of forty cents for preparing the papers . . ."⁶¹ That the Pension Agents determined not to allow any other measure to pass, except the one they had sanctioned, was the feeling of several members of Congress.

However true the charges may have been against the agents, they afforded at that time the best means through which the pensions could be paid. Neither the Postmaster-General nor collectors and deputy assessors were willing to take over the work. Had the Pension Bureau undertaken to make all payments directly from Washington, it doubtless would have resulted in a larger expense and a greater delay than that already experienced. The Secretary of Interior, Mr. J. D. Cox, estimated that at least 500 additional clerks would be required in the Pension Office alone, to carry out the provisions of either of the substitute bills.⁶² Due to the uncertainty of other plans, the old system of pension agents was retained.

In section three of the act, an effort was made to check one of the most nefarious abuses ever inflicted upon the

⁵⁹ Especially Messrs. Lawrence of Ohio, Butler of Mass., Crebs of Ills., and Randall of Pa. *Cong. Globe*. 41st Cong. 2nd sess. pp. 3423-3430.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 321, 3424.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 1070.

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 3420.

pensioners. It was due in large part to the old system of semiannual payments. Receiving their money only twice a year, the pensioners usually found themselves without funds long before the next pay day arrived. When needing money, they would usually go to their lawyer, a claim agent, or a broker, and borrow on the security of their next payment. They frequently had to discount their pensions in advance and pay extortionate rates of interest.

The opportunities thus afforded brokers, money lenders, and unprincipled attorneys were soon seized upon. According to the statement of Commissioner Van Aernam, a regular business of lending money on pledged pension certificates was to be found in all of the large cities. He added, "Some of these parties hold from five to eight thousand certificates, and the rate of interest is three for five dollars if the loan is made soon after the semiannual payment is made, and if loaned within twenty or thirty days of the next semiannual payment, the rate is reduced to four for five dollars. Generally the loans or advances are made in dribbles, in small sums reaching through the six months intervening between the payments; in all of which cases the interest is charged at the highest rates. One broker of this kind told me last July that he had at that time over forty-four thousand dollars out at such rates on such security."⁶³

In this same connection, Mr. Peters of Maine stated that pensioners had approached him as an attorney-at-law, and had offered him half the amount of their income if he would advance the other half in cash.⁶⁴ Senator Edmunds remarked that cases had been reported to him in which the pensioners were paying ten and twelve per cent for money which they had borrowed.⁶⁵

Congress was determined to check this abuse. A provision was added making it an illegal act to pay the pensions to any person other than those entitled thereto. Exception was made in behalf of persons laboring under legal disabilities, in which case the guardian received the pension. Under no condition was the claim of attorneys, brokers, or other persons, to be recognized by the pension agents in making

⁶³ From a letter addressed to Hon. Wm. Lawrence, M. C., by Commissioner Van Aernam, Feb. 2, 1870. *Cong. Globe*. 41st Cong. 2nd sess. p. 1071.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 344.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 4451.

the payments. Beyond this, Congress could not go. But it was a great protection to the pensioner to insure him that he would receive the payment direct, rather than have it pass through the hands of a third party.

While the system of direct payments was on the whole a beneficent one, there were a few cases in which the Commissioner felt that they should be withheld. Instances were cited in which certain claimants were guilty of such immoral conduct as to forfeit all right to a pension. It was pointed out in the annual report of 1868 that, "Widows, in increasing number, cohabit without marriage, refusing this solemn legal sanction for fear of losing their pensions thereby. Others live openly in prostitution for the same object. Thus is the government placed unwittingly in the strange attitude of offering a premium upon immorality, of which it should be relieved." Attention was also called to those claimants, who "immediately after drawing their pension, devote days, and sometimes weeks, to the most dissipated and riotous courses, while the money lasts."⁶⁶ To check these flagrant violations of morality, the Commissioner asked that he be given discretionary power to distribute the pensions to the most needy and deserving. Congress, however, failed to add such a provision, and the abuses continued.

The other important sections of the act related to claim agents and attorneys. Here, as on all other occasions, they were denounced as the worst enemy with which the Pension Bureau and Congress had to deal. Their actions during the last few years, in holding up valid claims until greater fees were paid, in carrying through fictitious claims by means of forgery and perjury, in forcing their services upon ignorant pensioners and then demanding exorbitant sums, had brought them into great disrepute. It is difficult to find in all the congressional proceedings a more bitter denunciation than that delivered against them by Mr. Benjamin of Missouri, chairman of the Committee on Invalid Pensions. They were characterized as "vampires who suck the very life-blood of the poor dependent pensioners," as "parasites who prey upon the penniless widow and orphan," and "the most infamous gang of cut-throats who ever lived."⁶⁷

⁶⁶ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions*, 1868. *House Exec. Doc.* 40th Cong. 3rd sess. vol. 2, p. 451.

⁶⁷ *Cong. Globe*. 41st Cong. 2nd sess. p. 1965, 1967.

The claim agents had become so bold in their fraudulent practices, that it was decided to investigate some of their operations.

In January, 1869, Colonel Richard J. Dodge was sent to Memphis, Tennessee, for this purpose. His report is filled with acts of rascality and outrages committed upon the pensioners, particularly the colored pensioners. Instances were cited in which the claim agents would hang about the doors of the disbursing office on pay days, and seize the claimant when he came out with his money. "Due to fear, and in order to avoid difficulty, the negro hands over his whole money, and these agents help themselves to whatever they see fit."⁶⁸ Mr. Benjamin cited ten cases which he said had been selected at random, wherein it was discovered that the claim agents retained more than half of the total pensions paid. The certificates were almost invariably withheld from pensioners, he added, "not only to retain the collection of the semi-yearly pension . . . but also as security for the payment of advances."⁶⁹

In September, 1869, Commissioner Van Aernam also sent some clerks from the Pension Office to investigate conditions in Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee. They examined 750 cases, and the Commissioner reported that they had disclosed an amount of systematic extortion and fraud unparalleled in the experience of the Pension Office.⁷⁰

In order to protect the pensioners from such abuses, it was provided that no agent or attorney could contract for, demand, or receive more than twenty-five dollars for the services which he rendered. The twenty-five dollar fee was to be charged only when consented to by the applicant and his attorney. Otherwise, the fee was to remain ten dollars. The local pension agents were instructed to deduct the fee agreed upon, and then make the payment directly to the pensioner, or guardian. By this means the claim agents were denied possession of the quarterly payments, and their influence over the pensioner was greatly destroyed.⁷¹

Thus the act of July 8, 1870, may be called purely an administrative measure. It was the result of several bills look-

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 1967.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions, 1870.*

⁷¹ *U. S. Statutes at Large.* vol. 16, pp. 193-196.

ing toward the protection of pensioners. By providing for more frequent payments, directly to the persons entitled thereto, and by prohibiting brokers, loan agents, and attorneys from securing possession of the pension, it stands as one of the most commendable laws on record.

Due to the provision for quarterly payments, the aggregate expenditure for pensions at the close of the fiscal year June 30, 1871, amounted to \$33,077,383.63. This exceeded the expenditure of the previous year by \$5,000,000; but it included the whole amount of pensions that had accrued between March 4, 1870, and June 4, 1871, that is, five quarterly payments.⁷²

By 1871 it appears as if Congress had extended the benefits of the pension laws so as to include all possible claimants. Within ten years, over 261,000 Civil War pensioners had been added to the rolls, and the Government had already paid out more than \$152,000,000 for their benefit.⁷³ "The poor maimed soldier, about whom so many Fourth of July orations have been heard on this floor,"⁷⁴ was being provided for more generously than the soldier of any other nation. Every congress that met between 1861 and 1871 had enacted a pension law, more liberal than the preceding one. Pension notaries and surgeons had been provided for every important center in the country. Provisions were made for enabling the pensioner to secure more frequent payments, and at the least possible cost. In every conceivable way, Congress had shown marked attention to the soldiers of the late war and those dependent upon them.

⁷² *Annual Rep't.*, 1871. *House Exec. Doc.* 42nd Cong. 2nd sess. p. 377.

⁷³ Compiled from *Annual Reports* of 1861-1871.

⁷⁴ From Mr. Butler's speech, May 12, 1870. *Cong. Globe.* 41st Cong. 2nd sess. p. 3428.

CHAPTER II

CODIFICATION ACT 1873 AND ATTEMPTED REFORMS OF PENSION SYSTEM

The liberality of Congress during the Civil War decade had resulted in the enactment of many pension laws that were utterly contradictory and irreconcilable. This was particularly true of measures relating to specific disabilities and to special ratings. To a less degree, it was also true of the acts relating to the administration of the pension system. Commissioner Baker, who continued to hold office during the first two years of President Grant's second administration, called attention to these facts in his annual report for 1871. He stated that there were upon the statute books no less than forty-four acts or supplementary acts relating to pensions, and added, that if they were strictly interpreted, many of them would defeat the purpose for which they had been enacted.¹ Different heads of the Bureau held opposite opinions concerning many of the acts, and even the Commissioners had not always agreed on certain interpretations.

In view of these facts, he urged upon Congress the necessity of revising and codifying the whole list of pension laws. His recommendation was favorably received by the House Committee on Pensions, and on April 15, 1872, a bill consisting of forty-one sections, and which included the contents of all important pension laws then on the statute books, was introduced in the House.² It was principally a codification measure. In only one instance did it provide for any important new legislation, and this was in regard to the organization of the Pension Bureau. The bill encountered no opposition in the House, and after its provisions were explained by Mr. Moore, chairman of the Committee on Pensions, it passed without even a roll call being demanded.³ Owing to the lateness of the session, no action was taken upon it in the Senate.

¹ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions, 1871. House Exec. Doc. 42nd Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3, p. 391.*
Cong. Globe. 42nd Cong. 2nd sess. p. 2442.
Ibid. p. 3396.

In his annual report for 1872 Commissioner Baker again called the attention of Congress to the need of revising and codifying the pension laws. The bill which had passed the House had met his approval, and he requested an early action upon it by the Senate. On February 12, 1873, the Senate took up the measure, and reviewed it, section by section. Senator Pratt, who had charge of the bill, stated that in order to understand the pension laws then in operation, it was necessary to turn through four volumes of the *Statutes-at-Large*, and study the results of ten years' legislation. So many changes had been introduced from time to time, and so many sections or parts of sections had been repealed, that it was difficult to determine what the existing law really was. For the convenience of pensioners, the members of Congress, and for those prosecuting pension claims, he insisted that a revision and codification of the laws was an absolute necessity.⁴

After undergoing a few slight amendments, the bill passed the Senate, was returned to the House, approved and became a law on March 3, 1873. In its final form, the act consisted of thirty-nine sections.⁵ It was a revision and codification of all the pension laws enacted since 1861.

In a few instances, however, new provisions were inserted. Persons receiving pensions for specific disabilities were classified according to the degree of the disability, and new rates were established, based upon the time at which the disability occurred. The pensions of widows were increased two dollars per month for each child under sixteen years, and the increase was to date back to the act of July 25, 1866. In case the widow died, the same increase with arrears was to be awarded to the minor children. The result of this section imposed a tremendous labor upon the Pension Bureau. Thousands of cases that had been on file for six or seven years, had to be taken up, re-examined, and passed upon because of this provision. Within the first year following the passage of the Consolidation Act, almost 30,000 claims of widows and children for increase of pensions had been adjudicated.⁶

⁴ *Cong. Globe*. 42nd Cong. 3rd sess. p. 1283.

⁵ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. XVII, pp. 566-577.

⁶ *Annual Rep't., Commissioner of Pensions*, 1874.

Another provision worth noting is that which extended the benefits of the pension laws to the widows and children of the deceased officers and soldiers who had served in the Missouri State Militia. For several years the Missouri congressmen had been endeavoring to amend the laws so as to bring about this very result. In 1862 an act was passed which provided pensions for the heirs of all deceased officers or privates who had been employed in the Department of the West or the Department of Missouri. But the provisions did not necessarily include all those enrolled in the state militia. On May 10, 1872, the Commissioner of Pensions issued an order in which he directed that the fifteen regiments of the Missouri state militia, the nine regiments of the provisional Missouri militia, and such home guards as were shown by the report of the Adjutant General of Missouri to have been mustered into the United States service, should be recognized as *having been in the service* of the United States. It now required legislative enactment to provide for the widows and children of such militiamen as had been killed while in the service. This was accomplished by section eight of the Consolidation Act. The pensions were not to commence, however, prior to the date of this act.

Due to the enormous business which the Pension Bureau was now performing, a deputy commissioner was provided for. This action was of utmost necessity. There were 340 clerks now employed in the Pension Office, and it was disbursing over thirty millions of dollars annually. With such responsibility resting upon his hands, the Commissioner was rightly entitled to the services of a deputy to assist him in the purely administrative problems. The deputy commissioner was to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; he was to receive a salary of \$2,500 a year. His duties were to be such as should be prescribed by the Secretary of Interior, and in case of the Commissioner's absence, resignation, or death, the deputy was to succeed to that position.

The remaining sections of the Consolidation Act dealt primarily with a revision of the laws already enacted, rather than with new legislation. Ambiguous acts were rewritten, certain others were repealed, and those that remained were made uniform and consistent.

For a period of five or six years following the passage of the Consolidation Act in 1873, the interest in the history of pensions shifts from the legislative to administrative problems. It was felt that the liberal provisions included in the act just mentioned had provided for all possible claimants for some years to come. In fact a glance at the pension rolls during the early seventies confirms this opinion. The number of Civil War pensions gradually but steadily declined between 1870 and 1877, and it was believed that the amount required to pay them had reached its maximum by 1872. In his annual report for that year Commissioner Baker stated, "We have reached the apex of the mountain, but it presents a plain of considerable extent, where there will be little fluctuation for several years."⁷ Two years later, when the pension roll dropped from 238,411 to 236,241, he reported that a rapid decrease would continue with each succeeding year, due to the fact that minor children were rapidly attaining the age of sixteen years, at which time their pensions ceased.

But the decrease in the number of pensioners enrolled did not mean a corresponding decrease in the amount of work imposed upon the Bureau. On the contrary, the entire clerical force was falling behind with its labor. As each year passed by, the adjudication of claims became more difficult. It must be remembered that while Congress had been busy for some years in enacting liberal pension laws, it had not provided a clerical force sufficient to administer them. In 1874 there were over 61,000 applications for original pensions, and 10,456 applications for increase of pensions, awaiting settlement. In speaking of this situation, Commissioner Baker stated that for more than two years the clerical force had not been sufficient to dispose even of the current work. Congress was frequently increasing the rates for specific disabilities, and this invariably led to additional labor on the part of the office force in opening old claims, re-examining, and re-rating them. On June 18, 1874, acts were passed which provided for an increase of pension for persons who had lost a leg above the knee or an arm above the elbow. Also persons who had been totally or permanently disabled

⁷ *Annual Rep't*, 1872. p. 326 of *Secretary of Interior's Report*.

were to have their pensions increased to fifty dollars per month.⁸ These acts imposed a large amount of extra work upon the Bureau, but notwithstanding this, no additional clerical force was provided.

The delays met with in the Pension Office had given rise to widespread complaint, and were working a hardship if not an injustice upon honest claimants. In 1875, Mr. Henry M. Atkinson, who served as Commissioner of Pensions for about eleven months—March 26, 1875, to February 10, 1876—asked Congress to provide for 20 additional clerks, and to increase the salaries of the chiefs of the divisions and members of the reviewing board. He added that there was probably more public interest being manifested in the faithful administration of the Pension Office than in any other branch of the Government. However, Congress again failed to act, and the clerical force remained the same.

By far the most serious problem arising from the large accumulation of unsettled claims was the opportunity it offered for fraudulent practices. The office force was simply unable to make a careful examination of the affidavits filed in each of the forty thousand and more claims that were annually received. Claim agents realized this, and took advantage of the situation. They knew that the clerks and examiners were not in position to sift the testimony in each case. Hence all sorts of doubtful claims were filed, in the hope that many of them would escape the scrutiny of the Office and be allowed.

Pension applicants and examining surgeons frequently combined with the claim agents in an effort to secure pensions, even when they knew their claims were fraudulent. In 1874, the special agents of the Bureau made an investigation of 1,263 claims, and they discovered that in those cases in which pensions had been granted, nearly 40 per cent—411 cases—proved to be without merit. It was stated that most of them had been established through intentional violations of the law. They were ordered dropped from the rolls, and the amount annually saved by the Government by reason of this action exceeded \$41,000. During the same year, the special examiners had caused over \$16,000 that

⁸ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 17, p. 78.

had been unlawfully obtained in pensions to be refunded to the United States Treasury. As a result of the investigation, 20 persons had been indicted, 13 had been convicted, 2 acquitted, and 5 were awaiting trial.⁹

This investigation simply confirmed the charges that had frequently been made against claim agents and pensioners. In 1875 Commissioner Atkinson stated, "The development of frauds of every character in pension claims has assumed such a magnitude as to require the serious attention of Congress. . . . By actual test in cases taken from the files of this Office it is shown that a large percentage of the affidavits filed in support of claims for pensions are signed and sworn to without being read over to affiants, and without their having a full and proper knowledge of the contents . . ."¹⁰

The special examiners continued to make their investigations, and each year found the number of fraudulent claims increasing. Between 1876 and 1879, there were 5,131 claims investigated, and of this number 1,425 were dropped as being fraudulent. By this action the Government saved over a million and a half dollars.¹¹

One of the cases discovered in 1878 is so notorious that it deserves mention. It was the case of a certain Mr. Prince who lived in Maine. He had made up seven fictitious widows' claims and was drawing a pension on every one of them. The smallest was the pension of one who was represented as a captain's widow. The others ranged from \$25 to \$30 per month. In all, he had received from the Government almost \$20,000 before he was discovered. When his case was examined, it was found that he had not a single real widow. The name of every witness had been forged.¹²

That there were hundreds of cases similar to this, in character if not in degree, was the belief of those who understood the defects of the pension system. Senator Ingalls, chairman of the Senate Committee on Invalid Pensions, declared in 1876, that if an examination was made of the whole pension system, he believed it would be found that of the twenty-nine or thirty millions of dollars that were paid out annually to the pensioners, five millions would be

⁹ *Annual Rep't.*, 1874. *House Exec. Doc.* 43rd Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 6. pp. 661-662

¹⁰ *Annual Rep't.*, 1875. p. 443 of *Sec. of Interior's Report*.

¹¹ *Sen. Report*. 46th Cong. 2nd sess. No. 418.

¹² *House Report*. 46th Cong. 3rd sess. vol. 2, No. 387. pp. 60-61.

discovered as going into the hands of fraudulent claimants.¹³ This is a significant statement, coming from a man who for years had been chairman of the Committee on Pensions. President Garfield had, while a member of Congress, expressed the belief that at least one-fourth of all the claims that had been granted were of a fraudulent nature.¹⁴

For checking these illegal practices, several measures had been proposed. Commissioner Baker had repeatedly urged upon Congress the necessity of a greater number of special examiners. He also asked that they be clothed with more authority when conducting an examination, authority to meet witnesses in person and cross-examine them. Commissioner Atkinson had suggested that a more thorough medical examination be demanded of all pension applicants. He also insisted upon improving the character and professional standing of the examining boards. The only way this could be brought about was for Congress to provide for increased fees in conducting examinations, and thus secure the services of first-class physicians.

Still another measure proposed for checking fraudulent practices was that of publishing the names of all pensioners in the several congressional districts or at the different agencies. It was believed that such action would serve the double purpose of protecting the reputation of those who deserved pensions, and would also expose each fraudulent pensioner to his neighbors and the public. In the Codification Act that passed the House in 1872, there was inserted a section which authorized the Commissioner of Pensions to publish the roll of pensioners in such manner and in such places as should appear most advantageous.¹⁵ But the provision was stricken out when the bill went to the Senate.

It required, however, something more than the mere publication of the names of the pensioners, or an increase of the special examiners, to check the extensive frauds in the pension system. Neither of these plans would have proved of any permanent value. The whole system of taking evidence, and the method of adjudicating claims had to be radically changed before any reform could be expected. No

¹³ *Cong. Record*, 44th Cong. 1st sess. p. 1082.

¹⁴ *Cong. Globe*, 42nd Cong. 2nd sess. p. 962.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 3395.

one realized this quite so keenly as Mr. J. A. Bentley, who was appointed Commissioner of Pensions in March, 1876. Mr. Bentley has the unique record of having been the only Commissioner of Pensions since the Civil War who served under three presidents. Appointed by President Grant in March, 1876, he served with such credit during the remainder of his term as to attract the attention of President Hayes, friend of the civil service reform. President Hayes retained him in office throughout his entire administration, thereby going on record as the only president from Lincoln to Wilson, who failed to appoint his own Commissioner of Pensions. When Mr. Garfield became President, Mr. Bentley continued to serve as Commissioner until June 27, 1881. But due to the influence of Republican leaders, he was forced to resign in order that the position might be given to Colonel W. W. Dudley of Indiana. Concerning Mr. Dudley's career, we shall hear much later.

Commissioner Bentley's five year term of service was marked with energy and efficiency. When he entered office the pension system was poorly organized and the records were filled with frauds. The same defective system of granting pensions upon purely *ex parte* testimony, that had been inaugurated during the war, was still in operation. This plan was perhaps as efficient as any that could have been devised for the great number of cases that developed during and immediately following the period of active warfare. The evidence, which depended upon the wounds, disease or disability of the claimant, could easily be obtained. If not reliable, the claim was withheld.

But after ten or a dozen years had elapsed, greater care had to be exercised in sifting the evidence. It was difficult to determine whether or not the disability in question had resulted from wounds received during the war, or from some misconduct on the part of the claimant since the close of the war. In the case of widows' claims, the evidence was entirely *ex parte* in character. And it was among this class of pensions that the greatest percentage of frauds was discovered. Any system that permitted claims to be established upon affidavits prepared in secret by the claimants and their friends, and upon the certificate of the neighborhood

physician, was an injustice to honest pensioners and the Government. When the applications reached the Office there was nothing to indicate whether they were true or false. Fictitious claims bore the same appearance as meritorious ones. It seems rather remarkable that the clerks in the Pension Office, who were denied the opportunity of seeing the claimant and his witnesses, and testing their honesty, made as few mistakes as they did in the granting of claims.

Shortly after entering office, Commissioner Bentley made a thorough study of the *ex parte* system. It required only a superficial examination to convince him of its defects. In his first annual report, 1876, he declared, "Not only is the door thrown wide open for the perpetration of fraud and deception, but every interest connected with the preparation of the case for adjudication—the claimant, his attorney, and the examining surgeon—is adverse to the Government. A mere statement of the substance and character of the present system would, it would seem, be enough to condemn it for the class of cases we now have without any statement of its practical workings as known to the Office."¹⁶

In a supplemental report Mr. Bentley submitted a plan which he believed would remedy the evils of the system then in operation. His plan, which came to be known as "Bentley's Sixty Surgeon Pension Bill", involved the following changes: The whole country was to be divided into pension districts of such a size, considering territory and population, that one surgeon devoting his entire time to the duties assigned him could make all required medical examinations in that district. A highly qualified surgeon was to be appointed for each district, and was to be placed under the direction of the Commissioner of Pensions. Also a competent clerk was to be sent to each pension district, to act in conjunction with the surgeon. The duty of the clerk was to take the testimony in each case, review the evidence, and cross-examine the witnesses. These two officials were to constitute a Commission on the part of the Government, before whom all pension applicants were to appear and submit whatever proof they desired in support of their claim. After obtaining all informa-

¹⁶ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions, 1876.* pp. 701-702 of *Sec. of Interior's Report.*

tion relating to each claim, the case and its testimony was to be forwarded to the Pension Office for final settlement.¹⁷

The system here outlined by Commissioner Bentley had several advantages. In the first place it provided for an open and full investigation, on the part of the Government, of all evidence that was to be submitted to establish a claim. The hearings were to be open to the public. Claimants were to have the opportunity of calling upon any witness they desired in order to support their case. Should their statements be questioned, or their testimony appear doubtful, the Government Commission was to subject them to a cross-examination. The whole plan was based upon the same principle that obtained in all civilized communities for the settlement of doubtful or contested questions of fact.

The plan would also have resulted in a great financial saving to the Government. The services of the 1,500 examining surgeons would no longer have been required. In their stead, 60 highly qualified surgeons were to be appointed at a fixed salary of \$3,000 per year. Commissioner Bentley declared that this change would not only result in a great saving to the Government, but it would insure a thorough medical examination by unprejudiced physicians.¹⁸ This in turn would have permitted the Pension Bureau to dispense with the duties of special examiners, for their services would no longer have been necessary in detecting frauds. By reason of this change, it was officially estimated that the Government would save over \$37,000 annually.

That the plan would have resulted in a decided improvement in the matter of adjudicating pension claims is not to be questioned. It would have benefited honest claimants, checked the fraudulent, and would have been a protection to the Government. It was based upon the modern principle of referring all testimony in disputed cases to a disinterested body for adjudication. As aptly stated by Commissioner Bentley—

“The principle upon which this plan is grounded is universally adopted in civilized communities for the settlement of doubtful or contested questions of fact, and the plan

¹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 703-705.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 705.

itself is not entirely new; at most it is but the application of an old plan to a new class of cases. It is suggested by ancient precedents, as well as by the modern practice of the courts, both of law and equity, in referring cases to a master or referee to take and report testimony."¹⁹

But the members of Congress never seem to have favored the plan. Year after year Commissioner Bentley called it to their attention. The continued development of frauds only confirmed his opinion, that a system such as he had outlined was absolutely imperative. In 1877, after consulting with the Secretary of Interior, Carl Schurz, he decided to make a partial test of the medical and surgical examinations in order to determine just what percentage was valid. Five hundred invalid pensioners were selected, whose names were enrolled in agencies located in New York, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. Dr. Almon Clarke of Wisconsin, a surgeon of high professional character, and who had been an examining surgeon of the Pension Bureau for several years, was selected to make the examination. He was instructed to make a careful examination in each case as to all the disabilities of which the pensioner complained. Also, he was to rate each disability, without having had knowledge of the rate allowed by the Office.

Dr. Clarke found and examined 491 pensioners. His rating reduced their monthly pay, in gross, \$701, or \$8,412 per year. Of the 491 pensioners examined, he recommended that 23 should be dropped from the rolls, and the rates of 179 others reduced.²⁰

This information only substantiated Commissioner Bentley's belief as to the existence of illegal pension claims and rates. Both he and Secretary Schurz again urged Congress to abolish the *ex parte* system, and substitute the plan which had been proposed. This recommendation is found in every annual report issued by Mr. Bentley during his term of office. But not until February, 1881, did it receive serious attention. As the third session of the Forty-sixth Congress was drawing to a close, and after it had been rumored that Mr. Bentley was soon to be replaced by a new Commissioner

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 704.

²⁰ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions, 1877.* pp. 731-732 of *Sec. of Interior's Report.*

of Pensions, the measure was called up in Congress. It passed the Senate, but received only half-hearted support in the House and failed. The Washington claim agents, led by Mr. George E. Lemon, made a strong fight against it. They appeared before the Committee on Pensions, and for days, occupied their attention in arguing against the bill.²¹ They led pensioners throughout the country to believe that it was a scheme designed by Commissioner Bentley for the purpose of denying them their just rewards. They circulated petitions all over the country, protesting against the measure. These were signed by pensioners and returned to Congress.²² By this means, the members of the lower House were led to oppose the bill. This was the measure that cost Mr. Lemon, the active pension attorney in Washington, \$12,000 to defeat. And he declared under oath that he had never done anything in his life in which he had taken so much pride, as in defeating the sixty-surgeon pension bill.²³

Following Mr. Bentley's retirement from office, the agitation in behalf of pension reform was permitted to drop. His successor, Colonel W. W. Dudley, refused to lend his aid to the sixty-surgeon measure, or any similar proposal, and the old *ex parte* system with all its attendant evils continued in operation.

The most important change that occurred in the administration of the pension system during Commissioner Bentley's term of office resulted from an executive order of President Hayes on May 7, 1877. By its provisions, the 58 pension agencies scattered throughout the country were consolidated into 18. This was one of the many civil service reforms undertaken by President Hayes shortly after entering office. For several years there had been considerable opposition to the large number of pension agents required to distribute the quarterly payments. There were many who felt that these offices were maintained purely for political purposes. Their existence was explained by the *Chicago Tribune* on the ground that they afforded a refuge for the impecunious relatives and henchmen of party leaders.²⁴ And Mr. Stark, representative

²¹ Statement of Sen. Withers, Chair. of Committee on Pensions. *Cong. Record*. 46th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 1102.

²² *Ibid.* pp. 1097-1106; 1211-1217; 1245-1252; 1340-1351.

²³ *House Reports*, 48th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3. No. 2683. p. 160.

²⁴ *Chicago Tribune*. May 9, 1877.

from Illinois, had declared that of the 19 agencies located in his state, those in the cities were filled with ward politicians, and those in the rural districts, with active political tricksters.²⁵

President Hayes believed that both efficiency and economy would result by consolidating the smaller, outlying agencies into a few large ones that were centrally located. To this end he directed that the seven agencies in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont be combined into one, located at Concord, New Hampshire; the four agencies in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island into one, located at Boston; the four agencies in New York into two agencies, one to be located in the city of New York, the other at Canandaigua; the three agencies in Pennsylvania into two, one to be located at Philadelphia, the other at Pittsburg; the four agencies in New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and District of Columbia into one agency at Washington; the five agencies in Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee and North Carolina into one agency at Knoxville; the two agencies in Kentucky into one, located at Louisville; the three agencies in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana into one at New Orleans; the three agencies in Indiana into one at Indianapolis; the four in Illinois into one at Chicago; the four in Wisconsin and Minnesota into one at Milwaukee; the two in Michigan into one at Detroit; the four in Iowa and Nebraska into one at Des Moines; the four in Missouri, Kansas, and New Mexico into one at St. Louis; the two in California and Oregon into one at San Francisco; and the three agencies in Ohio into one at Columbus.²⁶

The consolidation took effect July 1, 1877. By this act, the national Government saved \$142,000 annually in pension salaries. The new plan met with such success that the *Chicago Tribune* expressed surprise that it had not been thought of before.²⁷ Commissioner Bentley reported that the transfer of the records and files from the smaller agencies to the larger ones was speedily accomplished, and the next quarterly payments that fell due in September were promptly met.

²⁵ *Cong. Record*. 44th Cong. 1st sess. p. 423.

²⁶ *Annual Rep't: Commissioner of Pensions*, 1877. pp. 735-736 of *Sec. of Interior's Report*.

²⁷ *Chicago Tribune*. May 9, 1877.

So successful was the plan, that an effort was made during the next session of Congress to abolish all the agencies, and have the pensions paid directly from the Treasury Department in Washington. An amendment to this effect was introduced in the appropriation bill when it came up in the House in April, 1878.²⁸ The plan was supported by several members of Congress, in the belief that it would lead to still greater economy and efficiency. It also received the approval of Secretary of Interior Schurz, and the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. James Gilfillan. But Commissioner Bentley advised against it. He declared that the proposed plan would neither reduce the labor nor the duties incident to the payment of pensions. And unless it could be shown that the clerical force of the Treasury Department could handle the work more efficiently than the eighteen agents, he was unwilling to allow the transfer to be made.²⁹ The pension agents quite naturally opposed the amendment, and they prevailed upon the pensioners throughout the country to petition Congress, requesting its defeat. Due to this combined opposition, the measure failed, and the regular payments continued to be made through the eighteen consolidated agencies.

On June 20, 1878, an act was passed which prohibited claim agents from charging more than \$10 for their services in prosecuting a pension claim.³⁰ Under the law then in operation—act of July 8, 1870—a legal fee of \$10 had been established in all cases where no special contracts had been filed. But in prosecuting exceptional claims, the attorney had been permitted to enter into an agreement with his client, and charge as much as \$25 for his services. In all such cases, a contract had to be filed with the Commissioner of Pensions, and he, in turn, stipulated the exact fee that should be paid the attorney. This provision had imposed a large amount of unnecessary work upon the Commissioner. Mr. Bentley complained that the office was being flooded with an enormous number of claims that were without merit, and in many cases he did not have sufficient information upon which to base a just decision. To determine the

²⁸ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 2423.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 2465.

³⁰ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 20, p. 243.

exact fee that should be allowed in the thousands of cases that were referred to him, was an impossible task.

The act of 1878 fixed the fee at \$10 in all cases. There was nothing, however, to prevent the attorneys from collecting the fee in advance, provided the claimants were willing to make the payment. The act prohibited the filing of fee-contracts with the Commissioner of Pensions. In all cases then pending, upon which a contract had already been filed, the Commissioner was authorized to allow the amount specified.³¹ The act was bitterly opposed by the claim agents all over the country. During the next six years they kept up a constant fight against its provisions, and finally on July 4, 1884, due chiefly to the influence of Mr. Lemon, succeeded in having it repealed.

But there was another measure now pending in Congress upon which claim-agents were to center their immediate attention. This was a bill providing for the payment of arrears. So important were its provisions, and so great was its influence upon later pension history, that it deserves a special chapter for its treatment.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 243.

CHAPTER III

THE ARREARS ACT

The most significant and far-reaching piece of pension legislation enacted during the period covered by this monograph was the Arrears Act of January 25, 1879. A review of the important acts passed since the Civil War has shown that they all included a provision specifying the date at which time pensions were to begin. According to the act of July 14, 1862, a limitation of one year was fixed within which the claim should be presented in order that the pension should begin from the date of discharge.¹ This limitation continued in force until the act of July 4, 1864, extended the time to three years from the date of discharge.

The act of June 6, 1866, reenacted this same provision.² Before the expiration of this period, the act of July 27, 1868, extended the limitation to five years from the date when the right to the pension should have accrued. The five-year limitation became incorporated into the Consolidation Act of March 3, 1873. Section 6 of that act provided for the payment of arrears in case the application was filed within the time specified. In case, however, the application had not been filed within five years after the right to a pension had accrued, then the payments were to commence from the date of filing the last evidence necessary to establish a claim.³

Complaints against this provision were frequently heard. And as the years passed by, Congress was appealed to time and again to enact a more liberal measure covering the payment of arrears. During the first session of the Forty-third Congress a great number of petitions were forwarded to that body, asking for a repeal of the limitation. At least two attempts were made toward this end, but neither of them were successful.⁴ Nevertheless the agitation continued, and when

¹ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 12, p. 568.

² *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 14, p. 58.

³ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 17, p. 572.

⁴ *Cong. Record*. 43rd Cong. 1st sess. p. 205, 2274.

the Forty-fourth Congress convened for its first session in December, 1876, it was flooded with petitions urging the passage of an arrears bill. The petitions came from every state in the Union, except those recently in rebellion. Also the legislatures of three states, Illinois, Indiana, and West Virginia, forwarded resolutions to Congress asking for the enactment of such a measure.⁵ During the excitement attending the recount of the presidential votes, comparatively little important legislation was enacted. Nevertheless the House went so far as to pass an arrears bill by a two-thirds vote on the last day of the session, March 3, 1877.⁶ The measure was sent immediately to the Senate where it was tabled.⁷

When the new Congress opened in December, 1877, it became apparent quite early that additional legislation was necessary in order to satisfy the cry for arrears of pensions. Both Houses willingly expressed their desire toward this end. The fourth bill to find its way upon the calendar of the Senate was one introduced by Senator Ingalls of Kansas, dealing with arrears of pensions.⁸ But the members of the lower House were even more interested than the Senate. Petitions continued to pour in from every section of the country asking Congress to liberalize the granting of pensions. Mr. Townsend stated on the floor of the House that over eighteen hundred private bills were introduced during this session of Congress looking toward the relief of those pension applicants who had been deprived of arrears by failing to apply within the specified time.⁹

Finally on April 2, 1878, Mr. Cummings of Iowa submitted a bill providing that in all cases where pensions had been granted, and in all cases where they should be granted in the future, arrears should be paid from the date of death or discharge.¹⁰ The bill was referred to the Committee on Invalid Pensions and was not called up again for two months. But on June 19, the day before adjourning for the summer recess, Mr. Haskell, a Republican representative from Kansas, moved that the rules be suspended and the bill be

⁵ *Cong. Record*. 44th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 1377, 1507, 2147.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 2222.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 2168.

⁸ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 1st sess. p. 57.

⁹ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 150.

¹⁰ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 2217.

passed. His motion carried. An amendment was added, which provided that no claim agent or other person be entitled to any compensation for services rendered in making application for arrears. No discussion whatever attended the passage of the bill or the amendment. The vote stood 164 yeas, 61 nays, 65 not voting.¹¹ An examination of the vote shows that, excluding the representatives from the southern and border states, only four negative votes—all Democrats—were cast against the measure. (Eickhoff and Mayham of N. Y., Phelps of Conn., and Williams of Del.) So great was the demand for pension relief, that not a single Republican member, and only four Democratic members, representing states where any considerable number of pensioners lived, dared oppose the measure. Again the bill was sent to the Senate. But inasmuch as both Houses were to adjourn within a few hours, it was simply referred to the Committee on Pensions.¹²

During the summer of 1878 it appears that both pensioners and claim agents united their efforts in an attempt to win over the Senate. The interest in pension claims had by this time become more widespread and much more systematically organized than ever before. Claim agents and attorneys were building up an enormous practice. Those most skilled in the system were gradually drifting to the nation's Capital. There they divided their energy between handling claims and lobbying for more favorable pension legislation. In his annual report for 1878 Commissioner Bentley called attention to the concentration of business in the hands of a few big attorneys in that city. By means of subagents and a very thorough system of advertising they were "drumming" the country from one end to the other in search of pension claims. One of the largest of these firms, that of George E. Lemon and Company, established a newspaper in 1877 devoted exclusively to the interests of the ex-soldiers. This paper, known as the *National Tribune*, became the chief news agency for pension applicants throughout the country. By 1884 it had a circulation of 112,000 copies with paid subscribers in more than 18,000 post offices.¹³ Due to its

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 4874.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 4865.

¹³ *House Report*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. 1884-1885. No. 2683. p. 16.

wide circulation among ex-soldiers and the Grand Army posts, it became a powerful influence in creating a sentiment for more liberal pension legislation, and likewise brought to its editor an enormous pension practice.

But the activity of the claim agents was not confined alone to the pensioners during the summer of 1878. They were also determined that Congress, and especially the members of the Senate, should be made to feel the influence of the pensioners' demand. Petitions were prepared and circulated throughout the country calling attention to the fact that an arrears bill had recently passed the House and was then pending in the Senate. Twenty-five new senators were to be elected during the coming winter. And as Senator Beck, (Kentucky) stated, the claim agents after having "fixed" the House centered their attention upon those state legislatures that were to elect these new members.¹⁴ He added that there was no doubt whatever in his mind, but that the men who were sent to those legislatures in the fall of 1878 were duly impressed with the importance of sending no one to the United States Senate who would not agree to support the pending bill.¹⁵

As an illustration of the political activity of the claim agents in the state elections of 1878, the re-election of Senator Ingalls from Kansas is cited. Although his record tends to prove that there was no more loyal friend of the pensioners in the United States Senate than Mr. Ingalls, nevertheless it was charged that he was somewhat cold toward the soldiers and unapproachable. So an effort was made to defeat him. Captain R. A. Dimmick, a claim agent in Washington, and president of the Soldiers' Association, sent numerous petitions and circulars to the members of the Kansas Legislature warning them against Senator Ingalls' attitude on pensions. But apparently, Senator Ingalls' record was better known among his Kansas friends than among the Washington claim agents, and he was returned to the United States Senate.¹⁶

On December 2, 1878, the Forty-fifth Congress convened for its final session. Twice had an arrears bill passed the

¹⁴ *Cong. Record*, 47th Cong. 1st sess. p. 411.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 411.

¹⁶ *Committee Reports*, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. 1878-1879. No. 189. p. 69.

House by more than a two-thirds vote, and it could hardly be expected that the Senate would refuse to act favorably upon it. January 9, 1879, Senator Matthews of Ohio presented a petition from the Pensioners' Association, declaring that it represented the great body of pensioners throughout the country. The petition dealt with the question of pension arrears. It included an estimate which Commissioner Bentley had prepared upon the same subject, some two years earlier, for the Committee on Pensions. The number of persons who would be benefited by the passage of the act, and an estimate of the probable amount necessary to pay the pensions, was included. Using that report as a basis, they estimated that not more than \$15,000,000 would be required to carry into effect the provisions of the bill that had recently passed the House.¹⁷ They called the attention of the Senate to the fact that "six State Legislatures had almost unanimously recommended the passage of the bill," and petitions from over two hundred thousand citizens had been filed to the same effect. They therefore prayed for a prompt passage of the act "in behalf of honesty, equity, justice, and morality . . ."¹⁸

The following week, the Senate took up the Arrears Bill as it had passed the House. Attention was first directed to the probable expense which it would impose upon the Government. Senator Ingalls, chairman of the Committee on Pensions, was of the opinion that eighteen or twenty million dollars would be sufficient to pay the arrears called for. In justice to Senator Ingalls it should be stated, however, that he admitted the impossibility of forming an accurate calculation upon the subject, due to insufficient data. He reviewed the liberal practice of Congress in extending the time for filing the evidence in pension claims, first from one year to three, and then from three to five years. Referring to that section of the Revised Statutes—4709—which continued to deny thousands of their full pension, he denounced it as arbitrary, unjust, and without a parallel in congressional legislation.¹⁹

The debate which accompanied the passage of the bill,

¹⁷ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 373.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 373.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 496.

while very inadequate, showed a remarkable willingness on the part of the Senate to aid the pensioners. As stated by Senator Hoar, "we are unanimous for it, there has not been a voice raised against its principle."²⁰ The only important discussion that took place resulted from an amendment which the Senator himself had submitted. It provided that no arrears of pensions should be paid for any period prior to the occurrence of the disability for which the pension had been granted. It raised the very debatable question as to whether the pension ought to date from the discharge of the soldier, or be limited to the period within which the disability had occurred. The amendment, however, was rejected, and the bill passed the Senate just as it came from the House. The final vote stood thus: 44 ayes, 4 nays, 28 not voting.²¹ The four negative votes came from Senators Davis and Hereford of West Virginia, McCreery of Kentucky, and Saulsbury of Delaware.

The bill had thus far in its progress received comparatively little attention from the public or press. Whether this was due to the belief that no such a measure could ever be enacted, or to the general apathy of the public in matters of federal legislation, is difficult to determine. But now that the measure had passed both Houses of Congress and needed only the signature of President Hayes to make it a law, the press began to consider its probable cost.

It required only the most superficial examination to show that those responsible for the measure had been far too conservative in their estimates. The newspapers from all sections of the country pointed out the danger of permitting such a measure to become a law. The more the bill was studied, the greater became its probable cost in the minds of the public. Under caption of an editorial headed "Pension Panic in the Cabinet," a western newspaper stated, "The more the matter is looked into, the larger the thing grows. From a harmless little lamb it has already become an elephant, and bids fair to be a whale before it is done growing."²² Still other papers estimated that from fifty to one hundred millions of dollars would be required to pay the

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 491.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 494.

²² *Chicago Tribune.* Jan. 23, 1879.

total of arrears.²³ "By comparison to the arrears of pensions grab which passed the Senate to-day," remarked the *Chicago Times*, "the Congressional back-pay grab, that aroused so much indignation throughout the country, was a mere bagatelle."²⁴ In speaking of the effect which the bill had upon the business and commercial interests the same paper stated that had the Senate purposely been trying to defeat specie resumption, it could have resorted to no more effective measure than that of passing the arrearages bill. "Wall-Street agents anxiously watched the bill and the efforts made to amend it, and the moment it passed without a single change being made in the House bill the fact was telegraphed to European commercial centers."²⁵

To a unit, the press attacked the senators and representatives for lacking political independence. They were accused of being far more susceptible to the demands of the soldiers' vote than to the appeals made by the taxpayers of the country. "Those demagogues in Congress," remarked the *Cincinnati Commercial*, "who have voted to take the sum of fifty to one hundred millions of dollars, to fatten claim agents and squander on all sides, will be the very men to sneak out of voting the taxes to meet the outlay. This great pension fraud amounts to a scheme to confiscate and parcel out the money in the Treasury for the benefit of local politicians."²⁶ Great surprise was expressed by the *New York Tribune* at the eagerness with which the same Congress who, outwardly stood for "reform," "retrenchment," and "economy," should suddenly turn to the support of pensioners. The surprise was all the greater when it was remembered how little was the love which the dominant faction of the leading party in the House bore toward the very soldiers that were to be benefited by the passage of the act.²⁷ The only excuse that could be given for its passage, states the *Chicago Times*, "was not the legal or equitable claim of pensioners, but the fact that the politicians who have thus voted away the people's money hope to advance their personal ambition thereby. It was brought up at an

²³ *N. Y. Tribune*. Jan. 25, 1879. *Baltimore American*. Jan. 25, 1879.

²⁴ *Chicago Times*. Jan. 17, 1879.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Cincinnati Commercial*. Jan. 22, 1879.

²⁷ *N. Y. Tribune*. Jan. 17, 1879.

opportune moment by Ingalls of Kansas whose hoped-for re-election is now pending. There are no less than forty ex-soldiers in the Kansas legislature; hence Ingalls' sudden liberality with the people's money to forward his political fortunes. It was supported by Dan Voorhees, whose hoped-for re-election is now pending. It was supported by every other Senator whose *HOPED FOR RE-ELECTION* is now pending. It was supported by all the Senators except four."²⁸ In attributing questionable motives to those senators who supported the measure, the *New York Nation* remarked editorially, "Nobody, we suppose, really believes that the Senate passed the Arrears of Pensions Bill from pure motive of national gratitude. . . . Only four Senators had the courage to vote against it, and these all Democrats and not one a President *in petto*."²⁹

In the meantime President Hayes had the bill under consideration. There was serious doubt as to whether or not he would approve it. He and John Sherman, Secretary of Treasury, understood better than any one else the enormous sum that would be required to meet the demands of the pensioners, old and new. Two special meetings of the Cabinet were devoted to a consideration of the bill.³⁰ Secretary Sherman, Carl Schurz, Secretary of Interior, Commissioner Bentley, and the clerical force of the Pension Office, spent the greater part of three days collecting information concerning the amount of money that would be required to meet the demands of the pensioners in case the bill became a law.³¹ At a meeting of the Cabinet on January 22, Secretary Sherman announced that a careful examination of the data at hand led him to place the estimate at \$150,000,000. The Commissioner of Pensions, Mr. Bentley, thought one-half that amount (\$75,000,000) would be sufficient, while Mr. Schurz placed his estimate as low as \$50,000,000. But whatever the sum, "the Cabinet was of the opinion that Congress had chosen a bad time for withdrawing such an enormous amount from the Treasury, and that it would have been wiser to have deferred action upon the measure.

²⁸ *Chicago Times*. Jan. 17, 1879.

²⁹ *N. Y. Nation*. Jan. 23, 1879.

³⁰ *Baltimore American*. Jan. 22, 1879; *N. Y. Tribune*. Jan. 25, 1879.

³¹ *Baltimore American*. Jan. 24, 1879.

All agreed that a veto of the bill would not be politic, even if it was certain that it would be sustained, which the Cabinet realized was highly improbable after the pronounced majorities by which it passed both Houses of Congress.”³²

President Hayes was still undecided as to what action to take. Two days later he called another meeting of the Cabinet. Secretary Sherman was still of the opinion that his estimate was approximately correct. To raise the necessary funds, three propositions were suggested: (1) suspend the sinking fund and divert the surplus revenue previously applied to reducing the public debt to the liquidation of the pension gratuities; (2) restore the duty on tea and coffee and use the revenue for paying off the pension claims; (3) sell more bonds and use the proceeds for this purpose.³³ What the opinion of the Cabinet was upon the plans is not known, but the opinion of the press favored the latter in case either of the three expedients had to be adopted. The *Nation* feared that the necessity of meeting the deficit would again open the “flood-gates of folly.”

After holding the longest session it had held for a year the Cabinet adjourned,³⁴ and it was announced that President Hayes would sign the bill. This he did on January 25, after having had it under consideration for nine days.³⁵

President Hayes held that the country should always be liberal in caring for the ex-soldiers, their widows, and orphans. He felt that the Arrears Act was only the fulfillment of a promise made by the Government to its soldiers. In a letter to Mr. William Henry Smith, dated December 14, 1881, Mr. Hayes states:

“The thing I would talk of, if I ever defended or denied or explained, is the Arrears of Pensions Act. That act was required by good faith. The soldiers had the pledge of the Government and the people. Congress, State Legislatures, messages, the press—everybody assured the soldier that if disabled in the line of duty he would be pensioned. The pensions were due from the date of disability, if discharged on account of it, and from the date of such discharge. The

³² *Baltimore American*. Jan. 22, 1879.

³³ *N. Y. Nation*. Feb. 20, 1879. *Chicago Tribune*. Jan. 21, 1879.

³⁴ *N. Y. Tribune*. Jan. 25, 1879.

³⁵ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 743.

act was passed by practically a unanimous vote. A veto would have been in vain. But I signed it not because to veto it would have been ineffectual, but because it was right. It was a measure necessary to keep faith with the soldier. I had fought repudiation on the bond question. Here was a failure to pay a sacred debt to the national defenders. We could not afford—we ought not to haggle with them. Suppose there was danger of fraud. Was there no fraud in raising the revenue to pay the bonds? Whiskey and other frauds? Defective legislation is largely the cause of the frauds complained of. Secretary Schurz recommended the remedy. Again and again it was endorsed by me. Let the witnesses in pension cases be subjected to cross-examination by the Government and the greater part of the frauds would be prevented. The failure of the Government to protect itself against frauds is no reason for evading just obligations. It is said the amount to be paid is larger than was anticipated. That is no reason for repudiating the obligation. The amount is small compared with other war expenditures and debts. And the frauds and hardships upon Government are less than in many other items of unquestioned obligation. We can't make fish of one and flesh of another creditor. Look at the good done. In every county in the North are humble but comfortable homes built by the soldier out of his arrearage pay. They are in sight from the desk at which I write. *I would do it again.* But I will keep silent, and don't want to be quoted. If nobody says what ought to be said in Congress or the press, I will speak at some soldier meeting, and *print*.”³⁶

Whether or not the Arrears Act would have been passed over the Executive's veto is difficult to determine. It appears, however, that had President Hayes returned it with a judiciously written message, calling attention to the enormous sums that would be required to meet the demands made upon the Treasury, and the uncertainty which existed in the minds of the officials charged with its administration, its passage by a two-thirds vote would scarcely have been possible. The veto by President Grant of a bill providing for the equalization of bounties to ex-soldiers had resulted

³⁶ Charles Richard Williams. *Life of Hayes*. vol. 2, p. 338.

in its defeat, and there appears to be no valid reason for thinking that the members of the Forty-second Congress were not as anxious to aid the defenders of their country as those who now occupied the same seats.

Then, too, there seems to have been a general feeling that the Democratic members of Congress originally voted for the bill in order that it might not longer be said that they were the enemies of the Union soldiers. But had they been reassured by the President's veto, perhaps the fear of being labeled the enemy of the old soldier would have disappeared. Between those Democratic members who doubtless would have been glad to cast a negative vote, and the Republicans who could have been won over by a judicious veto message, the Arrears Act would in all probability have failed.

The provisions of the act can be stated very briefly. All pensions that had been granted under the general pension laws, and all those to be granted in the future, in consequence of wounds, disease, or death resulting from service in the United States forces during the war of the rebellion, were to commence from the date of death or discharge of the person on whose account the claim had been or should thereafter be granted; or upon the termination of the right of the party having prior title to such pension. The rates for the period over which arrears of pensions were to be granted were to be the same per month as those for which the pension was originally allowed. Section two authorized the Commissioner of Pensions to adopt rules and regulations for the payment of arrears to all pensioners rightly entitled thereto. Section 4717 of the Revised Statutes which had deprived claimants of their pensions unless their case was successfully prosecuted within five years from the date of its filing, was repealed. Claim agents were prohibited from receiving any compensation for their services in making application for arrears of pension. All acts or parts of acts in conflict with the new statute were repealed.³⁷

The next step was to make an appropriation to carry out the provisions of the act. On February 6, 1879, the Commissioner of Pensions was called upon for an estimate of the

³⁷ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 20, p. 265.

amount needed to pay the pensions—including arrears—for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1880. This estimate had already been prepared by Mr. Bentley and was at once forwarded to the House. It called for \$34,000,000 to pay the arrears upon claims allowed prior to the passage of the act, and \$2,500,000 for the claims that would be granted before the close of the fiscal year.³⁸ He also asked for an appropriation of \$50,000 in order to provide for extra clerical force.

This recommendation was forwarded to the House on February 8, 1878. The following week, the bill making appropriation for the payment of arrears was called up for discussion. Mr. Rice of Ohio, chairman of the Committee on Invalid Pensions, submitted an amendment which provided that section one of the Arrears Act be extended so as to include all pensions granted by special acts of Congress.³⁹ He felt that no member of the House would oppose such an amendment, and stated that it had received the unanimous recommendation of the Committee on Pensions, that every member of the Committee on Appropriations favored it, and that it was also approved by the Commissioner of Pensions.⁴⁰ The amendment was accepted without opposition, and the bill carrying an appropriation for \$25,000,000—\$7,000,000 less than asked for by Commissioner Bentley—was passed by the decided vote of 184 to 67, 39 not voting.⁴¹ Of the 67 negative votes, only four came from members representing northern states. Here again both parties attempted to outdo each other in their bid for the soldiers' vote. As described later by one of their own number, "democrats urged democrats to vote for it—to be ahead of the republicans with the 'soldiers' claim' because the Senate would defeat it; and republicans urged republicans to vote for it to be ahead of the democrats with the 'soldiers' claim' because the Senate would defeat it."⁴²

The Senate had only a few days within which to consider the appropriation bill and its amendments. Nevertheless it

³⁸ *House Exec. Doc.* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 75.

³⁹ Mr. Rice was at this time the Democratic aspirant for the governorship of his State.

⁴⁰ *Cong. Record.* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 1487.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* pp. 1487-1488.

⁴² Statement of Mr. Reagan, *Del. Cong. Record.* 46th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 1676.

was the occasion of one of the most interesting debates of the session.⁴³ There were several amendments proposed to the appropriation measure as it came from the House, a few of which were accepted. The first one to bring forth a general discussion was that offered by Senator Ingalls providing for the "sixty-surgeon pension bill" already considered. The necessity for some such administration reform, as set forth in that bill, was felt more keenly now than ever. Commissioner Bentley had repeatedly urged upon Congress the imperative need of a new system for settling claims. The whole plan was again reviewed, and the discussion followed along much the same lines as already noted. The proposed system was thought by many to be too expensive and unwieldy; others feared it would afford too great an opportunity for political patronage, and hence it was defeated.

The most important of the amendments which the Senate added to the bill was a provision making it necessary for persons to file their applications for arrears of pensions before July 1, 1880, if they expected to receive its benefits. While such a proviso was in direct opposition to the spirit of the original act, nevertheless the most enthusiastic pension advocates recognized the need of placing some limitation upon the period within which claims should be presented. Had such a provision not been inserted, the measure would have in all probability resulted in bankrupting the national treasury, or else would have led to an early repeal of the entire act.

The one amendment, however, that came nearest holding up the bill making an appropriation for arrears was introduced by Senator Shields of Missouri. It provided "that the law granting pensions to the soldiers and their widows of the War of 1812, approved March 9, 1878, is hereby made applicable in all its provisions to the soldiers and sailors who served in the war with Mexico of 1846."⁴⁴ It was simply an attempt to take advantage of the generosity of Congress and extend the liberal pension laws so as to include the Mexican survivors. Senator Shields was himself a hero of that war, and had served as a Union general in the late Civil War.

⁴³ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 3rd sess. pp. 1981-1984; 2032-2040; 2042-2051; 2252-2258; 2223-2243.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 2057.

He had the rare distinction of having already served two states in the Senate chamber—Illinois and Minnesota—and was now serving a third. Scarcely a month had passed since he had taken the last oath of office. Always keenly interested in his soldier comrades, he took an active part in all matters pertaining to pension legislation.

When the amendment was first submitted, the Senate was so intent upon passing the bill making appropriation for arrears, that it scarcely considered the new measure, and it was accepted by a vote of 36 to 22.⁴⁵ No sooner had the vote been announced, however, than Senator Windom of Minnesota entered a motion to reconsider, and declared that he would call it up again at the earliest moment.⁴⁶ This he did, two days later, and asked unanimous consent to reconsider the vote. He stated that from the best estimate he could obtain "the little proposition so good-naturedly introduced by the Senator from Missouri and so good-naturedly supported by a majority of the Senate the other evening would take from thirty to forty millions out of the Treasury." Senators one after another expressed a willingness to have their vote reconsidered, and set forth their reasons for doing so. The excuse most commonly given was that such an amendment as proposed by Senator Shields would result in pensioning a great number of persons who had recently fought against the Union. This did not appeal to certain members of the Senate, and the vote to reconsider was carried by a majority of three.⁴⁷

The discussion then turned upon the original question. Senator Hoar of Massachusetts proposed that the amendment be worded so as to read "provided that no pension shall ever be paid under this act to Jefferson Davis, the late President of the so-called confederacy."⁴⁸ There followed one of the most dramatic debates ever staged in the United States Senate. The whole question of the Civil War, the attitude of the southern leaders, and the life history of Jefferson Davis, were reviewed at great length. Senators Hoar, Blaine, Conkling, and Chandler were perhaps the most active in denouncing the late leader of the Confederacy.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 2057.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 2058.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 2224.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 2225.

His chief defenders were Lamar of Mississippi, Morgan of Alabama, Patterson of South Carolina, and Beck of Kentucky. An all-night session was taken up in hearing this man denounced by his enemies and praised by his friends. The session began Sunday night March 2, and lasted through until five o'clock Monday morning. In the midst of the debate Senator Lamar read a letter from Jefferson Davis in which the latter requested the southern senators to permit his name to be excluded from the provisions of the Shields' amendment, if by so doing it would insure its enactment. He called attention to the many worthy survivors of the Mexican War who were in need of the pension, and insisted that they should not be deprived of an award because their names happened to be associated with his.⁴⁹ The southern leaders apparently felt, however, that they could force through the Mexican War amendment without excluding the name of Mr. Davis. At least they refused to withdraw it.

After the debate had consumed the greater part of the night's session and as the daylight hour approached, Senator Chandler of Michigan arose and delivered an invective upon Jefferson Davis, which the press describes as the most crushing speech heard in the Senate chamber since before the Rebellion.⁵⁰ He reviewed the attitude of Mr. Davis toward the government which he was supposed to be serving while a member of the Senate and in the Cabinet. He then depicted his attempt to destroy that same government; and concluded by expressing his utter amazement at those southern members who were now uttering eulogies upon one "whom every man, woman and child in the North believes to have been a double-dyed traitor to his government."⁵¹ The *New York Tribune* describes the effect of the speech thus:

"Mr. Chandler sat down looking defiantly toward the Democratic side of the chamber and anxiously awaited a reply. But the Democrats remained quietly seated and stared at one another. No man ventured to interrupt, none felt insulted. It was simply crushing." (See also *Baltimore American*, March 4, 1879.) This speech of Senator Chandler's

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 2228.

⁵⁰ *N. Y. Tribune*. Mar. 4, 1879. *Baltimore American*. Mar. 4, 1879.

⁵¹ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 2234.

made him at once the idol of thousands of old war Republicans. Some of his friends took advantage of his popularity and began to groom him for the next presidential candidate of the Republican party.⁵²

A roll call was soon demanded and the Shields' amendment was defeated. The vote resulted in 20 favoring the measure, 25 opposed, and 31 not voting.⁵³ Every negative vote was cast by a northern senator. Following the rejection of the amendment, the vote was taken upon the original bill carrying appropriations for the payment of arrears, and it passed by the decided majority of 43 yeas and 3 nays.

The following were the three chief amendments which the Senate had added to the appropriation bill. The first one provided that the rates to be allowed in paying arrears of pensions should be graded according to the degree of the pensioner's disability from time to time and the provisions of the pension law in force over the period for which arrears were to be computed. The second amendment made a change in the date from which pensions were to commence, by providing that they should be paid from the day on which actual disability had occurred, rather than from the date of discharge. The third provision limited the payment of arrears only to those who should file their application before July 1, 1880.⁵⁴ As stated above, this was the one most redeeming section of the act. It specified the time limit within which claimants must act, if they expected to enjoy the benefits of the back payments.

The House accepted the amendments, and the bill providing for the payment of pension arrears was signed March 3, 1879.⁵⁵

Thus after four years of constant agitation on the part of claim agents, ex-soldiers, and the activity of numerous state legislatures, the Arrears Act became effective. During its passage it had supplied both parties in Congress with excellent political capital. For the first time since the close of the late war, the Democrats came forth and boldly proclaimed their interest in those who had recently fought the

⁵² *Baltimore American*. Mar. 31, 1879.

⁵³ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 2243.

⁵⁴ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 20, pp. 469-470.

⁵⁵ *Cong. Record*. 45th Cong. 3rd sess. p. 2408.

nation's battles. They refused to let it be said that they were any longer the enemy of the soldier. Early in the third session of the Forty-fifth Congress, while the bill was still under consideration, Mr. Townsend, a leading Democrat from Illinois, boasted loudly of the support which the members of his party were giving to pension legislation. Since gaining the ascendancy in the House, they had never opposed outright the passage of any bill recommended by the Committee on Pensions. "This side of the House," said he, "deserves commendation for the liberality and zeal with which it has supported legislation in the interest of soldiers engaged in all wars waged in behalf of our government, thereby refuting every accusation against the democratic party of want of regard for the interest of the soldier."⁵⁶

Also when the bill was under consideration making an appropriation for the payment of arrears, each party tried hard to play the other off against the soldiers' vote. In the discussion over the Shields' amendment, the Republicans accused the Democrats of attempting to hold up all arrears of pensions at the expense of rewarding certain survivors of the Mexican War. The Democrats, in turn, claimed the credit for having passed the original Arrears Act, and now taunted the Republicans for failing to vote appropriations to that end. They were charged with depriving the ex-soldiers of those very provisions which the Democrats had labored so faithfully to enact.⁵⁷

But the activity of the members of Congress does not begin to compare with the interest displayed during the passage of the bill by claim agents and prospective pensioners. These two classes comprised a powerful and well organized lobby, and during the sessions of the Forty-fourth and Forty-fifth Congresses, carried on a systematic campaign for more liberal pension legislation.

The most notorious as well as the most active of these lobbies was an organization known as "The Pensioners' Committee" which was established in Washington in 1875. From that date until the final passage of the Arrears Act, no efforts were spared either in the nation's Capital or throughout

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 150.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 2235-6, 2239.

the country to influence senators and congressmen alike. Headed by Captain R. A. Dimmick this organization circulated thousands of petitions, pamphlets, and resolutions throughout the country in an attempt to create a public sentiment favorable to the Arrears Act.⁵⁸ Their activity in lining up state legislatures has already been referred to in the case of Senator Ingalls' reelection. That they were equally active in other instances is not to be doubted.

But the chief aim of the committee that headed this organization was that of trying to monopolize the entire credit for having secured the passage of the Arrears Act. Just on the eve of the passage of the bill, March 1, 1879, it developed that they had a huge plan on foot to extract large sums of money from the pensioners. The pretense was, that every pensioner in the country owed a great obligation to Captain Dimmick and his assistants for their untiring zeal in pushing through the act.⁵⁹ The following circular, setting forth their claims, was issued March 1, 1879:

Pensioners! The Arrears of Pension Bill a Law

"The prayers of thousands are answered. A glorious victory. Our work is over. Thank God, my fellow pensioner, we have reached the desired haven—success! At this moment we know not how to congratulate you with the sympathetic feelings we now possess. I will state briefly that I was selected chairman of a pensioners' committee to come to Washington, D. C., and prosecute the Arrears Bill at the commencement of the Forty-fourth Congress, December, 1875, and endeavor to secure its passage. On my arrival here I found we had a mammoth work on hand. Immediately I set to work to secure co-operation and procure such information from the different parts of the country as I could obtain as to various reasons of an accidental and incidental nature why pensioners were debarred from receiving their back pension. After receiving responses from a few hundred, I then made up statistics showing the various causes of delay, and gave the same to General A. V. Rice, now chairman of the House Committee on Pensions, and I compiled the information obtained in an eight-page pamphlet, of which I issued 10,000, sending many to various State Legislatures, to the press, and hundreds of them at various times were placed in Congress. It was entitled "Important Reasons why the Pension Laws should be amended." This has been the fountain from which the public, the press, and the legislators have derived their information as to the justice and merits of the bill.

⁵⁸ *House Committee Report: 45th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 189.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

Senators, representatives, and officials have gleaned most of their information from this source. I have written many resolutions for State associations urging Congress to pass the bill, and secured their passage, I also have written every editorial and every article in favor of the bill that has appeared in the daily and weekly journals of this city: also numerous other articles for newspapers in various parts of the country. I have put out 100,000 pamphlets, circulars, petitions, etc., and nearly all petitions that have been presented in Congress for the past three years are those which we have issued and sent to the various parts of the country, and have been returned to Congress by our direction. . . . ”

He then sets forth the labor involved in pushing the bill through Congress, the debts which he had incurred, and closes with the statement that he would be happy to acknowledge any assistance in defraying the same.⁶⁰

Such were the claims made by one of the active pension attorneys in Washington. On the strength of this, and other circulars, signed by some of the clerks in the War and Interior Departments, in which they also testified to the activity of the “Pensioners’ Committee,” Captain Dimmick hoped to reap a great harvest from prospective pensioners. Although the plan was discovered before it had gotten well under way, nevertheless the House Committee, in making its report upon the subject, stated that during the few days it had been in operation, the Captain and his assistants had collected almost \$2,500.⁶¹

Other claim agents appear to have been equally as active, although perhaps not so unscrupulous in claiming credit for this significant piece of pension legislation. They all foresaw the tremendous importance of the measure, should it become a law, and were determined that pension claimants everywhere should know of the interest which they had taken in pushing it through. By this means, their firms were given wide advertisement, and a large increase in the number of claims was sure to follow.

With the passage of the Arrears Act, the work of the Pension Bureau became enormously increased. Even before the appropriations had been voted to carry its provisions into effect, claims began to pour in at an unprecedented

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 100-101.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 5.

rate. On February 18, 1879, Secretary Schurz addressed a letter to Vice President Wheeler of the Senate, in which he stated that within the twenty-one days immediately following the passage of the act, 2,301 claims had been presented for invalid pensions.⁶² This meant a daily average of more than one hundred, whereas thirty-four had been the daily average during the first six months of the fiscal year. Secretary Schurz added that calls for application blanks were coming in at the rate of 140 per day, "more than ten times as numerous as for a previous year. . . ."⁶³

Both claim agents and prospective pensioners became keenly interested in the provisions of the new law. Ex-soldiers who had up to this time manifested little interest in the question of pensions were suddenly informed of the large sum set aside for their benefit. Should their application be successful, it meant that several hundred or perhaps a thousand dollars would be awarded the pensioner in lump sum.⁶⁴ This incentive, in the language of Commissioner Bentley, constituted a very powerful attack on the patriotic pride of the soldier, and set many to thinking whether after all they had better not make application for a pension.⁶⁵ That the claim agents were ready to reap their harvest is evidenced by the fact that 23,372 claims for arrears of pensions were filed during the month of February, immediately following the passage of the bill.⁶⁶ This number was never again equalled during the operation of the Arrears Act. During the five months that intervened between its passage and the close of the fiscal year, June 30, 1878, the total number of claims filed for original and for arrears of pensions amounted to 101,481, a number almost twice as large as the totals for any previous year since the war. They poured into the office far more rapidly than they could be recorded, much less adjudicated. On April 1, 1879, Commissioner Bentley found it necessary to put on a relay of extra clerks, "one day and two night forces," in order to catch up with

⁶² *Sen. Exec. Doc.* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 63.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Commissioner Bentley estimated the average amount at \$1,025. *Sen. Miscel. Doc.* 45th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 24.

⁶⁵ *House Committee Reports.* 46th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 387. p. 11.

⁶⁶ *Annual Report, Commissioner of Pensions*, 1880. Table No. 8.

the work of filing claims.⁶⁷ At the close of the year, June 30, there were 184,709 cases awaiting settlement.

Not only were new applications piling up at an unprecedented rate, but pressure was brought to bear upon those claims already filed, and an early settlement demanded. The office force was simply overwhelmed with calls, and found itself falling farther and farther behind. A new plan of procedure had to be adopted and Commissioner Bentley decided to rearrange the entire system of military records for receiving and disposing of claims. Under the old plan all applications for invalid pensions were grouped together under one series, and those for widows and dependents, under a second. This meant that every pension claim that reached the Bureau was filed under one or the other of three lists. The result was that some names, such as those beginning with the letters S-M-I; H-A-R; W-I-L; and others had accumulated until they numbered from four to five thousand each.⁶⁸ To search through the entire list of such names, for the purpose of finding a particular case, required an unnecessary amount of labor.

Mr. Bentley ordered the whole system to be rearranged and new records prepared. The names were separated from the old series, and were filed with the military divisions in which the claimant had served. This was an enormous undertaking, and when completed, the records filled 176 volumes of 250 pages each. They contained the claims for pensions on account of service in 2,268 regiments, 194 battalions, 706 independent companies, 208 batteries, and 46 staff officers.⁶⁹ The plan resulted, however, in a great reduction of the time and labor required for locating the applicant's name. Without some such system, the work of the Bureau would have fallen hopelessly behind, and the administration of the Arrears Act would have been next to impossible.

In December, 1879, an appropriation of \$50,000 was asked for in order to increase the clerical force of the Pension Office. A considerably larger sum would have been requested but

⁶⁷ *House Committee Reports*. 46th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 387. pp. 9-10.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 17, 19.

⁶⁹ *Annual Report, Commissioner of Pensions*, 1880.

for the fact that the limited space in which the offices were located would not permit of a very large increase in the number of employees. The effects of the act were also felt in the offices of the Adjutant General and Surgeon General, where the clerks were utterly unable to meet the demands made upon them for military and hospital records. Over 40,000 such cases were awaiting a reply in November, 1879, and the Commissioner stated that additional requests were coming in at the rate of five and six thousand per month.⁷⁰

The members of Congress, likewise, felt the effects of the Arrears Act. Claimants appealed to them for aid in the prosecution of their claims. The representatives in turn would call upon the Pension Bureau to learn the cause for delay. Over 40,000 written and personal inquiries were made upon the Office during the year 1880 by members of Congress alone.⁷¹ Four years earlier the number amounted to only 9,000. The House Committee on Pensions, Bounty Land and Back-pay, was simply "swamped" with letters, asking that certain rejected claims be looked into. Mr. Caswell, a member of the Committee, stated that since the passage of the act, they were receiving over five thousand original applications per month, whereas before its passage, they had received only about ten thousand for the entire year.⁷² Mr. McMahan of Ohio remarked that he had in his possession over two hundred applications for pensions, which if properly attended to, would leave him no time whatever for the performance of other duties.⁷³ The House had already adopted the practice of giving each Friday evening session to the consideration of private claims, but this by no means relieved the congestion.

In order to meet this situation, the Committee brought in a bill looking toward the creation of a Pension Court. It was to be a judicial tribunal, established as a subordinate branch of the Interior Department; to be composed of three members, two of whom were to be learned lawyers, and one, a student of medicine and surgery. The duties of the Court were to review and adjudicate all pension cases that had

⁷⁰ *Annual Report*, 1879.

⁷¹ *Annual Report*, 1880.

⁷² *Cong. Record*, 46th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 2898.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 2896.

been ordered dropped from the rolls by the Commissioner, all claims then pending in Congress, and all future claims that should receive adverse reports from the hands of the Pension Commissioner. The Court was to review the testimony in each case, hear the evidence of the claimant, and then decide whether or not a pension should be granted.⁷⁴ Although the measure received lengthy and somewhat favorable consideration it failed to pass the House.

While the Pension Court bill was under discussion in the House, the Senate also had a measure under consideration, the object of which was to expedite the settlement of pension claims and prevent frauds. Provision was made for a "medico-legal" commission, whereby a lawyer and a physician were to be appointed for each Congressional district; they were to visit each county seat in the district three times a year, and examine and take the testimony of each claimant. Upon instructions from the Commissioner of Pensions, they were to visit other points in the respective districts and investigate any fraudulent cases. This measure, like the above mentioned one, failed of enactment; nevertheless they illustrate the activity on the part of Congress to meet the situation that confronted it.

But the most important step taken with regard to the administration of the pension system, was an investigation which was ordered by the House on January 12, 1880.⁷⁵ Within recent months the labor imposed upon the Office had become so great, and the delays in the settlement of pension claims and bounty land cases so notorious, that a Committee consisting of seven representatives was appointed to investigate the entire Bureau and its proceedings. The following members were appointed: Mr. A. H. Caffroth and Mr. A. C. Harmer of Pennsylvania, Mr. George W. Geddes of Ohio, Mr. W. R. Myers of Indiana, Mr. Benton McMillan of Tennessee, Mr. Lucien B. Caswell of Wisconsin, and Mr. J. R. Thomas of Illinois. The Committee began its hearings on February 16, 1880, and continued them at intervals until June 12, of the same year. Congress having adjourned for the summer recess, the Committee did not

⁷⁴ For text of bill, see *Cong. Record*. 46th Cong. 2nd sess. pp. 2895-96.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 287.

resume its hearings until January 19, 1881, when it again took up the investigation and carried it on until March 1st.⁷⁶

The scope of the investigation covered practically every phase of the pension system. The steps taken in the examination of cases, the amount and nature of testimony required to establish a claim, the system of adjudication and the reason for delays, the attempts of the Office to detect frauds, the power exercised by the Commissioner of Pensions in passing upon claims and fixing their rates, and the political activity of the Bureau, were the points that received most attention.

The investigation shows that there were two problems for which the Arrears Act seemed directly responsible. The first one was that of causing an inevitable delay in the settlement of claims. Attention has already been called to the increased rate at which applications poured into the Office immediately following the passage of the bill. It was the belief both of the Commissioner of Pensions and Mr. Harmer of the investigating committee, that there would be at least 250,000 unsettled claims pending at the end of the year in June, 1880.⁷⁷ As a matter of fact, this number proved to be too conservative. Commissioner Bentley stated before the Committee on February 21, 1880, that the aggregate number at that date was 268,636.⁷⁸ During the month of June alone, the last month in which claims could be filed asking for the payment of arrears, there were received in the office 44,532 original Civil War claims. This exceeded the combined number of pension claims filed for all causes during any one year between 1866 and 1878. To search through the records, examine the evidence, and pass upon this number of cases as rapidly as they were filed, was simply an impossible task. The clerical force in the Bureau was increased to 531 persons, an increase of about twenty per cent over that of the previous force, but even then they were not able to keep pace with the demands made upon the Office.

The delays which were met with by both pension attorneys and claimants led to several charges being preferred against the Commissioner and his department. The lack of a proper

⁷⁶ *House Committee Reports*. 46th Cong. 3rd sess., vol. 2, No. 387.

⁷⁷ *Cong. Record*. 46th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 287.

⁷⁸ *House Report*. 46th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 387. p. 26.

organization and the duplication of work was one of the chief criticisms made by attorneys who were interested in pension claims. Mr. N. W. Fitzgerald of Washington, who was handling upwards of 25,000 cases, testified before the Committee that within the last four or five months he had received "duplicate, sometimes triplicate, and sometimes quadruplicate letters from the Pension Office containing the very same matter exactly."⁷⁹ Hundreds of such notices, he stated, had recently been received by his office, which indicated an utter lack of efficiency within the Bureau. He also testified that he had frequently been required to file exactly the same evidence and same affidavits a second and third time. Testimony similar to this was also given by Mr. Charles King, another large pension attorney in Washington.⁸⁰

Another complaint lodged against the Pension Bureau at this time was directed at the arbitrary and far-reaching powers exercised by Mr. Bentley. The conditions in which the Bureau found itself after the passage of the Arrears Act unquestionably required careful supervision, and Commissioner Bentley felt it necessary to take a definite stand upon many points. For four years he had been urging Congress to repeal the *ex parte* system of taking testimony, and substitute a law that would more carefully guard against fraudulent practices. But this, Congress had failed to do, and the Commissioner was to a greater or less degree forced to exercise rather arbitrary powers. In this respect, Mr. Bentley surpassed all his predecessors. He was charged by Mr. George M. Van Buren, a pension attorney in Washington as having but one aim, that of building up a one-man power, of attempting to centralize the affairs of the Pension Office so as to give him entire control over all the pensioners throughout the country.⁸¹ Instead of acting the part of a judge in all cases, he was accused of playing the part of a prosecuting attorney, attempting to defeat every claim by any possible means.

Still more severe were the charges made by Mr. George E. Lemon, who was perhaps the most powerful pension attorney

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 71.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p. 215.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 90.

in the country during the eighties. While his criticism bears the earmarks of personal enmity, nevertheless his description of the unlimited power which a Commissioner could exercise, and the arbitrary action of Mr. Bentley in particular, deserve mention. In testifying before the committee he said: "The powers of the Commissioner of Pensions over the subject-matter in his charge, over the persons claiming pensions, and over the attorneys who represent such claimants, are wonderfully large. He holds the keys. He can allow or reject any claim. He can postpone, delay, require new evidence, and repeal his requisition without limit. He can wear out all human patience by substantial or frivolous objection. He can fix, alter, change, and modify the character of proof he will require, and the classes of witnesses to make such proof, at his simple whim or caprice. He can find good excuses for any amount of delays, or he can decline to give any excuse.

"He can send agents with secret instructions, whose reports are confidential, and cut off pensions when he likes,

"Mr. Bentley has of late years . . . piled rule upon rule and regulation upon regulation, until the practice of the Pension Office is difficult, involved and insecure."⁸²

At first glance these powers may seem to appear quite far-reaching and even despotic. Yet when it is remembered that the Bureau was working under a greater strain than ever before, and that all sorts of questionable methods were being resorted to in order to push through doubtful claims, the necessity for a strongly centralized system is at once apparent. Congress had within recent years acted most liberally, even to the point of extravagance, in making it possible for almost any ex-soldier or dependent to secure a pension. Almost every representative coming from states where any great number of pensioners lived, had so voted that he could return to his constituency and boast of the manner in which he had tried to aid their cause. But when it came to the actual granting of pensions, a somewhat rigid and discriminating policy had to be followed. The attitude of Congress had simply forced the Pension Bureau to take

⁸² *Ibid.* p. 405.

a decided stand in the matter of examining claims and granting pensions. Had something not been done to offset its extravagance, the whole system would have simply become unendurable.⁸³

The continued delay in the settlement of claims brought still another complaint against the Pension Bureau at this time. It was charged that the Commissioner and his force were too much interested in political affairs, and that their activity in that direction interfered with the efficient work of the Bureau. Although this charge did not become so widespread until a few years later, yet there is evidence that as early as 1880 the influence of the pension system was felt in the political affairs of the nation. According to the testimony of one of the special agents of the Bureau, Mr. Thomas P. Kane, it was quite a common practice for the Pension Office to concentrate its forces upon those claims coming from doubtful states, just before the general elections.⁸⁴ The applications from Ohio and Indiana received special attention, he added, during the fall of 1880. A table submitted by the chief of the Records and Accounts Division shows that during the three months of July, August, and September, 1880, the average number of pensions issued was 1,661; but in October, the month preceding the national election, there were 4,423 original claims allowed.⁸⁵ Another practice which was quite prevalent was that of sending special agents home to vote just before election time. Also special clerks were detailed to take out cases for investigation, go home and vote, investigate the case in question, and then have their expenses paid out of the special service fund.⁸⁶

The Pension Bureau found itself, during the campaign of 1880, in a very difficult position. On the one hand it was attempting to keep the pension grants within the limits of the appropriations made by Congress. Commissioner Bentley was charged with holding up every possible claim that he could in order that Secretary John Sherman might not have

⁸³ The charge was made, and it seems not without foundation, that there was a tacit understanding between members of Congress and the Pension Bureau that, outwardly, Congress should give the impression of being liberally inclined toward all soldiers' claims; but to save the Treasury from being drained, the Commissioner of Pensions should act very arbitrarily in granting the same. For testimony see *House Committee Report*, 46th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 387. p. 178, 266-267.

⁸⁴ *House Committee Reports*. 46th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 387. p. 389.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 424.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 385, 443-444.

to embarrass the administration by reporting a depleted treasury during the campaign of that year.⁸⁷ And yet on the other hand the Bureau was very careful not to antagonize the soldier vote. Every effort was made to explain the cause of delays in those cases where the pension was not forthcoming. On October 1, 1880, Mr. Bentley issued a pamphlet to all pension claimants which was at once dubbed a "political circular." He set forth at some length the occasion for the delays then existing in the Bureau, and reviewed the enormous work imposed upon it by the Arrears Act. He complained of the delay in the War Department in furnishing the evidence asked for, and declared that it was impossible to make any greater progress under the present system of adjudication. Attention was called to the fact that the Bureau had handled almost 900,000 pieces of mail during the last year, as compared to 355,000 pieces in 1876. A prompt answer of all inquiries necessarily delayed the settlement of claims. He closed the circular as follows: "The Pension Office, as you will see by the statistics given, is doing all it can with the system which it is compelled to employ, and the facilities which are available to settle the cases and relieve the delays; and the Commissioner of Pensions, with the approval of the Secretary of Interior, has recommended changes in the laws which it is believed will enable the claimants to obtain an early settlement of their cases, but which recommendations have not yet been acted upon by Congress."⁸⁸

Although Mr. Bentley stated before the committee that the circular had not been prepared for political purposes, nor for personal capital, nevertheless the wording of the document and the moment at which it appeared lead one to believe that some object, other than a mere statement of facts, lay behind it.

The other problem for which the Arrears Act was in large part responsible was the concentration of an enormous pension business in the hands of a few attorneys. Most of the larger firms were located in Washington, and there they had to be reckoned with, not only in matters pertaining to pension legislation, but also in the administration of the

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 90.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 451.

laws. Some idea of their far-reaching power and scope of business may be obtained from the testimony submitted in the Committee report. Mr. Charles King, representing one of the leading firms, stated that from the most reliable information that he could obtain, there were approximately 16,000 men practicing before the Bureau. Of the 210,000 claims then pending, he estimated that 180,000 were being handled by 100 attorneys.⁸⁹

Commissioner Bentley, in speaking upon the same subject, estimated that as few as ten firms were handling at least one-half of all the claims pending in June, 1880. The firms of Nathan W. Fitzgerald and Company, and George E. Lemon had twenty-five and thirty thousand cases, respectively, for which they were responsible. When it is remembered that a fee of at least ten dollars was realized upon every successful case, some idea is obtained of the enormous business which these and similar firms were conducting.

Commissioner Bentley protested strongly against this concentration of business and the establishment of great "pension machines." No group of attorneys could possibly know the details of each of the thirty thousand cases under their care. The individual claimants could not be seen or personally consulted. The testimony produced must of necessity have been machine testimony. And the interest of such attorneys appears to have been centered more upon the total aggregate of claims they could collect and the grand total of their fees, than upon the individual interests of their clients. It was such firms as these that led the Bureau to take an arbitrary stand in conducting its business. The claims which they submitted and the accompanying testimony had to be more carefully scrutinized than those coming from attorneys with a smaller practice. The Commissioner stated that it was a fact, generally recognized in the Office, that the most intelligent handling of claims was done by men who had but few cases to represent, those who lived in the country, among their claimants. They would in most cases compel the applicant and his witnesses to appear before them in person and submit to a cross-examination. By meeting the applicant face to face, and by careful examination,

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 189, 190.

the local attorney was in a position to at least *know* the facts; whether or not he always acted in strict accordance with this knowledge is another question. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Pensions reiterated the statement that cases coming from such attorneys were presented in a more intelligent and trustworthy manner than those which came from the large firms in Washington. His protest, however, was of little avail, and the practice of monopolizing claims continued. As will be shown in the succeeding chapter, there were three firms during the early eighties that practically controlled the claim-agent business, all of which were located in Washington.

The Pension Bureau was not the only department that felt the burden of the Arrears Act. The heavy drain which it continued to make upon the national treasury was destined sooner or later to attract the attention both of the public press and Congress. President Arthur in his annual message of December 6, 1881, announced that the estimate required for the payment of arrears was now raised to \$250,000,000. "The fact that a sum so enormous must be expended by the Government to meet demands for arrears of pensions is an admonition to Congress and the executive to give cautious consideration to any similar project in the future."⁹⁰

There was a determined effort on the part of the public press to have Congress repeal the act. From all sections of the country the charge was made that the people's representatives were betraying their trust by permitting such a law to remain in operation. Senator Voorhees of Indiana stated, January 16, 1882, that he could recall but two legislative enactments, the fugitive-slave law and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, that had provoked such an explosion of intense wrath as that which followed the arrears act. "If it had been a measure to disseminate pestilence, breed famine, or provoke war, it could hardly have been stigmatized with greater bitterness."⁹¹ He observed that "the most prominent journals from the North end of New England to the Pacific coast teemed with envenomed denunciation of the act." Extracts were read from different

⁹⁰ Richardson, *Messages and Papers*. vol. 8. 1881-1889. p. 59.

⁹¹ *Cong. Record*. 47th Cong. 1st sess. p. 405.

papers in which the measure was referred to as "a huge swindle upon the people of the United States, an infamous measure which should be promptly repealed"; and those who had supported it were accused of being moved by "jobbery, fraud, and demagogism."⁹²

Senator Beck of Kentucky urged the immediate repeal of the act early in the first session of the Forty-seventh Congress. He characterized it as a fraud upon the American people and "a standing monument to the ignorance, selfishness, and cowardice of the American Congress."⁹³ His remarks brought forth a sharp retort from Senator Ingalls, who, two days later, introduced a resolution against the repeal of the act. There followed a debate which was extended at intervals over the greater part of the remainder of the session. The whole history of the act, its original intent, and the unexpected cost which it had imposed upon the nation, were reviewed at length. The extent to which members had or had not been influenced by political motives, the part played by claim agents in the passage of the act, and the frauds that were being perpetrated upon the Government were the questions that received most attention.

The friends of the measure were constantly on the defensive in attempting to minimize its total cost. Although it had greatly exceeded the original estimate, they pretended that the end was now in sight and that all arrears would soon be paid. On the other hand, those who favored its repeal insisted that the burden would continue to increase rather than diminish, and that its ultimate cost would run into the hundreds of millions. Mr. Bentley, now retired, had recently stated in an interview with a reporter on the *New York Herald*, that in his opinion the Arrears Act would sooner or later cost the Government over \$510,000,000.⁹⁴ This estimate coming from an official who has been characterized as "the ablest and most disinterested Commissioner of Pensions we have ever had" deserved careful consideration.⁹⁵ The figures are of special interest when it is remembered that Mr. Bentley had originally placed the

⁹² *Ibid.* p. 405.

⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 319.

⁹⁴ Mr. Bentley was retired shortly after President Garfield entered upon his administration. He went to Denver, Colorado, and there entered upon the practice of law. This interview took place in that city. *N. Y. Herald*. Jan. 15, 1881.

⁹⁵ Gaillard Hunt, *N. Y. Evening Post*. Jan. 26, 1889.

amount that would be required at \$50,000,000. It shows how utterly impossible it was to make even an approximate estimate upon a measure that was expected to run its course within a few years. Although the most loyal supporters of the act finally had to admit that its cost had gone far beyond that which even the most liberal had estimated, yet they refused to countenance any proposition looking toward its repeal. They defended it as an act of justice and announced their intention of keeping the law upon the statute books, regardless of the cost which it might impose upon the country.⁹⁶

By the close of the year 1882, the Pension Bureau was conducting an enormous business. The new Commissioner, Mr. W. W. Dudley, had convinced Congress that an additional clerical force was necessary in order to meet the delays occasioned by the continuous flood of applications. It was estimated that with the present force of 741 clerks, ten years would be required to dispose of the cases pending at the close of the fiscal year, June 6, 1881.

To meet this situation Congress took a very decided stand, and agreed to furnish the Commissioner with all the extra clerical force he could use. On August 5, 1882, an appropriation of \$1,957,150 (over a million dollars more than ever before voted) was set aside for that purpose.⁹⁷ The number of clerks was at once doubled, and by the close of the year there were 1,559 employees upon the pay roll of the Bureau.⁹⁸ The desire was to shift, for once, the responsibility for delay from the Pension Bureau over into the hands of the claimants. Commissioner Dudley had estimated that with such a force of clerks he could adjudicate all pending claims by December, 1884, and that the Office could then keep up with the demands made upon it. He was able to report that on July 15, 1883, they had completed an inventory of all claims then on file and that the Office was practically up with its current work.

It was expected, when the extra force was provided for, that it would not be needed longer than a year or possibly eighteen months. However, the *Annual Reports* show that

⁹⁶ *Cong. Record*. 47th Cong. 1st sess. p. 1011, 1012, 1339-1340.

⁹⁷ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. 22, pp. 247-248.

⁹⁸ *Annual Report, Commissioner of Pensions*, 1882.

while a few clerks were dropped during the next few years, no perceptible decrease occurred in the total number of employees. Efforts had been made, while the bill was under consideration, to impose the civil service requirements upon all clerks who should be appointed to these positions. This, however, failed, the sentiment of Congress being that such employees should be recruited from ex-soldiers, and that it would be unfair to impose a civil service requirement upon them.⁹⁹

To still further improve the administrative side of the pension system, a new plan of special examination was provided for. As carried out, it practically repealed the old *ex parte* method as employed in the investigation of suspicious cases. Under that system it was the practice of special examiners to carry on their work secretly. They would enter a community where a case suspected of fraud had been reported, privately work up the testimony in the case, and in a few weeks the pensioner would receive notice that he had been dropped from the rolls. Such a method had frequently been criticised as being arbitrary, unjust, and prejudicial to the interests of both the Government and the claimant. For five years Commissioner Bentley had protested against the *ex parte* principle as applied in the filing of original claims and in the investigation of doubtful ones. The special committee appointed to investigate the conditions of the pension system and bounty lands had also objected to the system. They recommended that a plan be adopted whereby the claimant should be notified of the proposed investigation, and that he be given an opportunity to meet witnesses who testified against him, and produce witnesses in rebuttal.¹⁰⁰

In the act making appropriations for the payment of pensions in 1882, such a system was provided for.¹⁰¹ Thereafter, when a case was to be examined, the claimant was notified, and was given an opportunity to be present and cross-examine any witnesses who might testify against him. The special agent would also cross-examine the witnesses, both those appearing for and against the claimant. They

⁹⁹ *Cong. Record*. 47th Cong. 1st sess. pp. 4768-4771, 4857-4861.

¹⁰⁰ *House Report*. 46th Cong. 3rd sess. No. 387. p. 2.

¹⁰¹ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 22, p. 175-176.

were given power to take depositions, subpoena witnesses, and compel their attendance. The country was divided into 240 districts, in each of which a special examiner was placed. All cases in which there was an absence of records, or where an adverse record existed, and all those attempting to establish a claim by parole evidence only, were referred to the special examiner for investigation. The plan was to provide for an open, full, and fair investigation where all the interested parties could be heard, and all the facts ascertained.

The system appears to have met with immediate success. After it had been in operation for eighteen months, Commissioner Dudley declared that it was very gratifying both to the claimants and the Government. "So well do the claimants appear to be satisfied with the thorough and impartial manner of inquiries made by the special examiners that the office is often urged by them to subject their claims to this test. . . . It shows conclusively, as has often been predicted, that an honest claimant has no fears of a thorough inquiry, but on the contrary often invites the most thorough investigation into the merits of his case, and will render material assistance in obtaining all the facts."¹⁰² On the other hand, the system unquestionably prevented a great number of unjust claimants from pushing their cases, for fear that the searching inquiry to which they would be subjected before their neighbors and witnesses would greatly embarrass their standing in the community.

Not only did the system meet with the approval of the claimants, but it also proved a financial success. With the close of the year June 30, 1884, the number of investigations totaled 7,452, and the net savings to the Government amounted to \$1,802,102.32.¹⁰³ This estimate was made up of the amount of pensions computed as due in cases that had been investigated and afterwards rejected, the accrued pensions due in cases that were dropped after investigation, and of the money that had been illegally received by pensioners but later rejected. The entire system met with such approval that 150 additional examiners were provided for by Congress July 7, 1884, in order that all claimants who

¹⁰² *Annual Report*, 1884.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

were having trouble with their cases might have an early hearing.

Another objectionable feature of the *ex parte* system, that of permitting the claimant to be examined by the local or family physician, was also amended. For years this practice had been the subject of complaint by officials charged with the administration of the pension system. Commissioners Baker, Atkinson, and Bentley had all called attention to the defects of such a practice and had repeatedly urged its repeal. The latter Commissioner in 1879 stated that the examinations submitted by the neighborhood practitioners bore evidence of a very superficial character, and that not infrequently they were found to be untruthful in whole or in part.¹⁰⁴ Due to local pressure, the physicians appeared to be more interested in pleasing the claimant than in making a thorough and trustworthy examination. The result was that the medical referee and his assistants in the Pension Bureau, whose business it was to review the medical side of all cases, lacked sufficient information to determine the existence and character of the claimants' diseases. Wrong conclusions would be reached, and injustice either to the applicant or to the Government would inevitably follow.

Such a system of medical examination simply broke down under the pressure of cases following the Arrears Act. The medical staff of the Bureau was unable to examine the thousands of cases sent in for review. The delays brought forth complaints on the part of claimants, and they in turn were criticised by the Bureau for not furnishing sufficient data concerning their disability.

To remedy these defects a new system was provided for. By law of July 25, 1882, the Commissioner of Pensions was authorized to appoint boards of examining surgeons at such points in each state as he deemed necessary. All examinations for pensions or for increase of pensions were to be made, so far as practicable, before these boards. The fee for each examination was raised from one dollar to two dollars for each member of the board, with the hope that it would attract the most skilled medical men of the district.¹⁰⁵ Com-

¹⁰⁴ *Annual Report*. 1879. p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 22, p. 175.

missioner Dudley at once entered upon the organization of examining boards. In his annual report for 1883 he announced that there were 284 such boards in operation with 84 others in the process of being organized. When it could be done without "jeopardizing anything in the way of efficiency" he added, only two of the members were selected from the same political party, the third one being chosen from a different political faith.¹⁰⁶

The new system appears to have worked exceptionally well. In the report just referred to, the Commissioner announced that no branch of the Office had made such rapid strides as that observed in the Medical Department. The examining boards were so distributed throughout the states that no applicant was required to travel more than 40 miles in order to reach one by rail. He added that the liberal fee of two dollars had enabled him to employ and maintain in the service some of the most eminent men in the medical profession. Although the cost of this system was considerably greater than the single-surgeon plan with its one dollar fee, nevertheless it resulted in a safer basis of adjudication, and was an ultimate saving to the Government. The plan, however, has never met with entire satisfaction.¹⁰⁷ In these two respects, that of compelling all claimants with doubtful cases to appear before a board of examiners, and all applicants who desired any kind of a pension to appear before a board of surgeons for cross-examination, the Arrears Act had resulted in bringing about a good piece of legislation. The demands that were made upon the Bureau made it necessary to adopt a new system. The only regret is that the plan was limited to those cases suspected of being fraudulent or where the evidence was incomplete. Had it been extended so as to include all applications, original and increase, a long step would have been taken toward perfecting the administrative side of the pension system.

Judging from the unexpected cost which the Arrears Act imposed upon the national Government in the years immediately following its passage, one would scarcely expect to hear of any member of Congress advocating more liberal

¹⁰⁶ *Annual Report, Commissioner of Pensions, 1883.*

¹⁰⁷ For a severe criticism of the outgrown system of medical examination, see *Annual Rep't of Commissioner Evans, 1901, p. 62-67.*

pension legislation. Especially would this seem to be true regarding the Arrears Act itself. Nevertheless, the “warning voice of their constituents” (a phrase borrowed from Commissioner Bentley’s characterization of Congress) appears to have been heard again. A review of the bills introduced in the last session of the Forty-seventh Congress shows that eight different attempts were made to repeal the limitation which had prevented the payment of arrears upon claims filed after July 1, 1880. The movement for the repeal had the backing of the newly appointed Commissioner, General John C. Black, and several members of Congress. However, a majority of the senators and representatives apparently felt that it would be unwise to meddle further with the act, and the attempted repeal failed. Had the Republican party been successful in the campaign of 1884, doubtless the limitation would have been repealed. Their national platform for that year contained a plank in which they pledged themselves to its repeal, so that all soldiers should share alike. The Democrats had made no such a pledge, and under President Cleveland’s administration, there was little opportunity for any liberal extension of the pension laws.

On June 7, 1888, a “rider” was inserted in the appropriation act which did repeal the limitation imposed upon the payment of arrears to widows.¹⁰⁸ Although this act lies beyond the period properly covered by this monograph, nevertheless it should be considered here in order to complete the treatment of the Arrears Act. It provided that all pensions which had been, or which might thereafter be granted to widows under the general pension laws, should commence from the date of the husband’s death. This meant that widows could now receive arrears of payments upon their claims, regardless of the time at which they had been filed. It was a very bad move. As characterized by Commissioner Evans, after twelve years of operation, “it is a standing invitation to fraudulent claims . . . and offers a premium on perjury and false witnesses.”¹⁰⁹

Mr. Evans repeatedly urged its repeal, and stated that in his opinion, every legitimate claim for a pension, either by reason of death during the war, or the years succeeding

¹⁰⁸ *U. S. Statutes at Large*. vol. 25, p. 173.

¹⁰⁹ *Annual Report, Commissioner of Pensions*, 1901. p. 301 of pamphlet.

the war, had long since been filed. Widows' claims were filed, on the average, within thirty days after the death of the husband; yet following the enactment of this measure, the Commissioner reported that claims were being presented by alleged widows of soldiers who had died thirty odd years ago.¹¹⁰

The law recognized slave marriages, and this led to some of the most serious abuses ever perpetrated upon the Pension Bureau. Commissioner Evans, in his report for 1901, selected ten sample cases, three of which are here cited, to illustrate the fraudulent claims that were daily coming into the Office:

"The soldier died in the service; the mother applied and received pension as dependent mother; after the mother's death an alleged widow puts in a claim—establishes by witnesses, who testify under oath that they were present at the marriage of the soldier and claimant. The alleged widow knew, and admits the fact, that she was aware that the mother was drawing a pension as a dependent parent. The Government has no case—the mother was wrongly pensioned—the alleged widow has established her case, and your Commissioner is powerless though he believes the case to be fraudulent."

Certificate No. 237,678.

"Soldier died in the service January 27, 1864. On February 23, 1887, twenty-three years after his death, his widow filed a claim for pension, alleging marriage to him while in slavery by a customary ceremony. Proof was submitted tending to show fact of alleged marriage and their continuous cohabitation and recognition as man and wife up to date of his enlistment. She was pensioned as his widow October 15, 1887, and \$8 per month from January 28, 1864, and at \$12 from March 19, 1886. The arrearage payment in this case was \$2,352. After drawing \$4,000, the pensioner admits *that she was never married to the soldier.*"

Certificate No. 33,833.

"The soldier dies in the service December 30, 1862. Claimant was pensioned as his widow from date of his death until August 26, 1870, the date of her remarriage. On February 20, 1893, thirty-one years after the soldier's death and twenty-three years after her remarriage, she filed a claim for restoration of pension as widow, alleging that she lived with her second husband for nearly six years when she discovered that he had a wife and children then living, and that said marriage was illegal and void and not a marriage in fact or law, and thereupon left him. Twenty-eight years after claimant's marriage

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 30.

on August 26, 1870, and twenty-two years after separation from her second husband, she procured a decree, in February, 1898, annulling her second marriage on the ground that at date her second husband had a wife living and undivorced. The arrearage payment in this case was \$2,700."¹¹¹

In concluding his report the Commissioner stated that such cases could be multiplied indefinitely. "The law is an open invitation to fraud, perjury, and misrepresentation, and its enforcement has demonstrated by experience that it has openly invited and been the subject of gross and flagrant abuse, and it should be repealed."¹¹²

Mr. Evans himself, however, was replaced by a new Commissioner, and the reports for the following years reveal no such opposition to the act on the part of his successors. The law still remains, and by reason of it, widows who later remarried, may still filch the Government for thousands of dollars and use it to support husbands who had not yet been born when the Civil War was being fought.

It is impossible to determine exactly the total cost imposed upon the Government by the Arrears Act. Before its passage, the pension rolls had been gradually decreasing, both as to the number of pensioners and the amounts paid therefor. But within six years following its enactment the number of pensioners had grown from 223,998 to 345,125, while the amount that was annually expended for the same had increased from \$27,000,000 to over \$68,000,000. Commissioner Black in reply to an inquiry from Samuel J. Randall, January 25, 1886, estimated that the act had, up to June 30, 1885, cost the Government \$179,405,872.¹¹³ That it has imposed a sum many times larger upon the nation since that date, is not to be doubted. This was the act that had been passed in the belief that it would require but eighteen or twenty million dollars to carry out its provisions!

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* pp. 30-31.

¹¹² *Ibid.* p. 34.

¹¹³ *House Report.* 49th Cong. 1st sess. No. 783.

CHAPTER IV

PENSIONS AND POLITICS

Following the Arrears Act of 1879, there was no epoch-making piece of pension legislation enacted for seven years. But this period is not without interest. During the early eighties the pension system was undergoing a rapid growth and it was coming to play a very significant part in both state and national politics. For this development, the activity of the Grand Army of the Republic and the political interests of the newly appointed Commissioner, Colonel W. W. Dudley, were chiefly responsible.

For several years after its organization in 1866, the Grand Army of the Republic had devoted its energies to legitimate and praiseworthy motives. Its members had pledged to each other their loyal support, and declared their intention of enforcing a "speedy adjustment and payment of all lawful claims against the Government due soldiers and sailors and their friends."¹ But it was not until 1878 that they took any definite action upon the question of pensions. In his annual address for that year, their Commander-in-Chief, General John C. Robinson, called attention to the Arrears Act which was then pending in Congress. He stated that he had been impressed with the justness of the measure, and had brought it to the attention of the Department Commanders with the hope that they would secure favorable action upon it.²

Before a year had passed, the Arrears Act became a law. It infused new life into the Grand Army organization. Within two years over 44,000 names were added to its list, and by the close of the year 1881 it had a membership of 85,856.³ As a political organization it now became a power to be reckoned with. At the annual encampment in 1881, held in Indianapolis, a committee was appointed "to inquire into the examination and settlement of pension claims,

¹ *Proceedings of First National Convention of G. A. R.*, 1866. p. 9.

² *Proceedings of Twelfth Annual Encampment of G. A. R.*, 1878. p. 521-522.

³ *Adjutant-General's Report: G. A. R. Proceedings.* 1882. p. 911.

and to ascertain the cause for delay.” The Grand Army now meant business. At the next national encampment, which met in Baltimore, Corporal James Tanner, of whom we shall hear much in later pension history, submitted their report. He announced that the members of the committee had met in Washington on February 20, 1882, and continued in session for three days. Commissioner Dudley had been in conference with them, and favored “us with a most complete review of the condition of affairs in Pension Office and the workings thereof.”⁴

The committee had made eight recommendations to Congress, and reported the following results:

1st. “That the present force—742—of the Pension Office be doubled. This recommendation resulted in Congress providing for *eight hundred and seventeen additional clerks* in the Pension Office.

2nd. An increase in the clerical force employed on pension work in the office of the Adjutant-General, and of the Surgeon, U. S. Army, respectively.

Endorsed by Congress providing for the employment of *one hundred and sixty-seven* additional clerks in the Adjutant-General’s office, and *one hundred and sixty-six* in the office of the Surgeon General. It also resulted in the providing of *twelve* additional clerks in the office of the Secretary of War, *eight* in the Second Comptroller’s office, *twenty* in the office of the Third Auditor, making a total of *twelve hundred and ten* additional employees to be engaged exclusively in Pension work at a total annual expense of *one million, seven hundred and forty-two thousand, four hundred and thirty dollars*.

3rd. Additional appropriations to enable the Commissioner of Pensions to establish and pay examining boards of surgeons at such places as he deems necessary, and this had been met by a separate bill now on its passage.

4th. Appropriation to enable the Commissioner to employ additional special examiners; *two hundred and fifty* have been provided for.

⁴ *Proceedings of Sixteenth Annual Encampment of G. A. R.* 1882. p. 872.

- 5th. The Commissioner of Pensions to have power to employ, and appropriations to pay, medical experts for special examinations as to diseases of the eye, ear, nerves, etc. This is provided for in the bill establishing boards of examining surgeons referred to in recommendation in No. 3.
- 6th. Such legislation as may be necessary to secure to pension claimants or their attorneys certified copies of so much of the public or official records as relate to the service and military and hospital history of said claimants.

Upon this recommendation no action appears to have been taken.

- 7th. That false testimony against a claimant for pensions be made perjury as when given against the Government. This recommendation has been formally considered and will doubtless become a law.
- 8th. That the bill granting *forty dollars* per month for the loss of one leg, or one arm, or one foot, or one hand, or for an equivalent disability, become a law. This bill has passed the House of Representatives, and is now in the Senate Committee on Pensions.”⁵

No other organization in the country could boast of so much favorable legislation as that reported by the pension committee of the Grand Army of the Republic. Within one year after its creation, it had become the real power of that body. As a means for influencing doubtful members of Congress, it had no equal. In the report just mentioned, the committee did not stop with the mere request, but *demand*ed “that Congress should first and foremost take such steps, regardless of the question of dollars and cents, as would result in the speediest possible settlement” of the 285,000 claims then on file. “It is the first time,” continues the report, “that the accredited representatives of our order have come directly in contact with the law-making power. Common justice demands that we should officially state the obligations we feel under for the cordial reception we met with at the hands of the Pension Committees of

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 873-874.

both Houses.”⁶ It was freely stated by them that they had long felt the desirability of dealing directly with the accredited representatives of the soldier.

The committee had been so successful in its first appearance before Congress, that the Grand Army decided to establish a permanent standing committee on pensions. Henceforth, this was to be the great machine in that organization for the prosecution of pension claims. Its object was to take charge of all questions relating to soldiers’ applications and outline policies which it felt would be best suited for securing favorable legislation. From the bills proposed in Congress, they selected those upon which they desired favorable action, and what is still more significant, they soon began to formulate measures of their own and demanded their enactment.

By 1884 no other department of the Grand Army organization was doing such effective work. None but the most active and prominent members were appointed to serve on this committee. For the year just mentioned, the membership consisted of Messrs. George S. Merrill, Louis Wagner, Paul Van Der Voort, James Tanner, and Hon. Charles H. Grosvenor.⁷ The first three had held the exalted position of Commander-in-Chief of the national organization. Corporal Tanner’s activity was universally recognized, and he was later to be honored by being appointed Commissioner of Pensions. Mr. Grosvenor was perhaps the most devoted friend the ex-soldiers had in national politics, and was hailed as “the fearless, zealous, and active champion of their rights.”⁸

Shortly after Congress assembled in December, 1883, this committee established itself in Washington. Before proceeding with their labors, they consulted “with members of the several pension committees, with prominent senators and representatives, including a number of efficient and influential comrades, . . . Throughout, we had the advice and the cordial cooperation of the Commissioner of Pensions.”⁹ The committee found that nearly one hundred bills

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 874.

⁷ *Journal of Eighteenth National Encampment of G. A. R.* 1884. p. 107.

⁸ *National Tribune.* June 19, 1884.

⁹ *Journal of Eighteenth National Encampment of G. A. R.* 1884. p. 105.

relating to pensions had been introduced in Congress. Several sessions were held, in which the different measures were carefully considered. After informing Congress of the fact that they represented a constituency of more than 220,000 veteran soldiers and sailors, the committee then specified the bills they desired to have passed. The following were the chief measures which they recommended:

Extension of the limitation on the Arrears Act to January 1, 1885.

The granting of pensions to ex-prisoners of war who were suffering from disability.

An increase of the widows' pensions from eight to twelve dollars a month. Also an increase of pensions for minors.

An increase of rates for specific disabilities in certain enumerated cases.

And finally, they desired the passage of a bill fixing the qualification and status of claimants and their agents or attorneys.¹⁰

In concluding their report we find these words: "We beg leave to respectfully submit that if any one thinks the foregoing carefully considered requests make too large drafts on the resources of the country, that we represent a body of men on whom, in the hour of its direst extremity, the country made drafts of blood, of limbs, suffering and life, and the Nation's draft never went to protest."¹¹

These recommendations were submitted to Congress on March 11, 1884. The *National Tribune*, which had now become the chief organ of the Grand Army of the Republic, entered upon an active campaign to have the measures passed. Its Editor-in-Chief, Mr. George E. Lemon, had assisted the committee in preparing the bills, and was materially interested in their enactment. Ex-soldiers all over the country were called upon to write personal letters to their senators and congressmen, insisting that they be adopted. The same request was made of the Grand Army Posts. In an editorial of March 20, 1884, the *National*

¹⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 106-107.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 107.

Tribune stated: "The only reason for apprehension that now exists is the possibility that our comrades may fail to rally as they should to the support of the committee's recommendations. These recommendations, coming from such a source, cannot but have great weight with both Houses of Congress and both political parties, but they must be followed up by a hearty, united and enthusiastic appeal from our ex-soldiers generally for their adoption. Every veteran, whether a member of the Grand Army or not, who believes that the measures advocated by the Pension Committee of the Grand Army are just and calculated to benefit the soldier, should hasten to demand of his Senator or Representative his vote in their favor."¹²

In almost every issue from that date until Congress adjourned, an editorial appeared in behalf of the measures. Under date of May 7, it was announced that if Congress failed to do its duty by the ex-soldiers during the present session, it would not be because of any ignorance as to what that duty was. Petitions were pouring in by the hundreds, demanding favorable action upon the committee's recommendations. On May 6, 1884, Mr. Robert B. Beath, Commander-in-Chief of the national organization, issued an order (No. 12) in which he requested all Posts that had not yet sent in petitions to do so at once.¹³ An examination of the *Congressional Record* for this session shows that such action was taken by more than five hundred Grand Army Posts. Even the legislatures of three states, Iowa, New York, and Ohio, sent petitions to the same effect.

But in spite of all these efforts, the first session of the Forty-eighth Congress adjourned, having passed but one important measure. There were several reasons for this. In the first place, its membership was comprised very largely of ex-Confederates, men who had recently been in armed rebellion against the national Government. Quite naturally they would be opposed to any further liberalization of the pension laws in behalf of the Union soldiers. Under caption of an editorial headed, "The Confederacy in the Saddle", appearing in the *National Tribune* on July 17, 1884, it stated:

¹² *National Tribune*, Mar. 20, 1884.

¹³ *Ibid.* May 8, 1884.

"A Congress largely made up of men who were lately in arms against the Government, and the lower House of which was completely under their control, has lately concluded a singularly fruitless session of seven months."¹⁴ After denouncing the southern members of Congress for not lending their support to the pension measures, it concluded with the statement that the last hope of the Union soldier, his widow, and orphan, had been dispelled by the action of those men who had fought against them in the field.¹⁴

Another reason given for the failure of Congress to adopt the recommendations of the Grand Army Pension Committee was the fact that many Posts demanded consideration of measures entirely different from those which had been submitted. The National Encampment had tried hard to prevent this independent action, but was unable to suppress it. Disappointment was felt in many quarters because the committee had not included more demands in its report, and hence the separate organizations began to petition for laws satisfactory to their own members. This led to the preparation of a great number of bills, many of which were utterly contradictory in their nature. In commenting on this situation, the *New York Sun* remarked: "The accumulated pension schemes now before Congress have assumed the proportions of legislative insanity. Congress is considering with feverish earnestness projects which, had they not reached their present dimensions by insensible graduations, would be regarded as the chimeras of madmen. . . . Intelligent members of Congress should pause and consider whither they are drifting."¹⁵

In face of all the different requests made upon it, Congress was more or less undecided as to just what measures the majority of ex-soldiers really desired. At least, such lack of harmony afforded a good excuse for casting a negative vote by those senators and representatives who were opposed to more liberal pension laws. This failure on the part of the local Grand Army Posts to accept the recommendations of their committee, and support them to the exclusion of all other measures, brought forth a severe rebuke from its chairman, Corporal Tanner. In commenting upon their

¹⁴ *Ibid.* July 17, 1884.

¹⁵ *N. Y. Sun*, June 26, 1884.

action he stated, "We firmly believe that but for the attacks made upon the work of your committee by those who, with less opportunity of knowing what could fairly be hoped for in pension legislation by united action (but for this), we believe that substantially all that was recommended by your Committee would have become law at the session of Congress last closed, and, before the summer's sunshine had gone, a brighter, more lasting and blessed sunshine have lighted the hearthstones of a hundred thousand veterans' homes where now is want and almost black despair."¹⁶

There was still another reason why this session of Congress was unwilling to extend the pension laws, and that was the desire on the part of certain members, particularly the Democrats, to present a record for economy in the coming campaign. The Republicans, especially the high protectionists, would have been glad to increase the pension budget in order to drain out some of the surplus that was accumulating in the national Treasury. While the interests of the high tariff men and the pensioners did not become completely merged until a few years later, they were joining hands even before Cleveland's administration. Pensioners and ex-soldiers were repeatedly warned through the columns of the *National Tribune* not to allow their congressmen to vote for any reduction in the tariff. For it was felt that just as soon as the surplus began to disappear, the appropriations for pensions would be diminished. The following editorial appeared in the *National Tribune* on January 24, 1884:

"The Danger of the Hour"

"In the midst of their discussions as to the merits of the various pension and bounty measures now pending before Congress, there is one thing that our veterans should keep constantly in mind, namely, the danger that the present revenues of the Government will be so reduced by legislative action as to leave no surplus in the Treasury out of which the amount required for the carrying out of any of these new pension and bounty measures can be appropriated. That danger is real and perhaps imminent, and it becomes our ex-soldiers to exercise their utmost influence to avert it. It matters not what their politics may be, or whether they are believers in the doctrine of free trade or protection, they have a common interest in preventing this

¹⁶ *Journal of National Encampment of G. A. R.* 1884. p. 110.

reduction, since it would afford an excuse, if not a justification, for a refusal by Congress to further consider our claims upon it."¹⁷

In the Presidential campaign of 1884, however, the Democrats were determined to present a record for economy. Many of them felt that the pension roll had already become unduly expensive, and expressed some anxiety as to its future growth. Mr. Hancock, of Texas, remarked, "We are now expending for pensions alone more than double as much annually as was necessarily expended by the general Government from 1840 to 1850, and it is difficult to say where it is to stop when it is looked upon as a powerful lever by many members of the House to secure a succession to their seats upon this floor."¹⁸ Unwilling to bear the brunt of an extravagant expenditure of money, the Democrats prevented any increase in the pension budget for 1885.

It is interesting to note that the only important pension law passed by this session of Congress, happened to be one that was opposed by the Grand Army Pension Committee. By its provisions, the fee which claim agents were permitted to charge for the successful prosecution of claims, was increased from ten dollars to twenty-five dollars.¹⁹ It was tacked on to the bill carrying appropriations for pensions, and the two parties who were most vitally interested in the measure were Commissioner Dudley and the big Washington claim agent, Mr. George E. Lemon. The action of Mr. Lemon was such as to attract the attention of Congress, and shortly after convening in December, 1884, the Committee on Pensions and Bounty Land was ordered to make an investigation of the practices in the Pension Office, and "the conditions surrounding the enactment of certain pension laws."²⁰ The testimony that was produced in the hearing before this committee reveals the tremendous power that was exerted by Washington claim agents, and by Mr. Lemon in particular. The influence of the latter firm seems almost incredible.

Attention has already been called to the act of June 20, 1878, whereby claim agents were allowed to charge only ten dollars for prosecuting pension claims. The fee, however,

¹⁷ *National Tribune*, Jan. 24, 1884.

¹⁸ *Cong. Record*, 48th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 487.

¹⁹ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. 15, p. 99.

²⁰ *House Reports*, 48th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 3, No. 2683.

could be collected before the claim was allowed, and if not able to collect the full amount, the agents would take half of it, or whatever sum they could induce the applicant to pay. The act, instead of meeting with success, has led to very serious abuses. Claim agents would frequently collect the ten dollars, or as much of it as they could, and then drop the case without ever filing it. The claimant upon hearing that his case had been dropped would then turn to his representative for assistance. This imposed still greater work upon the members of Congress. And it was frequently discovered, when the case was examined, that the applicant had been robbed, not once, but several times.²¹

However, the majority of claimants appear to have been satisfied with the law. It was the Washington claim agents, and particularly Mr. Lemon, who was responsible for its repeal. Mr. Lemon's firm was by far the largest corporation in Washington during the eighties. For almost twenty years, he had been engaged in the pension business. It was he who had founded the *National Tribune*, the great soldier newspaper, in 1877. Within seven years he had increased its circulation to over 112,000 paid subscribers, a circulation which he claimed was hardly equalled by another weekly paper in the country.²² In 1884, his firm was handling upwards of 125,000 pension claims, more than all other attorneys in Washington combined.²³ For conducting this enormous business, he employed between sixty-five and seventy clerks, a force as large as that employed in the entire Pension Bureau in 1861.

In all questions of pension legislation, Mr. Lemon exerted a great influence. He boasted of having defeated the "Sixty-Surgeon Pension Bill," which Commissioner Bentley had proposed during his administration, and declared that it had given him greater pride than any other act of his life.²⁴ He had been unable to prevent the adoption of the ten-dollar fee law in 1878, but after Commissioner Dudley took over the administration of the office in 1881, Mr. Lemon set about to have it repealed. His intimate acquaintance with

²¹ Statements of Messrs. Rogers, (Ark.) and Warner (Ohio). *Cong. Record*. 48th Cong. 1st sess. p. 2886.

²² *National Tribune*. July 10, 1884.

²³ *House Reports*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3, No. 2683. p. 14.

²⁴ *Ibid*. p. 160.

the new Commissioner and with Secretary of Interior Teller, was used to a good advantage. In the spring and summer of 1884, he concentrated his efforts upon these two officials, and secured their approval for the reënactment of the law, allowing a fee of twenty-five dollars for prosecuting pension claims.²⁵ No part of the fee, however, could be collected until the claim had been allowed and the first payment made.

Concerning this feature of the bill, there was no ground for criticism. The objection lay in the fact, that when the measure finally passed, it was allowed to become retroactive. As originally intended, the twenty-five dollar fee was to be collected only upon those claims filed after the date of the passage of this act. This was stipulated in the bill as it passed the House.²⁶ But in the Senate this provision was omitted, and it was allowed to apply to all cases then on file.²⁷ Herein is where Mr. Lemon's influence had been felt. None of the other Washington claim agents, and in fact very few members of Congress, appear to have understood the significance of the provision. Mr. Warner, chairman of the investigating committee, stated that the measure received no consideration in either House, but that the claim agent who prepared the amendment—referring to Mr. Lemon—knew exactly what it would accomplish.²⁸

Just a few days before the passage of the bill, while it was still being considered by the joint committee of conference, Mr. Lemon completed all arrangements for buying out the claims of another large pension firm, headed by Mr. N. W. Fitzgerald.²⁹ In this transaction, he secured upwards of 40,000 additional pension claims, and the ownership of the *Citizen World*, a soldier newspaper that had a circulation among 20,000 paid subscribers. The total business was obtained for \$10,000. The same day on which the deal was closed, June 26, 1884, the conference committee reported favorably upon the bill. Mr. Fitzgerald, who had been suspended by Commissioner Dudley in October, 1883, was suddenly reinstated in order that his claims might be transferred to Mr. Lemon.³⁰ On the day following the transfer of his

²⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 16, 99.

²⁶ *Cong. Record.* 48th Cong. 1st sess. p. 3402.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 6389.

²⁸ *House Reports.* 48th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3. No. 2683, p. 21.

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 29.

³⁰ Testimony of Ass't Sec. of Interior, L. M. Joslyn. *Ibid.* p. 60.

claims to Mr. Lemon's office, Mr. Fitzgerald discovered for the first time that the provision allowing the increased fee, had been approved by both Houses. He then declared that he went to Mr. Lemon and tried to repurchase his business, offering him his money back and \$20,000 in cash. Mr. Lemon's reply was—"You don't know what you are talking about. Your business has not cost me only the \$8,000 (\$10,000) I paid you; it has cost me \$50,000 to get the bill through Congress."³¹ (This part of the testimony was flatly contradicted by Mr. Lemon. He admitted, however, that Mr. Fitzgerald had come to him and tried to repurchase the business.)

By the purchase, Mr. Lemon had secured upwards of 30,000 live claims, and due to a ruling of Acting Commissioner Clarke he could compel the applicants to file a new contract and collect the full amount of twenty-five dollars. The same day upon which the deal was made, Mr. Lemon secured an executive order (No. 100) from Secretary of Interior Teller, in which he alone was to be recognized as the substitute attorney for all claims that had been filed with Mr. Fitzgerald.³² This was rather a strange move on the part of Mr. Teller. According to an order issued under date of April 22, 1882, no substitution of attorneys could be made unless the written consent of the applicant was obtained. But this was now suddenly revoked, and some 30,000 claimants were thrown upon the mercy of Mr. Lemon.

That the act of July 4, 1884, was virtually the work of one claim agent cannot be doubted. It compelled claimants to file a new contract, and pay fifteen dollars more, in case the claim was allowed, than they had agreed to pay originally. In discussing this feature of the bill during the next session of Congress, Mr. Warner, chairman of the Committee on Pensions, characterized it as one of the grossest abuses ever practiced upon pension claimants. He stated that within six months after the passage of the law, over 90,000 such contracts had been filed. These were old claims upon which certain payments had been made, but under the new law, were forced to file a new contract of \$25 each. "In my opinion", he remarked, "piracy in the middle ages on honest

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 30.

³² *Ibid.* p. 41.

commerce was an honest calling compared to such a practice.”³³ Had the act been made to apply only to those claims filed after the date of its passage, there could have been little ground for criticism. In this case it would have been a protection both to the claimant and the honest pension attorneys, for since no part of the fee could be collected until the pension was allowed, it would have resulted in the filing of only the more honest claims. It was the retroactive feature of the law that opened the way to serious abuses. And for this provision, Mr. Lemon was largely, if not entirely, responsible.

Not satisfied with the treatment received at the hands of the Forty-eighth Congress, the ex-soldiers started out in 1884 to capture the next session, and also the presidency. Again the *National Tribune* was their chief spokesman. They apparently had not yet learned of the part Mr. Lemon had played in securing the adoption of the increased fee law, and hence were still willing to follow his suggestion in the campaign of that year.

As early as February 28, 1884, the following editorial appeared in the columns of the *National Tribune*:

“The Soldier’s Year—Let us Have a Soldier President.”

“This is the soldier’s year. Slandered, abused, neglected, despised though he be at all other times and seasons, this year the soldier cannot be ignored. For it is the year of a presidential election, and it is the soldier who holds the balance of power—one million honest unimpeachable votes, upon the casting of which the issues of the election will hang. Think of it, soldiers! . . .

“Prove yourselves equal to the occasion! Within the next four months both political parties will hold their nominating conventions at Chicago. It rests with you to say who shall be the delegates to those conventions. It matters not whether in national politics you are Republicans or Democrats; as soldiers it is your duty to exert your influence within party lines for the nomination of a soldier. . . .

“We are not so helpless or friendless as some may believe. There is not a community in the whole North and West where we cannot make our influence felt if we but show our colors and sound the advance. Every patriotic citizen in the land will rally to our standard, and the politicians who now affect to believe that the soldier is ‘played out’ will be only too glad to fall in at the tail end of the procession.

³³ *Cong. Record*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. p. 487.

"Fall in then, soldiers, and let us all take a hand in the campaign. We shall not lack for leaders when the time comes, and the day that witnesses the assertion of the soldiers' influence at Chicago will assure to us the full recognition of our rights by Congress and the Executive."³⁴

Editorials of a similar nature appeared in almost every issue of the *National Tribune* from that date up until the two conventions met in Chicago. Soldiers were constantly reminded of the strength they could wield if only they stood together. The evenly balanced conditions of the two great political parties offered a splendid opportunity for them to exert their influence, and perhaps cast the deciding vote. Under date of April 10, 1884, the *National Tribune* recommended that, this being the "Soldier's Year," each of the big parties should nominate a soldier for president. While it was admitted that ex-Governor Tilden, Grover Cleveland, and Senator Payne were perhaps the strongest men in the Democratic party, yet they should be passed over, and the Democrats should turn to the famous General W. S. Rosecrans. As to the Republicans, they should overlook Mr. Blaine and Senator Edmunds, and nominate General John A. Logan to lead them to victory.³⁵

When the Republican convention met and named General Logan for second place upon their ticket instead of first, the soldiers were somewhat disappointed. However, they accepted the results as the best possible combination. The fact that General Logan had won the nomination for Vice-President over Postmaster-General Gresham, who was considered an enemy of the pensioners, had given them great hopes. In presenting his name to the Convention, Senator Plumb of Kansas remarked that 70,000 soldiers upon the prairies of Kansas stood ready to endorse him, and that a million living veterans would rally to his support.³⁶ In commenting upon the nominations, the *National Tribune* stated, "The names of James G. Blaine and John A. Logan appear in this happy conjunction to-day because our ex-soldiers have brought it about. It was their influence which dominated at Chicago, and when they foresaw that there

³⁴ *National Tribune*. Feb. 28, 1884.

³⁵ *Ibid.* Apr. 10, 1884.

³⁶ *Proceedings of Republican National Convention*. Chicago, 1884. p. 169.

was but one combination which would prevent the nomination of candidates whose lukewarmness in their cause was not longer a matter of question, they hesitated no longer, but enthusiastically agreed upon this alliance of statesman with a statesman who was also a soldier."³⁷

When the Democratic Convention met a few weeks later and placed the names of Grover Cleveland and Mr. Hendricks upon their national ticket instead of such veterans as Generals Rosecrans, Black, or Hancock, the pensioners and ex-soldiers were sorely disappointed. The *National Tribune* at once urged upon them, regardless of their political faith, to support the ticket headed by Blaine and Logan.

There was a much stronger reason, however, why they should support the Republican party in that campaign. This was due to the plank in their platform relating to pensions. It read as follows: "The grateful thanks of the American people are due to the Union soldier of the late war, and the Republican party stands pledged to suitable pensions to all who were disabled, and for the orphans and widows of those who died in the war. The Republican party pledges itself to the repeal of the limitation contained in the arrears act of 1879, so that all invalid soldiers shall share alike, and their pension shall begin with the date of disability or discharge, and not with the date of application."³⁸

Contrasted to this specific pledge was the very indefinite statement found in the Democratic platform. "The system of direct taxation known as the 'Internal Revenue' is a war tax, and so long as the war continues, the money derived therefrom should be sacredly devoted to the relief of the people from the remaining burdens of war, and be made a fund to defray the expense of the care and comfort of worthy soldiers disabled in the line of duty in the wars of the Republic and for the payment of such pensions as Congress may from time to time grant to such soldiers, a like fund for the sailors having been already provided; and any surplus should be paid into the Treasury."³⁹

This plank was characterized as an empty promise. The attention of pensioners and ex-soldiers was called to the fact

³⁷ *National Tribune*. June 12, 1884.

³⁸ *Proceedings of Republican National Convention*. Chicago, 1884. p. 93.

³⁹ *Proceedings of Democratic National Convention*. Chicago, 1884. p. 198.

that another plank in the same platform declared that the existence of a hundred million dollar surplus in the national treasury proved the necessity for a change in administration. Hence the refusal on the part of Democrats during the last session of Congress to devote that surplus to the payment of pensions was considered as a notorious example of bad faith. "The real intent (of the Democrats) is clearly to so cut down the revenues of the Government that there will be no surplus out of which to meet the payments required by new pension legislation, and vice versa, to pass no new pension laws, so as to have an excuse for abolishing the internal revenue entirely."⁴⁰ Pension claimants were warned, from that date until the November elections, that if they expected to enjoy more liberal treatment in the future, they should, regardless of political affiliation, cast their votes for the Republican party.

It was in the midst of this uncertain campaign that Commissioner Dudley decided to abandon his work in Washington and enter the field in behalf of the Republican ticket. For this work he was eminently qualified. His activity in the campaign of 1880 had brought him to the attention of the Republican national leaders, and President Garfield had been forced to give him a position. Commenting upon his appointment, the *New York Nation* declared that it was the most inexcusable act of President Garfield's short administration, and one which did much to shake the confidence of the friends of civil-service reform.

" . . . when Garfield came into office, Mr. Bentley was Commissioner of Pensions. He had administered the office in a time of great perplexity, with remarkable energy and efficiency, and with unimpeachable integrity. But his place was wanted for Colonel Dudley, who had been of great service in the Indiana campaign. The President held out for a few weeks, but finally succumbed, and about the middle of June, 1881, he requested Mr. Bentley's resignation. What the mysterious 'pressure' behind Garfield was it is not difficult to conjecture. . . ."⁴¹

Of all government officials who have been guilty of pros-

⁴⁰ *National Tribune*. July 17, 1884.

⁴¹ *N. Y. Nation*. Oct. 2, 1884.

tituting their offices to purely political purposes, none can show a more notorious record, either in the method of organization or in scope of work, than that established by Colonel W. W. Dudley. During the three and a half years in which he was Commissioner of Pensions, his one aim appears to have been that of building up a great political machine. He realized more keenly than any previous Commissioner, the enormous power that lay in the hands of the pensioners, if only it could be effectively organized. To this end he devoted all his personal interests, as well as those of the Bureau over which he presided.

One of the first recommendations made by Mr. Dudley after he became Commissioner of Pensions, was that of asking Congress for a larger clerical force, in order that all pending claims might be at once disposed of. This request being granted—by an appropriation that enabled him to more than double the number of clerks—he next asked that boards of examining surgeons be appointed in the different sections of the country, for the convenience of pension applicants. Again Congress responded to his request; and the pensioners began to feel that at last they had secured the services of a real friend.

His next step was of much greater significance. In his annual report for 1882, Commissioner Dudley stated: "In my opinion, there is no question so befogged in mystery, and needing so much and more complete knowledge of its detail, than what may be termed the possibilities of the future with regard to the pension business."⁴² In order that he might determine "the possibilities of the future", he directed the clerks of the Bureau carefully to prepare a statement showing the total number of enlistments in each regimental organization from every state and territory in the Union. The statement also showed the number of applications for pensions on account of the late war, both as to invalids and as to the representatives of deceased soldiers.

The table when completed, contained some very interesting information. The grand total of individual enlistments in the army and navy during the war was given as 2,069,391. Of this number only 458,553, or 26 per cent, had applied for

⁴² *Annual Report. Commissioner of Pensions, 1882.*

pensions. Also 297,566 dependents and relatives had filed applications for pensions. The number of *living* soldiers and sailors who had not yet applied was estimated at 1,000,469; and 86,803 pensionable relatives had not yet presented their claims.⁴³ In submitting the results of his investigation, Commissioner Dudley announced that some idea could now be formed as to what still remained to be done, and as to what might be expected in the future.

It is interesting to note that of the 285,000 pensioners borne upon the rolls, more than two-fifths of them lived in the five states of Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. And over one-half of the 300,000 claims then pending came from these same five states. The political results in these doubtful states were to be determined largely by the treatment accorded to the pensioners who resided therein. Of this Commissioner Dudley was keenly aware, and during the next eighteen months he devoted considerable attention to their demands.

The most effective way in which thousands of claimants could be aided, was to furnish them a list of their company officers and comrades, whose testimony was needed to establish their case. For years, applicants had been complaining that their inability to locate the name and address of certain comrades was all that prevented them from securing a pension. This was doubtless true in a great number of cases. To assist them Commissioner Dudley decided to compile a directory, showing the names and post-office addresses of every surviving soldier of the late war. In this important undertaking he secured the aid of the Grand Army of the Republic. In March, 1884, he called upon General Robert B. Beath, commander-in-chief of that organization, and with his assistance, a plan was adopted whereby they hoped to secure a list of all G. A. R. posts and the address of every member throughout the country.⁴⁴

In addition to this, the special examiners were ordered to keep a record of all the witnesses they met with in the examination of cases. From these two sources, Commissioner Dudley hoped to be able to furnish each claimant the ad-

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Journal of Eighteenth National Encampment of G. A. R.* 1884. p. 33.

dressess of all those comrades whose testimony was needed to establish a claim. During the first six months after the plan was put in operation, the names and addresses of 189,000 members were secured.⁴⁵ It was expected that the number would reach approximately 700,000 by January 1, 1885. But since Commissioner Dudley was removed before he had an opportunity of submitting another report, it is not known what the results of the system were. Under the new Commissioner, General J. C. Black, the plan was apparently dropped, since no record can be found of its use.

All the above plans were only preliminary to the great work Mr. Dudley was to perform in the campaign of 1884. Having lost the nomination for governor of Indiana on the Republican ticket, he started out to secure a more important position. It was generally understood that in case of Mr. Blaine's election, he was to appoint Mr. Dudley as Secretary of Interior; and hence the latter felt called upon to see that his party was successful in the campaign of that year. To this end, he decided to use every means at his disposal. The Pension Bureau became simply a political machine, whose object was to secure votes for the Republican ticket.

Early in September, 1884, Commissioner Dudley left his work in Washington and went to Ohio in order to help conduct the campaign that was then in progress. Since the Ohio election was held on October 14, three weeks before the general election, it attracted national attention. Both political parties were bending every effort to win this first important contest. Sentiment there was about equally divided. While the Democrats controlled a majority of the members of Congress, 13 out of 21, yet the state had given President Garfield a plurality of 34,000 votes in 1880. What the outcome of the present campaign would be, it was difficult to determine. But the party that had the support of the soldier vote was certain of victory.

To win this support was Colonel Dudley's mission. In 1884, there were over 29,000 pensioners living in Ohio. They received from the national Government a total annual sum of more than \$5,300,000. Upwards of 40,000 claims from this same state were then on file in the Bureau, awaiting

⁴⁵ *Annual Report, Commissioner of Pensions. 1884.*

settlement. The political influence of these and other pension claimants was sufficient to throw the election into the hands of whatever party they desired. In all probability not more than forty per cent of these claims would ever be allowed. But in order that none of the applicants should take offense at the Republican administration, the clerks in the Pension Bureau were instructed to reject no more claims until after the election.⁴⁶ Not only this, but the charge was also made that Commissioner Dudley had ordered the claims of those voters who lived in Ohio and Indiana to be taken up in advance of those coming from other states, and to be given a preference in their examination.⁴⁷ The records fail to show to what extent this practice was engaged in during the weeks immediately preceding the election. But it is discovered from the annual reports for 1885, that approximately 2,000 claims had been allowed in Ohio, and over 3,000 in Indiana, during the last fiscal year. This number exceeded by fifteen hundred, the claims that had been allowed in these two states during 1883-1884.⁴⁸

Commissioner Dudley's chief work, however, was not that of promiscuously handing out pension claims. This he would have been unable to do, even had he so desired, for each case had to go through a definite procedure in the Bureau before it could be allowed. What he was primarily interested in, was that of managing the campaign so as to insure a Republican victory. To this end he used all the influence of his official position. Instead of resigning from office when he left Washington in September, 1884, he simply took "a leave of absence" and continued to draw his salary as Commissioner of Pensions up until November 10, one week after the general election.⁴⁹ And during this period of two months he was reported to have been in Washington but twice.

Upon reaching Ohio, Mr. Dudley established his headquarters in Columbus, and entered upon his work. He, in connection with Mr. Chauncy I. Filley of St. Louis, and Mr. Powell Clayton of Arkansas, took personal charge of

⁴⁶ This was the testimony of six different witnesses who appeared before the House Committee on Investigation of the Pension Office. *House Report*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3, No. 2683. pp. 32, 35, 38, 42, 43, 46.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 70.

⁴⁸ *Annual Reports*. 1882; 1884; 1885.

⁴⁹ *House Report*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3. No. 2683. p. 242, 262.

the campaign. Commissioner Dudley ordered men at will from the Pension Bureau to come and assist in the contest.⁵⁰ Special examiners were ordered to report for duty wherever he felt their influence was most needed. His conduct became so notorious that friends of honest government throughout the country began to protest, and President Arthur was called upon to dismiss him. On October 11, Mr. Everett P. Wheeler, counsel for the Civil Service Reform Association in New York, addressed a letter to the President in which he called attention to the fact that Commissioner Dudley was absent from his post, "and engaged in conducting the canvass of the Republican party in Ohio to the entire neglect of his official duties."⁵¹ President Arthur acknowledged receipt of the letter, but refused to take action upon the matter until the case was investigated by the Secretary of Interior. This was a great disappointment to the friends of the Civil Service system. The *New York Herald* stated:

"This will not do, Mr. Arthur. The facts are notorious—as notorious as the dates of an almanac in a court of law. You know of Mr. Dudley's absence from Washington. You know the cause of his absence. You know what he has been doing in Ohio. You know of his impudent boast that you dare not interrupt him till he gets through. You know of his intended passage from Ohio into Indiana, to repeat the same dirty work there for Mr. Blaine. You know too, that the "red tape" circumambient course on which you have sent the letter through the Interior Department will not bring it back to you till after the November election, and that in the meanwhile Commissioner Dudley will remain in Indiana perpetrating his villainies unless you take a prompter step to recall him or remove him."⁵²

The editorial closed with the statement that President Arthur could not go out of office with a clean reputation of having faithfully enforced the civil service laws, if he allowed a delayed report on Mr. Dudley's case.

The *New York Nation* also took up the attack upon Mr. Dudley's conduct in Ohio. Under date of October 16, it stated: "A more flagrant abuse of official power and more gross violation of civil service rules could not be committed than Mr. Dudley is guilty of. He is drawing a salary as an officer of the Government, yet he is using the whole power

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 38, 56, 186.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 70.

⁵² *N. Y. Herald.* Oct. 18, 1884.

of his office, not merely as a campaign speaker and worker, but as a direct bribe for votes. As head of the Pension Bureau, he promises every soldier who has an adjudicated claim against the Government that if he will vote for Blaine his claim will be given a preference."⁵³

A number of special pension examiners soon followed Mr. Dudley into Ohio. Their ostensible purpose in going there was to investigate certain claims upon which the Bureau desired additional information. But their real motive was that of assisting their chief in conducting the campaign. The Pension Bureau served as a recruiting station from which the Republican party drew its lieutenants. Mr. J. R. Cook, one of the examiners in the Office, was appointed chief clerk of the Republican Congressional Committee during the campaign of 1884.⁵⁴ Mr. E. G. Rathbone, chief of the Special Examiner's Division, was sent to Cincinnati in October, in order to "spot repeaters" sent in by the Democratic party. Mr. W. T. Ford, chief of the Record Division, was sent there to assist him.

During the week preceding the election, Mr. Rathbone had 66 special pension examiners with him in Cincinnati alone, many of whom were deputed to act as United States marshals on election day. The number of examiners ordinarily assigned to the state of Ohio was 63, but during September and October, 101 reported there for duty.⁵⁵ That they exerted a tremendous influence upon the soldier vote is evidenced by the testimony of numerous witnesses. One illustration is furnished by the case of Mr. George Starkey, of Washington County, Ohio. He had applied for a pension in 1877, but due to insufficient evidence, had not been able to establish his claim. During all this time, the special examiners had refused to act upon his case. But on October 11, 1884, two days before the general election, Mr. Winthrop, one of the many examiners in Ohio, appeared at the home of Mr. Starkey and made out three affidavits in his case, and then informed him of the fact that if he expected to have his pension granted he should support the Republican ticket.⁵⁶ Three other witnesses, all of whom were Democrats,

⁵³ *N. Y. Nation*. Oct. 16, 1884.

⁵⁴ *House Report*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3. No. 2683, p. 231.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 109.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 5-6.

testified that the same appeal had been made to them. They declared that they had voted the Republican ticket with the express understanding that their pensions would be withheld in case they did otherwise.⁵⁷

After conducting a campaign, which the *Indianapolis Journal* (Rep.) described as the most active and bitter canvass ever known in Ohio, the Republicans succeeded in carrying the state by 15,000 votes.⁵⁸ On the morning after the election, Commissioner Dudley expressed his delight in the following telegram which he sent to Mr. L. T. Michener, Secretary of the Republican State Committee: "From all reports I regard the state safe for the Republicans from 10,000 to 15,000. I can only say, thank God for the victory."⁵⁹

The Republicans also gained two more seats in Congress. This gave them a representation of ten, while the Democrats had eleven. The two new districts which the Republicans had won from the Democrats were the First and Second, the plurality being 1609 in one, and only 209 in the other. A desperate effort had been made to defeat Mr. Warner (Dem.) of the seventeenth district, who was chairman of the investigating committee. During the month of October, nine special examiners had been at work on pension claims in his district, whereas the number ordinarily assigned there was only three.⁶⁰ Although Mr. Warner succeeded in being re-elected, his plurality was cut down from 901 votes (1882) to 226.⁶¹

On October 18, the Democratic State Committee in Ohio sent out the following address, explaining the methods by which the Republicans had carried the state:

"Dudley and The Corruption Fund"

"A million dollars, raised by wealthy stockjobbers and monopolists, was sent into the State. With it came the scum of the country, thieves, ex-detectives, repeaters and government officials, headed by W. W. Dudley, Chief of the Pension Bureau. Although thousands of widows, orphans and maimed soldiers have been waiting patiently for years for pensions promised them, and due from the government,

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 6-9.

⁵⁸ *Indianapolis Journal*. Oct. 15, 1884.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *House Reports*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. vol. 3. No. 2683. p. 17, 270.

⁶¹ *American Almanac*. 1885: p. 247.

large numbers of employees and special agents from the Pension Office, headed by their Chief, and nonresidents of Ohio spent four weeks in the State under government pay engaged in preparing for the fraud committed last Tuesday. . .⁶²

After having completed his work in Ohio, Mr. Dudley returned to Washington for a brief visit. In referring to his plans for the future, the Washington correspondent for the *Indianapolis Journal* stated: "Colonel Dudley arrived (here) from Columbus at 3 o'clock this afternoon. He does not know just what part he will take in the remainder of the campaign. The first of next week he will go to New York, where he will meet the National Republican Committee. Then, it is believed, he will go to Indiana."⁶³

The report was soon confirmed. Within less than a week Mr. Dudley was back in Indiana, doing everything in his power to insure a Republican victory. He had even a keener interest in the political affairs of that state than in those of Ohio. As a citizen of Indiana he had a wide acquaintance among pensioners and politicians. He had served through the Civil War as Colonel of the Nineteenth Regiment of Indiana volunteers, and had lost a leg at Gettysburg. As already noted (p. 105), his political activity in the campaign of 1880 had brought him to the attention of the Republican national leaders, and led to his appointment as Commissioner of Pensions. In this capacity, he used the tremendous influence of the Bureau to advance the interests of his friends and party.

There was one member of Congress from Indiana whom, above all others, Mr. Dudley was determined should be defeated for re-election. This was Mr. C. C. Matson, a Democrat, and chairman of the House Committee on Invalid Pensions. While he had always stood as a friend of the pensioners and had liberally supported measures looking toward their relief, yet Mr. Matson did not believe in simply opening up the coffers of the Treasury to every man who had done service in the late war. Because of his unwillingness to further extend the pension laws, he had incurred the enmity of Commissioner Dudley, who was now determined to retire Mr. Matson to private life.

⁶² *N. Y. Herald*. Oct. 18, 1884.

⁶³ *Indianapolis Journal*. Oct. 16, 1884.

To accomplish this purpose, Mr. Dudley again made use of the influence of the Pension Bureau. A certain Mr. Grubbs, who was a personal friend of the Commissioner, had been nominated by the Republicans to oppose Mr. Matson. In order to win the election, he needed the support of the pension vote. Realizing this, he wrote the following letter to Commissioner Dudley:

"Martinsville, Ind.

Aug. 13, 1884.

Col. W. W. Dudley,

The best thing that can be done for me in this district, where I need it most, is the appointment of a board of examiners at this point. Soldiers of all the adjacent counties are urging it. If it could be secured, presumably through any efforts of mine, it would greatly benefit me."⁶⁴

In reply to this request, Colonel Dudley answered:

"Dear Sir—

Your favor of 13th at hand. I have directed that your inquiries in regard to pension cases should have prompt attention. As to the establishment of a board of surgeons at Martinsville, I will have the matter canvassed by my medical referee as soon as possible, and if practicable it shall be done."⁶⁵

In commenting upon this request, Mr. Matson added that the medical board had been provided, and that slips could be found in the Pension Office, showing that Mr. Grubbs had asked men to be sent to Martinsville for examination.

There was another favor shown Mr. Grubbs, which so far as can be discovered, has no parallel in the history of the Pension Bureau. This resulted from an order given by Commissioner Dudley, in which he directed the chief of the Western Division of the Pension Office, Mr. Comstock, to give the same attention to the correspondence of Mr. Grubbs in all matters of pension claims, that was extended to any regularly elected member of Congress.⁶⁶ This meant that all claims filed by Mr. Grubbs, and all inquiries coming from him relating to pension, were taken up out of their regular order and given a preference over those filed by other attorneys. This was a privilege which, heretofore, had been accorded only to members of Congress. Pension claimants

⁶⁴ *Cong. Record*. 49th Cong. 1st sess. p. 1973.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 1973.

⁶⁶ *House Report*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. No. 2683. p. 244.

who employed Mr. Grubbs as their attorney were now officially informed that the prompt attention which had been given their case was due to his request.⁶⁷ Mr. Grubbs was also permitted to use the congressional blanks in calling up pension claims, was allowed the official envelopes in which the replies to claimants were returned, and in every way, treated "just as if he had been a member of Congress."⁶⁸

It would have been a very difficult task for any candidate to have prevented the re-election of Mr. Matson. As chairman of the House Committee on Invalid Pensions, he had a tremendous influence among soldiers and pensioners. While his record may not have been all that they desired, yet they knew that he would always support any legitimate claim, and favored a reasonable extension of the pension laws. Against such a candidate, Mr. Grubbs had little chance of success. Yet he made a most surprising race. He reduced the 3,500 majority which Mr. Matson had received in 1882, down to 1,369.⁶⁹ For this remarkable showing, the official influence extended him by the Pension Bureau was doubtless responsible.

Another illustration of the interest displayed by the Pension Office in the Indiana campaign of 1884 is furnished by the case of Mr. Holman, Democratic representative from the fourth district. There were few members of Congress who could boast of a more consistent record, in the matter of extending aid to pensioners, than Mr. Holman. He had always opposed the policy of graded ratings, and insisted on uniform pensions for privates and officers alike. He had always voted for bills providing for increased rates, and had often criticised the Government for not being more liberal in providing for the ex-soldiers.

But his seat in Congress was desired by a Republican and certain of the clerks in the Pension Bureau conspired to defeat him. The most effective way in which this could be done was to place Mr. Holman in an unfavorable position before his pension constituency. If it could be made to appear that he was not as active in securing pension grants as were other members of Congress, his supporters would

⁶⁷ Order of Commissioner Dudley. p. 244.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 24.

⁶⁹ *American Almanac.* 1885. p. 214.

probably desert him. So in order to weaken his influence, the clerks and pension examiners began to hold up certain claims in which Mr. Holman was interested. It developed during the course of the investigation by the House Committee, that on October 9, 1884, Mr. Comstock, chief of the Western Division, ordered a certain widow's case (No. 315,437) which Mr. Holman had called up, to be delayed. The reason for it was, that "Holman is a d---d Democrat," and if the case was allowed at that time it would insure him 15 votes. Two witnesses, Mr. T. A. Broadus, an examiner in the Western Division, and Mr. L. J. Harbough, of the same Division, testified that such an order had been given by their chief, Mr. Comstock.⁷⁰ The claim was withheld, and not allowed until after the election. Mr. Holman, however, was returned to Congress, but by a greatly reduced majority. In 1882 he had carried his district by almost 3,500 votes, but in the campaign of 1884, that majority was reduced to 1,709.⁷¹

To what extent these practices were engaged in by other officials of the Pension Bureau is not known. But this one case illustrates how completely the pension system was dominated by politics during Mr. Dudley's term of office. Not only was he guilty of prostituting the interests of that important Bureau to partisan purposes, but the same charge could doubtless be made against the majority of those employed in its service.

Such was the complaint made by General John C. Black, who served as Commissioner of Pensions during President Cleveland's first administration. Referring to the conditions which he found when he entered upon his duty as Commissioner, he stated, "At one time the Pension Bureau was all but avowedly a political machine, filled from border to border with the uncompromising adherents of a single organization, who had for the claimant other tests than those of law, and who required, in addition to service in the field, submission to and support of a party before pensions were granted. . . . People of one faith filled every one of the great agencies. Examiners, trained in unscrupulous schools, traversed the land as recruiting sergeants for a party.

⁷⁰ *House Report*. 48th Cong. 2nd sess. No. 2683. p. 21, 25.

⁷¹ *Amer. Almanac*. 1885. p. 213.

“Chiefs of divisions, assistants, clerks, messenger boys, watchmen, and laborers were all but entirely from one school. Veteran service could not secure continuance in office, and at the behest and demand of partisans beyond the office old employes were cut adrift and zealous ruffians placed in their stead; leaves of absence were granted that the active men of the party might dominate over the elections. . . .”⁷²

But in spite of all Mr. Dudley’s efforts to carry the state of Indiana for Blaine and the Republican party, he failed. Mr. Cleveland was given a majority of 6,512 votes, and the Democrats succeeded in electing 9 of the 14 members of Congress.⁷³ The defeat of Mr. Blaine meant the retirement of Commissioner Dudley, and on November 10, 1884, he officially resigned. In reality, his resignation had occurred some three months earlier when he left his duties in Washington and entered the field as a campaign manager. Mr. O. P. G. Clarke, who had been Acting Commissioner of Pensions, was appointed to serve as Commissioner during the remainder of President Arthur’s administration.

With the incoming of the Democratic administration in 1885, the pension system underwent a radical change. The divisions of the Bureau were reorganized. A more thorough system of examination was inaugurated. Attempts to extend the provisions of the pension laws failed. Both President Cleveland and his newly appointed Commissioner, General John C. Black, stood for a thorough reform of the entire administration of the pension system.

A summary of the pension laws enacted between 1861 and 1865 reveals a liberality on the part of our national Government unequalled by any other nation in the world. The pledges made at the outbreak of the Civil War were being fulfilled in the most complete manner. Within less than twenty years after the Union army had been mustered out, over 890,000 pension claims had been filed on account of those who had been killed or wounded while in its service. Of this number 521,029 claims had been allowed, at a total cost of more than \$700,000,000. On June 30, 1885, there were 324,968 Civil War pensioners borne upon the rolls. They received from

⁷² *Annual Report, Commission of Pensions*. 1885. p. 111.

⁷³ *Amer. Almanac*, 1885. pp. 213–214.

the Government over \$62,000,000. But the maximum had not yet been reached. Thus far, pensions had been paid only on account of death or disability. The next extension of the laws was to provide aid for all those who had performed a certain amount of military service, whether disabled or not. The pension system here enters upon a new epoch, a treatment of which has been reserved for a later monograph.

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BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

No. 969, HISTORY SERIES, VOL. 4, NO. 2, PP. 121-296

THE HISTORY OF THE CHALCIDIC LEAGUE

BY

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A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
1912

MADISON, WISCONSIN
1918

PRICE, 40 CENTS

121

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THE CHALCIDIC LEAGUE

CHAPTER I

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT UNION

Jutting out in a south-easterly direction into the Thracian sea is the mountainous Chalcidic peninsula, ending in three finger-like promontories. Its area is approximately 4,000 sq. km., of which three fourths is found in the broad base of the peninsula. On the north it is shut off from the mainland by Mt. Cissos and Lake Bolbè, which extend across its whole width. The peninsula is almost entirely covered with forests, and along the coast and in the valleys between the mountains the country is very fertile. In the north-eastern corner there are deposits of iron and argentiferous lead. The rivers are small but comparatively numerous and there are many harbours upon the coast. Of the three promontories, Pallènè upon the west is the least mountainous and the most fertile. In size it is about equal to Sithonia, or the land of the Sithones, its neighbour upon the east. Actè, the third promontory, is the smallest and overtowers the others with its lofty Mt. Athos. The climate of Chalcidicè is less rigorous than that of the mainland and is suitable for the cultivation of the grape¹.

Thus the Chalcidic peninsula early came to the notice of the Greeks, as they sought places in which to plant their numerous colonies. The fertility of the country, its heavy forests furnishing material of all kinds for the building of ships, and its situation upon the sea, so favourable for the development of commerce,

¹ See the article upon Chalkidike in *Pauly-Wissowa*.

were advantages that attracted to it a large number of colonies from various states of Greece. The natives whom the Greeks found there were, so far as one can judge, of Thracian stock. In the fifth century remnants of this earlier population were still living upon the peninsula of Actè². These were the Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians. The Mygdonians, likewise a Thracian tribe, held the territory about Lake Bolbè.³ In historical times the main body of the Bisaltians inhabited the country westward of the lower Strymon; the Paeonians were settled to the west of the upper Strymon; the Edonians held land in the neighbourhood of Amphipolis, while the Crestonians dwelt to the north of the Mygdonians⁴. These were the tribes that the Greeks found upon their arrival in the Chalcidic peninsula.

Many Greek cities participated in the colonization of the peninsula. Chalcis, Eretria, Corinth, and Andros sent colonies there and by the beginning of the fifth century the entire coast line was covered with their settlements, many of them large and flourishing towns.⁵ But the Chalcidians from Euboea seem to have led the way in the colonization of this part of the Thracian coast. Sithonia, the central promontory, attracted their notice

² Thuc. IV, 109.

³ Thuc. I, 58; II, 99; Hdt. VII, 123 f.

⁴ Strabo, VII, 323, 4; 329, frg. 11; Thuc. II, 98-100; Hdt. VII, 113-115, 124.

⁵ Thuc. I, 56ff; IV, 84, 88, 103, 109, 123; Theop. frg. 145; Steph. Byz. *Φάρβηλος*; Strabo, VII, 329, frg. 11; X, 447, 8. Chalcis was the founder of colonies, *τὰς ὑπὸ Ὀλύνθῳ*. This seems to refer to political subjection rather than to geographical position. The word *ὑπό* with the dative cannot mean around. Strabo may have thought of Olynthos as situated upon a hill and therefore above the other towns, or as inland. Harrison (*Cl. Qu.*, 1912, p. 166) thinks that the number and area of the towns that could properly be said to lie under Olynthos in either sense would be small. For example they could not include Toronè, Assera, or Arnae. In VII, 329, 11, Strabo is more precise, for he says that the Chalcidians settled in the land of the Sithones. According to Herodotos, VII, 122, this included Toronè, Galepsos, Sermylia, Meeyperna, and Olynthos.

Thuc. IV, 109, speaks of the Chalcidic element in Actè, while Heracleides (*F. H. G.*, II, 222) says that Cleonae was a foundation of Chalcidians from Elymynion which, according to Steph. Byz. was *νήσος Εὐβοίας πόλιν ἔχουσα*. Cf. schol., Arist. *Pax*, 1126. Mela (II, 2, 30) mentions an Echinia near Acanthos, *inter Strymona et Athon*. The confusion between Λ and X is easy. Moreover, Plutarch, *Actia Graec.*, 30, refers to a Chalcidic element in the settlement of Sanè and Acanthos, and Dion. Hal., *Ep. I ad Amm.* 5, speaks of Chalcidian colonists in Stageiros. Scholiast, Arist. *Eq.*, 237: *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ Θράκης οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς, ἀποικοὶ ὄντες ἀπὸ τῆς Εὐβοίας*. Libanios on *Olynthiac* I, 1.

and there they planted many towns. It was from these Chalcidic colonies that the peninsula has received its name. Eretria took as her share Pallènè and Actè,⁶ and Andros sent many colonies to the eastern shore. Stageiros, Acanthos, Sanè and Argilos were all of her founding⁷. Finally about 600 B. C., Corinth founded the city of Potidaea upon the narrow neck of land that connects Pallènè with the mainland⁸.

The new Greek population was, to a large extent, a homogeneous one, with a common tongue and similar commercial interests. Conditions, therefore, were very favourable for the formation and continued existence of some form of political union. An external impulse alone was further necessary for the fusion of these independent Greek cities into a compact whole. This impulse was to come with time and to thrust forward into prominence the little Chalcidic city of Olynthos.

At the time of the Persian expedition of Xerxes most of the cities of this peninsula submitted to him and furnished him ships or troops; many of the more important maritime cities sent both. The Chalcidian and Bottiaean contingents are especially mentioned by Herodotos,⁹ and this may be taken as evi-

⁶ Strabo, X, 447, 8. In Thucydides and other early writers the term Chalcidicè does not include the whole peninsula. See Harrison, *Cl. Qu.*, 1912, pp. 93ff. Scabala, Pharbelos, Mendè, Neapolis, Eion, Dicaea were directly or indirectly Eretrian colonies. Theop. frg. 145: Σκάβαλα, χώρα Ἐρετριέων. Steph. Byz.: Φάρβηλος, πόλις Ἐρετριέων. Thuc. IV, 7: Ἡῶνα τὴν ἐπὶ Θράκης Μενδαίων ἀποικίαν. Thuc. IV, 123: Μένδη . . . Ἐρετριῶν ἀποικία. For Neapolis and Dicaea see tribute lists, *I. G.*, I, 230, 242. Strabo credits Eretria with the settlement of Pallènè and Actè, but Thucydides fails to mention the Eretrian element in Actè. The only pure Greek city of that peninsula, so far as we know, was Sanè and that was a colony of the Andrians. In the other towns there was a certain mixture of Chalcidians. Thuc. IV, 109; Hdât. VII, 22. But in the opinion of Scylax, 66f, a writer of the fourth century, all of the cities of Actè are Hellenic.

⁷ Thuc. IV, 84, 88, 103, 109.

⁸ Thuc. I, 56ff; Nicol. Dam. 60 (*F. H. G.*, III, 393).

⁹ Hdât. VII, 122-123, 185. For Stageiros and Acanthos, cf. VII, 115. Troops alone were furnished by Assa, Píloros, Singos, Sartè, and the towns of Krossaia. Toronè, Galepsos, Sernylia Mecyperna, Olynthos, Potidaea, Aphytis, Neapolis, Aegè, Therambos, Seionè, Mendè, and Sanè furnished ships and men. In the summary (VII, 185) Herodotos says that the Greeks of Thrace furnished ships, and that among others the Paeonians, the Bottiaeans, the Chalcidic γένος, and such as dwelt on the sea-coast of Thrace furnished troops. Harrison has attempted to prove that the Chalcidians were not originally colonists from Chalcis, but were a tribe similar to the Bottiaeans. In part he relies upon the passages where Herodotos speaks of

dence that the Chalcidians and Bottiaean were the most important peoples of the peninsula. Toronè was probably the largest Chalcidian city¹⁰. The evidence of Herodotos points to a union of some sort among the Chalcidians, the foundation for which was a consciousness of common descent¹¹. Further evidence for this union is to be found in certain of the early coins of the Chalcidian peninsula. These coins, according to Head, probably were minted at Olynthos hardly later than the end of the sixth century B. C., although they have been assigned by others to Chalcis.¹² Herodotos, however, informs us that the Chalcidians first obtained possession of Olynthos about 479¹³. Since this is the case we can hardly ascribe these coins to Olynthos, for there is no reason to assign them to the Bottiaean city. On the other hand, there is no need to deny their Chalcidian origin. It is fair to assume, then, that the coins were struck by the Chalcidians, settled in or near Sithonia. Numismatic evidence in this way corroborates and strengthens our assumption that the Chalcidians had united for certain purposes at least. They issued a common coinage and acted together in times of crisis¹⁴.

the Chalcidic γένος. From those passages, however, we need not come to any such conclusion. If Herodotos had told us that the Chalcidians had furnished troops it would have been very easy for a reader to confuse the Chalcidians of Thrace with those of Euboea. This passage, taken by itself, cannot then be considered as conclusive evidence that Chalcis founded no colonies on the coast of Thrace, and the other evidence brought forward by Harrison is even more unsatisfactory. The fact that Eretria and Andros founded colonies in Thrace has not been questioned. It is hardly probable that Eretria's greatest rival, Chalcis, took no part in this colonization. Harrison, *Cl. Qu.*, vol. VI, 93ff, 165ff.

¹⁰ Thuc. IV, 110, 114; Hdt. VIII, 127.

¹¹ This is expressed by the word γένος. For further discussion see below.

¹² B. M. C. Mac., pp. XXXIV f.; Head, *Hist. Num.*,² pp. 207f.

¹³ Hdt. VIII, 127. See below.

¹⁴ When Olynthos commenced its coinage it remained true to Chalcidian tradition and adopted agonistic types similar to those in use during the previous century. The reverse type with its eagle points directly to Chalcis as the origin of the Chalcidian race. Harrison, *loc. cit.*, however, considers this as next to no evidence for a connection between Chalcis and the Chalcidians of Thrace. He bases his conclusion upon the well known fact that Elis also made use of the eagle type and says that the occurrence of agonistic types both on the earlier and the later coins of Olynthos makes it unnecessary to assume that the eagle type was borrowed by Olynthos from Chalcis. The evidence of a connection may be weak, but at least it cannot be lightly cast aside. When the similarity between names and coin types is so striking that confusion arises, we may assume that it is not so much the result of a coincidence as of premeditation. In either case, a hypothetical explanation of

Olynthos, about to play so great a part in the Chalcidic league, was originally settled by Bottiaeans¹⁵. Upon the defeat of the Persians at Salamis, Potidaea and the other cities of Pallênê revolted and a general uprising was feared by Artabazos. Olynthos was suspected of rebellious intentions and was captured. The city was then taken (480–479) from the Bottiaeans and was given by Artabazos to the Chalcidians under Critoboulos of Toronê¹⁶.

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this similarity of type, invented to suit a theory for which no positive evidence exists, must necessarily be viewed with suspicion.

Harrison has also attempted to show that the language of the Chalcidians resembled Eretrian, rather than Chalcidian. In his estimation the evidence points "not to Chalkis, nor to Euboea, at large, but to Eretria; though the Olynthian inscription lacks the most striking feature of Eretrian, the rhotacism of intervocalic σ ." He goes on to say: "If, then, the Chalkidians of Thrace were derived from Chalkis, we must suppose that these features which at present connect Olynthos with Eretria were common to Eretria and Chalkis. If, as I suspect, the Chalkidians of Thrace were not derived from Chalkis, these features must be due to the influence of the neighboring colonies: Eretria's colonies, Mendê and Eion (and perhaps Dikaia), Mendê's colony, Nee-polis, and the Andrian colonies on the east coast." The weakness in this argument is pointed out by Harrison himself, the lack of inscriptions from Chalcis and her other colonies. Another difficulty is that the epigraphical evidence from Chalcidicê, except for coins, all dates from the fourth century, after many changes and much shifting of population had taken place. Harrison ought to have taken into consideration the evidence of the lettering on the early Olynthian coins. On one of them occurs the fol-

lowing inscription $\begin{matrix} \Delta\downarrow \\ \text{LK} \end{matrix}$ The form \downarrow for Δ is peculiar to Chal-

cis and does not occur elsewhere in Euboea, and in Greece proper only in Boeotia and Attica. A later coin of the same type has the inscription OAVN which points perhaps to Eretrian influence. *Numis. Chron.*, 1897, 276, pl. XIII, 6; cf. *Brit. Mus. Cat. Maced.*, p. 87, no. 2.

¹⁵ Hdt. VIII, 127; Thuc. II, 99. The Bottiaeans were a Greek tribe and had once possessed territory on the lower Iliaemon and Ludias rivers, whence the growth of the Macedonian power had driven them to take refuge in what later became Botticê. Their two most important towns were Spartolos and Olynthos. Their migration to the Chalcidic peninsula probably took place in the sixth century, for the Macedonian power included this territory as early as the reign of Amyntas I. Thuc. II, 99; Hdt. V, 94; VII, 123, 127; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15; Köhler, *Sitz.ber. d. Berl. Akad.* 1892, p. 345; 1897, p. 271; Strabo, VII, 329, frg. 11; 330, frgs. 20, 22, 23.

¹⁶ Hdt. VIII, 126–129. It is worthy of note that the Chalcidians remained faithful to the Persians, while Pallênê, settled by Eretrians and Corinthians, revolted, and the Bottiaeans were suspected of disloyal intentions. The attempt to recapture Potidaea failed although a Scionaean captain within the town tried to betray it. In the battle at Plataea 300 Potidaeans took part. They were stationed with the Corinthians, by whom the city had been

The Greek settlement of Olynthos, then, did not take place until the first years of the fifth century. This is an indication of the tenacity with which the Greeks clung to the seaboard, only gradually moving into the interior. Thus Olynthos in 480-479 had become a Chalcidian city and this fact found expression in the coins of the town. Some of them show types that were common to the city of Chalcis, and one of them has the inscription $\begin{smallmatrix} A\downarrow \\ LK \end{smallmatrix}$ upon its reverse. A later coin of the same type has in its stead an inscription showing that it was coined at Olynthos¹⁷. These coins then substantiate the account given by Herodotos and show that a feeling of kinship and unity existed among the Chalcidians of Thrace at the beginning of the fifth century.

The settlement of Olynthos by colonists taken from a number of related Chalcidian cities no doubt served to strengthen the union of these cities and to give to Olynthos special importance. It would be natural for the Chalcidians to regard it as a common possession in which all had a part. In time it became the center of Chalcidian interests, around which a closer and more permanent union grew up. This explains the importance of the

founded. No other city of the Chalcidic peninsula was represented. Hdt. IX, 28; Ditt. *Syll.*² 7.

The account given by Herodotos of the capture of Olynthos, however, is of greater importance. The expression τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν γένος is again used to describe the Chalcidians. From this passage it is clear that the Chalcidians, to a certain extent, at least, were united among themselves. They adopted a common policy and remained faithful to Persia. For this they were rewarded with the city of Olynthos, which they settled by joint action. The use of the term γένος in this passage is not so striking as in Hdt. VII, 185, and it can not be taken as proof that the Chalcidians were a Greek tribe, in no way related to Chalcis. If any inference is to be drawn from these two passages, it is that the Chalcidians were conscious of their common origin to such an extent, perhaps, that a primitive union had been formed. The tribal theory, brought forward by Harrison, *loc. cit.*, would be adequate if we had evidence in its favour; but ancient writers fail even to suggest this, and the weight of their authority is on the other side. That there was an early Chalcidian union is not surprising, when we consider that the Chalcidians of the west acted together in times of crisis.

¹⁷ *Numis. Chron.*, 1897, p. 276, pl. XIII, 6. Cf. *Brit. Mus. Cat. Maced.*, p. 87, no. 2. This coin might have been referred to Chalcis if the obverse had not contained the figure of a horse cantering, a type used by the Thracian Chalcidians. Hence we must ascribe it to a feeling of unity among them and to their settlement of Olynthos by united action.

city during the Peloponnesian War and the readiness with which the smaller Chalcidian towns upon the coast gave up their homes and migrated to it¹⁸.

Shortly after the formation of the Delian Confederacy, Cimon besieged and took Eion on the Strymon, then in the hands of the Persians. Likewise the Persian garrisons were driven out of the cities on the Thracian coast, Doriscos alone excepted.^{18a} Since no ancient authority tells us when the Greek cities of the Chalcidic peninsula enrolled themselves in the confederacy it is impossible to decide whether they waited until Cimon appeared in their neighbourhood with an armed force, or whether, even before this time, they had accepted membership in the new league and expressed their willingness to contribute their share in its expenses. We only know that they were admitted to the confederacy at an early date while Aristides was still acting as assessor.^{18b} Aside from this, our knowledge of the history of the Chalcidic peninsula during the fifth century until the Peloponnesian War is almost entirely confined to what may be gleaned from the Attic Quota lists, which are in a very fragmentary condition and do not commence until 454. It is noteworthy that in some of the earlier lists cities which later became identified with the Chalcidian League are found combined. For example in 454, Olynthos, Seabla, and Assera are placed together; Mecyperna and Stolos also made a joint contribution.¹⁹ In 445 mention is made of the

¹⁸ Thuc. I, 58.

^{18a} Thuc. I, 98; Hdt. VII, 106f.; Plut. *Cimon*, 7; Polyæn. VII, 24.

^{18b} Thuc. V, 18. Cf. Beloch, *Rhein. Mus.*, 1888, p. 75; Busolt, *Griech. Geschichte*, III, 1, 228. Francotte, *Les Finances des Cités Grecques*, pp. 101f., while denying that the cities of Chalcidic were assessed by Aristides, admits that they became members of the Delian League at an early date.

¹⁹ *I. G.*, I, 226. Ὀλύνθ[ιοι] Σκα Μεκυπερ[ρα]ῖοι
βλαῖο[ι] Ἀσσε Στόλιοι | Η . . . |
ρίται Η . . . |

Theop. frg. 145: Σκάβαλα, χώρα Ἐρετριέων. Theop. frg. 147 gives Assera to the Chalcidians. Arist., *Hist. An.*, 519 a 14, speaks of a river ἐν τῇ Χαλκιδικῇ τῇ ἐπὶ τῆς Θρακῆς ἐν τῇ Ἀσσυρίτιδι. The passages, Hdt. VII, 122 f. and 185, do not necessarily exclude Assa from the Chalcidian tribe. Olynthos was of course Chalcidic. Thus we have the union of an Eretrian and two Chalcidian towns, so far as payment of tribute to Athens was concerned. Is not this an indication that there was no great difference between the two classes of towns? If Harrison's thesis were true, that the Chalcidians were a tribe like the Bottiaean, and not colonists from Chalcis, there would

Sermylians and their *συντελεῖς*²⁰. Athenian policy, however, seems to have been directed against such incipient unions and in the later lists each city is credited with its own individual contribution. The union of Olynthos with Scabla and Assera is of peculiar interest, for it is the first indication we have of a union among the Chalcidic cities in which Olynthos was the central and moving figure. It was probably at the time when this union was dissolved that a change was made in the

be no link to bind an Eretrian colony with two Chalcidic villages. On the other hand if the Chalcidic towns were also colonies of Euboea, similar conditions would prevail in Chalcidian and Eretrian towns and there would be no material difference between the two.

Stolos and Mecyperna, *I. G.*, I, 226, are also found in the list of 454 together. Stolos we know was a Chalcidian colony and Strabo calls Mecyperna the harbour (VII, 330, frg. 29) of Olynthos. Steph. Byz.: Στώλος, πόλις μὲν τῶν ἐν Θράκῃ βαρβαρικῶν ὥς μετήνεγκαν ἐκ τῶν Ἰδοννῶν οἱ Χαλκιδαῖς εἰς τὰς αὐτῶν πόλεις.

²⁰ *I. G.*, I, 235: [] Σερμυλιᾶς κα[ι] συν. Who were the *συντελεῖς* of the Sermylians? Böhnecke has made the suggestion that Arnae, which was somewhere not far from Sermylia, was a colony of that town. *Dem. Lyk. Hyp.*, p. 398 and *Forschungen u. d. Gebiete d. Att. Redner*, p. 155. Steph. Byz. gives us the following information, Ἀρνη τῆς Ἐρασινίων πρὸς τῇ Θράκῃ. The name Ἐρασινίων has been a stumbling block to all editors and commentators, and various emendations have been suggested. Thucydides, IV, 103, definitely states that Arnae was Chalcidian and numismatic evidence confirms his statement. Böhnecke believes that the name Arnae is preserved in the modern Derna, which lies in the neighbourhood of Ormilía. *Dem. Hyp. Lyk.* p. 389. Ormilía without doubt is the ancient Sermylia. Thus he would emend by substituting Ἐρμυλίων or Σερμυλίων for Ἐρασινίων. This is a possible emendation and, if it is correct, we may assume that Arnae paid its tribute as a dependency of Sermylia. Thucydides shows that Arnae was in existence during the fifth century and that it was perhaps a day's march from Bromiskos. As it is not found in the tribute lists and was important enough to strike coins it is not at all improbable that its tribute was paid with that of the presumably Chalcidian Sermylia. I am inclined to question Böhnecke's location of Arnae at Derna. It seems more probable that the name of Calarnae of Mela, II, 2, 30, is to be identified with the Arnae of Thucydides. *Inter Strymona et Athon turris Calarnaea et portus Κάπρου Λιμὴν, urbs Acanthos*. Steph. Byz.: Κάλαρνα, πόλις Μακεδονίας, ὡς Λούκιλλος ὁ Ταρραῖος.

The tribute of Sermylia presents several interesting problems. In 454 it amounted to the immense sum of 17.72 talents. Only Abdera and Aegina paid a higher tribute, so far as the accounts are preserved. In 451 the tribute was 5.91 $\frac{2}{3}$ talents. In the years 449 and 447 Sermylia paid three talents. In 445 Sermylia and its *συντελεῖς* paid a tribute of five talents. In this year there is no possible doubt about the reading, Σερμυλι[ε]ς κα[ι] συν. In the years 444 and 443 the tribute remained the same but the inscriptions have preserved no reference to *συντελεῖς*. Until the year 438 we have no record of the amount paid by Sermylia but in that year the tribute was lowered to four and one half talents. It was in that year that Athens was active in and around Chalcidic. In 439 or thereabouts the tribute of several Chalcidian cities was raised. Thus the reduction of the tribute of Sermylia is

Olynthian coinage. The inscription OAVN took the place of ^{ΑΔ}_{ΛΚ} which had been used heretofore. For many years nothing came of the early Chalcidian union. It is evident, however, that Athens was not able to destroy the feeling of unity that existed in the minds of the Olynthians and their Chalcidic neighbors. The crystalization of this feeling was due to an impulse from without. This came from Macedon.

noteworthy. It is also to be noted that in 438 several cities paid no tribute and that in the list of the following year ten new names are found for the first time. It was in 437 that Amphipolis was founded. Of these new tributaries, so far as their location is known, Pyloros is the only one that could possibly have been subject to Sernyia. The year 436 saw discontent in Chalcidicæ and for the first time, so far as we know, Sernyia paid no tribute. This may have been due to dissatisfaction because she had been deprived of her control over neighbouring towns. Other towns joined with Sernyia in refusing to pay their customary tribute and perhaps for the same reason, *I. G.*, I, 226-244.

CHAPTER II

FORMATION OF THE CHALCIDIC LEAGUE

Alexander I, the Philhellene, had extended the Macedonian sphere of influence on all sides, but by so doing he had made certain the coming conflict with the Greeks. These people then, settled upon the coasts that were necessary to Macedon if she was to obtain the power that was hers by every right, must, sooner or later, either become incorporated in the growing state of their powerful neighbour or make it commercially dependent upon them. Philip II realized this fully, when, conscious of his superiority, he replied to the Olynthian embassy that it was impossible for the Chalcidian power to exist side by side with that of Macedon¹.

Perdiccas, Alexander's successor as king of Macedon, had several rivals to contend with, and, for many years, was in no position to take an aggressive attitude. While he was strengthening his power, Athens was not idle. She fully realized the importance of maintaining her position and of putting every obstacle in the way of further Macedonian extension. When once she saw that the control of the Strymon was important for both states, she did not rest until *Ἐννέα ὄδοι*, the strategic point upon the river, was in her possession and she had founded the city of Amphipolis upon that site². Then a policy, none too straightforward, was set into operation against Perdiccas. Athens supported pretenders to his throne and encouraged rebellious subjects in their attempts to break away from the authority of the Macedonian crown³.

¹ Dem. IX, 11.

² The first attempt to found a Greek city on this important site was made by Aristagoras, 498-7. About thirty years later Athens made an unsuccessful attempt. Thuc. I, 100; IV, 102f; Diod. XII, 68; Schol. Aesch. II, 31; cf. Hdt. IX, 75; Paus. I, 29, 4.

³ Thuc. I, 57, 59; II, 95.

In the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War more than forty cities of the Chalcidic peninsula were tributary to Athens. The richer and more important of them were situated upon the two peninsulas of Pallènè and Sithonia. In comparison with these, Olynthos and the other cities of the base of Chalcidicè were small and unimportant towns. Acanthos, the chief Andrian colony, and Spartolos, a Bottiaean city, both surpassed Olynthos in resources and importance⁴.

At this time there seems to have been more or less discontent among the Athenian allies in the Chalcidic peninsula. In the year 440 several unknown Thracian cities paid no tribute⁵ and in the list of 438-7 again there are a number of absentees.* It has been suggested that this is to be connected with the general feeling of unrest in the Athenian Empire, which found its expression in the revolt of Samos. In the next year, however, Athens was free to turn her attention to Chalcidicè. It was at this time that Amphipolis was founded† and that many new names were placed upon the Attic quota lists. In the quota

⁴ *I. G.*, I, 237, 239, 242, 243, 244, 259. If we take the lists for the years 443, 441, 438, 437, 436, and 427 and compare the tribute of the various cities we can come to a rough estimate of their relative importance. The following table compiled from the lists of these years shows how small Olynthos was when compared with its neighbours:

City	Year	Tribute in talents	Year	Tribute
Aineia	443	3	427	$\frac{1}{6}$
Acanthos	443	3	427	3
Spartolos	436	$3\frac{1}{12}$		
Mendè	437	8	427	8
Olynthos	438	2		
Potidaea	436	15		
Sermylia	437	$4\frac{1}{2}$		
Scionè	438	15	427	9
Toronè	441	6	427	12

The combined tribute from the peninsula of Pallènè was about forty talents, that of Sithonia about fifteen, and that of Acè about five. The combined territory of these three peninsulas was approximately one-third of the area of the base of the larger peninsula, which paid roughly about twenty talents. Thus we see that Pallènè nearly equalled the combined wealth of the remainder of Chalcidicè, and that Olynthos was quite small at this time with its meagre two talents tribute.

⁵ *I. G.*, I, 240.

* *I. G.*, I, 242-4. In 438-7 Galepsos, Scapsa, Stolos, and Argilos pay no tribute.

† Thuc. IV, 102f; Diod. XII, 32; Polyæn. VI, 53.

list for the year 437-6 about ten names are to be found for the first time⁶. It is not probable that all of these were new members of the Athenian Empire. Without doubt, the majority of them had paid tribute before through their wealthier and more powerful neighbours, to whom they owed some sort of allegiance. In this way the allegiance of these towns was transferred directly to Athens; and perhaps the cities that had failed to pay their tribute during the preceding year were thus punished by a loss of territory. It is noteworthy that there were no important reductions of tribute at this time. The tribute of Spartolos, indeed, was increased, notwithstanding the fact that a Bottiaean town appears as tributary to Athens for the first time⁷. The most notable example of an increase in tribute occurred at Potidaea. There the original sum of six talents was increased to fifteen. We know no special reason for this, since the Potidaean tribute had been paid during the Samian revolt. Thus we see that Athens was not idle and gained for the time being, at least, both in tribute and in a widened sphere of direct commercial influence. Her particularist tendencies, however, soon brought about discontent in some of the leading cities, for in the year 436 several of them paid no tribute⁸. In Spartolos, Olynthos, and Potidaea this same feeling of unrest was more slow in coming to a head. The final step was taken at the instigation of Perdiccas.

We have seen that Perdiccas had good grounds for opposing the Athenians and for trying to weaken their power, and that it was good policy for him to encourage every movement by which the Athenian allies might be severed from their allegiance. With these things in mind, he entered into negotiations

⁶ *I. G.*, I, 243. In the list of 437 the names, Airoleion, Haisa, Gigonos, Kithas, Cleonae, Píloros, Pistasos, Sartè, Sinos, Smilla, and Tindè are found for the first time.

⁷ Airoleion probably was Bottiaean, Theop. frg. 140, Oxford ed., (*ex coniectura*), and perhaps Gigonos and Haisa were also. Sartè may have been tributary to Toronè and Píloros to Sermylia.

⁸ *I. G.*, I, 238, 242, 243, 244. In the year 436, Stageiros, Stolos, Scionè, Sermylia, Mendè, Toronè, and Aphytis paid no tribute. The tribute of Potidaea was raised from six talents in 438 to fifteen talents in 436. The tribute of Spartolos was also raised during this period from two to three and one-twelfth talents.

with the discontented cities⁹. It was greatly to his advantage to persuade them to revolt; for if they did so, his hands would be free to deal with the pretenders to his throne whom Athens was supporting, and the Athenians would then be too busy in crushing the revolt to put any large force into the field against him.

Athens, learning of these negotiations and fearing for the loyalty of the discontented Potidaea, commanded the city to raze the walls on the side toward Pallenè, to give hostages, and to sever all connections with its mother city Corinth¹⁰. Potidaea immediately sent envoys to Athens in an attempt to avoid compliance with these harsh commands. Furthermore it prepared for the revolt, asking assistance from Corinth and the Peloponnese¹¹.

Perdiccas also sought to gain allies who were openly hostile to Athens. In this way the winter of 433–2 passed¹²; and in the following spring the Athenians decided that the time for action had come if they were to forestall the revolt and the expected alliance between Macedon, Potidaea, the Bottiaeans, and the Chalcidians. Archestratos was sent against Perdiccas with thirty ships and one thousand hoplites. He also was entrusted with the task of taking hostages from the city of Potidaea, of demolishing its wall, and of preventing any attempts at rebellion¹³.

Influenced by promises of assistance from Sparta and a number of its own neighbours, Potidaea revolted early in 432, before the arrival of the Athenian fleet. An alliance was formed with the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans, who also revolted. Perdiccas joined this alliance and persuaded the inhabitants of the Chalcidic coast towns to emigrate to Olynthos, giving to them a part of the Mygdonian territory for cultivation, so long as the war with Athens should last¹⁴.

The extent of the original revolt can be made out roughly from an inspection of the quota lists. The names of many towns dis-

⁹ Thuc. I, 57.

¹⁰ Thuc. I, 56f.

¹¹ Thuc. I, 58.

¹² Thuc. I, 57.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Thuc. I, 58, 71.

appeared about this time, although the fragmentary condition of the tablets does not allow one to be at all certain about details. That the rebellion was general throughout Botticè, extending perhaps to the coast about Strepsa and Gigonos, the territory about Olynthos, southern Crousis, and the coasts of northern Sithonia can be clearly made out. Pallènè, except Potidaea, the greater part of Sithonia, Actè, and the eastern coast with its Andrian colonies remained loyal¹⁵.

Thucydides tells us that an alliance was formed including Potidaea, the Chalcidians, and the Bottiaeans¹⁶. That this alliance culminated in a close union is attested by certain contemporary

¹⁵ *I. G.*, I, 256. This list for the year 428 is complete in its Thracian part and is to be compared with the lists for the two following years, *I. G.*, I, 257, 426-5; *I. G.*, I, 259; cf. Cavaignac, *Le Trésor d'Athènes*, pp. XXXVI f.; *B. S. A.*, XV, 229-242. The latter has been assigned to the year 427-6. The list of Thracian tributaries is complete. The omissions are as follows, Potidaea, Olynthos, Spartolos, Strepsa, Assera, Aioleion, Milkoros, Tindè, Seapsa, Cleonae, Haisa, Gigonos, Kithas, Smilla, Piloros, the Phegetioi, Dicaea, Pharbēlos, Seabla, Meeperna, Sermylia, and Singos. By comparing with *I. G.*, I, 257 (426-5) we are able to exclude from the list of revolting cities Dicaea, Cleonae, and Aioleion, a Bottiaeian town (Theop. frg. 140). Sermylia and Seabla are found in *I. G.*, I, 255 which is to be placed early in the war. Of the remaining cities, Potidaea, Olynthos, Spartolos, and Stolos revolted, as we learn from Thucydides I, 56ff; V, 18. Assera (Theop.) frg. 147; Aristotele, *Hist. An.*, 519 a 14). Milkoros (Theop. frg. 150), Tindè (Steph. Byz. *Τίνδιον*), Seapsa (Steph. Byz., *Κάψα*; cf. Hdt. VII, 123; *Κάμψα*) are known to have been Chalcidic at some time or other. Seapsa appears in *I. G.*, I, 263 (after 425-4) but this may only mean that it had returned to its Athenian allegiance. As it was near Aineia which did not revolt and situated in Crousis, I shall not include it in the list of revolting cities. Piloros and Meeperna, the harbour of Olynthos, lay between Assera and Olynthos, both of which were Chalcidian, and Singos was not far distant from Piloros. Haisa, Gigonos, Kithas, and Smilla were situated in Crousis, south of Aineia. Steph. Byz.: *Αἷσα, Σμίλα, Γίγωνος*; Hdt. VII, 123; Theop. frg. 338. They are bracketed with Tindè in a joint payment for the year 437 (*I. G.*, I, 243). Pharbēlos was a colony of Eretria (Steph. Byz.), and perhaps was situated near Pallènè. Strepsa was a town on the borders of Macedon. Aesch. II, 27; Thuc. I, 61 (?); Steph. Byz.: *Στρέψα, πόλις Μακεδονίας*. As it appears in the *τάξις φόρων* for 425, it may not have revolted, but its absence from the lists *I. G.*, I, 256, 257, and 259 is suspicious. The Phegetioi are otherwise unknown. From this list it is possible to judge as to the extent of the revolt. It must be remembered however that there is no evidence to prove that any of these towns revolted in 432. A part of Crousis, at least, including Aineia, remained faithful as we know from Thucydides (II, 79) and the tribute lists. This limits the revolt on the north-west. In Pallènè the revolt did not extend beyond Potidaea. Sermylia in northern Sithonia did not take part in the revolt, which would make one hesitate before including Singos in our list of revolting towns. Acanthos and the Andrian colonies in the east remained faithful. Thus we have established the limits given in the text.

¹⁶ Thuc. I, 58.

coins¹⁷. Head has dated these coins in the early years of the fourth century, but they belong, no doubt, to this earlier period.* It has long been recognized that a change in the system of coinage was one of the accompaniments of the Chalcidic revolt from Athenian rule. Until 432 the Attic standard was in common use in a great majority of the cities of this region, but this soon gave way to the Phoenician standard, then in use in Macedon. Macedonian influence had been a powerful factor in bringing about separation from Athens, and Macedonian trade was growing more and more important. Hence the change from the Attic to the Macedonian standard was a natural one for the Chalcidians to make as soon as possible after their separation from Athens. According to the hitherto accepted classification of the Olynthian coin series a break occurred, extending from about 432 to the rise of the league of the Chalcidians in the first decade of the fourth century. The Chalcidian adoption of the Phoenician standard is thus assigned to the fourth century, when Macedon had already ceased to use that standard. This classification is based upon the assumption that the Chalcidian league did not come into existence until after the Peloponnesian War. We would naturally expect Olynthos to have been one of the first to adopt the new standard; and as the leader of the Chalcidians in their revolt against Athens it had need of money for carrying on the war. It is obvious that this was no time for a suspension of coinage¹⁸.

Hence we must refer the ruder examples of the famous Chalcidic coinage to the years of the Peloponnesian War and not to the fourth century. There are further reasons for placing the beginning of the Apollo series of Chalcidic coins at so early a

¹⁷ The coins referred to are those of the Chalcidians, the Bottiaeans, the Acanthians, and the Arnaeans, having the figure of Apollo upon the obverse and with a cithara for the reverse type. Cf. Head, *Historia Numorum*,² pp. 208f., 213; *B. M. C. Mac.* p. 63, nos. 2f; p. 36, nos. 40-41; p. 62, no. 1; p. 87, no. 5. For a full discussion of these coins see *Classical Philology*, vol. IX, pp. 24-34.

* Walker has assigned these coins and the formation of the Chalcidic league to the end of the fifth century, 421-400. Apparently Head has accepted this date. See *Ency. Brit. Olynthus*.

¹⁸ No other important city of the Chalcidic peninsula suspended its coinage during the war, excepting of course the ones destroyed or captured by Athens. On the other hand some of the revolting cities issued coins for the first time.

date. There were at least four states, the Chalcidian, the Bottiaeans, Arnae, and Acanthos, that adopted the coin type bearing upon the obverse the head of Apollo Laureate and upon the reverse a cithara and the name of the state issuing the coinage. It is clear that this uniformity of coinage could not have existed unless there had been a close political alliance between the states issuing the coins, such as we find for example about the same time between Rhodes, Ephesos, Iasos, Cnidos, and Byzantion¹⁹. Therefore we can only assign these coins to a period in which the Bottiaeans, the Acanthians, and the Chalcidians were on very intimate and friendly terms. This was not the case in the early years of the fourth century. We have a treaty of about the year 390 or 389 between the Chalcidian League and Amyntas king of Macedon²⁰. From this treaty we learn that the Chalcidians were at war with Acanthos and the Bottiaeans. This hostility, as we know, was due to the comprehensive plans that the Chalcidians were making for the expansion of their league²¹. Neither the Bottiaeans nor the Acanthians were willing to become members of this league. Acanthos, an important Andrian colony situated on the east coast of the Chalcidic peninsula, may have attempted to exercise a hegemony over the Andrian colonies or perhaps even to unite them as the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans had united²². There is some slight evidence that these were her aims soon after her revolt to Brasidas in 424.* In any case she could not suffer with patience Chalcidic possession of strategic points in her immediate neighbourhood. Thus when the Chalcidians became masters of Thyssos in 420 and of Dion in 417, towns situated upon the peninsula of Actè²³, Acanthos began to feel jealous of the growing Chalcidian power. This jealousy became acute soon after the Peloponnesian War and continued until after the defeat of the Chalcidians by Sparta in 379. Thus it is impossible to conceive of any close alliance between Acanthos and the Chalcidians during this period.

¹⁹ Hill, *Historical Greek Coins*, nos. 32 f.

²⁰ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77.

²¹ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 11 ff.

²² The Bottiaeans had a common coinage and made a joint treaty with Athens in 420. Hicks and Hill, no. 68; *B. M. C. Macedon*, p. 63.

* See pp. 78ff.

²³ Thuc. V, 35, 82.

As for the Bottiaean, they enrolled themselves among the Athenian allies in 420 at the time of the peace between Athens and Sparta²⁴. The Bottiaeans were close neighbours of the Chalcidians on the west. They had formed a loose confederation as an inscription and coins testify,* and looked askance at the growth of the Chalcidian league. As in the case of Acanthos, they were at war with the Chalcidians²⁵ about 390 but were conquered very soon after²⁶. Thus we can date the beginning of the breach between the two states definitely in 420, when the Bottiaeans accepted the terms of the peace and became Athenian allies. The Chalcidians were at war with Athens for several years, at least, after this date.

Finally the coins that indicate an alliance between the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans must have been struck before the year 420 and after the revolt in 432. Having seen that these coins belong to the first decade of the war we can have no hesitation in connecting them with the alliance which Thucydides says was concluded between these two states. The fact that the revolting states adopted a common coin type is an indication that the alliance was very close indeed, and the further fact that the coins were struck upon the standard in use in Macedon seems to point to the influence of Perdiccas. It was largely through his efforts that the revolt had taken place. The Bottiaean state and the Chalcidians were the first members of this monetary alliance. Acanthos must have joined soon after 424 when it revolted to Brasidas²⁷. The fourth state to adopt this coinage was the little place of Arnae. Thucydides does not tell of its revolt, but he mentions it as a Chalcidic town in the winter of 424-3²⁸. Of the other cities that we might expect to find in this league, Potidaea, Toronè, Mendè, and Scionè fell to Athens soon after their revolt. Except for Mendè, almost no coins of these cities, struck on the Phoenician standard—the standard recently adopted by the revolting states—are in existence and these are of small value.

²⁴ Note 22; *I. G.*, I, 260; cf. notes 5 and 9, chap. VIII.

* See note 22.

²⁵ *Ditt. Syll.*,² 77.

²⁶ *Isaeos*, V. 42: τῆς Ὀλυθίας ἐν Σπαρτῶλῳ; cf. *Jebb, Attic Orators*, II, p. 354.

²⁷ *Thuc.* IV. 84-88.

²⁸ *Thuc.* IV, 103.

This monetary league can not have existed for any length of time, as we see from the fact that the coins which have come down to us are few and small in value, a tetrobol from Olynthos, obols from Acanthos and Arnae and copper coins of the Bottiaeans. The gradual separation of Chalcidic and Bottiaeian interests is shown by a coin of the latter state, retaining the cithara but having for the obverse type not the head of Apollo but that of Artemis²⁹. The league had been formed in direct opposition to the Athenian power, and when once the purpose of the league had been gained, namely, freedom from the burdens imposed by Athens, and when the Bottiaeians became reconciled with the latter state, there was no bond strong enough to hold it together.

What bearing does the foregoing discussion have upon the question of the origin of the Chalcidic League? It is generally agreed that the Apollo coins issued from the Olynthian mint formed a league coinage and were not strictly speaking Olynthian coins at all. This is shown by the fact that all of the types that had been in use for the coinage of the city of Olynthos were laid aside in favor of one that had a more general application³⁰. Moreover the name of the city gives way to that of the league. Upon the reverse of all of the new coins the inscription XAAKIΔEΩN occurs. Upon the obverse of one of these Chalcidic coins is the inscription OAYNΘ[I.³¹ This coin is to be placed at the beginning of the series before the city had become entirely

²⁹ *B. M. C. Maced.*, p. 63, nos. 1 and 4; Head, *Hist. Num.*,² p. 213. The next step was the rejection of the cithara for the reverse type and the adoption of the figure of a bull. We have a bronze coin of Pausanias, king of Macedon, which seems to have been struck upon a coin of this type. While the chronology of the Macedonian kings is very uncertain, we can date this coin at least before 390. Imhoof-Blumer, *Monn. Gr.*, p. 66, no. 6.

³⁰ Thuc. I, 118. The account given by Thucydides in this passage is worthy of consideration here. We are told that the Delphian God gave his sanction to the war and promised to side with the Spartans. Without doubt the Chalcidians were acquainted with this oracle. After the revolt when the Chalcidians and their allies were considering the adoption of a new coin type, what one more satisfactory was to be found than the image of the God under whose protection they were fighting? Amphipolis too, when it revolted, adopted the head of Apollo for the obverse type on its coinage. It would seem probable then that there was some connection between the oracle given at Delphi and the adoption by the Chalcidians and their neighbours of the Apollo type for their new coinage.

³¹ *B. M. C. Maced.*, p. 87, no. 5; Head, *Hist. Num.*,² p. 209.

identified with the league, for the name of the city soon disappeared and was never replaced upon the coins. In conclusion, since the Apollo series of Chalcidic coins had its beginning about 432 and since it was distinctly the coinage of the Chalcidians and not merely of the city of Olynthos, we must then infer that there was a Chalcidian state at this early date. A consolidated currency is one of the surest signs of a close political union between states that have been hitherto autonomous and the fact that at so early a date there was this distinct Chalcidic coinage proves conclusively that the feeling of Chalcidic unity had crystallized into actual union in the administration of internal affairs.

Thus within the larger monetary league, we find a union of Chalcidic towns with a common coinage and headed by Olynthos³². We have seen traces of the beginnings of union even during the sixth and fifth centuries, extending down to the time of the Athenian supremacy. Even as the colonies of Chalcis in the west often acted together as a unit in times of crisis, so those upon the northern peninsula never lost that feeling of kinship which seems to have distinguished the Chalcidian colonies. Their interests were common ones and all things seemed to favour the formation of a state out of the autonomous Chalcidian towns. Now that Perdicas had persuaded many of the seacoast towns to move *en masse* to Olynthos, nothing could be more natural than that a closer political union should be formed³³. It is impossible to state with certainty what towns were destroyed or how many of the Chalcidians joined the new league. Such places in the immediate vicinity of Olynthos as Stolos*, Meeypernat†, Milkoros, Assera, and Piloros, were undoubtedly among

³² Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 12. Here we have a concise history of the Chalcidic league up to the year 383. In this account two steps are mentioned. The first naturally refers to the measures taken by Olynthos and the small seacoast towns. The second, introduced by *ἔπειτα δέ* and speaking of *τῶν μεζόνων*, gives us an account of the growth of the Chalcidian power that took place chiefly in the early years of the fourth century. Cf. Strabo, VII, 329, frg. 11; Polyb. IX, 28, 2.

³³ The fact that the inhabitants of the smaller Chalcidic towns were so willing to remove to Olynthos, destroying their old homes and leaving all that to a Greek was so dear, the political independence of his *πόλις*, shows conclusively that the tie between the colonies in the neighbourhood of Olynthos was generally recognized and was stronger than a mere feeling of relationship.

* Strabo, IX, 408, 23; Steph. Byz. Στῶλος.

† Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 29.

the constituent members.³⁴ As the revolt became more general, a larger portion of the Chalcidic peninsula was included in the territory of the league³⁵.

We have the coins to show that there was a union among certain Chalcidian towns during the first years of the Peloponnesian War, and this is substantiated by the account that Thucydides gives of operations in Chalcidicæ. The coins give evidence of internal union. A careful reading of Thucydides will show that as far as external affairs were concerned the Chalcidians acted together and formed a distinct body³⁶. The word ΧΑΛΚΙΔΕΩΝ upon the coins shows that this was the official name for the state. Thus when Thucydides speaks of the Chalcidians, we must infer *a priori* that he means the people as a state and not as a race. The narrative of Thucydides, however, presents more cogent arguments than any *a priori* reasoning. According to him the Chalcidians carried on the war in the name of the whole people, conducted negotiations, received embassies, declared truce, and made alliances.

After they had sworn alliance with the Bottiæans and with Potidaea, at the advice of Perdiccas, king of Macedon, they took measures to enlarge Olynthos, their capital city, and to strengthen the league generally by pulling down the smaller sea-coast towns. These small towns would have been nearly impossible to defend during the long war that followed. Their inhabitants the Chalcidians transferred, in large part, to the metropolis. This action is proof positive that there was in existence at that time a close political union among these cities. Otherwise such an anoikism could never have taken place, for the foundation of Megalopolis shows how unwilling even the Greek villages were

³⁴ *I. G.*, I, 256. This list belongs to 428 and is complete for the Thracian district. Hence one may conclude that the cities not found in that list were not Athenian allies at that time, unless we know something to the contrary; cf. *I. G.*, I, 259, (427-6); Cavaignac, *Le Trésor d' Athènes*, pp. XXXVI f.; *B. S. A.*, vol. XV, p. 240; cf. note 15, *sup*.

³⁵ It is not necessary to conclude that all members of the league shared in the anoikism or that all of the Chalcidian cities were originally included in the κοινόν. Toronè is an example of a Chalcidian city that remained master of its own affairs, and Stolos was a member of the league that was not destroyed. So we may judge from the fact that it receives special mention in the treaty of 421. Thuc. V, 13.

³⁶ Cf. Swoboda, *Arch.-epigr. Mitth.*, VII, pp. 55-59.

to merge their individualities in a larger union, how little they wished to transfer their political rights to a body of which they would form only a part. In the case of Megalopolis the destruction of the villages was decided upon by the Arcadian state for protection against Sparta, both for the *κοινόν* and for the unprotected villages that were to form the new city. In one respect conditions were more favorable for the synoikism of Megalopolis than for the anoikism at Olynthos. In the one case the city was of new origin and the inhabitants, so far as citizenship was concerned, were all on an equal footing from the beginning. In Olynthos the citizens of the razed towns were not only to lose their old rights but even to be absorbed into a long established *πόλις*, where they would form but a small part of the citizen body. This anoikism, then, could not have been brought about so generally, with so little friction and unwillingness, if it had been a measure suggested by Perdiccas, merely for the protection and strengthening of Olynthos at the expense of the other Chalcidians. This is what Thucydides seems to suggest when he says, ἀνοικίσασθαι ἐς Ὀλυνθον μίαν τε πόλιν ταύτην ἰσχυρὰν ποιήσασθαι³⁷. It must have occurred, therefore, as a result of the action taken by a Chalcidic *κοινόν* in which the principles of *συμπολιτεία καὶ ἐπιγαμία καὶ ἔγκτησις* were expressed.³⁸ Without the employment of force, no other conditions would have been sufficiently potent to bring about such a thorough anoikism. We cannot know with certainty what cities took part in this movement to strengthen Olynthos. With the material at hand we must be content with the knowledge that it is possible to trace the outlines of the process which resulted in giving to Olynthos the power necessary for the part she was to play during the next century until her final conquest by Philip of Macedon.

We have seen that the account of the anoikism, given by Thucydides, implies the existence of a union of some sort among the Chalcidians. If we read him further, we will see that *οἱ Χαλκιδῆς οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης* acted together as one body, just as any other state. That this was the official title is most certain³⁹. How then does

³⁷ Thuc. I, 58.

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 12; 19.

³⁹ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 121; *I. G.*, II, 17; *F. H. G.*, II, 153; Arist. *Pol.*, II, 12, 14; Strabo, VII, 329, frg. 11.

Thucydides use the term *οἱ Χαλκιδῆς* and what meaning does he give to it? Does it mean to him the Chalcidian state? The answer will be in the affirmative. In the first place he tells us that the Chalcidians swore alliances with the Bottiaeans and with Potidaea⁴⁰. It is important to notice that Thucydides says that the Chalcidians did this and not the Chalcidian cities. Hence one must infer that this was the action of a union and not of individual cities. In the battle before Potidaea, the Chalcidians⁴¹ formed a distinct body of troops stationed at Olynthos with the Macedonian horse and the other allies. This is our first indication of a Chalcidian army. After Aristeus made his escape from Potidaea, he remained among the Chalcidians, aiding them in the war⁴². Perdicas in 431, after his reconciliation with Athens, made an expedition *ἐπὶ Χαλκιδίας* with the Athenian troops under Phormio⁴³. In 430 Hagno lead another expedition against the Chalcidians, *τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης*, and against Potidaea.⁴⁴ Phormio was no longer *περὶ Χαλκιδίας*. The next summer Xenophon led an expedition against the Thracian Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans.⁴⁵ Spartolos was hard pressed, and traitors and pro-Athenian sympathizers were already at work, but at the request of the revolutionary party, *viz.*, the friends of the Chalcidians, assistance came from Olynthos. These reinforcements, however, Thucydides calls Chalcidians and not Olynthians, although doubtless they were made up in large part of Olynthian citizens. This is a noteworthy indication of the existence of a Chalcidian army and speaks very strongly in favour of our contention that Thucydides constantly refers to a Chalcidian state and not to an unorganized alliance between the Chalcidian cities. Later in the same year Sitalces marched against the Chalcidians, having in mind to end the war with the help of Athens.⁴⁶ Athens, however, failed him and he did nothing more than to ravage the country. In 425 Eion was betrayed to Athens but

⁴⁰ Thuc. I, 57-58.

⁴¹ Thuc. I, 62-63.

⁴² Thuc. I, 65.

⁴³ Thuc. II, 29.

⁴⁴ Thuc. II, 58.

⁴⁵ Thuc. II, 79.

⁴⁶ Thuc. II, 95 ff.

was recaptured by a force of Chalcidians and Bottiaeans.⁴⁷ In the following year, Strophacos, who was Chalcidian proxenos in Thessaly, with several prominent Thessalians, conducted Brasidas through that country.⁴⁸ The fact that a Chalcidian proxenos had been appointed in Thessaly is added proof that the league was a state, in the full sense of the word, and not a mere confederation of independent cities, allied for the time being to accomplish certain definite purposes, such as, for example, freedom from Athenian rule. In that case there would have been proxenoi of each of the more important cities of the union. Olynthos would probably have had its own foreign representatives.

Brasidas was invited by Perdiccas and the Athenian tributaries that had revolted to come with assistance from the Peloponnese⁴⁹. Those who sent this invitation were, of course, the Bottiaeans and the Chalcidians, although Thucydides mentions only the latter by name. Neighbouring cities that had not yet revolted secretly joined in this request for Spartan aid. The contrast, implied by this statement of Thucydides, is that the Chalcidians acted as a body while the others acted as individual πόλεις. He does not say *αἱ Χαλκιδικαὶ πόλεις* as we would naturally expect if the city still remained the political unit, and the change is emphasized more strongly by the mention of the action of those cities that still retained their old civic constitutions. Here, then, we find that the league had charge of negotiations with foreign states. This is an absolute essential to the existence of any state composed of elements that have been hitherto autonomous. When this right has been conceded by individual states to a central authority, true union has come into being. In almost the very next chapter, ambassadors of the Chalcidians are mentioned as present with Perdiccas and Brasidas in the expedition against Arrhibaeos⁵⁰. This confirms the statement that foreign relations were in the hands of the league itself.

We next hear that the Chalcidians, knowing that there was a

⁴⁷ Thuc. IV, 7.

⁴⁸ Thuc. IV, 78.

⁴⁹ Thuc. IV, 79, 84.

⁵⁰ Thuc. IV, 83.

strong party in Acanthos favourable to them, took part in an expedition with Brasidas against the city⁵¹. Under the orders of Brasidas, some time later, a body of three hundred Chalcidian targeteers with Peloponnesian hoplites, all commanded by Polydamidas, was sent to the aid of Scionè and Mendè, as a defense against the expected Athenian attack⁵². In the second expedition against Arrhibaeos the allied forces had with them Chalcidians and Acanthians, besides contingents from the other cities in proportion to their strength⁵³. Here again we have contrasted the Chalcidians on the one hand and individual cities on the other.

At the capture of Toronè by Cleon in 422, a few Chalcidians were taken prisoners and were sent to Athens. Later, however, they were exchanged⁵⁴. At the time of Cleon's expedition against Amphipolis a body of Chalcidian peltasts was with the army of Brasidas protecting the city. In the battle that followed Chalcidie horse and light armed troops rendered good service⁵⁵. After the treaty of peace in 421, Clearchidas refused to give up the city of Amphipolis, acting as he was in the interests of the Chalcidians⁵⁶. Although the treaty required Sparta to restore to the Athenians all that she had captured during the war, there was nothing to prevent continued resistance on the part of the quondam Athenian allies in Chalcidicè, and as was to be expected, the Chalcidians remained hostile and did not submit themselves to the conditions imposed upon them by the two contracting parties⁵⁷. Corinth also was dissatisfied with the treaty and with the Spartan-Athenian alliance that followed, while Argos, seeing an opportunity to become a leading state in the Peloponnese once more, conducted negotiations with various disaffected cities, with a view to forming an Argive alliance

⁵¹ Thuc. IV, 84.

⁵² Thuc. IV, 123.

⁵³ Thuc. IV, 124.

⁵⁴ Thuc. V, 3. At the capture of Toronè, the Peloponnesians, the Toronaeans and the other Chalcidians were sent to Athens: *αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ Πελοποννησίους καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος Χαλκιδιέων ἦν, ἀπέπεμψαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας*. This shows that the Toronaeans were considered Chalcidians, probably as members of the league, for they were exchanged later through the kind offices of the Olynthians.

⁵⁵ Thuc. V, 6-10.

⁵⁶ Thuc. V, 21.

⁵⁷ Thuc. V, 26.

against Sparta and Athens. Among others the Chalcidians took this opportunity of gaining powerful friends in the hope of protecting themselves from Athenian aggression⁵⁸.

In 417, the Dians revolted from Athens to the Chalcidians⁵⁹, and later the Athenians attacked Perdiccas on the ground that he had failed to help them in an expedition under Nicias against the Chalcidians and Amphipolis⁶⁰. In the following year, when Perdiccas found himself hard pressed by an Athenian force, the Chalcidians received orders from Sparta to assist him, but as they had made a truce with Athens and were unwilling to break it, they refused.⁶¹

Throughout all these years the Chalcidians had been the moving spirits in the rebellion against Athenian authority in Thrace and in resistance to all attempts to reassert that authority. Since they acted with a united front towards all foreign powers, we are forced to conclude that the Chalcidic *κοινόν* which existed in the early years of the fourth century had already been formed and, moreover, even during the first decade of the Peloponnesian War was working in complete harmony.

So complete was the union that Olynthos, the leading city among the Chalcidians, received but scant mention at the hands of Thucydides. On only two occasions did the Olynthians undertake anything of importance,—once when they exchanged prisoners at Athens⁶² thereby obtaining the freedom of the Chalcidians and Toronaeans captured in Toronè, and a second time when they captured Mecyperna⁶³. The raid upon this town, the harbour of Olynthos, was undoubtedly carried out in the main by those most concerned, the Olynthians. We may well be surprised by the small part that they played in the general history of the league, as presented by Thucydides, but, nevertheless, the explanation is a simple one. Thucydides was interested only in

⁵⁸ Thuc. V, 29-31. Walker cites this as evidence for the formation of the Chalcidic league after the Peace of Nicias; but as I have shown, an earlier date is more in accordance with the known facts. See the article, *Olynthus*, *Ency. Brit.*

⁵⁹ Thuc. V, 82.

⁶⁰ Thuc. V, 83.

⁶¹ Thuc. VI, 7.

⁶² Thuc. V, 3.

⁶³ Thuc. V, 39.

the history of the league as a whole and not in the actions of any of its parts, nor did he confuse the part with the whole. Although Olynthos was the most important member of the Chalcidic union, he did not make the mistake of crediting that city with the deeds of the state of which it formed a part. His consistent preference for the term Chalcidian is shown by his description of the attack on Spartolos by Xenophon⁶⁴. Then, if ever, one would have expected him to speak of the Olynthians. As the story goes, the inhabitants of Spartolos sent to Olynthos for aid. This was sent, but it consisted of Chalcidian troops. If, however, this hasty call for assistance had been made to Olynthos at a time when there was no thoroughly centralized power but only a loose alliance of the Chalcidians, the reinforcements that came from Olynthos would have been Olynthians, and Thucydides would probably have called them such. There would have been no time to call out troops from the other members of the league.

The care that Thucydides showed in constantly using the term *Χαλκιδῆς* goes a long way to prove that he was speaking of them as members of a *κοινόν* having a distinct corporate existence. This becomes clearer if we review the functions that we have seen were performed by that body. The control of the army was in its hands. This was always called Chalcidian. No mention is made of a contingent from Olynthos nor from any other of the revolting Chalcidic cities⁶⁵. Negotiations were carried on by ambassadors of the *κοινόν* and treaties were made in its name. It had its foreign representatives and maintained a well defined and straightforward policy throughout all this period. This policy was, of course, resistance to Athens. It was against the Chalcidians that Athenian expeditions were so often sent and for them that Clearidas refused to return to Athens that important vantage point, Amphipolis. In fact, so far as it is possible to judge, externally the Chalcidic cities were but one body exercising all the functions of statehood.

⁶⁴ Thuc. II, 79.

⁶⁵ I do not mean that no contingent from Acanthos is mentioned by Thucydides, for Acanthos was not a Chalcidian city nor a member of the Chalcidic league. This applies to other cities in a similar position.

Thucydides has shown us that the Chalcidians managed their foreign affairs as one people. The coins we have discussed show that the administration of internal affairs to a certain extent had been consolidated. Thus we have only to combine the information given by these two sources and we will see that a Chalcidic *κοινόν* was formed about the time of the revolt of the Chalcidians from Athens in 432.

CHAPTER III

TO THE CAPTURE OF POTIDAEA

Now that we have considered the evidence of the coins and of Thucydides concerning the formation and existence of the Chalcidic league, we can with profit take up the narrative of events in these regions in greater detail.

The revolt of the Potidaeans, the Bottiaeans, and the Chalcidians had been anticipated by the Athenians and measures had been taken to prevent it. Athens promptly fitted out an expedition against Perdiccas, whom she suspected of being the prime mover in all the disturbances on the borders of Macedonia and Thrace. Early in 432, thirty ships and one thousand hoplites were sent under the command of Archéstratos, the son of Lycomedes, with orders to take hostages from Potidaea, to raze the wall of that city, and, in addition, to watch closely affairs in the neighbouring cities¹. During the previous winter a Potidaean embassy at Athens had been unable to gain any concession, but at Sparta promises were given that, if Potidaea were attacked, the Peloponnesians would invade Attica². In March of the year 432, the revolt took place³. Two separate alliances were sworn, one by the revolting states with Corinth⁴ and the other with Perdiccas.⁵

All of this happened before the arrival of Archestratos.⁶ As

¹ Thuc. I, 57. With Archestratos went colleagues, probably two, although the text of Thucydides gives the number as ten. Cf. Busolt, III, 2, p. 795, note 2. The chronology of this period is involved in several difficulties. Cf. Busolt, III, 2, p. 799, note, and my article published in *Classical Philology*, vol. X, pp. 34-53.

² Thuc. I, 58, 71.

³ Cf. note 1.

⁴ Thuc. V, 30.

⁵ Thucydides does not expressly state that an alliance was made with Perdiccas but the course of events clearly shows that such was the case. Thuc. I, 57ff.

⁶ Thuc. I, 59.

his forces were all too insufficient to subdue the cities that had risen, he turned his attention towards Macedonia with the intention of humbling Perdiccas and of placing upon the throne his brother Philip. This Philip and a certain Derdas, another enemy of Perdiccas, held independent principalities in upper Macedonia and had been in league with Athens for some time previous; and now Philip and the brother of Derdas were working in conjunction with the army of Archestratos.⁷ Notwithstanding the fact that Athens was officially on friendly terms with Perdiccas, she had entered into relations with his enemies and rivals, with a view to checking his power.⁸ For this reason Perdiccas, fearing what might happen next, had stirred up his neighbours, allies of Athens, to rebel, and had sought alliance with Corinth. All had happened as he had expected and now open war was declared. Archestratos had some slight successes, capturing Thermè and blockading Pydna.⁹

During the month of May, forty days after the revolt,¹⁰ Aristeus, a Corinthian, arrived in Potidaea with assistance consisting of Corinthian volunteers and Peloponnesian mercenaries to the number of one thousand heavy armed and four hundred light armed troops. While this expedition was preparing, Athens, greatly alarmed at the turn affairs were taking in the Chalcidic peninsula, fitted out a second expedition against Potidaea, consisting of forty ships and two thousand Athenian hoplites under the command of Callias and four colleagues. It was imperative that she put forth the utmost efforts to quell the revolt before it became widespread.¹¹

Callias hastened to Macedonia, but, instead of proceeding at once against Potidaea, he remained for a time besieging Pydna without success. Meanwhile Potidaea and the Chalcidians were by no means idle. They were making every preparation for the coming of the Athenian army. The arrival of Aristeus finally brought Callias and Archestratos to a realization of the danger of further delay. They raised the siege of Pydna and came to

⁷ Thuc. I, 57, 59; II, 95, 100.

⁸ Thuc. I, 57.

⁹ Thuc. I, 61.

¹⁰ Thuc. I, 60.

¹¹ Thuc. I, 60f.

terms with Perdiccas, making an alliance with him. They then left Macedonia, taking with them six hundred Macedonian horse under Philip and Pausanias, and proceeded by slow marches to Gigonos, a town on the coast not far from Potidaea.¹² Here they encamped.

The allies had collected their forces in expectation of this movement and in two divisions were awaiting the approach of the Athenian army. Now that Perdiccas had lured the enemy away from Macedonia, thereby gaining all that he had desired from the Athenian alliance, and now that there was every chance of dealing a crushing blow to Athenian hopes in Chalcidicè, he joined his former allies, receiving from them the position of cavalry commander. Aristeus had been given command of the infantry. The Potidaeans, the Peloponnesian mercenaries, and the Corinthian contingent took up their position outside the walls of Potidaea on the side towards Olynthos, while the rest of the allies, Chalcidians, Bottiaeans, and two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas, were stationed as a guard for the latter place, ready to close in upon the Athenian rear if Potidaea should prove to be the primary point of attack.¹³

Callias foresaw this movement and checked it with a counter demonstration of Macedonian horse and allied troops. Having made these preparations to defend his rear, he broke camp at Gigonos and marched forward to the attack of Potidaea. An engagement followed in which the wing commanded by Aristeus was successful. It was not supported, however, by the rest of the army.¹⁴ The Potidaean forces and the Peloponnesians fled into the city, while the troops in Olynthos offered no support.¹⁵ Aristeus was almost cut off; with great difficulty he managed to make his escape into Potidaea. Callias, the Athenian general,

¹² Thuc. I, 61; Hdt. VII, 123; Steph. Byz.: Γίγονος πόλις Θράκης, προσεχῆς τῇ Παλλήνῃ. I cannot here enter into a discussion of the geographical difficulties presented by Thucydides. If the reading of the Oxford text is correct, ἐπὶ Στρέψαν instead of ἐπιστρέψαντες, a part of the difficulty is removed, but this offers no satisfactory explanation for the attack upon Beroea, a city so far inland. If, however, there is a second Beroea a short three days march from Gigonos, or if there is a corruption of the text, then it can be easily explained.

¹³ Thuc. I, 62.

¹⁴ Thuc. I, 62.

¹⁵ Thuc. I, 63.

was killed in the battle and with him one hundred and fifty Athenian hoplites. Of the enemy some three hundred fell. This battle took place in the second half of the month of May.¹⁶

Although the Athenians had gained a victory, they were in no position to carry out an effective siege. Their army at this time consisted of about three thousand hoplites and numerous allied troops. Potidaea, however, extended across the narrow isthmus and a complete blockade, conducted from both sides at once, would have entailed a division of forces. Since there was still a strong garrison within the city and a large army of Chalcidic troops and allies stationed in the Athenian rear at Olynthos, such a separation was not to be thought of. As it was, the Athenians took up a position upon the north side of Potidaea, outside the walls, and conducted a partial blockade, sending, meanwhile, to Athens for reinforcements. When the Athenians learned that the investment of Potidaea was but half complete and that it was free from attack on the side towards Pallènè, they sent out in June a further expedition of sixteen hundred hoplites under the command of Phormio. This made a total of some four thousand five hundred Athenian heavy armed soldiers engaged in the siege. Phormio landed at Aphytis on the east coast of Pallènè and marched thence to the revolted Potidaea, wasting the country as he advanced. He found no opposition and had no difficulty in making the investment complete, for the Athenian ships had already cut off all communication from the sea.¹⁷

Things were almost at a standstill in the Chalcidian peninsula. The Athenians did not have a force sufficiently strong to conduct extensive operations for the subjugation of the rebels. The troops in this region were fully engaged in their siege operations and had no time for campaigns far distant from Potidaea.¹⁸ It was about this time that the original number of seventy ships

¹⁶ *Ibid.*; *I. G.*, I, 442; *Thuc.* II, 2. The battle occurred in the tenth month before the attack on Plataea, i. e., Thargelion, May 15 to June 13. The reading of the MS *ἐκτῶ* can not stand. I place the attack on Plataea early in March 431. See *Class. Phil.*, vol. X, 34-53. Alcibiades and Socrates were present at the battle of Potidaea, as we learn from Plato, *Symposium*, 219ff.

¹⁷ *Thuc.* I, 64.

¹⁸ *Thuc.* I, 65.

was reduced to thirty. This number was sufficient to blockade Potidaea from the sea.¹⁹

The Chalcidians, moreover, without the assistance of the Corinthian and Peloponnesian troops shut up within the besieged city, were unable to gain further adherents for their cause. Aristeus saw that, unless sufficient aid came from the Peloponnese to raise the siege, the final capture was inevitable. Wishing to husband the provisions of the town, so that they might last until aid should arrive from without, and thinking that his forces were large enough to become troublesome to the besiegers if a part of them could escape and harass the Athenians, he tried to persuade the garrison to send away all except those that were necessary for the defense of the walls. This plan, however, was not accepted, and he with a chosen few made his escape and joined the Chalcidians, who at that time were defending themselves against the attacks of Phormio. After the completion of the siege works, Phormio had left the actual blockade to the troops sent out under Archestratos and Callias and had undertaken a campaign in the neighbourhood against the other revolted cities.²⁰ Each side gained a few victories. Phormio ravaged Botticè and western Chalcidicè and captured a few small places, while Aristeus defeated a body of Sermylians near their city.²¹

About this time, in the second prytany of the year 432-1, in the month of September, Eucrates was sent into Macedonia to harass Perdiccas and to keep him from interfering in the Chalcidic peninsula.²² The plan seems to have been to divide the forces of the enemy. Eucrates was to keep Perdiccas in Macedonia, while Phormio kept the Chalcidians from giving assistance to Potidaea. The besieging army gave the Potidaeans no opportunity to help their allies.

Meanwhile Aristeus was engaged in trying to obtain further aid from Corinth and Sparta, and Corinth was using every means in her power to bring about a general war, by which she hoped to save Potidaea and her citizens besieged there.²³ Finally she

¹⁹ Thuc. III, 17; Arist. *Ath. Pol.*, 24, 3; cf. Busolt, III, 2, p. 808, note 1.

²⁰ Thuc. I, 65.

²¹ Thuc. I, 65.

²² *I. G.*, I, Supp., 179a.

²³ Thuc. I, 65, 67.

carried her point. Sparta voted for war and called a synod of the confederacy to lay the question before the allies, who, also, were persuaded to declare war on Athens. In the year 431 this war broke out.²⁴

Conditions in the north were favourable to neither side. Athens was at war with Perdiccas and had lost a greater part of Botticè and Chalcidicè proper together with tribute, amounting roughly to about ten talents yearly.²⁵ Potidaea, it is true, although lost to Athens, was thoroughly invested but, as results showed, leaving aside the possibility of assistance to the besieged and the final liberation of the city, the Athenians had a long siege ahead of them. Meanwhile they were being deprived of the Potidaean tribute of fifteen talents yearly and were expending huge sums upon the siege, amounting to about eight hundred talents per annum.²⁶ On the other hand, a large body of picked Corinthian troops was in danger of capture and an unsuccessful battle might easily lose for the Peloponnesians all the allies that had been gained in these regions.

In the summer of 431, Nymphodoros, a native of Abdera was invited to Athens and made Athenian Proxenos. Through his agency an alliance was made with Sitalces, king of Thrace. To cement this alliance Sadocos, the son of Sitalces, was given Athenian citizenship. Nymphodoros also brought about a reconciliation between Athens and Perdiccas. Athens then restored Thermè and Perdiccas joined the Athenian army under Phormio, who was then fighting against the Chalcidians.²⁷ Nymphodoros also gave promises in the name of Sitalces that an army of Thracian horsemen and peltasts would be sent to the aid of the Athenian forces.

Later in the year Phormio was recalled and no troops were sent to take his place.²⁸ The besieging force was not increased

²⁴ Thuc. I, 125; II, 2.

²⁵ The Attic quota lists. *I. G.*, I, 256, 428-7 B. C.; 257, 426-5 B. C.; 259, 427-6 B. C. See *B. S. A.*, vol. XV, pp. 229-242, and Cavaignac, *Le Trésor d'Athènes*, pp. XXXVI f.

²⁶ Thuc. II, 70; III, 17.

²⁷ Thuc. II, 29, 95; Aristoph. *Acharn.*, 141ff.

²⁸ Thuc. II, 29, 31, 58. It is probable that Phormio was not reelected for the year 431-0. He belonged to the tribe Pandinios (Paus. I, 23, 10), *Prosop. Attica*, 14958, and we know that Hagno, also of that tribe, was gen-

and remained three thousand men. Athens was too busily engaged elsewhere to devote much additional attention to Chalcidicè. Payments for the army already there were made at irregular intervals. Early in the spring of 431 in the sixth or seventh prytany one hundred and sixty-five talents were sent to the forces in the north.²⁹ The size of the sum seems to indicate that activities were being renewed with increased vigour about this time.

Until the middle of May of the following year (430) there were no troops in the field against the Chalcidians. At that time, notwithstanding the fact that the plague had broken out in Athens, Hagno and Cleopompos, taking the fleet that had returned from its Peloponnesian expedition,³⁰ sailed out to assist in the reduction of Potidaea and to take the place of Phormio in the war against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. This expedition was on a large scale, consisting of one hundred Athenian triremes, fifty from Chios and Lesbos, four thousand Athenian hoplites, three hundred horse, and many allies. They were well equipped with siege engines which they put into use upon their arrival, but all was of no avail. The new troops had been infected with the plague before leaving Athens, and almost immediately the disease spread, working alike among the forces of Hagno and Cleopompos and the original three thousand. In

eral in 431-0. Beloch, *Att. Pol.*, p. 323. At the time of the expedition into Megara late in the summer of 431, only three thousand hoplites were absent from Athens and these were engaged in the siege of Potidaea. Hence Phormio with his troops must have already returned home.

²⁹ *I. G.*, I, 179a. The payments for the army at Potidaea were approximately as follows. Of the first two payments to the Hellenotamiai we know neither the sum nor the date, but they were probably made in the third and fourth prytanies. The third is to be dated on the twelfth day of probably the fifth prytany, Jan. 2, 431. The amount was ten talents or more. The fourth payment was made between the twentieth and twenty-ninth days of a prytany, probably the sixth, Feb. 18-27. It amounted to one hundred and sixty-five talents. The next payment, twenty talents, fell between the tenth and the nineteenth days of a prytany, probably the seventh, March 19-28. The sixth payment, of amount unknown, was probably made on the fourteenth day of the eighth prytany, May 1. During the prytany of Hippothontis, which was probably the ninth, two payments were made, one of forty talents on the sixth or perhaps the sixteenth day, June 1 or June 11, and the second of something over twenty talents on a day not known. The last payment of sixteen talents was for the cavalry and was probably made on the seventeenth day of the tenth prytany, July 21. For a discussion of this inscription, see Kolbe, *Hermes*, 34, 380-394.

³⁰ Thuc. II, 58; VI, 31.

forty days more than a quarter of the army of four thousand hoplites that had set out from Athens had been carried off by the rapidity of the disease. About the first of July the rest took ship and returned home, leaving behind to prosecute the siege the depleted forces that had come out during the first year of the war.³¹

Meanwhile Aristeus had been trying every means to bring relief to Potidaea. Towards the end of the summer of 430 Corinth and Sparta despatched an embassy to Asia, in an attempt to persuade the king to assist them with money against the Athenians. Aristeus was made a member of this embassy. As Athens was master of the sea at that time, the ambassadors were forced to take the land route from Greece to Asia. This led them through Thrace, which had recently become an ally of Athens. Aristeus, however, persuaded the other members of the embassy to delay a short time and to do everything in their power to withdraw Sitalces from the Athenian alliance. He hoped that Sitalces would see fit to send an army to aid Potidaea and to raise the siege. When they arrived an embassy from Athens happened to be at the Thracian court. Sadocos, who had previously been honoured by grant of Athenian citizenship, gave to the Athenian ambassadors, Learchos and Ameiniades, a body of troops with which to capture Aristeus and his companions. This was done as they were preparing to cross the Hellespont. They were taken immediately to Athens and there executed without trial.³² The strenuous efforts of Aristeus in behalf of Potidaea and the Chalcidians had created such fear and hatred in the hearts of his enemies that they meted this summary punishment upon the Peloponnesian embassy. The death of Aristeus deprived Potidaea of one of its most ardent supporters and greatly lessened its hopes of receiving Peloponnesian assistance, powerful enough to compel Athens to abandon the siege.

During the following winter, the garrison of the city was reduced to the last extremity. Starvation was imminent and no

³¹ Thuc. II, 58. They returned to Athens about the beginning of the new civil year. Hagno had not been reelected to office. He was followed by his predecessor Phormio. Cf. Beloch, *Att. Pol.*, pp. 290, 299f., 323; cf. 277.

³² Thuc. II, 67.

immediate relief could be expected. The annual Peloponnesian invasion of Attica had not sufficed to cause Athens to withdraw the blockading forces and the long continued siege had exhausted all the provisions of the defenders. Nothing remained but capitulation. Xenophon, Hestiodoros, and Phanomachos had been sent out from Athens to take charge of the siege. As winter was upon them and the army itself was in an exposed position, and since the Athenians had already spent two thousand talents upon the attempt to capture Potidaea, the generals did not wait for an unconditional surrender. The inhabitants with the Peloponnesian and Corinthian soldiers that had made up the garrison were allowed to leave the country, taking with them a small amount of money for ephodia and barely enough for themselves in the way of clothes. A large part of the Potidaeans joined their Chalcidian neighbours, thereby materially strengthening the latter. At Athens there was great displeasure and indignation at the leniency shown by Xenophon and his colleagues. An unconditional surrender must necessarily have taken place in a short time. The proceeds from the sale of prisoners would then have gone a long way towards recompensing the victors for the large sums of money expended by them upon the siege.³³ Soon after the capture of the city a thousand colonists were sent out to take possession of it and the adjacent territory.³⁴

³³ Thuc. II, 70; Isoc. XV, 113.

³⁴ Thuc. II, 70; Diod. XII, 46; *I. G.*, I, 340: Ἐποίκων ἐς Ποτειδαίαν.

CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLT SPREADS

The most important of the revolting Athenian allies had at last been captured at great expense. Perdiccas had been won over. Thrace had entered into a close alliance with Athens and things looked very favourable for the speedy reduction of the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans. Now that the Corinthian garrison was no longer in danger, and since Aristeus, the active ally of Chalcidian interests, had been executed, there was but little reason to expect that the Peloponnesians would send assistance to the north, so far from the base of operations.

In the early summer of 429, Xenophon and two colleagues recommenced operations in Chalcidicè. They had with them an army of two thousand Athenian hoplites and two hundred horse¹. Their first attempt was against Spartolos, the chief town of Botticè, for they thought that in it they would find sufficient Athenian sympathizers to deliver it into their hands. The capture of the city would soon put a stop to the revolt throughout the whole of the Bottiaean territory, and the Chalcidians, forced to stand alone, would, in time, be compelled to return to their former allegiance. While Xenophon was wasting the country round about Spartolos, a request for aid was sent to Olynthos. A part of the Chalcidian troops were collected there, expecting an attack, but they quickly marched to the assistance of the endangered town, arriving there with a force of cavalry, hoplites, and light armed soldiers. Battle was immediately offered near the city. The engagement resulted in a victory for one part of the troops and in defeat for the other. The strength of the Chalcidians lay in their cavalry and light armed troops, and in this part of the engagement the

¹ Thuc. II, 79.

Athenians were overcome. A second body of peltasts arrived from Olynthos too late for the battle; but encouraged by their previous victory and strengthened by the reinforcements, the Chalcidian light armed troops, supported by the cavalry, sallied out again from Spartolos. Their peculiarly harassing tactics proved disconcerting for the Athenians and soon put them to flight. The remnants of the Athenian army made their escape to Potidaea and returned to Athens with less than nothing accomplished, having lost more than one-fifth of the army, including Xenophon and his two colleagues.

This battle showed Athens the strength that she had to meet and to overcome if she was to regain her former authority. The Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans had been in revolt more than three years and yet were no nearer subjection than before. Sooner or later, unless the revolt could be quickly checked, the other allies in that neighbourhood would take encouragement and would join the movement. While the Chalcidic tribute was but a small fraction of the total, if the rebellion should spread and become general, as would probably be the case, Athens would be face to face with a revenue largely decreased and with her expenses proportionately increased. The two thousand talents spent upon the siege of Potidaea would be multiplied many times. On this account it was necessary to take urgent measures against the Chalcidians before their neighbours should join them. About this time, however, Pericles died, after which a lull occurred in the Athenian operations in the north.

It was then that Perdicas changed his colours again². This time he did not openly break with Athens but secretly assisted her enemies in their western operations. Cnemos, the Spartan admiral, undertook an expedition for the conquest of Acarnania, but in this he failed on account of a premature attack made by a part of his barbarian allies. Perdicas sent to him a contingent of one thousand mercenaries, but these arrived too late to be of any assistance in the campaign. Nevertheless, this action showed that Perdicas was none too faithful in his professions of friendship for Athens.

Just as winter (429) was commencing, Sitalces undertook to

² Thuc. II, 80.

carry out his promise of 431, wishing to punish Perdicas for his treachery and to subdue the Chalcidians³. For this purpose he collected a huge army of his subjects, amounting in all to one hundred and fifty thousand men. He had with him an Athenian general, Hagno, a number of Athenian ambassadors who had come to demand of him the fulfillment of his promise, and Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom he intended to put upon the Macedonian throne. With these forces he advanced into upper Macedonia, taking Eidomenè by storm and winning over several other towns that were loyal to Amyntas. His further operations were confined to ravaging Mygdonia, Crestonia, and the territory of Anthemos, for a short time only, since he was continually harassed by the Macedonian cavalry.

Notwithstanding the great size of his army, Sitalces was unable to accomplish anything of importance. Athens had failed him. The promised fleet had not arrived, for the Athenians, not expecting Sitalces to keep his promises, had sent nothing but envoys with gifts. Perdicas, meanwhile, had not been idle but had been conducting negotiations with Seuthes, the son of Sparadocos, a man of great influence with Sitalces, and had finally won him over with the promise that he would give him his sister, Stratonicè, in marriage. Sitalces then left Macedonia and for a time ravaged the Chalcidian and Bottiaean territory; but his soldiers, having had enough of this winter campaign, deserted in large numbers and his army melted away. Then Seuthes, working in the interests of Perdicas, persuaded Sitalces to return home. The expedition had accomplished almost nothing. A month had been spent in laying waste the country; but, owing to the inability of the Thracians to conduct siege operations, no important towns had been taken. Macedonia, in the end, had received the protection of Seuthes and the Chalcidians had been in no wise subjugated.*

The dilatory policy of Athens in the north was still pursued. Since her attention was fully engaged elsewhere, not thinking that the Spartan policy might change, she remained content with the recapture of Potidaea and postponed further opera-

³ Thuc. II, 95–101.

*Thuc. II, 101.

tions against the Chalcidians until some more opportune time. Small bodies of troops may have been sent out occasionally or placed as garrisons in certain favourable spots⁴, but no general movement was made. In individual instances conciliatory measures were adopted towards faithful allies⁵. Methonè, Aison, and Dicaea were allowed special privileges with regard to the payment of their tribute, being excused entirely except for the customary quota annually dedicated to the Goddess. In addition to this concession, negotiations were carried on with Perdiccas, asking him not to limit in any way the trade of the city, Methonè. Besides such conciliatory measures as these little was done.

Not long afterward, Sparta saw an excellent opportunity to make her power felt in the north⁶. The Trachinians and the Dorians appealed to Lacedaemon for protection against their neighbours of Oeta, from whom they had long been suffering severely. Their appeal was only too gladly received. A colony composed of Spartans, Perioeci, and other Greeks, excluding the Ionians and the Achaeans, was sent out in the summer of 426. The city of Heraclea, with a population of about ten thousand, was founded near Thermopylae. The site was favourable. It could be used as a base of operations not only against Euboea, but also against the northern allies of Athens, and was suitable for the conveyance of troops to Chalcidicè. Naturally the neighbouring peoples were particularly hostile, especially the Thessalians, who resented the foundation of Heraclea as an encroachment upon territory tributary to them and feared that it would be a means to their destruction and subjugation by Sparta. For this reason they made continual raids upon the new foundation, gradually wearing it out. In addition to these outside disturbances, the Spartan governors proved harsh and unjust in administration, thereby making Heraclea unpopular for further settlements. As a consequence it soon lost its early strength and never fulfilled its promise of an important future.

⁴ *I. G.*, I, 40, l. 28; *Thuc.* IV, 7.

⁵ *I. G.*, I, 40, 41; cf. *I. G.*, I, 257. Privileges granted to Methonè, Aison, Dikaiopolis, and Aphytis.

⁶ *Thuc.* III, 92f.

In the early summer of 425, operations on a small scale took place in Chalcidicè.* An Athenian commander, Simonides, collected a force, consisting of a few Athenians from the neighbouring garrisons and of a multitude of allies, for the purpose of recapturing the town of Eion.⁷

In this he was successful. The Athenian sympathizers in the town acted in concert with him and betrayed the place to him. He was not strong enough, however, to hold the place against an attack of Bottiaeans and Chalcidians who came immediately to its rescue and forced Simonides to leave, after having suffered considerable loss.

Early in the winter of this same year, Aristides, who had been sent out in charge of a tribute-collecting ship, coming to Eion on the Strymon, found there a Persian ambassador to Sparta by the name of Artaphernes and arrested him⁸. He took him immediately to Athens where the despatches were read. This interrupted correspondence between Persia and Sparta suggested to the Athenians that they too should appeal to the king for aid.

In the following year, 424, the conduct of the war was altered. Cleon had captured Sphaacteria and with it a number of Spartan prisoners. These the Athenians held as surety against a repetition of the annual Peloponnesian raids into Attic territory. The Lacedaemonians could not run the risk of the loss of these citizens, and so perforce, adopted new measures and changed the scene of operations from Attica to Chalcidicè. Brasidas, having shown himself a man of resource and ambition, was entrusted with the task of weakening the Athenian power still further in the Chalcidic peninsula⁹. Helots to the number of seven hundred were sent out with him. At that time great

* *I. G.*, I, 446; Supp., p. 46. This inscription contains the names of Athenians that had fallen in war at Potidaea, Amphipolis, ἐπὶ Θράκης, at Pylos, at Singos, and at Sermylia, and has been referred to this year. The small number of fatalities shows that we have to deal with a number of minor engagements. The date of this inscription, however, is uncertain and thus it may refer to minor engagements after the arrival of Brasidas.

⁷ Thuc. IV, 7. This Eion, a colony of Mendè, is not the Eion upon the Strymon, of which we hear so often. Cf. *Pauly-Wissowa*, p. 795, s. v. Bottike and Eion, no. 2.; Eustath., *Comment.*, II., II, 92.

⁸ Thuc. IV, 50.

⁹ Thuc. IV, 78-81.

anxiety was being felt in Sparta lest the Helots, instigated by the Athenians at Pylos, should revolt. Hence it was thought advisable to get some of the more dangerous of them out of the way. There had been similar reasons for the choice of Brasidas. His ambition was thought to be dangerous to the Spartan state. In Chalcidicè was found an opportunity to make use of the energies of the discontented Helots and of the ambitious Brasidas. There was the most favourable spot for dealing a blow to Athens. A revolt was already in progress and even in the cities supposedly favourable to Athens¹⁰ there was a large anti-Athenian party that had joined secretly in the invitation sent by the Chalcidians to the Peloponnese for assistance. Perdiccas, with the power of Macedon behind him, had expressed his willingness to break with Athens and had promised to maintain half of the Spartan forces at his own expense. The Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans were to furnish maintenance for the rest. Thus the Spartans were in a position to inflict great damage upon Athens at little expense or trouble to themselves, and they hoped to create such a diversion that the Athenians would be forced to discontinue their attacks upon the Peloponnese. Moreover, if they could win over the Chalcidic peninsula and take Amphipolis, they would have an excellent base for the equipment of a formidable navy, could hope to extend their operations to the other Athenian tributaries, and might even persuade the islands to come under their hegemony.

Thus when the Chalcidians sent a special request that Brasidas should be sent to their aid, he was chosen for the task and made his preparations for a march to the north.¹¹ After collecting seventeen hundred hoplites, of whom seven hundred were the Helots already mentioned, he set out for Heraclea Trachinia. The Thessalians were in the main hostile to Sparta at this time. The foundation of Heraclea still rankled in their minds so that Brasidas could not expect a quiet passage through Thessaly. The Thessalians, however, were divided into factions and were not in

¹⁰ Thuc. IV, 79, 84. The oligarchic party of Aeanthos joined with the Chalcidians in petitioning the Lacedaemonians for assistance.

¹¹ Thuc. IV, 70, 74, 78. Brasidas did not commence his march to the north until after the affair at Megara, which took place about the month of August, 424.

a position to unite in opposition to him. At Melitia in Achaea Phthiotis, several of his friends from Pharsalos, including the Chalcidic Proxenos, at his request met him to give him and his troops safe escort through Thessaly. Perdiceas, also, used his influence upon his Thessalian friends and sent Niconidas from Larissa to share in the escort. Notwithstanding these precautions, Brasidas was met at the river Euripos by a party of Thessalians who were opposed to the march. They stated, justly enough, that Brasidas had no right to lead armed forces through the country without the consent of the nation; and his escort told him that they would not conduct him further if there was any objection to the march. They excused themselves for what they had done by saying that they had only acted as hosts should act towards guests. Brasidas, however, met the hostile Thessalians with tactful words and sent them away; whereupon he made all haste to finish his march through Thessaly before a force collected large enough to stop him. In this he was successful, reaching Dion, a Macedonian city, without trouble. Shortly afterwards he joined Perdiceas for an expedition against Arrhibaeos, king of the Lyncestians.¹² The desire of Perdiceas to gain help for this undertaking was the chief reason for his open break with Athens and for his requests to Sparta for assistance. His envoys had promised that Brasidas would gain many allies for the Lacedaemonians among the neighbouring tribes. Therefore, when Brasidas received word from Arrhibaeos that he was ready to submit the affair to him for arbitration, he was unwilling to make the king of Lyncestis a permanent enemy by going further with Perdiceas in his plans for subjugation. The Chalcidian envoys who were present with the expedition advised against the complete subjugation of the enemies of Perdiceas, on the ground that it would not be well to remove all difficulties from his path lest Perdiceas should be found wanting when they in turn were in need of his promised assistance. So Brasidas left Perdiceas to his own devices, thereby vexing him so greatly that he refused to pay the half of the maintenance of the Peloponnesian troops,

¹² Thuc. IV, 73, 83.

as he had promised. A third was all that he was willing to provide.¹³

Athens little realized the danger threatening her and sent no forces sufficient to cope with a general uprising in Thrace.¹⁴ Her attention was at that time fully taken up with the expedition into Boeotia and few men could be spared for the war in the Chalcidic peninsula. Athens merely declared war on Perdiccas and decided to keep closer watch over her allies in that region. Thucydides and Eucles were sent to take charge of affairs there, but they were provided with a very insufficient force, consisting of seven ships. Eucles, being without troops, took up his headquarters at Amphipolis and Thucydides remained at Thasos with the fleet. This island was suspected of harbouring feelings of disloyalty, and for this reason the presence of Athenian forces was thought necessary for the protection of Thasos and the adjacent mainland with its rich deposits of gold. Thus Athens thought to hold the places most important for the maintenance of her position among the Thracian allies, Amphipolis controlling the valley of the Strymon and guarding the roads from Chalcidicè to the Thracian coast, and Thasos, the most important island in that neighbourhood. Otherwise the Athenian allies were left almost without protection.¹⁵ Argilos had no garrison at the time of its revolt and this is probably true of the other cities. It was not until after the capture of the city of Amphipolis that Athens realized the importance of placing garrisons in its allied cities.

Brasidas, after having entered into a truce with Arrhibaeos, left Macedonia and entered Chalcidicè where he joined forces with his allies, the Chalcidians.¹⁶ They had asked for his aid, fearing that the recent successes of Athens would leave her free to turn her attention towards them.¹⁷ The combined army, with Brasidas in command, advanced upon Acanthos, an Andrian colony, situated not far from the canal of Xerxes on the east coast of the Chalcidic peninsula. Hitherto this city had been a faithful member of the Athenian empire and one of the most impor-

¹³ Thuc. IV, 83.

¹⁴ Thuc. IV, 82, 104.

¹⁵ Thuc. IV, 108.

¹⁶ Thuc. IV, 84.

¹⁷ Thuc. IV, 79.

tant upon the base of the peninsula, paying an annual tribute of three talents.¹⁸ With the successful revolt of their Chalcidic neighbours before their eyes, the oligarchic party within the city had acted in concert with its friends, the Chalcidians, and had secretly invited Brasidas to come to their assistance. Being only a minority, however, they were unable of themselves to admit him into the city without prolonged discussion. The demos feared that the constitution would be changed in the interests of the oligarchic party. For this reason, Acanthos and the other cities which later came over to Brasidas hesitated at first to admit him. This hesitation shows that, in the main, Athenian rule had not been oppressive in these regions.

In the autumn, just before the vintage, Acanthos was face to face with the question whether she should adhere to Athens, thereby endangering her harvest, or whether she should join the Chalcidians at the demand of Brasidas and the oligarchic party of the city.¹⁹ As the democratic party was in the majority, it seemed doubtful whether the revolt could be brought about without a struggle, but the fear of losing the vintage persuaded the people to admit the Spartan general alone and to hear what arguments he had to bring forward in favour of his demands. He told them that he had come to free them and others from the Athenian yoke, as had been promised at the beginning of the war. He had no intention of freeing them from one master to make them slaves of another, nor did he come in the interests of any party. No constitutional changes were contemplated and the democracy was still to remain. This he promised with solemn oaths, both for himself and for the Spartan government at home. His speech ended with a threat as to what they might expect if they were to persist in opposing him. His promises and threats were effective and the revolt of the city was voted by secret ballot. Soon afterward, the Acanthians entered into alliance with the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans. This fact is shown by the similarity of coin type used by these three states. The new type was adopted by Acanthos at the time when it first struck coins of the Phoenician standard soon after its revolt from Athens.

¹⁸ *I. G.*, I, 259.

¹⁹ *Thuc.* IV, 84–88.

This alliance probably lasted only a few years, for Acanthos and the Chalcidians became rivals a short time later.²⁰

Stageiros, another Andrian colony not far from Acanthos, influenced by the revolt of the latter city, offered no opposition to the demands of Brasidas and revolted from Athens during the same summer.²¹ Meanwhile, the Athenians were still lax in their efforts to protect their faithful allies. No army was sent to Chalcidicè. The summer was ended, and a winter campaign in Thrace was a thing to be avoided, if possible, by the Athenian citizen troops. Moreover, the attack on Boeotia was in preparation and no force could be spared for so distant a campaign. About this time Seuthes inherited the kingdom of Thrace from his uncle Sitalces.²² This meant that Thracian sympathy was no longer to be counted upon, and it might easily be that Seuthes, who was an ally of Perdiceas, would take active part with Brasidas in bringing about the revolt of the Athenian allies upon the borders of his country. Hence, affairs were in a very critical position for Athens.

Amphipolis, the connecting link between the Athenian allies in the Chalcidic peninsula and those east of the river Strymon, was destined next to feel the power of Brasidas. With great difficulty, the city had been settled by Athens thirteen years before,²³ but it had already become very important, for it commanded the bridge across the Strymon and the passage into Thrace. One would think that the Athenian generals would have taken every precaution to guard the place, but, on the contrary, no forces were placed in the city and Eucles had nothing to depend upon but the loyalty of the citizens, the majority of whom were bound to Athens by no ties, for only a small portion of them were Athenian citizens. The remainder of the population consisted of foreigners who had been attracted to the spot by its commercial advantages. Some were Chalcidians, whose sympathies lay with the revolted Chalcidians. Some were from Argilos, a neighbouring town across the Strymon that had suffered greatly in impor-

²⁰ *Ibid.*; Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77; cf. Chap. II.

²¹ Thuc. IV, 88.

²² Thuc. IV, 101.

²³ Thuc. IV, 102.

tance because of the foundation of Amphipolis. The Argilians, therefore, were hostile. Macedonian settlers, instigated by Perdiccas, also formed a part of the discontented element.²⁴ Thus, unless energetic measures were taken by the Athenian generals, conditions were very favourable for the success of Brasidas.

In November or December of the year 424 the attack was made.²⁵ The conspirators within the city were warned and all preparations were made. Brasidas, relying partly on them, partly on the suddenness of the attack, expected an easy victory. Starting from the Chalcidic town of Arnae one wintry day, he commenced his march towards Amphipolis. During the night he arrived at Argilos. The Argilians had been awaiting his coming and revolted to him upon his approach. Without hesitation they joined forces with him and led him to the bridge across the Strymon. This bridge gave access to the territory of Amphipolis and was watched by a small guard of volunteers, placed there by Eucles. This guard, however, offered no resistance and was quickly overpowered. The intrigues of the conspirators within the city, the unexpectedness of the attack, and the difficulty of keeping a body of citizen soldiers on faithful guard during a wintry night, all played their part in this preliminary success. After the capture of the bridge and the guard upon it, Brasidas took possession of everything outside the city, capturing many citizens whom he found without the walls. When news of the attack came to Eucles, he sent a request to Thucydides for assistance, but the consternation within and the favourable terms offered by the Spartan general caused even the loyal citizens to waver and, before Thucydides could bring up his fleet from Thasos where he was stationed, Amphipolis had capitulated. Those that wished, whether Athenians or not, departed with their goods, while the others remained in peaceful possession of their rights and property, without any interference on the part of Brasidas.

²⁴ Thuc. IV, 103; *I. G.* I, 237, 244. In 443 the tribute paid by Argilos was one talent. In 436, after the founding of Amphipolis, it had dropped to one-sixth of that amount. This shows the influence the new city had on the fortunes of the older town. In all probability some of the territory of Argilos had been confiscated for the foundation of Amphipolis. For Chalcidians in Amphipolis, cf. Aristotle, *Pol.*, VIII, 3, 13, 1303B.

²⁵ Thuc. IV, 102-106.

Thucydides got no farther than Eion at the mouth of the Strymon before the fall of Amphipolis.²⁶ This place he put in a position for defence. It commanded the river and was of great importance to any one holding Amphipolis. Without it the way to the sea was blocked. Thus Brasidas had succeeded only in part. He lost no time, however, in attacking Eion but he failed both in gaining command of the entrance to the harbour and in capturing the city from the landward side. Could he have taken it, he would have used it as a base for the fitting out of a Spartan fleet. Notwithstanding his failure here, he commenced to build triremes on the upper Strymon, hoping that his urgent messages to Sparta would bring him sufficient forces to capture the city by siege.²⁷

Returning from Eion to Amphipolis, with the assistance of Perdiccas he took measures for the settlement of affairs in that city.²⁸ Almost immediately he found that his hopes of further successes were well founded. Cities beyond the Strymon eagerly joined him. Myreinos of Edonia was among the first. A little later, two colonies of Thasos on the coast came over to his side, Oesymè and Galepsos. Brasidas had now a free approach to the Athenian tributaries on the Thracian coast, and great fear was entertained at Athens lest he should extend his operations in this direction. A rapid march might even put the Athenian holdings upon the Hellespont in danger and, if successful, would cut off the grain supply from the Black Sea, so necessary for the life of Athens. The loss of Amphipolis, the threatening dangers, taken together with the disheartening defeat at Delion, caused serious alarm among the Athenians and made them fear that a general revolt among their allies might break out at any moment, now that their prestige had suffered so heavy a blow. Notwithstanding all this, they merely sent out a few small garrisons for the most important posts.²⁹ The season of the year and the unexpectedness of the blow united to cause delay.

The Athenian fears were well founded. The oligarchic anti-Athenian parties in the cities that were still faithful grew more

²⁶ Thuc. IV, 106f.

²⁷ Thuc. IV, 108.

²⁸ Thuc. IV, 107.

²⁹ Thuc. IV, 108.

powerful and secretly sent messages to Brasidas asking for assistance in their rebellious projects. His many successes had inspired in all a conviction that Sparta, at last, was willing to help them and could be trusted to keep its promises towards them.³⁰ In this they were to be disappointed, for, as it proved, Brasidas was their only support. The Lacedaemonians were more eager for peace than for the good of their newly gained allies.

The next campaign of Brasidas, in the winter of 424-3, was against Actè, the easternmost peninsula on the Chalcidic coast.³¹ It contained many small towns with inhabitants of many nationalities. Some were Greek, among whom were a small number of Chalcidians, but the greater part belonged to various Thracian tribes, Edonians, Crestonians, and Bisaltians. Others Thucydides calls Pelasgians. Most of the towns of Actè revolted to Brasidas upon his approach, but Dion and Sanè remained faithful to Athens. Brasidas did not have an army sufficiently strong to compel them to join him and so, after wasting their territory, he left them and crossed over into Sithonia. It was more important to forestall any measures on the part of Athens and to capture this peninsula before the arrival of garrisons to defend it.

The most important city situated upon Sithonia was the Chalcidian Toronè. It had paid in the year 427-6 a tribute of twelve talents, exactly twice as much as had been hitherto demanded. The general increase of tribute seems to have rested upon the Toronaeans more heavily than upon others in that region.³² For this reason they were discontented and ready for revolt. Toronè, moreover, was a Chalcidic city and had many citizens who were in sympathy with the revolted Chalcidians, their neighbours. The recent successes of Brasidas had served to increase the strength of the oligarchic party in the town. Athens had placed there a small garrison with two guard-ships, but, owing to the

³⁰ Thuc. IV, 108.

³¹ Thuc. IV, 109.

³² *I. G.*, I, 259, 427 B. C.; Cavaignac, *Le Trésor d'Athènes*, pp. XXXVI ff; *B. S. A.*, XV, pp. 229-242; *I. G.*, I, 256, 428 B. C.; *I. G.*, I, 237, 443 B. C.; *I. G.*, I, 239, 441 B. C. Athens may already have commenced further oppressions of her allies, trying to fill her empty coffers by means of the confiscated estates of rich citizens in the subject cities. This would naturally create feeling among the richer classes and would favor the formation of an aristocratic party with Lacedaemonian leanings. Cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.*, 286ff; *Pax.*, 639ff.

lateness of the season, the city had not been put in a state of complete defence, the walls being decayed and, moreover, carelessly guarded. Brasidas, acting in concert with the Chalcidian or oligarchic party in the town, suddenly appeared before the walls during the night. As the majority of the citizens had no suspicion of his presence, the conspirators introduced into the city a body of seven light armed soldiers under the command of Lysistratos, an Olynthian. These men killed the sentinels on guard and with the help of their Toronaean friends opened the gates to a company of chosen targeteers. Thereupon a signal was given to Brasidas, and he led the remainder of the army into the city. The Athenian soldiers were taken by surprise and with some of the citizens fled to the fort Lecythos, situated near the town upon a narrow peninsula that was connected with the mainland by an isthmus. The city itself was completely in the hands of the enemy, but those who had taken refuge in Lecythos refused to surrender. Brasidas made many fair promises to the main body of citizens, after the manner of his speech at Acanthos, and told them that he had come to liberate and not to enslave, that no Toronaean need fear ill treatment at his hands, and that it was to their advantage, as well as their duty, to be faithful allies of the Spartans.

After the expiration of a two days' truce, spent in making preparations for the attack upon Lecythos, Brasidas advanced, and, owing to an accident within the fort, became master of the place. Many of the Athenians escaped to Pallenè by means of their ships, but all that were captured were put to death.³³

During the remainder of the winter, Brasidas was engaged in putting to rights the affairs of his newly made allies and in placing Toronè in a position to defend itself against the expected Athenian attack, tearing down the old walls and rebuilding them to include more of the town.³⁴ Probably in some of the captured cities, notwithstanding the promises of Brasidas, aristocratic governments were established.³⁵ We know this to have been the case later at Mendè, and it is rather significant that at Acanthos and

³³ Thuc. IV, 110-116.

³⁴ Thuc. IV, 116; V, 2.

³⁵ Thuc. IV, 107, 116, 130; cf. Chap. XIV.

the other towns "the few" were the ones who were actively interested in the Lacedaemonian plans.³⁶ We have no means of judging as to the newly established constitutions of Toronè and Scionè, but it is safe to assert that the tendency was aristocratic and that some change was carried out, presumably in that direction.

In the year 423 politics in Athens and Sparta were more favourable to peace than they had been at any time before. The Spartan successes in Thrace had made both sides eager for a truce. This would give time for the negotiations necessary for the conclusion of peace or would afford both sides an opportunity to strengthen their respective positions. Instead of continuing in the way into which Brasidas had led them, the Spartans desired nothing better than to use what he had gained for them, as a means for obtaining favourable terms from Athens. Athens, for her part, wished to put an end to further inroads into her empire and to put herself in a stronger position, where she could, if peace failed, regain that which she had lost. Sparta and Brasidas, however, went their different ways, neither troubling about what the other was doing or wished to do. While the Lacedaemonians were using all their means to bring about a truce, Brasidas, their general, was trying to bring about a revolt upon the peninsula of Pallènè. This with a few scattered cities was all that was left of the Athenian empire in these parts. Methonè, on the Macedonian coast, Eion on the Strymon, and Dion and Sanè, upon the peninsula of Actè, were still faithful, but Pallènè was more important than any of these for the plans of Brasidas. Being cut off, as it was, from the mainland by the city of Potidaea, Pallènè was, in effect, an island and could only be approached by sea, so long as Potidaea remained an Athenian possession. An attack on Pallènè would show Athens that her dominion over the islands was soon to be threatened, and it would show the island communities that they might rely upon Sparta in case they saw fit to revolt. It may be questioned whether Brasidas was justified in thinking that his power was sufficient to maintain Pallènè against the combined attack of Athens by sea and by land.

³⁶ Thuc. IV, 84, 110, 123.

CHAPTER V

BRASIDAS AND CLEON DURING THE TRUCE

In the month of April, 423, truce was declared between Athens and Sparta, the terms of which were that the '*status quo*' should be maintained and that neither side should receive deserters from the other.¹ Unfortunately for all who were desirous of a peaceful settlement of affairs, Brasidas did not make his arrangements for the revolt of Scionè before the ratification of the truce. Scionè, next to Potidaea, was the most important city of Pallenè. At the time of its revolt it was paying to Athens a tribute of nine talents yearly.² Together with its neighbour, Mendè, it seems to have owed its commercial importance, in large part, to the wine produced in that region.³ The revolt of Scionè occurred almost immediately after the oaths for the truce had been sworn.⁴ It was carried through without the presence or intimidation of Brasidas. When he heard what had happened, he crossed over to Pallenè to encourage the citizens of Scionè, and, in an assembly called to welcome him, he praised them for their action. After he had finished speaking he was received with great honours. The whole affair redounds greatly to his credit and shows to what a height of popularity he had reached, by means of his moderation and justice, and, moreover, what confidence was placed in him and his plans.

Now that he had an important foothold upon Pallenè, he wished to anticipate the Athenian attack by winning over the remainder of the peninsula and if possible to recapture Potidaea. This would afford him access to the peninsula by land and he

¹ Thuc. IV, 117-119.

² *I. G.*, I, 259.

³ [Dem.] XXXV, 10, 20, 35.

⁴ Thuc. IV, 120-122.

could then more easily defend his recent acquisitions. It is not strange that he should have had hopes for the revolt of Mendè, another very important city, situated near Scionè, but that he should expect co-operation from Potidaea, a recently founded Athenian colony, strikes one as peculiar. Nevertheless, even there he had friends with whom he had entered into negotiations for the delivery of the city.⁵

Leaving the city of Scionè temporarily to the protection of a small garrison, he returned to Toronè to fit out an expedition to carry out his further plans. With these forces he sailed across again to Scionè, intending to use this as his base of operations in Pallènè.⁶ Soon after his arrival, ambassadors came from Athens and from Sparta to announce the truce, Aristonymos the Athenian and Athenaeos the Lacedaemonian. Except for Scionè, there was no disagreement as to the application of the terms of the truce. All of the other revolted allies agreed to accept them, but Aristonymos, learning that Scionè had been guilty of rebelling two days after the cessation of hostilities had been agreed upon, refused to allow it to remain in the alliance with Sparta or to share in the truce itself. Brasidas protested, but to no avail, and arbitration was refused by the Athenians.⁷

At Athens Cleon and his supporters, hostile to any proposals for peace, were only too glad to have this instance of Spartan perfidy to use for party ends; and the indignation aroused among the Athenians was such that Cleon had no difficulty in persuading them to fit out an expedition for the recapture of Scionè and to vote the massacre of the Scionaeans, as punishment for their rebellion. Notwithstanding this hitch in the operation of the truce, both sides abstained from general hostility. In Pallènè alone was the war carried on.⁸

While preparations were being made in Athens for the recapture of Scionè, the oligarchic party in Mendè took measures to put their city in line with Scionè. Immediate action alone could

⁵ Thuc. IV, 121.

⁶ Thuc. IV, 121f. After the arrival of the ambassadors Brasidas sent back his army to Toronè.

⁷ Thuc. IV, 122.

⁸ Thuc. IV, 122, 134; cf. the following account.

free them from Athens, for if once peace was declared and Spartan support withdrawn they could have no hope of resisting the Athenian power. They saw, moreover, that Brasidas was willing to help them, although it was contrary to the terms of the truce, and for this reason they trusted him to do all in his power for their protection. Having had it in mind for some time to take this step, the conspirators compelled the majority to accede to their wishes. That the people, as a whole, were against this step, is clearly shown by their actions later during the siege; but we do not know what means the oligarchic party took to gain their ends. Brasidas did not hesitate to receive them into alliance with him, claiming that the Athenians had violated the terms of the truce. Next he took measures to put both Mendè and Scionè in readiness for a siege. The women and children were conveyed to the Chalcidic city Olynthos for safety and Polydamidas with five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian peltasts was sent to their assistance.⁹ Hearing of this, Athens increased her preparations with a view to the recovery of both cities. Fifty ships were manned, including ten from Chios, and sent out under the command of Nicias and Nicostratos. One thousand Athenian hoplites, six hundred archers, and one thousand mercenaries from Thrace, together with a body of allies to be recruited from the neighbourhood of the Chalcidian peninsula, were included in the expedition.¹⁰

When Brasidas had done all that could be done for Scionè and Mendè, he turned his attention towards the affairs of Perdiccas, who was still at war with Arrhibaeos.¹¹ We are not informed what reasons Brasidas had for leaving Chalcidicè when an Athenian attack was expected to come at any moment. He may have relied overmuch upon the tardiness of Athenian action and the ease with which Arrhibaeos and the Lyncestians could be conquered. In any case it would have been dangerous for him to coop himself up in Pallenè with all his troops; for even should he be successful in defeating the Athenians on land, the superiority of the hostile fleet would keep him shut up, as it were,

⁹ Thuc. IV, 123.

¹⁰ Thuc. IV, 123, 129.

¹¹ Thuc. IV, 124-128.

upon an island, and would render his troops useless for further operations outside that peninsula, whether of an offensive or of a defensive nature. Perdicas had been importunate in his demands for assistance and may even have threatened to go over to the Athenian side, unless he received aid from Brasidas immediately. Perdicas had been helping in the maintenance of the Peloponnesian forces and felt that he had a right to some return for this expense.¹²

One thousand Chalcidian and Macedonian horse, three thousand hoplites, and an unorganized mass of Macedonians made up the combined army of Brasidas and Perdicas. The hoplites were recruited from various sources. Besides the Peloponnesians serving under Brasidas, there were Greeks settled in Macedonia, Chalcidians, Acanthians, and soldiers furnished by other allied cities. In the battle that followed their entry into the territory of the Lyncestians, Arrhibaeos was defeated and his army was put to flight. Brasidas now wished to return, feeling apprehensive about the fate of Mendè. The expected Illyrian reinforcements then joined Arrhibaeos, the news of which so frightened the Macedonian army that it took flight immediately, carrying Perdicas along with it. This precipitous movement left the Greek contingent alone in the enemy's country, surrounded by forces superior to them in number and in knowledge of the lay of the land. There was nothing to do but to retreat; but this retreat was so well conducted that after a few skirmishes the Barbarians ceased their attacks in the open country and tried to seize the pass through which it was necessary for the Greeks to go before leaving the territory of Arrhibaeos. Here Brasidas forestalled them, thereby reaching Macedonia in safety. But since he was unable to restrain the anger of his soldiers at their desertion by Perdicas, and could not keep them from ruthlessly plundering the baggage train of the Macedonian army which they found at Arnissa¹³, the enraged Perdicas executed another right about face and came to terms with the Athenian generals, using all his influence against the Peloponnesians¹⁴.

¹² Thuc. IV, 83.

¹³ Thuc. IV, 124-128.

¹⁴ Thuc. IV, 132; V, 6, 80.

When he entered into negotiations with them, they required proofs of his newly formed friendship for Athens. Thereupon he persuaded his Thessalian friends to allow no more Spartan forces to pass through their country to the aid of Brasidas and the Chalcidians. This informal agreement with the Athenian generals was later ratified and became an alliance for offensive purposes against the Chalcidians and the other revolted allies¹⁵. In every way the second expedition against Arrhibaeos had proved disastrous to the hopes and plans of Brasidas, for upon his return to Toronè he found that Mendè had already fallen to Athens¹⁶. While Brasidas was absent, the expected Athenian expedition had arrived upon the scene of action. Nicias had first turned his attention to Mendè. The first attack upon the town had ended in the defeat of the Athenian troops; for the Mendaean, with three hundred Scionaean and the Peloponnesians under Polydamidas, had taken their position upon a steep hill outside the city and could not be dislodged. The next day the Athenians changed their position, sailing around Mendè to the south, where they took a part of the suburbs and devastated the fields without opposition. The democratic party meanwhile grew discontented and desirous of surrendering to Athens. The Scionaean, fearing that this would be done, returned to their homes. The Athenian army divided its forces. Nicias wasted the country as far as the Scionaean border, while Nicostratos took up his position outside the northern gates of the city. Polydamidas, wishing to attack Nicostratos, exhorted the Mendaean to go out and offer battle. In repressing insubordination that broke out among the dissatisfied members of the popular party, Polydamidas so angered the already discontented democrats that they attacked the aristocratic party and the Peloponnesians and then threw open the gates for the entry of the Athenians. The Peloponnesians rushed to the citadel for refuge and Nicias, who had returned, entered the town with his whole army. The place was plundered, but, through the efforts of the generals, the lives of the citizens were spared. Clemency was shown to the city as a whole. Its old constitution was reestablished and the conspirators were

¹⁵ *I. G.*, I, Supp., 42, p. 141.

¹⁶ *Thuc.* IV, 129.

handed over to the Mendaeans for trial. The citadel with its Peloponnesian garrison was placed in a state of siege by means of a wall and guard.¹⁷

After the settlement of affairs in Mendè, the main body of the army left the city and marched against Scionè. The defenders took their stand upon a hill outside the city but were soon dislodged and were forced to retire into the town, where they were joined shortly by the Peloponnesian garrison of Mendè, which had escaped from the acropolis by night and had eluded the Athenian guards outside Scionè. The Athenians then proceeded to invest the city, surrounding it with a wall and establishing a blockade¹⁸. Towards the end of the summer the investment was completed and the main body of troops returned home, leaving a guard sufficient to keep up the siege¹⁹. During this time Brasidas had returned to Toronè, but, feeling that he could not help his friends of Pallènè, he kept quiet and did nothing²⁰. Perdiccas had come to terms with Nicias and as a proof of his friendship, through his influence in Thessaly, he put a stop to a Lacedaemonian expedition under Ischagoras that was then fitting out for the aid of Brasidas²¹. Ischagoras, nevertheless, with Ameinias and another Spartan came through to Chalcidicè. They had been sent out by the Lacedaemonian government to learn how things stood with the Spartan allies in the north. They brought with them certain Spartans of military age who were intended as harmosts for the captured cities. As there were no Spartans under the command of Brasidas, the Lacedaemonians deemed it necessary, for the proper protection of Spartan interests, to send reliable men to act as governors and commanders in the newly acquired towns. Although it was contrary to Lacedaemonian custom to appoint men of age for military service to such positions, Clearidas was made harmost at Amphipolis and Pastelidas received a similar appointment at Toronè.²²

¹⁷ Thuc. IV, 129f.

¹⁸ Thuc. IV, 130f.

¹⁹ Thuc. IV, 133.

²⁰ Thuc. IV, 129.

²¹ Thuc. IV, 132.

²² Thuc. IV, 132.

It seems that the Spartan commissioners used all their power and influence to make Brasidas abide by the terms of the truce, for he undertook no further operations during that summer. After they returned, towards the spring of the year 422, he made a night attack upon Potidaea, but he was detected before he had managed to scale the wall and withdrew hastily.²³

²³ Thuc. IV, 135.

CHAPTER VI

CLEON'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST AMPHIPOLIS

In April of 422, the truce expired but it was not until after the Pythian games in September that hostilities actually commenced. No peace had been agreed upon¹. Sparta sent a second body of nine hundred troops to the aid of Brasidas, but they went no further than Heraclea, being detained there by the necessity of placing affairs in that colony in a more healthy condition². In Athens, Cleon was insisting constantly upon the departure of an expedition against Amphipolis. The hopes of the peace party had received a blow. The Athenians had trusted Sparta; but she had proven herself either unable or unwilling to keep the promises that she had made. So it seemed advisable to repair the breaches made in the Athenian empire by the campaigns of Brasidas. Cleon was entrusted with this task.³ His military qualifications were few; but it was necessary to have some one in charge of the affair who was an ardent

¹ Thuc. V, 1. The reason for this delay was as follows. Cleon was not a member of the board of strategoi when the truce ended in April 422. At that time his political opponents held office. Laches, Nicostratos, and Nicias were the leaders of the opposition. Evidently it was not thought advisable to entrust anything of importance to men who were opposed to a continuation of the war. Cleon came into office towards the end of July, but instead of immediately setting sail for Chalcidicè he waited until after the Pythian games which came in September. How are we to explain this inactivity and to reconcile it with Cleon's eagerness to renew the war in the north? It would be inexplicable but for the fact that the Etesian winds during the summer months make voyages northward almost impossible. They commence about the 22nd of July and blow for forty days until about the first of September. This explains the whole course of events. Cleon was unable to sail before September, but his eagerness to renew the war was such that he persuaded the Athenians to undertake an autumn campaign. Autumn campaigns were greatly disliked by the citizen soldiery of Athens, and to this may be due a part of the discontent of Cleon's troops.

² Thuc. V, 12.

³ Thuc. V, 2.

supporter of the war policy. Although a majority of the citizens were in favour of the undertaking, a large minority, consisting of the middle classes, had no sympathy with it. From this minority came, in large part, the hoplites to whom the carrying out of the affair must necessarily be entrusted. This fact, taken together with the popular Athenian distrust of Cleon's ability as a general, created a general unwillingness to serve under him on the part of those chosen for the expedition⁴. He had under his command thirty ships carrying twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, three hundred horse, and a body of allies. In addition to these forces, he expected Perdiccas to send reinforcements, in accordance with the alliance of the previous year. Polles also was called upon to bring to the aid of the Athenian army as many Thracian mercenaries as possible⁵. Brasidas, by this time, had left Toronè, his headquarters, and had gone to Amphipolis to assist Clearidas in making all necessary preparations for its defence; for it was no secret that Athens wished to regain this city above all others⁶.

Cleon touched first at Scionè, still under siege, but, finding that its capture was only a matter of time, he did not delay long there. Taking with him as many of the besieging hoplites as could well be spared, he crossed to the peninsula of Sithonia, landing in the so-called harbour of the Colophonians near Toronè. When he learned that Brasidas had left the city, he made an attack upon it, both by land and by sea. The new fortifications, of much larger extent than the old, were still unfinished and the garrison of the city was not large enough to guard the full length of the walls and to defend the harbour. Thus while Pastelidas was busily engaged protecting the new wall enclosing the suburbs, the Athenian fleet sailed into the port and took the town. The citizens of Toronè, together with the Peloponnesians and the Chalcidians engaged in the defence of the place were sent as prisoners to Athens, while the women and children were

⁴ Thuc. V, 7.

⁵ Thuc. V, 2, 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*

sold into slavery. Cleon left a garrison in the city and sailed around Mt. Athos, on his way towards Amphipolis⁷.

As soon as Brasidas learned that Cleon had arrived in the Chalcidic peninsula, fearing for the safety of Toronè and knowing its weaknesses, he hastened to its aid. Cleon, however, had anticipated him and the capture of the city took place when he was still four and a half miles from it⁸. When he heard that it had fallen he returned with all speed towards Amphipolis. Cleon made Eion his headquarters, where he awaited the arrival of expected reinforcements from Perdiccas and Polles, king of the Odomantes.⁹ During this time the towns of Actè were readmitted into the Athenian empire, probably at their own request. Cleon also attacked Stageiros but failed in his attempt to take it. Galepsos, however, which had submitted to Brasidas after the capture of Amphipolis, was retaken¹⁰.

Brasidas took a position upon a high hill called Cerdylion, across the river from Amphipolis in the territory of Argilos. Here he was able to keep a close watch upon the movements of the enemy. His army, in addition to his own forces, included one thousand Edonian and Chalcidian peltasts and three hundred horse. He had summoned, as well, fifteen hundred mercenaries from Thrace and the whole body of Edonian troops. His heavy armed forces amounted in all to two thousand men. Of these, he kept with himself upon Cerdylion fifteen hundred, while the rest remained under the command of Clearidas in the city¹¹.

The armies of the two commanders were about equal in num-

⁷ Thuc. V, 2f; Müller-Strübing, *Thuk. Forsch.*, pp. 262f. It is probable that many of the women and children had been sent into safety in the interior, perhaps to Olynthos. The prisoners were exchanged later through the kind offices of the Olynthians. The women and children of Scionè had been sent to Olynthos at the time of the expected Athenian attack. Cf. Thuc. IV, 123.

⁸ Thuc. V, 3.

⁹ Thuc. V, 6.

¹⁰ Thuc. V, 6. If the towns of Actè had been captured by Cleon the probabilities are that Thucydides would have mentioned the fact, or they would have been included with Toronè, Scionè, and Sermylia in the treaty of the following year. That Cleon recovered them is seen from the fact that Cleonae is in the tribute list of 421 and that Thyssos revolted to the Chalcidians soon after the peace. Thuc. V, 35; *I. G.*, I, Supp., p. 141, no. 37; cf. Kirehoff, *Thuk. u. s. Urkundenmaterial*, pp. 42ff and *infra* Chap. VIII, note 9.

¹¹ Thuc. V, 6.

bers, but the insubordination of the Athenian soldiers, due to their distrust of Cleon, here manifested itself. Their impatience forced Cleon to act. Drawing out his whole army to investigate the lay of the land, he was led into a trap that cost him his life and lost the battle for Athens. He had no intention, whatever, of fighting before the arrival of his reinforcements. Thus when he saw the enemy within the city preparing to sally out against him, he gave the order to retreat. This retreat he managed so unskillfully that he left his center open to the attack of the enemy. Brasidas attacked with a handful of men and found the Athenians so unprepared that he routed their center and left wing easily. Clearchidas with his troops sallied out against the right wing where Cleon was stationed, and after a short resistance here, the Athenians turned and fled, Cleon himself being the first to leave the field of battle. Those that escaped slaughter made their way to Eion and from there they took ship for Athens. Six hundred Athenians lost their lives in the battle, among which number was their general, Cleon.¹²

On the other side the loss was small in numbers, but Brasidas was among the slain. He was buried in the city of Amphipolis with great ceremony. The services that he had rendered the city seemed so great in the eyes of the citizens that he was given the title of "Founder" and all the honours pertaining to that title, games, and annual sacrifices. The real founder, Hagnon, the Athenian, was thus degraded and displaced¹³.

¹² Thuc. V, 7-11. Perhaps the impatience of the Athenian soldiers was due in part to a desire to put an end to the autumn campaign, so that they could return home or at least go into winter quarters in Amphipolis.

¹³ Thuc. V, 11.

CHAPTER VII

THE PEACE OF NICIAS

Now that in both Athens and Sparta the war party had lost its leader everything seemed favourable to a rapid consummation of peace. Each side had something to offer in exchange for that which it desired to receive. Sparta wanted most of all the return of the prisoners held by Athens and the evacuation of the places held upon its coast. Athens wished the return of the colonies it had lost in the north. Other reasons for peace were not lacking. Towards the end of the winter of 422 Athens and Sparta entered into negotiations which resulted in an agreement that each side should give up all that it had gained by force of arms. This caused much dissatisfaction among the Peloponnesian allies, but early in 421 Sparta, together with a majority of allies, accepted peace for a period of fifty years upon these terms¹.

So far as the history of the Chalcidic league and of its neighbours is concerned the conditions were as follows. First of all, the Lacedaemonians and their allies, i. e., the Chalcidians, Acanthians, etc., were to restore Amphipolis to Athens.² This was the most important item, without which the Athenians would never have consented to a peace. The Chalcidians as Spartan allies were then included in the treaty whether they wished it or not. Sparta was willing enough to pledge their obedience to the terms she had made; but when it came to fulfilling these terms she found herself unable to enforce them without recourse to arms. At Amphipolis there was a Lacedaemonian garrison and Athens trusted that Sparta would be able to hand the city over to her. Moreover, it was

¹ Thuc. V, 14ff.

² Thuc. V, 18, 5.

undoubtedly an Athenian colony and had been captured from her during the war. The right of Athens to the place was unquestionable. The only difficulty was that the Amphipolitans were unwilling to return to their allegiance. The Chalcidians seem to have had considerable influence in the town, for Thucydides tells us that Clearidas, working in their interests, refused to give up Amphipolis to the Athenians³.

The conditions with regard to Argilos, Stageiros, Acanthos, Stolos, Olynthos, and Spartolos were different⁴. The first three were Andrian colonies that had come over to Brasidas at his request. None of them had been taken by actual force of arms. Olynthos, Spartolos, and Stolos, likewise, had not been captured by Sparta but had been Lacedaemonian allies from the very beginning of the war. These six, therefore, were to receive a semblance of autonomy for which they were to pay to Athens the tribute as it had been assessed by Aristides⁵. They were to have the right of entry into alliance with Athens if they so desired; but she could not use force upon them, except in default of payment of tribute. Sparta renounced all claims to alliance with them. It was not possible for her literally to hand them over to Athens. These cities were only her allies and not dependencies and she had no garrisons in them by which she could force them to do as she chose. Athens, however, had gained her point. By the treaty, these cities had become members of her empire. If they proved refractory, Sparta had promised not to interfere when they refused to pay the tribute. In that case she could attack them and do with them as she chose. If they became discouraged because of their desertion by Sparta and paid their tribute, Athens would be saved the trouble of more forceful measures. Another fact is to be noted here. No mention of

³ Thuc. V, 21.

⁴ Thuc. V, 18, 5.

⁵ The word used in the treaty for the action of the Lacedaemonians is *παρέδοσαν*. This can only mean that Sparta renounced all claims to alliance with these cities. It can not mean that she promised literally to give them up, for, except possibly for Amphipolis, which had a Lacedaemonian garrison, these cities were only her allies and not dependencies. Hence Sparta had no authority over them. Moreover, she had her promises made to them to perform and if she failed in this, she could expect nothing more nor less than a rejection of the treaty by these allies. The Chalcidians, in fact, did refuse to accept the treaty.

the Chalcidians by name is found in the treaty. The same thing is true of the Bottiaeans. In place of this occur the names of the cities, Spartolos, the chief city of the Bottiaeans, and Olynthos and Stolos, two Chalcidian cities. It is definitely stated, moreover, that the Spartan allies were to take the oaths *κατὰ πόλεις*. This warrants us in the conclusion that Athens was unwilling to recognize the newly formed states and wished to weaken their prestige, as far as possible, by making individual cities swear to the treaty. This would form another objection to the peace from the standpoint of the Chalcidians.

Mecyperna, Sanè, and Singos were to be autonomous just as Olynthos and Acanthos.⁶ The fact that these three towns come under a separate classification is of peculiar interest here. Various conflicting explanations of this state of affairs have been given. Why was a separate category formed for these three cities, and how did they differ from those in the preceding list? It can be taken for granted that the article which refers to Sanè, Singos, and Mecyperna was not put in as an afterthought. There is still another question that must be answered. What have Olynthos and Acanthos to do with these cities, that their names should be inserted here? Are they to be considered merely examples, chosen because they happened to be the most important cities, or are they of special significance? Before we enter upon a discussion of the explanation of this clause of the treaty, it is necessary for us to pass in review what we know of the histories of these three cities. Sanè was an Andrian colony, situated upon the peninsula of Actè near the place where Xerxes dug his famous canal.⁷ Plutarch tells an interesting story of its foundation and of the part it played in the settlement of Acanthos.⁸ According to his version of the story it was founded by Andrians and Chalcidians acting in concert. This is borne out to a certain slight extent by Thucydides, who says that part of the inhabitants of Actè were of the Chalcidic race.⁹ After Sanè had been captured from its original inhabitants it was learned that Acan-

⁶ Thuc. V, 18.

⁷ Thuc. IV, 109.

⁸ Plutarch, *Actia Gr.*, 30. It is to be remembered that Andros was at an early date an Eretrian dependency.

⁹ Thuc. IV, 109.

thos was deserted; whereupon scouts were sent out to ascertain the truth of the matter. These scouts learned that the rumor was correct; and one of them, a Chalcidian, conceived the idea of claiming the city for the Chalcidians. When they were near the city he broke into a run, hoping to enter Acanthos first and then lay claim to it by right of priority of arrival. An Andrian scout guessed his purpose and, being unable to overtake him, cast his spear ahead of the Chalcidian into the Acanthian territory. Both parties then asserted their rights to the city and it was referred to the arbitration of the Erythraeans, Samians, and Parians. The first two decided in favour of the Andrians, but the Parians upheld the Chalcidian claim. The interesting thing about this story is the fact that, in the time of Plutarch, there was a tradition connecting Sanè and Acanthos. During the time of the Athenian empire, Sanè was one of the many minor cities of the Thracian district. Its tribute was raised from two-thirds of a talent to a talent. During the war, this was lowered to one-sixth, which it paid in 427.¹⁰ In the winter of 424-3 it resisted the attack of Brasidas and was not captured by him.¹¹ After this we have no further mention of the city until its name occurs in the treaty of peace.

Of Singos little is known. It was situated upon the east coast of the neck of Sithonia. It is impossible to say by whom the city was founded, but as it lay in Sithonia where the Chalcidians settled, it is probable that it too was a Chalcidian colony.¹² Kirchoff¹³ suggests that it, like Sanè, was Andrian; but his only proof for this hypothesis is that it is mentioned in the treaty after Sanè. He wishes to bring it into connection with Acanthos. The quota lists show that it was a more important city than Sanè, originally, but that it dwindled gradually, until in 436 it was paying but one talent tribute. Before that it had been paying four, three, and two talents per annum. After 436 it is found in no list. Thucydides fails completely to mention it in his account of the war in Chalcidicè. Its name occurs in the

¹⁰ *I. G.*, I, 234, 446 B. C.; 244, 436 B. C.; 259, 427 B. C.

¹¹ *Thuc.* IV, 109.

¹² *Strabo*, VII, 329, frg. 11.

¹³ Kirchoff, *Thuk. u. s. Urkundenmaterial*, p. 46.

treaty of 421 but nowhere else. It is important to note, however, that it was placed upon the *τάξις φόρου* of 421-0, but the tribute assessed to it was the nominal one of ten drachmas.¹⁴

Mecyperna was upon the coast near Olynthos and was in fact the harbour of that place.¹⁵ Thus probably it was a Chalcidian town. In the quota list of 454 it is found joined with the Chalcidian city Stolos, for some reason unknown. After that, however, whenever it appears upon the lists, it is alone. Its tribute varied from two-thirds of a talent to a talent. Like Singos it appears in none of the extant lists after 436 and is not mentioned by Thucydides until its name occurs in the treaty. In the *τάξις φόρου* of 421-0 it is also found and its assessment is the same as that of Singos, ten drachmas.¹⁶ In the winter of that year, an Athenian garrison was in the city, but a raid made upon it by the Olynthians was successful and it was captured by them.¹⁷

In summing up, we find that Sanè was an Andrian colony, with perhaps some Chalcidian elements. Mecyperna was Chalcidian and Singos was situated in territory settled by Chalcidians. From 436 until 421 we have no knowledge as to whether Mecyperna and Singos were faithful to Athens or not. Their names are not found in the list of 428, which is complete for the Thracian district.¹⁸ This is purely negative evidence, for their names may have occurred elsewhere in one of the appendices that are so often found in the later lists.¹⁹ Sanè remained faithful until 424, but after that nothing is known.

The question resolves into the following. Would there have been any necessity or reason for making a separate provision in the treaty of peace for these cities, if they had never revolted from Athens, and for stating it as a corollary to the provision relating to Olynthos and Acanthos? Furthermore is it possible

¹⁴ *I. G.*, I, 226, 454 B. C.; 228, 452 B. C.; 230, 450 B. C.; 234, 446 B. C.; 242, 438 B. C.; 244, 436 B. C.; Supp., p. 141, no. 37. This belongs with frg. z" which has been wrongly dated in the year 425; cf. note 9, Chap. VIII.

¹⁵ Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 29.

¹⁶ *I. G.*, I, 226, 454 B. C.; 235, 445 B. C.; 242, 438 B. C.; 244, 436 B. C.; Supp., p. 141, no. 37.

¹⁷ Thuc. V, 39.

¹⁸ *I. G.*, I, 256.

¹⁹ This, however, is improbable, as the appendices usually contain the names of towns of minor importance.

that two cities situated in the heart of the rebellion, such as were Mecyperna and Singos, could have remained faithful to Athens? If these cities revolted, did Sanè revolt between 424 and 421, or, if it did not, why was it placed with the others in this treaty? If they all remained faithful, why mention them at all?

These questions are very difficult to answer, and it is not surprising that so many differences of opinion have arisen. The words of the treaty are as follows. The Mecypernaeans, the Sanaeans, and the Singians are to inhabit their own cities just as the Olynthians and the Acanthians. Does the word *οικεῖν* mean to inhabit or to govern? It may even mean "to settle in." It is evidently the crucial word of the passage and upon its interpretation depends, to a large extent, the meaning of this provision of the treaty. If *οικεῖν* means, in this passage, "to govern", it is clear that these three cities are to be autonomous, to pay the Aristidean tribute and to become Athenian allies, if the Athenians could persuade them to take this step. These were the conditions that applied to Olynthos and Acanthos. The inference is that the cities were not at that time Athenian allies and were not paying tribute. To go further, is there any evidence that they paid the Aristidean tribute or even were assessed the Aristidean tribute for the following year? As for Sanè, there is no evidence whatever, but for the other two we are in a more fortunate position. According to the *τάξις φόρου* of 421 they were assessed ten drachmas each. This is a mere nominal sum and no one will deny the impossibility of so small a tribute having been assessed by Aristides. There is no other case on record, so far as I know, of such a sum, except in this *τάξις φόρου* of 421.* It is, moreover, much less than that paid by these cities from 454 on. It is not probable that conditions had changed so materially in the twenty-five years since the first establishment of the tribute. The change from ten drachmas to four talents in the case of Singos and from ten drachmas to one talent in the case of Mecyperna is scarcely conceivable under ordinary conditions.²⁰

* But cf. *I. G.*, I, 37, where Keria is assessed ten and one-half drachmas.

²⁰ *I. G.*, I, 226-259; I, Supp., p. 141, 37.

If then *ολκεῖν* means "to govern" and the cities of Mecyperna, Singos, and Sanè were not Athenian allies, as we have shown, how did they differ from Acanthos and Olynthos, that they should have a special article to themselves? From this alone, it is hard to see how they can have differed. We have shown, however, that the Aristidean tribute did not apply to them and the only conclusion is that *ολκεῖν* does not refer to government at all. It must then refer to settlement or to habitation proper. If so, our inference is that the inhabitants had not been dwelling in their own cities. Where then had they been dwelling? We have seen that it was a policy of the Chalcidians from the very start of the revolt to concentrate themselves in their capital city, Olynthos. Stahl in his edition of Poppo's *Thucydides*²¹ thinks that these are two of the cities upon the seacoast which participated in the anoikism of Olynthos. He thinks that the Sanè of the treaty is not the Sanè of Actè but another town of the same name situated upon the peninsula of Pallènè near Potidaea.²² Steup, however, has shown that this assumption is inadmissible. If there had been two cities of any importance with the same name, it would have been necessary to distinguish them in some way in an important document like a treaty.²³ Moreover the fact that Acanthos is mentioned with Olynthos in this article shows that it had some connection with one of the three cities named therein. This necessitates the assumption that the Andrian Sanè is under discussion. To leave Sanè and Acanthos aside for a moment, let us consider the question of the others. As we have said, Mecyperna and Singos are not found in any extant tribute list after 436. This is of course no proof that they were not at that time faithful Athenian allies; but the complete preservation of the quota lists of 428 and 427 in their Thracian parts renders it probable that they had revolted. They were, moreover, right in the heart of the rebellion, Mecyperna from the beginning and Singos, if not then, at least after the capture of Sithonia by Brasidas. Mecyperna was less than two and a quarter miles from Olynthos and it is inconceivable that the Chalcidians should have allowed

²¹ Stahl-Poppo, *Thuc.* V, 18, note.

²² Hdt. VII, 123; Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 27; Steph. Byz., Σάνη.

²³ Steup, *Thuk. Stud.*, pp. 44ff; cf. Kirchhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 46f.

the Athenians to hold so important a post in the midst of their territory. Hence we must conclude that this was one of the cities which participated in the original revolt and most probably in the anoikism. It is not so certain that Singos was among the number of the rebellious cities in 432; but its situation was such that it must have joined in one of the following years, probably in the interval between 432 and 428. As it is not mentioned in the account of Brasidas' exploits, which are given in such detail, and as the capture of it could not have been neglected by him, one must assume that it had revolted at some previous time. If it had been an Athenian ally, its position commanding the entrance to Sithonia would have made it necessary for Brasidas to attempt its capture before advancing upon Toronè, and if he had done so with success, or otherwise, one must assume that Thucydides would have mentioned it, since he takes pains to mention the successful resistance of two small towns like Sanè and Dion during this same campaign. On the other hand, if it had revolted of its own accord during the early years, Thucydides need not have mentioned the fact of its union with the Chalcidians, for he fails completely to give the names of the cities that joined with Olynthos to make up the Chalcidian state. Hence we must conclude that Singos revolted from Athens during the first years of the war and moved the greater part of its inhabitants to Olynthos. There is no other satisfactory explanation of the *olkèiv* clause. If Mecyperna and Singos had remained faithful Athenian allies and had retained their inhabitants, why should they, more than others, be mentioned in the treaty and why should permission be granted to them to go on living where they had always lived? This permission is granted to no other city. Moreover, the tribute list of 421 shows that something had happened to weaken them very materially, for otherwise they would have been assessed more than ten drachmas tribute. This is the strongest indication we have that Mecyperna and Singos had lost the greater part of their inhabitants and we must connect this loss of population with the well known Chalcidian policy of concentrating its power in Olynthos, especially since this policy was concerned with sea-coast towns that would be hard to protect. This is a further indication that the revolt of Singos occurred in

the early years before the arrival of Brasidas, for, after his arrival, such a policy was not so necessary. The power of Brasidas was felt to be sufficient to protect the cities that rebelled. Except for the tribute list of 421 and this article of the treaty, our proof is largely negative, but I think that it is clearly established,—first, that Mecyperna and Singos revolted during the early part of the war, secondly, that their inhabitants moved to Olynthos, and finally, that this article of the treaty provides for the resettlement of these towns by the original inhabitants.

Steup and Kirchhoff maintain that these cities were in the possession of Athens at the time of the treaty.²⁴ So far as one can judge, their conclusions are based upon the possibility that Mecyperna and Singos were included in the appendices of the quota list of 428, the fact that Sanè remained faithful to Athens up to 424, and the fact that in the winter of 421-0 Mecyperna was in the hands of the Athenians, although Thucydides fails to mention the fact of its capture. They think that, if it had been recaptured between the winter of 422-1 and 421-0, Thucydides would certainly have mentioned it. As for the first argument, it is weaker than pure negative evidence and can not be used against the probability that these cities could not have remained in the Athenian alliance while their neighbours, on all sides, were in revolt. The history of Sanè up to 424 can prove nothing for Mecyperna and Singos and the silence of Thucydides is entirely negative.

As for Singos, Steup thinks that Thucydides' description of the anoikism prevents one from assuming that this town participated in it. The word *ἀνοικίσασθαι* gives one the impression that the cities to which the author is referring were separated from Olynthos neither by "Berghöhen" nor by foreign territory. This eliminates Singos. This is confirmed, he thinks, by the fact that Toronè, a Chalcidic city, did not take part in the uprising. As we have shown, however, there is no necessity for assuming that Singos revolted in 432 but only that the revolt occurred in one of the early years of the war. Hence the de-

²⁴ Steup, pp. 40ff.; Kirchhoff, *Thuk. u. s. Urkundenmaterial*, pp. 46ff. For the capture of Mecyperna in the winter of 421-0 see Thuc. V, 39.

scription of the events of 432 need not have reference to Singos, and the use of the word ἀνοικίσασθαι can not be taken as an objection to the hypothesis that Singos followed the example of the other towns when she finally revolted.

What then about his other thesis that Olynthos and Acanthos had at some time or other claimed sovereignty over these three cities, the first over Mecyperna and the second over Sanè and Singos, and that this article was placed in the treaty at the request of Athens, in order to prevent any assertion of these claims? Athens feared that Olynthos and Acanthos would again assert this sovereignty and so had every reason for wishing it to be expressly stated that her allies Mecyperna, Singos, and Sanè were to be autonomous, just as were their former masters. Sparta in agreeing to this denies that Acanthos and Olynthos have any claims, whether old or new, upon these Athenian allies. Kirchhoff goes a step further and says that the sovereignty dated from the times before the Athenian supremacy in the Chalcidic peninsula. In any case, in the quota lists, there is no sign of such dependence of Mecyperna, Singos, and Sanè upon Olynthos and Acanthos. Mecyperna may have been originally a dependency of Stolos or vice versa for they are found together in the list for 454, but there is no sign of any connection between it and Olynthos nor of the other cities with Acanthos.²⁵ It is not clear how Olynthos can have had any claim to Mecyperna before the time of the Athenian control in Chalcidicè for it did not receive its Chalcidian inhabitants until 479, almost immediately preceding the formation of the Delian League. Granted, however, that Olynthos and Acanthos had this supremacy at this early date, from 454 on it can only have been a theoretical supremacy and not an actual one; and if they were unable to assert this theoretical sovereignty during the time of the war,—that is to say, if these three cities remained faithful to Athens against the will of their masters,—Athens need have had little fear that they would be disloyal and would return to conditions existing more than fifty years before. If Olynthos and Acanthos had no part in the affairs of Mecyperna, Sanè, and Singos, and could not persuade them to revolt, their

²⁵ *I. G.*, I, 226.

claims were altogether too idle to cause Athens to think seriously about them for a moment. As for Sanè, what we know of its early history would seem to imply that it rather than Acanthos would have, in theory at least, the sovereign position. If we are to assume anything, it is this, that Mecyperna and possibly Singos were members of some early Chalcidian union, and not dependencies of a small town like Olynthos. We must remember that Olynthos was a very unimportant little village until the revolt of 432.

We come back then to the point from which we started. The sovereignty was an actual one and dates from the time of the revolt of each of the cities, and probably not before. Steup seems to have come near to the truth in his discussion of Mecyperna. He admits the possibility of its having been one of the seacoast towns destroyed at the beginning of the war. He then goes on. If the city had been actually deserted by its inhabitants and destroyed in 432, what conclusions can be drawn from this as to the conditions existing in the winter of 422-1? Is it not possible that the Mecypernaeans were induced to return to their Athenian allegiance through discontent at the state of affairs resulting from the synoecism or for some other reason? He closes by saying that the language of Thuc. V, 39, 1, does not allow of a doubt that the city was in existence at that time. Such a rebuilding of Mecyperna must be presupposed. He thus admits that Mecyperna had taken part in the synoecism, or as I have called it the anoikism. It seems probable to me that the same thing later happened to Singos, but that the desertion of the sites was not so complete as Steup would have us suppose. It is more than probable that many of the inhabitants were averse from leaving their homes and for this reason remained loyal to Athens, at least to the extent of being silent sympathizers in an enemy's country. If so, it may well be that some of them stayed in the deserted towns. One can not tell whether the citizens who had not wished it had been forced to take up their abode in Olynthos. Probably this was not the case where the town was fairly large and the dissenting minority considerable. If then a certain number of the inhabitants remained in these two places, they would take care not to awaken the hos-

tility of the Chalcidians, unless they saw Athens in a position to protect them. This was never the case from almost the first day of the revolt until the year 421. Hence Thucydides had no occasion to mention them until the treaty of that year.

At the time when the negotiations were being carried on, conditions probably were as follows. Mecyperna and Singos were villages in the territory of the Chalcidic league. Most of their population had moved to Olynthos. The citizens who remained, and perhaps others as well mourned for the loss of the prestige of their native cities, desiring to be freed from Chalcidian domination and to return to the Athenian alliance once more as autonomous cities. The Chalcidians of course were loath to give them up, but they were not in a position to influence either Sparta or Athens so as to be allowed to retain them in their possession. Athens wished above all to regain what she had lost and to break up the Chalcidian power, while Sparta had no reason to object to the reestablishment of these cities upon their former footing as Athenian allies. We may assume that affairs took approximately the following course. The few loyal inhabitants of Mecyperna and Singos informed Athens of their wishes to be freed from Chalcidian rule and to rebuild their cities, asserting that they were ready to become allies of Athens. This suggestion proved acceptable to the Athenians, for having lost Olynthos and other allied cities once under her power, they were only too happy to remove from Chalcidian influence towns that desired protection and alliance. In this way they might regain some of their lost ground and cripple their enemies. Sparta had no objection to this. Both sides had agreed that the Chalcidian league, as such, was to have no recognition in the treaty and that the basis of city autonomy should be maintained.²⁶ Thus Sparta, after deserting Olynthos and her other allies, could not very well object to the special terms given to Mecyperna and Singos.

Unfortunately Sanè is difficult to fix in this category nor does

²⁶ The fact that Stolos and Olynthos are named in the treaty and not the Chalcidians and that the oaths were to be sworn *κατὰ πόλεις* warrants us in the conclusion that Athens was unwilling to recognize the newly formed state and wished to ignore it by making the individual Chalcidian cities swear to the treaty.

it appear in the fragmentary *τάξις φόρον* of 421.²⁷ We can get no help from that quarter. The episode of Plutarch already related shows that it was connected by tradition with Acanthos. It remained faithful to Athens up to 424, and in 427 its tribute had been reduced from one talent to one-sixth.²⁸ In 424 it had been able to repulse an attack of Brasidas, but after that nothing is known of it. The fact that it occurs with Mecyperna and Singos in this article of the treaty seems to point to a revolt or to a capture by Acanthos. At that time probably the Acanthians followed Chalcidian methods and removed most of the inhabitants to their own city. We can perhaps date this capture between the battle of Amphipolis and the conclusion of the peace in the following spring. Although Thucydides does not mention it, it is probable that it occurred at that time. It has been shown that, before the battle of Amphipolis, Cleon had recovered the cities upon Actè that had gone over to Brasidas, and so there is no reason to suppose that Acanthos had taken Sanè before that time. We can not imagine that hostilities ceased in the Chalcidic peninsula during the interval between the battle and the final treaty of peace, even though Thucydides did not mention them. Without doubt they were for the most part of little importance; but that they ceased entirely cannot be believed, since the Chalcidians and their allies were prompted by quite other motives than the Spartans. Thucydides was busy narrating the progress of the peace negotiations and might easily have omitted to mention the capture of a small place like Sanè, as he omitted the recovery of Actè by Cleon. Captured, then made subject to Acanthos, and deprived of its inhabitants, in part, at least, Sanè was in much the same position as were Mecyperna and Singos, and it could be included in the same article of the treaty.

This article gives a good picture of the methods employed by the Chalcidian state. We are not to suppose, however, that all cities that entered the Chalcidian league were destroyed. Stolos, as the treaty shows, had not lost its identity; but it is to be remembered that this town was situated in the interior, a little

²⁷ *I. G.*, I, Supp., p. 141, no. 37.

²⁸ *I. G.*, I, 256, 259.

to the north-east of Olynthos. Probably only the sea coast towns were evacuated. This agrees with the account of Thucydides for the first year of the revolt.²⁹ While Olynthos was uniting the neighbouring Chalcidians under her leadership, Spartolos seems to have been doing the same thing for the Bottiaeans as the coins of that nation show³⁰. Thus it is not strange that Acanthos, the most important Andrian colony of the peninsula, should follow the example of Olynthos and Spartolos and attempt to form an Andrian state. Her first venture resulted in the capture of Sanè.

The other articles of the treaty were as follows.³¹ All prisoners were to be returned, including those that would be taken at the capture of Scionè. The inhabitants of Scionè, Toronè, and Sermylia, and of any other city that Athens had recaptured or was besieging, were to be at the mercy of Athens. The treaty was to be sworn to by Athens, Sparta, and the allies, city by city.

It is clear from the wording of the treaty that Sermylia had at some time revolted and had been recovered by Athens. When this occurred Thucydides does not state. The city was still tributary in 430³², although it had been an object of attack by Aristeus and the Chalcidians in the first year of the war. It seems probable that its revolt is to be placed at about the same time as that of Singos. Both names are lacking in the almost complete lists of 428 and 427.³³ Sermylia is situated at the base of Sithonia on the western side, while Singos was upon the side away from Olynthos. The more distant city would be likely to hesitate until the territory between it and Olynthos had been annexed to the Chalcidian state. By the time, at least, of Brasidas' activity, when the rest of Sithonia was in revolt, it had been forced to join in the movement. Athens had recaptured it before 421; but this again Thucydides passes over in silence. Scionè was not yet in the possession of Athens; but it was in a state of siege and its capture was only a question of time. The

²⁹ Thuc. I. 58.

³⁰ *B. M. C. Maced.*, p. 63, nos. 1-4. Coins two and three, as I have shown, are to be dated in the years 432-421 instead of in 392-379 as given.

³¹ Thuc. V, 18.

³² *I. G.*, I, 255, B. C. 430(?).

³³ *I. G.*, I, 256, 259.

capture of Toronè has already been related. The other cities mentioned, but not named, were Mendè, Galepsos, and the cities upon Actè.³⁴

³⁴ See Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VIII

CHALCIDIAN DIPLOMACY TO THE END OF THE FIFTH CENTURY

Sparta was vouching for the willingness of cities over which she had no control to accept the peace. The Chalcidians were not members of the Peloponnesian league and had no part in the negotiations for the peace. They were in a position to demand better terms. They were in alliance with Corinth and with Sparta, and the latter had no right to dictate to them nor to command them to become subjects of the Athenian Empire once more. The Chalcidians had revolted in order to be free from Athenian domination and had maintained their freedom against all that Athens could do. Acanthos and her neighbours also were allies of Sparta and had received promises of protection and freedom. Hence all had a just grievance against the Lacedaemonians for the readiness with which they had broken their promises when they accepted such terms as these.¹ It is true that they were not to be given absolutely into Athenian hands. The tribute was merely to be reimposed at the original figure. We are unable to go back of 454, but Argilos was paying in that year the immense sum of ten and one-half talents. By 445 this had been reduced to one, and, in 436 again, to one sixth of a talent. In 454 Stolos together with Meeyperna paid in excess of five talents, but in later years neither of them were assessed at more than a talent. We can tell little about Olynthos, for in 454 it was joined with Scabla and Assera, paying an uncertain amount that may have been as high as four and a fraction or as low as two talents. Thus if the tribute of 454 is any indication of the Aristidean tribute, Stolos and Argilos, and possibly Olynthos, would have fared worse under a renewal

¹ Thuc. V, 21, 35.

of the early tribute than they were faring at the time of the revolt. Hence they would have reason to be dissatisfied with the conditions imposed upon them.²

The treaty was to be sworn by the allies *κατὰ πόλεις*. This was another point with which the Chalcidians might well be dissatisfied, for it was an attempt to break up their recently formed state. All cities that had joined them, provided their existence had not been completely blotted out, were to be detached from the league and to be given the opportunity to take charge of their foreign relations once more. The *κοινόν* was to be deprived of the right of acting for the whole body of Chalcidians. Thus everything that the Chalcidians had gained during the revolt was to be taken away. They were again to become Athenian tributaries; the state for which they had laboured was to be dismembered; and the territory over which the Chalcidians had been ruling was to return to Athenian masters. In promising that the Chalcidians would acquiesce in such unjust conditions, Sparta had undertaken more than she could accomplish. Several of her allies refused to take the oaths and without general agreement between Sparta and her northern allies nothing could be done in carrying out the Lacedaemonian promises.³

The lot decided that Sparta was to make restitution first. The prisoners that she held were immediately released, and Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas were sent as commissioners to the Chalcidic peninsula to see that Clearidas delivered Amphipolis to the Athenians and to persuade the other cities to accept the conditions of the peace that had reference to them. This they were unable to do, and a general protest against the treaty was raised by the Spartan allies in the north. Clearidas, imbued with the spirit of Brasidas and sympathizing with the Chalcidians, declared that he was unable to give Amphipolis to the Athenians against its will. Taking envoys with him from

² *I. G.*, I, 226, 235, 244. But cf. Francotte, *Les Finances des Cités Grecques*, pp. 101f., who contends that this article of the treaty does not require the payment of a fixed amount, but merely provides that the ratio between the tribute and the wealth of the town should be the same as that fixed by Aristides.

³ Thuc. V, 21, 35.

the protesting cities, he hastened to Sparta to see what could be done for them. Finding that the peace had been sworn and persuading the Spartans that it was beyond his power to surrender a city belonging to others, he was ordered to return and to withdraw all Peloponnesian forces from that region. This he did.⁴

The Bottiaeans took this opportunity of making their peace with Athens and soon afterwards an alliance was formed in accordance with the terms of the treaty.⁵ In the spring of 420 we

⁴ Thuc. V, 21, 34f.

⁵ Hicks and Hill, no. 68. This inscription has been variously dated. Von Scala, *Staatsverträge*, no. 82, and Busolt, III, 2, p. 1171, have assigned it to the year 422 and think that this alliance was a direct result of the alliance between Athens and Perdiccas. Meyer, *G. D. A.*, IV, pp. 494ff., thinks that because of the orthography it belongs after the year 420, and so places it in the year 417. It seems to me that this is an alliance between the Bottiaeans and Athens in accordance with the terms of the treaty of peace of 421. The Bottiaeans had grown tired of the war and were willing to return to their original position as Athenian tributaries and allies. As evidence for this, we have a fragment of a quota list for the year 421-0, *I. G.*, I, 260, bearing the names of two Bottiaean towns, Kamakai and Tripoi. Sinos also is probably Bottiaean. Köhler, *Sitz.-ber. d. Ber. Akad.*, 1891, 476. It is to be noted, however, that the names [Τριπ]οῖαι Σίνος (*in rasura*) have been found in frg. γ of *I. G.*, I, 37, which has been assigned to the year 425, but probably belongs to the *τάξις φόρου* of 421. Cf. Cavaignac, *Le Trésor d'Athènes*, pp. XLVf, Pl. I, 3; and note 9, *infra*. Of these Kamakai and Tripoi are found in the fragmentary list of cities at the bottom of the inscription containing the alliance with Athens. Also the *τάξις φόρου* of 421 contains names of cities that may well be Bottiaean, Aioleion, for example. Cf., Theop. frg. 140, *Βοττικῆς* (Meineke) and *Pauly-Wissowa*, III, p. 795. There is no mention of tribute in the alliance and hence we must assume that there were two steps in this reconciliation, first, the return of the Bottiaeans as tributaries to Athens, and secondly, the formation of an alliance. Meyer's statement, "Von Tribut war nicht mehr die Rede," is somewhat misleading. We are not to assume that the Bottiaeans were excused from paying tribute, but that this had been satisfactorily arranged before the alliance was made. Moreover there is no necessity for excluding Spartolos from the treaty, as Meyer does. The list of cities is very fragmentary, and Spartolos may have headed it so far as we can tell. The expression *βουλῆν* seems to show that the alliance was made with the Bottiaean state as a whole. Why then exclude Spartolos, the chief city of the league? From a list that contains but three out of the ten or fifteen names that were originally attached to the treaty, it is impossible to say that Spartolos was not included. Thuc. II, 79 shows that there was an Athenian party in that city in the early years of the war, and it is probable that by 421 it came into power and was able to restore Spartolos and the rest of the Bottiaeans to the Athenians.

The fact that Aioleion paid tribute in 426 makes it possible that the revolt was not general throughout Botticè. *I. G.*, I, 257.

This inscription with the expression, *Βοττιαίων δὲ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ*, taken together with the fact that the Bottiaeans had a common coinage at this time, shows that the movement towards unity was not unity with the

find Bottiaean cities again paying tribute to Athens.⁶ The Chalcidians, however, refused absolutely to agree to any conditions except freedom for themselves and possession of their territory. Amphipolis, likewise, refused to surrender to Athens, and the Athenians found that they had accomplished little more than to withdraw Spartan assistance from the rebels.⁷

Through the agency, as one must infer, of the Athenian sympathizers in Meeyperna,⁸ a garrison was introduced into that town by the Athenians, and it was placed upon the assessment lists of the coming year. This probably also happened at Singos as we find it likewise upon the *τάξις φόρου* for 421.⁹ The fall

Chalcidians but that their neighbours were eagerly following their example. No doubt the Bottiaean league was formed between 432 and 421. The coinage commences then and the Bottiaeans are mentioned in Thucydides as a unit, just as the Chalcidians are. Thuc. I, 57, 58; II, 79, 101; IV, 7. Thus it is evident that the union was perfected early. It is unfortunate that we do not have the *Πολιτεία Βοττιαίων*, written by Aristotle.

We must conclude, therefore, that this is an alliance with the Bottiaean state in accordance with the terms of the treaty of peace of 421 and that instead of being with Spartolos alone, as the treaty reads, it includes the rest of the Bottiaeans.

⁶ I. G., I, 260.

⁷ Thuc. V. 35.

⁸ Thuc. V, 39.

⁹ I. G., I, 37^{yz}; Supp., 543, p. 54; cf. 37, p. 141. These three fragments can no longer be attributed to the *τάξις φόρου* of the year 425. E. Cavaignac, *Études sur l'histoire financière d'Athènes au I^e Siècle*, pp. XLVf. and Adolf Wilhelm in his *Urkunden des Attischen Reiches* published in the *Anzeiger der phil. hist. Klasse der kais. Akad. der Wissensch.*, April 28, 1909, pp. 48-49 and 52-53. Of the twenty-two names from the Thracian assessment, eleven, or perhaps twelve, appear for the first time as Attic tributaries. Of the others, six had not appeared in any list after 436. These are Othoros, Pharbelos, Singos, Pleumè, Sinos, and Meeyperna. Istasos is probably the same as Pistasos which would make the number seven. It is noteworthy that Singos and Meeyperna have their tribute reduced to the nominal sum of ten drachmas. It is probable that this assessment of ten drachmas has reference to some decree excusing Meeyperna and Singos of all payment of tribute except the customary quota to the goddess. A quota of ten drachmas ordinarily means a tenth of a talent tribute, which is of course low for these two cities. This is to be explained as a result of their partial destruction and incorporation with Olynthos. Cf. pp. 72-75. The tribute would naturally be increased as soon as the cities recovered some of their lost strength. Hence it is necessary to place this in the first assessment after the peace of 421, i. e., in that of 421-0. The cities Pistasos or Istasos and Othoros were perhaps Bottiaean, as we know that about that time the Bottiaeans accepted the conditions of the peace. Sinos and Tripoiæ were undoubtedly Bottiaean. Cf. note 5, *supra*. Pharbelos was an Eretrian colony, probably situated near Palenè, p. 132. The mention of Meeyperna definitely places the date in the early months of

of Scionè took place during the summer of 421 after a protracted siege of nearly two years. The defenders were put to death in accordance with the Athenian decree, passed after the revolt of the city,¹⁰ and the women and children were sold as slaves.¹¹ The city with its territory was given over to the Plataeans, who had been disappointed in their hopes of having their own city returned to them by Thebes.¹²

Athens was active in other places of this region and gained a number of new allies, and others that had been in revolt since the beginning of the war returned to their allegiance. These were no doubt in large part Bottiaean or disaffected Chalcidian towns.¹³

The Chalcidians, for their part, were not idle and continued hostilities wherever they were able. They succeeded in taking the town of Thyssos upon the peninsula of Actè, which was at

420 (Thuc. V, 39) for it was recaptured by the Chalcidians before the spring of that year.

Tragilos and Bromiseos, so far as we know, made their first appearance as Attic tributaries at this time. Thucydides makes no reference to their adherence to the Athenian cause. During the summer of 421, the Athenian force engaged in the siege of Scionè recaptured it and was thus freed for further operations. It is probable that these troops were used to strengthen the position of Athens in and round about Chalcidicè and, in addition to garrisoning towns like Meeyperna, were engaged in recovering old allies or gaining new ones. Bromiseos would be an important point for them to hold, commanding, as it did, the road between Chalcidicè and Amphipolis. By this move they severed connections between these allies. The few months immediately after the capture of Scionè seem to have been the only time when Bromiseos could have been won over, for the Athenian forces in Thrace during the next few years were too small in number to hold what Athens already had. These considerations have led me to place this inscription early in 420. It must belong, as Cavaignac says, *loc. cit.*, either to 420 or 416, but I can find no reason for placing it in the latter year. Moreover, Wilhelm in his article says that he finds the character of the writing extraordinarily similar to other inscriptions of 420.

¹⁰ Thuc. IV, 122; V, 32.

¹¹ Thuc. IV, 123 says that the women and the children were removed from Scionè to Olynthos before the siege. There is an apparent contradiction here. It is probable, however, that some women remained in the town to cook for the defenders and to share their fate, but cf. Müller-Strübing, *Thuk. Forsch.*, pp. 138ff.

¹² Thuc. V, 17, 32.

¹³ *I. G.*, I, 37y, Supp., 37, p. 141. Bromiseos, near the mouth of Lake Bolbè, and Tragilos, not far from the site of the later Philippi, were the two most important new allies of this immediate neighbourhood. Further east upon the coast, there were others.

that time in alliance with Athens.¹⁴ A few months later, about April of the year 420, during the latter part of the winter, the Olynthians made a sudden attack upon Mecyperna and captured it, notwithstanding that an Athenian garrison held the place.¹⁵ The Chalcidian league probably now embraced nearly all of the base of the peninsula, except Botticè on the west and the Andrian colonies on the east. In addition, it had a foothold upon Actè and held some of the cities at the uppermost end of Sithonia. Northward it extended to Mygdonia and Apollonia.

Meanwhile Athens and Sparta had formed an alliance,¹⁶ much to the disgust of the old Lacedaemonian allies, especially Corinth, Megara, Elis, and Boeotia. The Spartan peace with Argos was soon to come to an end and the malcontents were looking towards her for leadership. Finally Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea formed a defensive alliance, directed against the coalition of Athens and Sparta. This alliance the Chalcidians joined, having had friendly relations with Corinth since the revolt of Potidaea and the services that the Corinthian Aristeus had rendered them.¹⁷

Sparta protested at this action of Corinth, saying that it was against the fundamental principles of the Peloponnesian confederacy; but the Corinthians maintained that it was their sacred duty to keep the promises made to the Chalcidians at the time of their revolt. Upon these promises the Chalcidians had put so much reliance that they had dared the dangers of rebellion from Athens. The Corinthians further showed that the treaty of peace was not at all in accord with promises made by Sparta to their northern allies. This argument the Spartans were unable to answer, although they must have felt that Corinth was covering up her real motives with pious excuses.¹⁸

The Boeotians had held aloof from this new Peloponnesian confederacy and had signed a truce with Athens, terminable at

¹⁴ Thuc. V, 35. The text here is corrupt, but inasmuch as the Dians did not revolt until some time later (Thuc. V, 82), the suggestion of Poppe seems to be the correct one.

¹⁵ Thuc. V, 39.

¹⁶ Thuc. V, 23-24.

¹⁷ Thuc. V, 25, 27-31.

¹⁸ Thuc. V, 30.

ten days' notice. A change of public opinion followed in Sparta and this resulted in the election of ephors hostile to the Athenians and to the peace. They tried indirect means to come to an agreement with Argos so that they could renounce their alliance with Athens, and they persuaded certain Boeotian ambassadors to do what they could to bring Boeotia into the Argive alliance. This being done, the Boeotians were to use their influence to bring about an understanding between Argos and Sparta¹⁹. The Corinthians and the Chalcidians also wished an alliance with Boeotia for the same purpose and sent embassies to Thebes to make the arrangements. The Boeotarchs were eager to make these alliances, now that they had the permission of Sparta back of them, but the negotiations failed through mismanagement in the public assembly.²⁰

Then followed a time when every city fought diplomatically for an advantage of position. Former alliances were disregarded and new ones made. Sparta made a separate treaty with Boeotia.²¹ In 420, Athens entered into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis. The Corinthians and the Chalcidians refused to enter this.²² In the following year Athens repudiated her alliance with Sparta on the ground that the treaty had been broken.²³ Not long after war broke out between Argos and Sparta, ending in an Argive and Spartan alliance of short duration.²⁴ Finally ambassadors, sent to the Chalcidians of Thrace, brought about the reestablishment of the old Lacedaemonian friendship and the exchange of new oaths. Perdiccas, although he did not openly break with Athens, followed the example of the Chalcidians and entered into friendship with Sparta.²⁵ In the very next year, 417, Argos renewed her friendship with the Athenians and in this position things remained for some time.²⁶

Throughout this period the policy of the Chalcidians had re-

¹⁹ Thuc. V, 32, 36-38.

²⁰ Thuc. V, 38.

²¹ Thuc. V, 39.

²² Thuc. V, 47f.

²³ Thuc. V, 56.

²⁴ Thuc. V, 79.

²⁵ Thuc. V, 80.

²⁶ Thuc. V, 82.

remained thoroughly consistent, notwithstanding the constant political changes in southern Greece. Their friendly relations with Corinth had not been broken and new affiliations had been made with states that were at the time out of harmony with Athens. In the first place, they had joined the Corinthian-Argive alliance at the time when Sparta and Athens were working together. Then they had given assistance in the overtures made to Boeotia, hoping thereby to cause an open break between the Spartans and the Athenians again. After the failure of this attempt, the Chalcidians were forced to be content with the Corinthian alliance. Then they broke off relations with Argos when the Argives united with Athens, and still later renewed them when Sparta gained Argos as an ally. Perdiccas at this time entered into his old alliance with them; and when the Argives again made peace with Athens, the Chalcidic-Corinthian-Lacedaemonian alliance was reformed.

During these years of diplomatic skirmishes neither the Chalcidians nor the Athenians accomplished much in the way of military success. The Athenians contented themselves with maintaining small garrisons in the towns that they held in the north.

Late in the first prytany of the year 418-7 about the middle of August, a payment was made to the Hellenotamiai for an expedition which was already ἐπὶ Θράκης under the command of Euthydemus. Early in the year 417, the Athenians made preparations for the reconquest of their lost territory, intending to subdue the Chalcidians and to recapture Amphipolis with the assistance of Perdiccas, who had not yet broken openly with Athens. Perdiccas, however, gave them no assistance and the expedition was disbanded.²⁷ During that summer, the Chalcidians gained an important point. Dion, having remained faithful to Athens throughout the war, now came over to the Chalcidians of its own accord.²⁸ A little later in this year, Athens declared war upon Perdiccas who had betrayed her

²⁷ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 37, line 9. We know nothing of the activity of Euthydemus except that he was present ἐπὶ Θράκης in 418. For the year 417 see line 19, στρατηγοῖς Νικίαι Νικεράτ[ο Κουδαντ]ίδει Λ[υσιστρ]άτοι Ἐ[μ]πέδο Ὀἰθεν; Thuc. V, 83.

²⁸ Thuc. V, 82.

both in the expedition she had planned against the Chalcidic peninsula and in making an alliance with Argos and Lacedaemonia. In the winter an army was sent out, but nothing more than a blockade of Perdiccas and of the Macedonian coast was accomplished and nothing whatever was done against the Chalcidians.²⁹

The vacillation of Perdiccas was a great vexation to every one with whom he had any connection and especially to Athens. This last defection of his proved to be a boon to the Chalcidians. The Athenians, greatly angered by his change of front, temporarily neglected the recovery of their revolted allies and directed all their attention to the punishment of Perdiccas. They felt that if he actively supported the Chalcidians, they could do nothing with the small forces they cared to send. Moreover, the disgust that the Athenians felt at his treachery reacted favourably for their straightforward opponents in Chalcidicè. The Chalcidians, since they knew how little the promises of the Macedonian king were to be trusted, felt themselves free to enter into negotiations with Athens with a view towards a cessation of hostilities, perhaps hoping for a final declaration of peace. These negotiations resulted in the conclusion of a truce terminable at ten days' notice, and Perdiccas was left to fight his battles alone³⁰.

In the following year, 416-5, Athens continued operations against Macedonia, making Methonè her headquarters. Reinforcements, consisting of Athenian cavalry and Macedonian exiles who had taken refuge in Athens, were sent out. For a time they ravaged the country, but they were able to accomplish nothing more. Sparta held aloof and sent no aid to the Macedonian king. When she commanded the Chalcidians to put an end to their armistice with Athens and to go to the assistance of Perdiccas, the Chalcidians flatly refused.³¹

²⁹ Thuc. V, 83; Ditt. *Syll.*,² 37, line 25. This is the record of a payment made directly to Chairemon for an expedition ἐπὶ Θράκης. It is the first payment recorded for the year 417-6. The fact that the money did not go through the hands of the Hellenotamiai shows that it was paid to him before he left Athens. Chairemon was probably in command of the expedition sent out by Athens to blockade the Macedonian coast in the winter of 417-6.

³⁰ Thuc. VI, 7.

³¹ Thuc. VI, 7. This happened in the winter of that year.

The Sicilian plans of Alcibiades so held the minds of the Athenians that Nicias was unable to persuade his fellow countrymen that their first duty was the conquest of the Chalcidians and the strengthening of their power over the disaffected allies.³² They had thoughts for Sicily alone, and time had accustomed them to look with comparative indifference upon all that they had lost in the north. Moreover, the great expense to which they had been put for the recovery of Potidaea, Toronè, Scionè, and Mendè, the losses that had been sustained at Amphipolis, and the difficulties that they were certain to encounter in an expedition against the Chalcidians had long since put a damper upon any desire for extensive operations in those regions; and many Athenians, no doubt, were firmly convinced that the gain would not be worth the trouble. It would be much better, they thought, to seek untried fields, where there was a promise of success more commensurate with the risk involved. The suggestions of Nicias were laid aside and further operations against the Chalcidians were put off until a more favourable opportunity.

Perdiccas, however, was considered too important to be allowed to remain an enemy of Athens, and, early in the year 414, an expedition was sent out to the Thermaic Gulf.³³ Probably operations had not ceased against him at any time. Deserted by Sparta and with no help from his Chalcidian neighbours, his territory ravaged, Perdiccas had every reason to change sides again and late in the summer of this year we find him acting in co-operation with Athens once more.³⁴ Mere alliance would not suffice the Athenians. They had learned from former experience that his promises meant little or nothing and they now demanded proof of his renewed friendship, just as they had done before. Thereupon Perdiccas joined Euetion in an expedition against Amphipolis. A large force of Thracians was collected to act in concert with them but the attack failed. As Amphipolis was surrounded on three sides by the river Strymon, which was then in the power of the Athenians, and as they had a fleet of triremes

³² Thuc. VI, 10.

³³ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 37, line 68, στρατηγοὶ ἐν τοῖς Θερμαίοις Κόλποις. The date of this payment was the 22nd day of the eighth prytany or about the middle of April.

³⁴ Thuc. VII, 9; cf. VI, 7.

at their disposal, they still thought it possible to take the city, and so placed it in a state of siege. Notwithstanding the fact that they had good prospects of final success in their undertaking, they soon abandoned the siege. Thucydides is very brief in his account of this and one is left in doubt whether the Chalcidian truce was still in force.³⁵ As Amphipolis was at no time a member of the Chalcidic state, it was quite possible for Athens to attack the one while still at peace with the other.³⁶ Moreover, Bromiscos had been in the hands of Athens since the year 421, and this would shut off communication between the Chalcidians and Amphipolis.³⁷ Thus since it was difficult for the Chalcidians to give effective aid, the Chalcidians would have been the more willing not to arouse Athens by idle attempts to relieve the Amphipolitans.

No further mention is made of the Chalcidians during the course of the Peloponnesian War. The fact that this last Athenian expedition was directed, so far as one can tell, against Amphipolis alone, while the abortive one that preceded was against both the Chalcidians and Amphipolis, makes it probable that the earlier truce had resulted in a permanent peace with Athens. Amphipolis was really the important point. If that could be regained, Athens might rest content, notwithstanding the minor loss of the towns in the Chalcidic league. The Chalcidians had been in revolt so long and, except during the time of Brasidas, had accomplished so little in the way of enlarging their territory and of gaining fresh recruits at the expense of Athens, that she had little to fear from that quarter and might better conciliate them by a recognition of their independence and thereby prevent them from lending their assistance to Amphipolis. In this way the Athenian recovery of the town would be facilitated. We have seen how similar tactics worked against Perdiccas and we must

³⁵ Thuc. VII, 9.

³⁶ That Amphipolis remained independent is shown by what we know of the course of events in these regions and the long series of Amphipolitan coins.

³⁷ *I. G.*, I, Supp., 37, p. 141. If the Ms. reading of Xen. *Hell.*, I, 5, 15 is correct, the Athenians still held Eion on the Strymon as a base of operation. Cf. Schol. Aeschines, II, 31: πέμπτον (ἀτύχημα), οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες Ἡϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξηλάθησαν. Dem. XXIII, 199. These passages are probably references to the events of 406.

remember that this happened at a time when the Athenians were about to put an end to the collection of tribute and when conciliatory measures had to be adopted.

For the remainder of the fifth century we are left to glean such facts as we can from isolated references to affairs Thraceward. Armies go there, generals are stationed there but the expression *ἐπὶ Θράκης* is a very inclusive one. It would seem that Thasos, together with the opposite coast, became the scene of operations in that region and not the Chalcidic peninsula, as heretofore. Whether or not Athens was formally at peace with the Chalcidians is impossible to determine. It would seem that she was, for we know of no expedition against them after the year 417 when Perdiccas failed to aid Nicias as he had promised. The entire change in the scene of operations and the fact that the Chalcidians took no part in the affairs on the coast of Thrace show that they were keeping a neutral position. It is thus probable that the Chalcidians were at peace with Athens but did not care to become the ally of either side in the war. The part the Sermyleans took in the affairs of Neapolis is in direct contrast to the inactivity of their neighbours.³⁸ We must remember that Sermylea was one of the towns that had revolted in the early years of the war but had been captured by Athens before the peace of 421. Thus we get from this somewhat doubtful mention of Sermylea a glimpse at conditions in the Chalcidic peninsula in some of the later years of the war. The Chalcidians had not been able to win back this city. This indicates that the expansion of the territory of the league had not been very great since the treaty of peace between Sparta and Athens; it may perhaps be taken as a further indication of the peaceful, if not friendly, relations existing between the Chalcidians and the Athenians.³⁹

³⁸ Hicks and Hill, 75. If the Sermyleans are really mentioned in this inscription, this is of interest for it shows the extent of the Chalcidic league at this time. It is an indication that the league had not made any headway in regaining the towns upon the peninsula of Sithonia. This may be because the Athenians and the Chalcidians had made peace. If the restoration of the name Sermyleans is correct, we learn that they assisted the Neapolitans in maintaining the Athenian empire on the Thracian coast against Thasian attacks.

³⁹ If we can accept the Ms. reading of Xen. *Hell.*, I, 5, 15, the Lacedaemonians captured Eion in 406. This reading, however, has been questioned.

After the battle of Aegospotami and the final overthrow of the Athenian empire, Lysander sent Eteonicos, the former har- most in Thasos, to the Thracian region, where he was received with a general revolt of the Athenian allies.⁴⁰ This of course did not include the Chalcidians for although they may have been at peace with Athens, they were certainly not in alliance with her nor members of her empire. Before the capitulation of Athens, measures were taken for the expulsion of the Athenian colonists from Potidaea and Toronè and the Plataeans from Scionè. An attempt was also made to restore, as far as possible, the original inhabitants or their descendants.⁴¹ Many of them were to be found among the Chalcidians. At the surrender of Potidaea the garrison and the citizens had been allowed to go where they wished and a great number of them had taken up their abode in Chalcidic territory. The prisoners captured in Toronè had been exchanged by their Chalcidic neighbours, although the women and children had been sold into slavery.⁴² Scionè was more at a loss for inhabitants. At its capture in 421 a general massacre had taken place. Precautions, however, had been taken at the time of the revolt and a large part of the women and children had been sent to take refuge in Olynthos. These remained to furnish the population for the newly reestablished town.⁴³

This enforced sojourn of the inhabitants of Toronè, Scionè, and Potidaea among the Chalcidians reacted very favourably upon the growth of Chalcidic influence and power. During the years of the war when assistance and support had been given so freely to the exiles from Pallenè and Sithonia who had found homes in Olynthos and had been freed by Olynthians from Athenian imprisonment, a strong feeling of friendship for the Chalcidians must have sprung up. This might lead to an incorporation of the restored towns in the Chalcidian league. Such an incorpora-

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.*, II, 2, 5. Here the expression, τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία, refers to the whole region, for Xenophon goes on, τὰ ἐκεῖ πάντα.

⁴¹ Plutarch, *Lys.* 14; Xen. *Hell.*, II, 2, 9; cf. II, 2, 3.

⁴² Perhaps some of them had sought refuge among the Chalcidians before the Athenian attack. Cf. Chap. VI, p. 65, note 7; Thuc. II, 70; V, 3.

⁴³ Thuc. II, IV, 123; V, 32.

tion did in fact occur some time during the first years of the fourth century, after the collapse of the Spartan empire.

After the capture of Athens, general measures were taken for the government of the new Spartan empire. Oligarchies and decarchies were established everywhere. Harmosts and garrisons were sent out to the cities that did not already have them, and protection was furnished the aristocratic governments against the outraged democrats. Bloodshed, banishment, and confiscation were used ruthlessly, very often for the personal gain of the decarchs themselves.⁴⁴ Such violence was probably not universal; nor were colleges of ten set up in all the cities. Sparta also imposed tribute upon her newly made allies just as Athens had done.⁴⁵ The position of the members of the Peloponnesian league remained the same. No tribute was levied upon them and wars were waged by the league and not by Sparta alone. Likewise allies outside the Peloponnesian confederacy with whom Sparta had been in alliance since the beginning of the war were left to manage their own affairs. No harmosts and no garrisons were sent them.⁴⁶ This was probably the case with the Chalcidians, as well as with the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians.

It was quite otherwise with some of the neighbouring cities.⁴⁷ Certain of them showed signs of disaffection and in the year 404–3 Lysander was sent to Thrace to regulate affairs. He found opposition in Aphytis upon the peninsula of Pallènè and besieged it. He was compelled, however, to withdraw because of a warning in a dream. His stay in Thasos was celebrated by the murder of democrats who had taken refuge in a temple.⁴⁸ From Thasos he continued his voyage, going to many of the cities and islands and establishing constitutions such as would fit in with his plans. Within a few years, however, the system of decarchies proved so unsatisfactory and so unpopular that the ephors were compelled to abolish them, without, however, withdrawing the garrisons and

⁴⁴ Diod. XIV, 3, 10, 13; Plut. *Lys.*, 13–14; cf. 19; Xen. *Hell.*, II, 2, 5; 3, 7.

⁴⁵ Diod. XIV, 10, 2; Aris. *Ath. Pol.*, 39.

⁴⁶ See Meyer, *Die Rede an die Larissæer*. Theopomp's *Hellenika*, pp. 266 ff.

⁴⁷ Diod. XIV, 10; Plut. *Lys.* 19–22.

⁴⁸ Polyæn. I, 45, 4; Nepos. *Lys.* 2; Plut. *Lys.* 19f. In this passage there seems to be a confusion between Thasos and Miletos.

harmosts. Moderate aristocracies were set up in their place, such as that of the five thousand in Athens, in which full citizenship depended upon the possession of property to the amount of a hoplite census. All of these changes applied to the cities grouped about Chalcidicè, but not to the Chalcidic state; for as we have shown, it was an independent ally of Sparta from the first and never a subject, and moreover it had already an aristocratic form of government.⁴⁹ Thus like Boeotia, it probably remained throughout master of its own affairs and was not troubled with harmosts and garrisons.

⁴⁹ See Chap. XIV.

CHAPTER IX

PERIOD OF CHALCIDIC EXPANSION

During the years that followed, when Sparta was turning a longing eye towards Macedon and Thessaly, and when she was engaged in affairs nearer home and in Asia, an excellent opportunity was given the Chalcidians for strengthening their position. The years of peace gradually made them desirous of extending their sphere of influence beyond the cities that originally were of Chalcidic settlement. The reestablishment of those towns that had been destroyed by Athens and the relations of friendship existing between them and the Chalcidians gave a great impetus to this desire for aggrandizement. Other neighbours, such as the Bottiaeans and the Andrian colonies in the eastern part of the peninsula, were not so favourably disposed to this movement of expansion. Incorporation in another state was not to their liking, and the original bond that had united them with the Chalcidians and had caused them to make a close alliance had been broken since 421. As the Chalcidic league gained power upon the peninsula of Actè, upon which Acanthos also had designs, as we have seen from her attempt to hold Sanè, a feeling of jealousy sprang up. This antagonism increased from year to year until at last the two became avowed enemies.

Now that both the power and desire for expansion were at hand, only the opportunity was lacking. As long as Sparta encountered no opposition in Greece, it was hopeless for the Chalcidians to attempt to gain further members for their league from among their neighbours, who were Spartan allies. Peace, however, was not destined to be of long duration. Dissatisfaction was rife. Boeotia, Corinth, Argos, and Athens were waiting for an opportunity to gain that position which each thought was its own proper right and which Sparta resolutely refused to give

them. In the year 395 the trouble came to a head. Sparta was engaged in Asia, and the Persians at the suggestion of Conon, were busy preparing a fleet. As it was in their interest to create a diversion in Greece, they attempted to bring about an anti-Spartan coalition. First of all war broke out between Boeotia and Sparta but it was not long before Athens joined and an alliance of the disaffected cities was formed at Corinth. Every effort was put forth to make this as comprehensive as possible and many of the Spartan allies took this occasion to revolt. Euboea, Leucas, Ambracia, and Aearnania were among the number. The Chalcidians of Thrace felt that their opportunity had come. Influenced partly, no doubt, by the action of Corinth, their old established friend and ally, but chiefly led by a desire for further expansion, they joined the alliance.¹ Notwithstanding this alliance, they had no intention of embroiling themselves in the affairs of others and took little part in the campaigns of the war.² At the battle of Nemea, where nearly every other allied state was represented, no record of a Chalcidian contingent is to be found.³

Immediately upon the outbreak of the war, Agesilaos was called home from Asia. He encountered some opposition in Thrace but arrived in Amphipolis without great difficulty just in time to hear of the Spartan victory at Nemea. He did not trouble himself with a conquest of the Chalcidians but continued his march, crossing Macedonia without resistance. Thessaly, being then on friendly terms with Boeotia, gave him some difficulty but he finally reached his goal in safety.⁴

The Chalcidians eagerly seized this opportunity and persuaded Toronè, Potidaea, and perhaps Scionè to join them.⁵ Mendè,

¹ Diod. XIV, 82.

² Isaeos, V, 46: *ποσούτων καὶ τοιούτων γενομένων πολέμων, εἰς δὲ Ὀλύνθους μὲν καὶ νησιῶται ὑπὲρ τῆςδε τῆς γῆς ἀποθνήσκουσι μαχόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις.* This is to be dated in 390 or 389. Cf. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, II. 350ff. This passage seems to indicate that the Chalcidians were active in the war, but to what extent it is impossible to tell.

³ Xen. *Hell.*, 2, 17.

⁴ Diod. XIV, 83, 3; Xen. *Hell.*, IV, 2, 8.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 12, 15; 3, 18. After speaking of the original formation of the league out of small cities in 432, Cleigenes continues as follows, *ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μεζόνων προσέλαβόν τινες.* It is difficult to tell which these cities were and when this development occurred. It is probable that Scionè was included, for it had always been friendly and it had had scarcely

which had a more independent position than these other cities, refused to become incorporated in the league.⁶ The Chalcidian plans were comprehensive, for they desired authority over the whole peninsula from the coast on the west to Amphipolis in the east. These designs, however, were not acceptable to the Bottiaeans, Acanthians, and the Amphipolitans.⁷ Each of these peoples felt that autonomy was more to be desired than participation in a league of which it would be but a part. The Bottiaeans were united among themselves and feared that union with a larger state would mean for them nothing less than loss of individuality and influence. Acanthos was jealous of the advance made by the Chalcidians in territory to which it had claims, and it hoped for a power in the eastern half of the peninsula over the Andrian colonies, similar to that of Olynthos over her Chalcidian neighbours. Amphipolis, the most important city of that region, was far removed from Olynthos and could not expect to be given its due share in the control of the affairs of the *κοινόν*. Its sympathies, moreover, were probably with the Andrian colonies rather than with the Chalcidian, although many of its inhabitants were of Chalcidian origin.⁸

During the time when the Chalcidians were members of the Corinthian league, Athens regained much of her lost influence in this region. Thrasybulos, in the year 389, operated upon the Thracian coast and with the help of two Thracian princes, Amedocos and Seuthes, regained Thasos and many other Greek cities, both upon the islands and upon the mainland.⁹

So matters stood with the Chalcidic union when Amyntas came to the throne of Macedon in 390. His power was insecure. On the one hand Argaeos was a rival claimant for the crown; on the other, the Illyrians were threatening an invasion. He turned immediately to his Chalcidian neighbours for assistance and a de-

enough time to become strong again since its restoration. It is significant, moreover, that the list of the Chalcidian enemies mentioned in the treaty with Amyntas (Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77) does not include Seionè, although it has Mendè, a near neighbour.

⁶ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Aristotle, *Pol.*, VIII, 3, 13, 1303B; 6, 8, 1306A; Thuc. IV, 103.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.*, IV, 8, 26; cf. V, 1, 7; *I. G.*, II-III, 1, *editio minor*, 21, 22, 24, 25.

fensive alliance. This was readily granted him. In addition to certain commercial concessions that dealt chiefly with shipbuilding material and with the growing trade of the league, the treaty contained a mutual promise of aid against an attack upon either country. The Chalcidians gained a further guarantee that Amyntas would make neither peace nor alliance with their rivals and enemies, the Mendaean, the Bottiaean, Acanthian, and the Amphipolitan.¹⁰ At this time there could have been little danger of attack upon the Chalcidians from any of these cities; but the Chalcidians desired to have a free hand to deal with them as they wished. This clause would allow them to go on with their plans of expansion without fear of objection and interference on the part of Macedon. Amyntas, however, did not wish to give the Chalcidians too free a rein and insisted that peace with any of these cities should be made with the consent of both. This condition was of little importance to the league. With its enemies once under its control, the *κοινόν* would be strong enough to break with Macedon, should Amyntas raise any objection to its course of action.

That the Chalcidian plans were large and comprehensive is shown by the fact that the construction of a navy was in their minds.¹¹ With Amphipolis and the Strymon valley under their control, it would have been possible for them to extend their authority to the east among the neighbouring Thracian tribes, win for themselves the Pangaeon district with its rich gold mines, and perhaps spread out over the islands off the coast.¹² Hence it was to their interest to gain a free hand in their dealings with the cities that were opposing them and to be allowed the greatest possible liberty in the importation of shipbuilding materials.¹³ For this they agreed to give assistance against the expected Illyrian attack, perhaps without meaning to put themselves to any great trouble to fulfil these promises. Later events give one the impression that the Chalcidians were aiming to get

¹⁰ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77. For a discussion of this inscription see Swoboda, *Arch. epigr. Mitth.*, VII, pp. 1-59.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 16; cf. the articles relating to ship-building material in the treaty with Amyntas. Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77.

¹² Cf. Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 16-17.

¹³ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77.

as much as possible from Amyntas and to give the least possible in return.

It was not long that Amyntas had to wait for the Illyrian invasion. When it came it proved too strong for him.¹⁴ The Chalcidians offered him no help and he was forced to flee from the country, satisfied merely if he could save his life. The Macedonian territory, adjacent to the Chalcidians, he ceded to them as his allies.¹⁵ This may have included the town Apollonia of which we hear for the first time. It was situated in Mygdonia, south of Lake Bolbè, which, at least during the reign of Perdiccas, was a part of the Macedonian territory.¹⁶ Being inhabited by Greeks, however, it took this opportunity to gain its freedom and resisted the attempts of the Chalcidians to conquer it.¹⁷ Other Macedonian towns looked with favour upon the Chal-

¹⁴ Diod. XIV, 92; XV, 19; Isoc. VI, 46; Ael. *Var. His.*, IV, 8.

¹⁵ Diod. XIV, 92; XV, 19; Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 12f. The account of Xenophon differs from that of Diodoros in that it omits the Illyrian invasion and thereby gives an erroneous impression as to the Chalcidian possession of the Macedonian cities implying that they had been taken directly from Amyntas and had not been rescued from the Illyrian power.

¹⁶ Hegesandros, frg. 40 (*F. H. G.*, IV, p. 420); Thuc. I, 58; cf. note 17.

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 11. We have no information concerning the history of Apollonia before the time of the Spartan attack upon Olynthos. It is possible, however, to reconstruct it in some of its more important details. In 432 Perdiccas gave to the inhabitants of the sea-coast towns a part of Mygdonia, south of Lake Bolbè, to inhabit (Thuc. I, 58,). Apollonia is nowhere mentioned in the Attic quota lists; and either it was not in existence at that time or it was under Macedonian rule. Its name may give some indication of its origin. Thuc. I, 118 tells us that the Delphian God had given his sanction to the war; and we know that the Chalcidians and their allies, including Amphipolis when it revolted, adopted Apollo for the obverse type of the new coinage. It is natural to suppose that these Chalcidian settlers in Mygdonia congregated into a town. This town they named Apollonia in honour of Apollo under whose guidance they had been led to destroy their original homes upon the seashore and to migrate inland. This settlement was meant only as a temporary measure but, as time went on, and as the settlers came to feel at home there, they had no inclination to change their abode a second time. Their relations with Olynthos and the Chalcidians were gradually severed as more and more Macedonians joined them. Under the protection of Perdiccas and his successor the city grew. Perdiccas had not meant that it should be a permanent gift to the Chalcidians and for this reason it never became incorporated in their league but remained a part of the Macedonian kingdom although its inhabitants were in large part Chalcidian by birth.

As the city grew and the non-Chalcidian element became a continually increasing part of the whole body of citizens, it was no more willing to be merged with Olynthos than the other cities of that region. Likewise, since it was largely inhabited by Greeks, it was ready to free itself from Mace-

cidian designs and accepted union with the league as virtual freedom. Hitherto they had been subjects of a king and had few rights and privileges. Many Chalcidians and other Greek merchants were without doubt dwelling in them and these merchants would probably welcome any step that would give them some of the privileges that they had enjoyed at home. The fact that the cities were in large part Macedonian in population, had never known autonomy, and had always been a part of a large state made them more ready to incorporate themselves in another state, especially one where they would have political rights that had been denied them before. Equality in all things was granted to these new members of the Chalcidic state.

The Chalcidians, however, were not satisfied with their Macedonian accessions. With their strength came greater aspirations and they went further afield until Pella was numbered among their possessions.¹⁸ During this time Amyntas had not been idle. His attempts to gain assistance from without at last proved successful, and with a body of Thessalian troops he drove out the Illyrians and unseated Argaeos from the throne.¹⁹ His demands that the Chalcidians should restore the Macedonian cities were unavailing. These cities had not been in his power when they joined the league and his flight and practical abdication had released them from all allegiance to him. If they could not protect themselves, there was nothing left for them to do but to put themselves under the protection of the Chalcidians who could protect them. Amyntas had deserted them and thereby forfeited all claims upon their obedience; and now that he had returned, the Chalcidians were unwilling, notwithstanding their former alliance, to lose the new possessions which they had gained with so much danger to themselves.

donia and to become a city state whenever the opportunity should present itself. This it did, probably during the disturbances of the reign of Amyntas. As further evidence for the comparatively late origin of the town, it had no coinage before the fourth century, when we find it using an obverse type imitated from that of the Chalcidians. I agree with Beloch, II, 224, note 5, who says that there was one Apollonia only in the Chalcidic peninsula, the Mygdonian city south of Lake Bolbè. See note 26, Chap. XIII.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 12-13, 18: καὶ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἵσως ἐποίησεν ἅμα τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ τὰ φρονήματα αὖξασθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

¹⁹ Diod. XIV, 92.

CHAPTER X

SPARTAN INTERVENTION

Meanwhile the Chalcidians made further endeavors to win over Acanthos, Apollonia, and other towns that were still holding out against them, such as, for example, Mendè and Aphytis in Pallènè and Spartolos in Botticè.¹ It is probable that they succeeded in their attempts upon Spartolos soon after their treaty with Amyntas, for a chance reference in Isaeos shows that about 390 it was a part of the Chalcidic state.² Acanthos and Apollonia, however, felt themselves too weak to resist. It is probable, moreover, that there was a Chalcidic party within their walls and that fears were entertained lest this party should prove strong enough to deliver the cities into the hands of the league. The treatment that the Chalcidians were giving the newly enrolled members was so generous that the supporters of city autonomy felt that a short period of participation in the privileges of union would be sufficient to win over a majority of the citizens and to dull any regrets that might at first be felt at the loss of their independence.³

With these things in mind, an embassy from Apollonia and Acanthos went to Sparta for the purpose of seeking protection there. Amyntas, likewise, turned to the Lacedaemonians for as-

¹ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 11-19.

² Isaeos, V, 42. Spartolos (τῆς Ὀλυνθίας ἐν Σπαρτῶλῳ) is mentioned in this passage as a part of the Olynthian state. It had been head of the Bottiaeian league and as such it was a member of the Athenian league soon after 421. In 390 the Bottiaeans were hostile to the Chalcidians, but as this speech of Isaeos was delivered about 390, during the Corinthian war, Spartolos must have been conquered by the Chalcidians soon after their treaty with Amyntas. In 382, upon the arrival of the Peloponnesian forces it revolted and allied itself with Sparta. See Jebb, *Attic Orators*, II, 350 ff., 354.

³ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 19.

sistance in regaining his lost territory.⁴ Circumstances combined to render their requests acceptable. Sparta's dominion in Greece at this moment was unquestioned. Nearly all opposition had been crushed and the Peloponnesians were only too ready to curry favour with the Spartans.⁵ The peace of Antalcidas, with its guarantee of autonomy to every Greek city, large and small, was the moving force in Greek politics, and Sparta was making use of it for her own advantage, to strengthen her position as the leading state in Greece and to break the power of any union that might in time prove dangerous to Lacedaemonian interests. She had here a clear case of attempted and accomplished violation of the terms of the peace and it was to her own good to interfere and to put a stop to the expansion of the Chalcidian *κοινόν* before it should gain too great a power in the politics of Greece. Its strength was as yet not large in comparison with that which Sparta could bring against it, but the principles upon which it was founded were proving themselves so powerful for winning new adherents, even among the Greeks, whose one universal political ideal was that of a city state, that unless measures were taken speedily, Sparta would soon find herself unable to cope with the problem. There was danger, moreover, that the league would ally itself with Athens and Thebes. Negotiations were well under way. Ambassadors from these cities were already at Olynthos, and the Chalcidians had voted to send others in return to complete the preliminary arrangements.⁶ All this rendered immediate action by Sparta necessary. A synod of the Peloponnesian allies was called, and, almost without a dissenting vote, it was decided to send an army of ten thousand hoplites to the aid of Macedon, Acanthos, and Apollonia. As speed was necessary and as much time would be consumed in the gathering of so large a force, Eudamidas was sent forward with two thousand men, Neodamodeis, Perioeci and Skiritans, to act as garrisons in the cities that had need of them.⁷ In the early summer of 382

⁴ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 11; Diod. XV, 19.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 20.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 15.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 20-25; Diod. XV, 19; Isoc. IV, 126.

this advance contingent reached its destination.⁸ The anti-Chalcidian party in Potidaea proved strong enough to open the gates of that city to Eudamidas and he made the place his headquarters.⁹ To such towns as Spartolos, which also revolted to him, Acanthos, and Apollonia he sent small garrisons.¹⁰ His army was not numerous enough to conduct extensive operations and he contented himself with raids upon the Chalcidic territory until the arrival of reinforcements. Phoebidas, who had been commissioned to follow with the troops left behind by Eudamidas, halted in Boeotia to capture the Cadmeon of Thebes.¹¹ This enterprise proved successful, and the Spartans took up the war in the north with increased vigor.¹² Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaos, was placed in command, and the full levy, strengthened by a force of cavalry and hoplites from Thebes, was put into the field. Some time toward the end of the summer of 382, they arrived in Potidaea, after having been joined by Amyntas of Macedon and Derdas of Elimia with a few troops.

The Thebans and the Athenians sent no assistance to the Chalcidians. Thebes itself was in the hands of the Spartans and could do nothing, while the Athenians were frightened by what had happened, and standing almost alone, they were unwilling to offend the Lacedaemonians. The fact that Thebes had been negotiating an alliance had been used as a pretext against her; and Athens, as it would seem, did not wish a repetition of the affair directed against herself.¹³

A battle followed the arrival of Teleutias, but although the Peloponnesians gained a partial victory, Teleutias did not feel himself strong enough to attempt a siege of Olynthos. The Chalcidians, meanwhile, were actively engaged in raids upon the hostile cities.¹⁴ In the spring of 381, a marauding expedition of six hundred Chalcidic horse set out from Olynthos against Apol-

⁸ The chronology of this war is somewhat doubtful. Cf. Meyer, *G. D. A.*, V, 894 A.

⁹ *Xen. Hell.*, V, 2, 24.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*; cf. note 2, *supra*. Spartolos was in the hands of the Spartans at the time of the death of Teleutias in 381. *Xen. Hell.*, V, 3, 6.

¹¹ *Xen. Hell.*, V, 2, 25–36.

¹² *Xen. Hell.*, V, 2, 37f.

¹³ *Xen. Hell.*, V, 2, 34.

¹⁴ *Xen. Hell.*, V, 2, 39–43.

lonia, but being surprised by Derdas, they turned in flight and were driven to the very walls of the city from which they had come.¹⁵ During the summer, however, this defeat was atoned for by a much more serious one inflicted by them upon the Peloponnesians. Teleutias with his whole force marched against Olynthos, but outwitted by the Chalcidians, he was forced into battle, routed, and put to flight. The army scattered, seeking refuge in Potidaea, Spartolos, Acanthos, and Appolonia. Teleutias was killed with about twelve hundred of his army.¹⁶

It was necessary for Sparta to send out a new general with reinforcements. Agesipolis was given the command and volunteers came to him from all sides. Besides those from Sparta and the allied cities, there was Thessalian cavalry, and Amyntas and Derdas joined as before. The Chalcidians had made ready for a siege. Their troops were far outnumbered by the newly reinforced Peloponnesian army, and there was nothing for them to do but to retire behind their walls, while the enemy wasted their crops and those of their allies. Their strength was concentrated in Olynthos and they were even unable to prevent Toronè being taken from them by storm.¹⁷

In this way things went on till the summer of 380 when Agesipolis was taken with a fever and died in the temple of Dionysos at Aphytis. Polybiades was then placed in command and he maintained a close siege of the city of Olynthos until the food that had been collected in anticipation of this blockade had been exhausted. Thereupon the Chalcidians sent plenipotentiaries to Sparta, who made peace upon the condition that the Chalcidians join the Spartan alliance and render military service at Lacedaemonian behest. All of this took place in the year 379 before the revolt of Thebes.¹⁸

The accounts of the treatment meted out to the league are very unsatisfactory.¹⁹ We may assume that the Macedonian boundaries were restored, that all of the cities recently gained by the

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 3, 1-2.

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 3, 3-6; Diod. XV, 21.

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 3, 8-9, 18; Diod. XV, 21f.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 3, 19-20, 26; Diod. XV, 23.

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 3, 26; Diod. XV, 23. For military service under the Spartans in 377, cf. Xen. *Hell.*, V, 4, 54.

Chalcidians were taken away, and that these cities also joined the Spartan alliance. This would leave the Chalcidian league almost as it stood after the close of the Peloponnesian War, restricted to the central portion of the base of the peninsula. This had been so long united and had become so identified with Olynthos, its capital city, that all thought of the original component elements had disappeared. The position of Olynthos in this territory is comparable to a certain extent with that of Athens in Attica. One sees, at least, that Xenophon used the word Olynthians to denote the Chalcidic *κοινόν*, while Thucydides, in whose memory remained the fact that the inhabitants of Olynthos had come from many Chalcidic towns and that the city was not coextensive with the state, did not use the name of the city for the nation but always spoke of the Chalcidians. Diodoros, who compiled his history from various sources, used both names.²⁰

For a time the Chalcidians fulfilled the condition of the alliance and rendered faithful service to the Spartans. During the campaign of Agesilaos in Boeotia in the year 377, a body of Olynthian cavalry protected the rear of the Peloponnesian troops in their march to Thespieae.²¹ In the same year a reorganization of the Spartan empire took place, according to which the Olynthians and the allies *ἐπὶ Θράκης* formed the tenth division.²² We do not know how extensive an alliance the Spartans had in these parts, for Diodoros merely informs us that many of the other cities eagerly enrolled themselves under Sparta after the destruction of the Chalcidian power.²³

²⁰ Diod. XIV, 82, 92; XV, 19-23.

²¹ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 4, 54.

²² Diod. XV, 31.

²³ Diod. XV, 23, 3.

CHAPTER XI

RELATIONS WITH ATHENS AND MACEDON UP TO THE YEAR 360

This dependence of Chalcidicè upon Sparta was of short duration. Within four years, the Chalcidians commenced to regain that of which they had been deprived during the last war. The Lacedaemonians were not in a position to watch carefully their actions nor could they have interfered if they had wished. The Athenian power upon the sea had been reestablished and the Spartans could not approach Chalcidicè by land, because of the recent developments in central Greece. About this time, likewise, the Chalcidians probably regained Potidaea, Toronè, and other towns upon the peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallènè.¹ When Chabrias in 375 came to win over new recruits for the second Athenian confederation, the Chalcidic league renewed its alliance with Athens.² Friendly feeling had existed between the two peoples since the outbreak of the Corinthian war, although neither had felt itself in a position to render aid to the other. One can not tell whether the projected alliance of the year 382 was made; but whether or no, Athenian sympathy must have gone with the Chalcidians in their struggle against the overwhelming force of Sparta.

From the list of the members of the second Athenian confederation inscribed upon the stele that contains the provisions relat-

¹ During the operations of Timotheos in this region about fifteen years later, these places were Chalcidian possessions. Diod. XV, 81; Isoc. XV, 108, 113; Dein. I, 14; Polyæn. III, 10, 15.

² *I. G.*, II, 17, 105. This latter inscription may well belong to this year rather than to 352-1, to which it must otherwise be attributed. Cf. Ferguson, *Athenian Secretaries*, p. 38. I can not agree with Hill, *Classical Review*, 1900, pp. 279f, that it is the record of an Athenian alliance of 383 B. C. Cf. *infra*, p. 125, note 13.

ing to the formation of this confederation,³ we can learn somewhat as to the extent of the Chalcidian power at this time. Towards the end of the list occurs the name *Διὲς ἀπὸ Θρακίας*. This evidently refers to the town of Dion upon Actè. The last record we have of this city tells of its revolt from Athens during the Peloponnesian War,⁴ and of its union with the Chalcidians. Joining this with what we have learned concerning the rivalry between Acanthos and the Chalcidians and with a second inscription of a later date,⁵ we may infer that Acanthos gained a hold upon the easternmost peninsula, thereby supplanting the Chalcidians whose position there had never been strong.

The Chalcidian alliance with Athens, however, could only continue so long as Athenian interests did not clash with the long cherished Chalcidian plans for expansion. Should Athens prove too powerful in the Thracian district and endeavor to put a limit to the achievements of the league, the Chalcidians would feel no hesitation about making other allies. The bone of contention, naturally enough, was Amphipolis, a town independent of both, but one upon which each of them had claims and designs. Athens claimed it as her former colony, and the league, as an old ally among whose inhabitants were many Chalcidians.⁶ The importance of the town to both claimants rendered the conflict certain sooner or later.

The trouble came to a head soon after the congress at Sparta in 371.⁷ Athens laid claim to Amphipolis,⁸ and Amyntas, king of Macedon, taking part in the meeting, used all of his influence in favour of the ratification of the Athenian claim. The relations of Amyntas with Jason, the powerful tyrant of Pherae and the master of Thessaly, were such that it was important for the Macedonian king to become as closely allied as possible with the stronger of the Greek states. Hence he was perfectly willing to

³ *I. G.*, II, 17.

⁴ *Thuc.* V, 82.

⁵ *I. G.*, II, part 5, 108b. See Chap. XIII, note 6.

⁶ *Arist. Pol.*, VIII, 3, 13, 1303B; 6, 8, 1306A.

⁷ *Xen. Hell.*, VI, 3, 2-20; *Diod.* XV, 50.

⁸ *Aesch.* II, 32f. That Athens and Amyntas were on good terms, Hicks and Hill, 107, shows, and, as has been rightly conjectured, this inscription belongs to about the time of the congress at Sparta, perhaps in 370-69 as suggested by Ditt. *Syll.*,² 78.

renounce any dormant claims he might have had upon Amphipolis in exchange for Athenian protection. In this way the Athenian claim was ratified, to the great dissatisfaction of the Chalcidians. Amyntas had pleased the Athenians and had gained their friendship. At the same time he probably wished to deliver a blow to the hopes of the Chalcidians, his old enemies and neighbours.

The Chalcidians awaited their opportunity. Amyntas died in 370-69⁹ and the troubles following his death were eagerly watched by the league. In 368 the Athenians dispatched Iphicrates with a fleet for the recapture of Amphipolis.¹⁰ This brought about the actual break between the Chalcidians and Athens. About the same time, (368), Alexander of Macedon was murdered and there followed a contest among the claimants for the Macedonian crown.¹¹ The Chalcidians saw an opportunity to win influence and a close alliance. If a king, friendly to their interests, could be placed upon the throne, their position would be greatly strengthened and the Athenians would have fewer chances of success in their attempt to recapture Amphipolis. Pausanias, as it would seem, was the Chalcidian choice and they assisted him in his endeavour to gain the crown. He commenced operations at the Chalcidian frontier and for a time was successful, winning over one town after another. Anthemos, Thermè, Strepsa and other places fell into his hands and the prospects of final success were good.¹² Euridicè, the widow of Amyntas, and Ptolemy, to whom she had given the regency during the minority of Perdicas and Philip, the younger brothers of Alexander, turned to Iphicrates, the Athenian general, for protection against Pausanias and his Chalcidian backers. This protection they claimed by reason of Iphicrates' previous friendly relations with Amyntas.* Iphicrates listened to their request and drove Pausanias out of the kingdom, hoping indeed to gain, in return, Macedonian assistance for his attack upon Amphipolis. This, however, proved to be a vain hope. Thebes

⁹ Diod. XV, 60.

¹⁰ Aesch. II, 27-29.

¹¹ Plut. *Pel.*, 27; Diod. XV, 71.

¹² Aesch. II, 27-29, scholia.

* Aesch. II, 27-29; Nepos, *Iph.*, 3, 2.

interfered and Ptolemy, who had no intention of allowing the Athenians to gain the city, was persuaded by Pelopidas to join the Theban alliance.¹³

The Chalcidians considered it more politic, for the time being at least, to recognize the independence of Amphipolis and so they made an alliance with it against the attacks of Iphicrates.¹⁴ Ptolemy also joined in its protection. Iphicrates then was able to do nothing. For three years Iphicrates remained in charge of operations against Amphipolis but accomplished little.¹⁵ It is told of him that he gained hostages from the Amphipolitans, but how this happened we do not know. He gave these hostages into the keeping of Charidemos, a certain captain of mercenaries in his employ. Charidemos, however, was not to be trusted and delivered them to Amphipolis. This happened after the recall of Iphicrates but is illustrative of the conditions prevailing in the Athenian army at that time.¹⁶

While Iphicrates was engaged against Amphipolis, the king of Persia was giving judgment upon the fate of the city.¹⁷ Pelopidas at the time of his embassy to the Persian court in 367 received from the king a rescript, by which, among other things, the independence of Amphipolis was acknowledged. Some time later an embassy from Athens went up to protest, and it was then that the decision was reversed and the Athenian claims were recognized.¹⁸

In 364 Iphicrates was removed from his command and Timotheos took his place.¹⁹ Feeling in need of as strong an army as possible, he attempted to re-engage Charidemos. This mercenary captain, however, was under the influence of Iphicrates, who had just been removed from his command, and of Kotys, who was openly hostile to Athens. Instead of taking service under the newly appointed Athenian commander, he restored the Amphipolitan hostages, whom he had in charge, to their friends in Am-

¹³ Plut. *Pel.*, 27; Aesch. II, 27-29.

¹⁴ Dem. XXIII, 149-150.

¹⁵ Dem. XXIII, 149; Aesch. II, 29.

¹⁶ Dem. XXIII, 149-150.

¹⁷ Dem. XIX, 137; Xen. *Hell.*, VII, 1, 36; Diod. XV, 81, 3.

¹⁸ Dem. XIX, 137, 253; Hegesippos, *de Hal.*, 29.

¹⁹ Dem. XXIII, 149-150; schol., Aesch., II, 31; Polyæn. III, 10, 7, 8, 14f.

phipolis, and taking a number of Athenian ships, he sailed off to serve under the Thracian Kotys in his war against Athens.²⁰ Timotheos felt that the recent murder of Ptolemy Alorites²¹ and the accession of Perdikkas III to the Macedonian throne offered him a splendid opportunity to obtain revenge for the ungrateful manner in which the Athenians had been treated at the time when Iphicrates had established Ptolemy in his regency. Turning his attention to Macedon and especially to the Thermaic Gulf²² he captured the coast towns, Pydna and Methonè, and persuaded Perdikkas²³ to enter an alliance with Athens and to assist in the war against the Chalcidians. Perdikkas was willing enough to aid Athens in her attempts to weaken the Chalcidian league, for it had been a menace to Macedonian unity since the time when the Chalcidians had snatched so many Macedonian towns from the hands of the Illyrians and had taken the territory that Amyntas was powerless to hold. A second time they had interfered in the affairs of Macedon and had almost succeeded in placing their candidate upon the throne. Hence it was that Perdikkas entered eagerly into the plan of humbling a neighbour that might again become dangerous. With this assistance Timotheos was able to capture Potidaea and Toronè, together with many Chalcidian towns of less importance.²⁴ Although he was successful in gaining Macedonian aid and in taking from the league much of its outlying territory, such as the peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallènè, he could not capture Olynthos nor do more than weaken its power. One must remember, however, that he was ill supported by Athens and for supplies and men he was dependent in great part upon his own resources. Isocrates considered it as one of his greatest merits that he was able to do so much at so little expense to Athens.²⁵ He raised his money in various ways. Part of it he collected from the Athenian allies about Thrace; part he furnished himself; and the rest came from

²⁰ Dem. XXIII, 149-150.

²¹ Diod. XV, 77, 5.

²² Deinarch. I, 14.

²³ Dem. II, 14; Polyaen. III, 10, 14.

²⁴ Diod. XV, 81, 364-3; Isoc. XV, 108, 113; Polyaen. III, 10, 15; Deinarch. I, 14.

²⁵ Isoc. XV, 113.

miscellaneous sources, from the profits of debasing coinage, for example, and from the gifts of friendly princes.²⁶ His eagerness to enlist Charidemus and his willingness to pardon him for his previous treachery show that the problem of maintaining an army sufficiently large to be effective was one that was difficult of solution.²⁷ Another mercenary captain serving under Timotheos was Menelaos. Later he was honoured by Athens and given Athenian citizenship.²⁸

In his attempts to capture Amphipolis, Timotheos was even less successful than he was against Olynthos. The details of the war have not been preserved for the most part and those that remain cannot be dated with any degree of certainty.²⁹ It would seem that Alcimachos, a lieutenant of Timotheos, received a severe repulse and that soon after Callisthenes was sent to replace Timotheos in his command.³⁰ This probably happened in the spring of 362.³¹ During the time when Callisthenes was in command in these regions, the loyal citizens of Potidaea preferred a request to Athens that cleruchs be sent out to take possession of the city. The request was granted and Potidaea was made an Athenian cleruchy.³² Callisthenes, however, had as little success against Amphipolis as his predecessor.³³ Perdicas III, following in the footsteps of the second Macedonian king of that name, deserted the Athenian cause and offered his assistance to the Amphipolitans. He had been willing to assist Athens so long as she was busily engaged in weakening the power of his enemies and potential rivals, the Chalcidians; but when it came to delivering into the hands of the Athenians a city so favourably situated as Amphipolis and giving them so strong a foothold in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, Perdicas decided to dispense with Athenian alliance and to throw the weight of his power on

²⁶ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 102, (362 B. C.); Polyæn. III, 10, 14; Arist. *Oecon.*, II, 23, 1350a.

²⁷ Dem. XXIII, 150.

²⁸ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 102, 103.

²⁹ Schol., Aesch. II, 31.

³⁰ Aesch. II, 30; Arist. *Rhet.*, II, 3, 13, 1380b.

³¹ Timotheos was still in command in the early months of 362, as we learn from Ditt. *Syll.*,² 102.

³² Ditt. *Syll.*,² 104; Dem. VI, 20, schol.; Hegesippos, *de Hal.*, 10; Diod. XVI, 8.

³³ Aesch. II, 30.

the side of Amphipolis. Presumably a Macedonian garrison was given to the city for its protection.³⁴ At least Callisthenes for some unknown reason not acceptable to Athens, thought it wise to conclude an armistice with Perdicas, and for this he was tried and condemned to death.³⁵ In 360, Timotheos again took the command against Amphipolis but he fared worse than before. His attack was repulsed and the triremes that he had transported by land so that he could use them above the town had to be burned, in order that they might not fall into the hands of the enemy.³⁶ In the interval between Callisthenes and the return of Timotheos, so far as one can judge, no operations were undertaken against the Amphipolitans.

³⁴ Diod. XVI, 3; Aesch. II, 29.

³⁵ Aesch. II, 30.

³⁶ Schol., Aesch. II, 31; Polyaen. III, 10, 8.

CHAPTER XII

CHALCIDIAN ALLIANCE WITH PHILIP

Late in the year 360, Perdiccas III fell in battle with a horde of invading Illyrians.¹ Macedonia then became the scene of a many sided struggle for succession. Pretenders to the throne arose from all sides. While these claimants, however, were fighting among themselves for supremacy, it seemed quite likely that Macedonia would fall a prey to the attacks of its restless neighbours, the Illyrians and the Paeonians, who were seizing this opportunity to overrun as much of the country as possible. Athens again tried the doubtful experiment of interfering in Macedonian domestic quarrels by supporting Argaeos, one of the many claimants to the crown. Mantias was sent out to Macedonia in command of three thousand hoplites and a fleet of considerable size. Landing at Methonè, Mantias sent Argaeos with the mercenary troops to Aegae, the ancient capital of Macedonia. At this place Argaeos called upon the citizens to enlist themselves under his banner, but as few favoured his cause, he returned to Methonè.

Philip, the son of Amyntas, showed himself the most powerful claimant for the throne. The Paeonians he had caused to withdraw by the payment of a sum of money. Pausanias and Archelaos, two other pretenders, he had disposed of easily. There was no one left to deal with except Argaeos. Having made these preparations, Philip appeared before Methonè where Mantias and his troops were stationed. In the battle that followed the Athenian forces were defeated and many prisoners were taken by Philip.²

Philip saw that friendship with Athens was necessary for his

¹ Diod. XVI, 2, 4.

² *Ibid.* 2f.

purpose and took such measures as he could to heal the breach between them. Knowing that the Athenians were eager to gain possession of Amphipolis and that they had been willing to support Argaeos so that they might have upon the Macedonian throne a king friendly to their interests and one that would grant to them this city, Philip withdrew his garrison from the place and left it free and autonomous.³ Upon the capture of the Athenian troops at Methonè, he had another opportunity to show his good will toward Athens, and so instead of holding the prisoners for ransom or exchange, he freely liberated them.⁴

After Philip had made these friendly advances, he entered into negotiations for the conclusion of peace. Now that he had given up all claims to that for which the Athenians had been struggling for so long a time, the city of Amphipolis, and had shown his friendship to them in other ways, he had no difficulty in persuading them to come to a peaceful understanding with him.⁵ The Athenians, however, desired him to guarantee to them the possession of Amphipolis. It was not enough for him to have surrendered all claims upon it. Consequently a bargain was struck by which, in return for this favour, the Athenians were to deliver into his possession the seacoast town of Pydna, which was then an Athenian ally. This agreement was so far from being just to the inhabitants of Pydna that the Athenian ambassadors in charge of the negotiations hesitated to bring it before the assembly. It came up before the Boulè alone and was there ratified.⁶

This secret agreement, however, Philip almost immediately broke. His chief end had been gained when he had lulled the suspicions of Athens and had induced it to lay aside its hostility for him. He could now turn his attention to his more dangerous neighbours, the Paeonians and Illyrians. During the year 358, his hands were occupied with the pacification of these peoples.⁷ When he had accomplished this and had removed the barbarian menace, he was free to extend Macedonian power and influence.

³ Diod. XVI, 3.

⁴ Dem. XXIII, 121.

⁵ Diod. XVI, 4; Dem. II, 6-7; XXIII, 121.

⁶ Theop. frg. 165a-d.

⁷ Diod. XVI, 2-4.

For this extension of power it was essential that Philip gain a foothold upon the seacoast and make Macedon a maritime nation. Since the time of Amyntas the Macedonian seacoast had been greatly lessened. Pydna was in the hands of Athens. Philip, however, did not first direct his attention to the shores of the Thermaic Gulf, but to the country commanded by the river Strymon. Here was situated the flourishing city of Amphipolis and near it lay the rich mining region of Mt. Pangaeos. The valley of the Strymon could furnish wood in abundance for the building of a fleet; and Lake Bolbe and the lower river formed an excellent place for the headquarters of a large navy. The gold mines would furnish the money for equipping and manning it. Thus there were many reasons why Philip should try to become master of Amphipolis. To incorporate it, however, in the Macedonian kingdom, meant nothing more nor less than to sever all relations with Athens. The Athenians still asserted that Amphipolis was theirs, because of its original settlement by them. Philip, moreover, had promised to deliver it to them in exchange for Pydna. It is impossible to tell whether Philip ever had any intention of keeping his bargain. It would seem that from the first he realized the importance of the extension of Macedonian power to the sea; but that his original aim had been to regain the lost Macedonian territory upon the Thermaic Gulf. As his power grew and as he felt himself more safely seated upon the Macedonian throne, his plans widened; and the importance of the possession of Amphipolis grew upon him to such an extent that he was willing to enter into open hostility with Athens. The success of the Thasian colony, Krenides, situated upon Mt. Pangaeos, and the development of the neighbouring mines undoubtedly exerted their full share of influence upon him.⁸ Whatever may have been his full purpose in promising to deliver the city of Amphipolis into Athenian hands, in the year 357, he took measures to get it into his power.⁹

In the city, however, notwithstanding its long and determined

⁸ Diod. XVI, 3.

⁹ Diod. XVI, 8. The date of the capture can be made out from a comparison of Dem. I, 8 with an Athenian inscription of the Archonship of Agathocles, 357-6, Ditt. *Syll.*,² 109.

resistance to Athens, there was a strong Athenian party, and, when the purpose of Philip began to become patent, the strength of this party increased to such an extent that it controlled the affairs of the city. Accordingly Hierax and Stratocles were sent to Athens to ask for aid against Philip and to offer their submission to Athens. For some reason Athens would have nothing to do with this offer.¹⁰ She may still have had faith in the promise of Philip, expecting to receive the city from his hands. It is certain, at least that during the siege Philip sent an embassy to Athens renewing his promises and saying that when Amphipolis was captured it would be restored to the Athenians.¹¹ On the other hand Athens may have thought it impossible to save the city from Philip and for this reason was unwilling to risk a body of men in its defence. After a short siege Philip was successful and the city fell¹². The leaders of the Athenian party were exiled and the town and its territory was incorporated in the Macedonian kingdom¹³. Theoretically Philip allowed the town to retain its autonomy but actually he had the control of affairs in his own hand¹⁴.

While the Athenians were wondering what Philip would do next, whether he meant to keep his promise or not; and before they could recover from their surprise at his failure to do so, Pydna also was in his possession¹⁵. His foothold upon the coast was now well established and it was only necessary for him to extend it and to develop his navy. Although he had found it advisable to break with Athens, he did not feel himself strong enough to stand entirely alone while the formation of his navy was in progress. It was necessary, moreover, that Athens should have no base of operations in his immediate neighbourhood. For this reason the Chalcidians were to be reckoned with. Not-

¹⁰ Dem. I, 8; Theop. frg. 43.

¹¹ Dem. XXIII, 116; Hegesippos, *de Hal.*, 27.

¹² Diod. XVI, 8.

¹³ Diod. XVI, 8.

¹⁴ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 113. This shows that the city was theoretically in charge of its own affairs and autonomous; but the statement of Diodoros expresses the actual state of affairs, that it was subject to Philip. It is noteworthy that one of the exiles, Stratocles by name, was a member of the Amphipolitan embassy to Athens.

¹⁵ Diod. XVI, 8; Dem. I, 9, 12; XX, 63.

withstanding the fact that Timotheos had greatly weakened them, they still formed a powerful state, naval and commercial, so far as the Thracian coast was concerned. If Athens should persuade them to enter an alliance with her, for the purpose of waging war against Philip, the position of the Macedonian king would become precarious. The Chalcidians, however, were ready to enter into an alliance with Philip. This he offered in order that he might forestall any understanding with Athens and that he might have no fear of Chalcidian opposition to his plans. Hostility to Athens was the common interest that bound the two together, and it was agreed that neither party should conclude a peace without the consent of the other¹⁶. In return for this alliance the Chalcidians received the city of Anthemos, to which they had claims. Philip, moreover, captured Potidaea from the Athenians and gave it and its territory back again into the possession of the league. The Athenian colonists were sent home unharmed. This happened in the early part of the year 356¹⁷. Pydna and Amphipolis had slipped out of the hands of the Athenians because of their too ready confidence in the word of Philip and because of their unwillingness to undertake any risks in the defence of these cities. With Potidaea it was not far otherwise. Procrastination and dilatory methods characterized Athenian movements in and about Chalcidicè. Although Philip spent considerable time upon the siege of Potidaea, the army sent out by Athens for its relief did not arrive before the final capitulation of the place¹⁸.

In this way Philip had gained what Athens had lost. The Athenians had had this very opportunity of an alliance with the Chalcidians, but hoodwinked by the fair promises of Philip, they had refused to listen to the requests made to them by Chalcidian ambassadors¹⁹. The political insight of the Chalcidians detected

¹⁶ Diod. XVI, 8; Dem. II, 6f; VI, 20; XXIII, 108; Liban. on Dem. I; Scala, no. 185. Dem. II, 6 shows that the Chalcidians would have made terms with Athens if it had been possible. Their hostility to Athens gave way to their fear of Philip. When Athens refused they were forced to make the best of their position and to turn to Philip. This refusal of Athens must have made them more hostile than ever to her.

¹⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 3; Dem. II, 7.

¹⁸ Dem. IV, 35; cf. 4f.

¹⁹ Dem. II, 6.

the quarter from which the danger was to come and they were willing to lay aside their quarrel with Athens in order to have her protection against Philip. When they found themselves unable to persuade Athens of the correctness of their views, there was nothing left to do but to make their hostility to Athens a means of gaining better treatment from Philip. They were unable to stand alone and it was then essential for them to make an alliance with Philip, as it were, to protect themselves against him, or at least to delay as long as possible the struggle that they felt to be impending. Philip, for his part, not only needed their assistance and most of all their good-will; but he felt that they were in a position to inflict damage upon him and to hinder him in the furtherance of his plans. Having assured himself of the Chalcidian friendship, he saw that it was worth while for him to deprive Athens of Potidaea, her most important station in this region. As he could not hold it for himself, so long as the Chalcidic state intervened, breaking the continuity of the Macedonian coast line between Amphipolis and the Thermaic Gulf, it was to his distinct advantage to hand it over to the Chalcidians. Thereby he would gain their good-will and lull any suspicions that they might have concerning his ultimate intentions.

Philip could now turn his attention in other directions. He made use of Amphipolis to enter Thrace, where he founded the city of Philippi and caused the gold mines of the neighbourhood to be worked on a greater scale²⁰. Neither the town nor the mines were new, but they were taken over by him and enlarged. The name of the town had been Krenides, but Philip departed from Greek custom and named it after himself²¹. We are told by Diodoros that the mines of the city furnished him an annual revenue of one thousand talents. At least Philip was able to put into circulation a very large quantity of new gold coins. Having crossed the Strymon, he came into contact with the Thracian prince, Ketriporis, who together with Lypeios of Paeonia and Grabos of Illyria, made an alliance with Athens. These princes were defeated, without great difficulty, before they could receive

²⁰ Diod. XVI, 8.

²¹ Diod. XVI, 3, 8.

assistance from Athens²². In the next few years Philip was actively engaged in extending his power in every direction. On the Thracian coast he captured Abdera and Maronea²³. On the Thermaic Gulf he deprived Athens of Methonè, her last possession²⁴. Likewise he was active in Thessaly and upon the Propontis. It would seem that Philip was waiting only for an opportunity or an excuse for attacking and destroying the Chalcidic league.

²² Hicks and Hill, 131; Diod. XVI, 22; Plut. *Alex.*, 3.

²³ Polyæn. IV, 2, 22.

²⁴ Diod. XVI, 34, 353-2 B. C. Also wrongly given under 354-3, XVI, 31; Dem. I, 9, 12, 13; IV, 35.

CHAPTER XIII

DESTRUCTION OF THE LEAGUE BY PHILIP

The league, however, was on its guard, strengthening itself in every possible way. Its territory was probably as great in extent as it had been at any time during its history, except perhaps for a short period just before its humiliation by the Lacedaemonians.¹ Towards Macedonia, Anthemos, by a recent gift of Philip, was within its boundaries.² Botticè by this time had certainly become a part of the Chalcidic league³ for its territory was confiscated later for settlement by Macedonian nobles, as was that of Olynthos.

¹ Some indications of the extent of the Chalcidic league during the fourth century can be gained from a consideration of the coinage of the Chalcidic peninsula. The cities issuing coins must have been independent at some time during this period. Acanthos, Olophyxos, Orthagoreia, Aphytis, Mendè, Potidaea, Aineia, and the Bottiaeans were the only states issuing coins during the fourth century. The coinage of Apollonia is rather doubtful. Orthagoreia may be identical with Stageiros, but evidence on this point is somewhat conflicting. In any case other evidence shows that Stageiros was a member of the Chalcidian league at the time of its destruction by Philip. Thus its coinage can be assigned only to the first quarter of the fourth century. The fact that Olophyxos struck coins about 350 corroborates our assumption that the league had little or no hold on the peninsula of Actè. The coins of Potidaea are probably contemporary with its reestablishment by Sparta about 400. Those of Mendè and Aphytis show that the Chalcidians made little headway in Pallènè. As for Aineia, we have no reason for assuming that it remained independent when places such as Anthemos were in Chalcidian hands, and thus we must assign the coins of that city to a date antecedent to its incorporation in the league. The Bottiaean coinage ceased, probably about 490. It is to be noted that none of the cities of Sithonia issued coins during the fourth century, which fact may be taken as an indication of Chalcidian influence in that peninsula. Head, *Historia Num.*, pp. 203-214.

² Dem. VI, 20; Arrian, *Anab.* II, 9, 3; cf. note 3.

³ Arrian, *Anab.* I, 2, 5. This shows that Bottiaean territory was confiscated for the benefit of the Macedonian nobles at the time of the destruction of the league. Also cf. Theop. frg. 140. Meineke's conjecture *Βοττικῆς* for *Ἀττικῆς* is very probable and would show that Botticè was a part of the Chalcidic league. One can not tell when this union was brought about. Arrian confirms this conjecture.

It is doubtful whether Apollonia on the northern frontier was ever incorporated in the league, although its territory was later confiscated by Philip.⁴ On the east the Chalcidic territory was limited, not by the coast, but by the territory of Acanthos⁵. Of the three peninsulas the easternmost was under Acanthian influence rather than Chalcidian.⁶ Sithonia and at least the northern portion of Pallènè formed a part of the possessions of the league⁷. Demosthenes, speaking of the league,⁸ says that it could put into the field one thousand horsemen and that the number of its citizens was ten thousand. This gives one a certain idea of the extent and power of the Chalcidian league in the period immediately preceding its final struggle with Philip.

Although it seemed strong and prosperous, Philip had really weakened its powers of resistance in many insidious ways. Bordering so closely upon Macedonia, Chalcidicè was in a position to be easily influenced by Philip's newly acquired wealth. The relations between the two countries were friendly and there must have been a great deal of communication from one to the other. Of all this Philip made use in his attempts to cement the friendship between the Chalcidians and the Macedonians. He did not hesitate to use bribery for the purpose of attaching to himself important citizens of the various cities of the league. Wood for house-building, cattle, sheep, and horses were given in abundance with this end in view⁹. Demosthenes may possibly have indulged in rhetorical exaggeration in his accounts of the importance of these measures of Philip, but other less tangible forces were at work. The Chalcidians were to a large extent interested in commercial enterprises. Macedonia was their nearest neighbour and

⁴ *I. G.*, II, 70, 355-4 B. C. This is a decree giving honours to a citizen of Apollonia for services rendered to Athens during the Social War. Arrian, *Anab.* I, 12, 7; cf. note 26, p. 128.

⁵ (Dem.) XXXIV, 36. In 326 Acanthos was still in existence and had not been destroyed. Hence in all probability it had not been a member of the league.

⁶ *I. G.*, II, part 5, 108b; cf. Köhler, *Sitz.-ber. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1891, p. 475. This shows that Acanthos and Dion were connected and not joined with the Chalcidians.

⁷ Diod. XVI, 53; Hegesippos, *de Hal.*, 28. Toronè was captured by Philip with the other cities of the league.

⁸ Dem. XIX, 266. See chapter on population.

⁹ Dem. XIX, 265.

it is fair to assume that Chalcidian traders were found throughout the country. A large proportion of the Macedonian trade must have gone through their hands. Hence everything that tended to promote this trade tended to exert a pro-Macedonian influence upon the merchant princes of Chalcidicè. Philip's alteration in the standard of weight in use for Macedonian coins was a judicious one;¹⁰ for when he adopted the standard used by the Chalcidians he gave a great impulse to this commerce. This worked more effectively than all the direct bribery mentioned by Demosthenes. Many of the leading Chalcidian citizens must have seen that the fate of their peninsula was bound up with that of Macedon and felt that commercial interests demanded friendship with Philip at all costs, even to the sacrifice of their national independence. That the Macedonian party was strong later developments showed¹¹.

In many ways the Chalcidians could look upon loss of autonomy with better grace than most of the other Greeks. Their training for the last eighty years had been in the direction of union. The cities that had joined the league had given up the prevalent Greek idea that the city was the political unit and had united themselves to form a common state. Hence the idea of union with a still larger power, thereby forming a still larger unit, was not a novel one nor in itself essentially objectionable. When one takes into consideration the energy shown by Philip and the growing power of Macedon, the hopelessness of a struggle against it, and the manifold commercial advantages of remaining on friendly terms with a neighbour so powerful and so necessary to their welfare, one will hesitate to condemn the so-called traitors. The Chalcidians had shown political sagacity in advance of their time. Conditions now were altered and it remained to be seen whether they would take the next step toward union with Macedon of their own accord or by force. The last few years had shown which way things were moving and those who were far-sighted enough to read the signs of the times probably realized that there was nothing for the Chalcidians to do

¹⁰ Hill, *Historical Greek Coins*, nos. 43-44.

¹¹ Dem. IX, 56, 66. Apollonides was exiled for opposition to Philip.

but sooner or later to become a part of Macedon. The conservative party, however, was in the majority, except perhaps for short periods of time; and it was the stubborn resistance to union with Macedon, offered by this party, that in reality brought down upon the Chalcidic cities the terrible punishment meted out to them by Philip.

It was irksome indeed for the Chalcidic or nationalistic party to feel that they were hemmed in on all sides by the power of Philip and that only by reason of his favour could they be at all secure. He had become too great to keep faith with them¹². They were full of foreboding for the future and their fears were well justified. If they should insist upon breaking with him and seeking assistance from Athens, there could be no hope for them. The Chalcidian treaty with Philip required that neither party should make peace with the Athenians without the consent of the other. Violation of this provision by the Chalcidians meant the wrath of Philip and almost certain punishment; for this would give him an excuse and an opportunity for attacking and subduing them, the very thing for which he was waiting.

But notwithstanding the dangerous possibilities attendant upon alliance with Athens, the Chalcidians decided to come to terms with her in hopes that they could thereby maintain their independence against Philip. Having come to this conclusion they waited for an opportunity for action, and in the summer of 352, when Philip was busily engaged in Thessaly, ambassadors were sent to Athens to conclude a peace¹³. There was even talk of forming an alliance, but this was probably postponed on account of the Chalcidian fear and dread of Philip. Although

¹² Dem. XXIII, 198.

¹³ Libanios, *Hypoth.*, *Olynth.* I; Dem. III, 7; XXIII, 108f.; *I. G.*, II, 105. This inscription, a treaty between Athens and the Chalcidians, has been dated by various editors in various years. If the treaty was made at this time, Ferguson, *Athenian Secretaries*, p. 38, is the only one that has dated it correctly, *i. e.*, in the year 352-1, in the archonship of Aristodemos. It seems to me quite improbable that this treaty refers to the so-called Olynthian war. Philochoros, frg. 132, says that the alliance was made in the Archonship of Callimachos (349-8). This fits in better with the facts. If there had been an alliance existing between Athens and the Chalcidians at the time of Philip's expedition of intimidation in 351, Philip would not have let matters rest with a warning. Thus it seems best to date it in the archonship of Charisandros, when the Chalcidians joined the second Athenian confederacy.

this peace with Athens was displeasing to Philip, and moreover, contrary to the Macedonian alliance, he did not feel himself ready to take active measures against them. After his return from Thrace in 351 he threatened them with an invasion, entering Bisaltia and going to the very borders of the Chalcidic territory.¹⁴ The Chalcidians were not ready to engage in a struggle with him at that time and sent an embassy to persuade him of their friendship.¹⁵ Evidently this was successful for nothing further was done by Philip. What is more, he sent word that his intention was a peaceful one,¹⁶ and he seems to have tried to gain his end without compulsion and the horrors of war.

The two parties in the Chalcidic towns were evenly divided. A few months before this time the national or independence party had been strong enough to make peace with Athens. Now, after the peaceful designs of Philip had been seen, the Macedonian party was in the majority and Apollonides, a leader of the opposite party, was sent into exile¹⁷.

After having assured himself of many adherents in all the Chalcidian towns, in the year 349, Philip advanced into Chalcidicè. Since he thought that he had sufficient sympathizers among the Chalcidians to make a resort to force and arms unnecessary, and since he wished to quiet the fears of his opponents,¹⁸ he let it be understood that his errand was a peaceful one;¹⁹ but when he arrived in the vicinity of Olynthos, he demanded the restoration of his stepbrother Arrhidaeos, who had escaped him and had taken refuge among the Chalcidians.²⁰ Upon their refusal to comply with his demand, he laid aside his mask of friendship and commenced the war in earnest.

This refusal of the Chalcidians shows plainly how evenly the parties were divided. Not long before the Macedonian party had been strong enough to exile Apollonides, presumably for the purpose of pleasing Philip. Now that Philip had attempted to

¹⁴ Dem. I, 13; IV. 17; cf. Theop. frg. 124.

¹⁵ Theop. frg. 124.

¹⁶ Dem. IX, 11.

¹⁷ Dem. IX, 56, 66; [Dem.] LIX, 91.

¹⁸ Dem. I, 21.

¹⁹ Dem. VIII, 59.

²⁰ Schol., Dem. I, 5; Justinus, VIII, 3, 10.

dictate to them, the balance swung in the other direction and it was decided to undergo the risk of war rather than to submit to this dictation. Probably the Chalcidians saw the real purpose of Philip and felt that his demand for the restoration of Arrhidaios was only a pretext made use of to justify himself in the eyes of the world. Immediately they sent an embassy to Athens asking for an alliance, and this was granted them in the archonship of Callimachos (349–8)²¹.

In accordance with this alliance the Athenians sent a body of mercenary troops to Chalcidicè to assist in carrying on the war against Philip. These troops were under the command of Chares and consisted of two thousand peltasts and thirty triremes. As results proved, these forces were insufficient²². Demosthenes, who saw the danger, was unable to convince the Athenians of the critical position in which the Chalcidians were placed and of the need of more strenuous measures. Probably the Chalcidian ambassadors had hesitated to depict conditions in their true colours. They were offering Athens an alliance and it was to their interest to make their offering seem as valuable as possible. The soldiers for which they were asking were not for their protection, but were for the purpose of carrying on the Athenian war against Philip from more advantageous headquarters.

The details of the war are more or less uncertain, but it seems clear that neither side accomplished much during the first campaign. Diodoros tells us that Philip in his expedition against the Chalcidian cities captured a fort called Geira and destroyed it, and at the same time so frightened certain of the other towns that they submitted to him evidently without opposition²³.

²¹ Philochoros, frg. 132.

²² Philochoros, frg. 132; Diod. XVI, 52, 9; cf. Dem. XIX, 266.

²³ Diod. XVI, 52, 9. I have given the manuscript reading. Beloch (*Gr. Gesch.*, II, p. 502, note 1) and others have thought that Stageiros is meant. This seems to me to be impossible, for Stageiros was a city, not a fort. Certain of the manuscripts read *Zeipá*, and the suggestion has been made that this is the same as *Zeipnía*, Theop. frg. 45. It is not impossible that the name *Zépeia*, found in the *τάξις φόρων* of 421, *I. G.*, I, Supp. 37, p. 141, is a variant of the manuscript reading. I prefer this explanation to that given by Beloch. Chytropolis, perhaps, came over to Philip during this campaign. Theop. frg. 134. Of its history we know nothing except that it was a colony of Aphytis.

So far as we know nothing else was accomplished during this year. It is probable that in the autumn Chares and his troops returned to Athens. As for Philip, he was busy putting down opposition in Thessaly.

In the spring of 348 a second embassy came from the Chalcidians to Athens asking assistance. In answer to this Charidemus was sent out in command of a larger expedition. Four thousand peltasts, one hundred and fifty horsemen, and eighteen triremes accompanied him.²⁴ The ambassadors had been insistent and had pictured the Chalcidians as hard pressed by the war. Probably Philip had already commenced his campaign of 348. In the preceding year he had won over several Chalcidian towns. Where these were we do not know. They may have been Bottiaean or Pallenian, for the first efforts of Charidemus were spent in ravaging this territory. This may have been the time when Derdas of Macedon was taken prisoner; but of this one can not be certain. Little of real value was accomplished, for the incidents recorded of Charidemus refer to his insolence and dissoluteness rather than to his military exploits.²⁵

During this time, Philip had not been idle. Among the towns that came into his hands, either by force or persuasion, were Apollonia (?)²⁶, Toronè, Mecyperna, and Sanè.²⁷ With these he

²⁴ Philochoros, frg. 132; Justinus, VIII, 3, 10. Philip's step brother Menelaos may have accompanied this expedition. His brother Arrhidaeos had found refuge in Olynthos, and had been the ostensible cause for the war. Later the two suffered the same fate at the hands of Philip. Cf. Schaefer, *Demosthenes u. s. Zeit*, II, pp. 17, 124, notes.

²⁵ Theop. frg. 139; cf. Ael. *Var. His.*, II, 41. For successes of Charidemus see Dem. III, 1, 35, and Liban. *Hypoth.*, Ol. III, 27.

²⁶ Dem. IX, 26; Hegesippos, *de Hal.*, 28-9.

To which Apollonia was Demosthenes referring in IX, 26, when he says that Olynthos, Methonè (?), Apollonia, and thirty-two towns ἐπὶ Θράκης were completely destroyed by Philip? We have two or perhaps four cities of that name from which to choose. See *Pauly-Wissowa*, nos. 3-6. The existence of an Apollonia on Actè, Pliny, *N. H.*, IV, 10, 37, is very questionable and the other Apollonias seem to have possessed many lives. I need not go into the question as to whether there were two Apollonias in the Chalcidic peninsula or not. The fact remains that except for this passage of Demosthenes no ancient writer tells us of the destruction of either of them by Philip. One of them, no. 3, existed for several centuries after Philip's time and is mentioned by several writers. Livy, 45, 28; Pliny, *N. H.*, IV, 10, 38; Ptol. III, 12, 33; *Acts of the Apostles*, 17, 1; *Itineraries*. Apollonia no. 4 is supposed to have been the Apollonia mentioned by Xenophon and destroyed by Philip. If so its destruction was not complete. for Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 21, tells us that it

had little difficulty. The Chalcidians had concentrated all their efforts upon the protection of their capital Olynthos. Philip was now ready to attack them where they were the strongest. All of their other possessions were in his hands. Even Mecyperna, the Olynthian harbour, had fallen to him. Advancing upon the city, he met the Chalcidians in two battles and defeated them.* When he was within a short distance of the city, the Chalcidians tried to come to terms, but it was too late and their attempt was in vain. Philip replied that the time had come when one or the other must give way.²⁸ With this he commenced the siege of the town and in an attempt to storm it he lost many men. Finally, however, he managed to cut off from the town a body of five hundred horse, weakening the garrison so that the city was captured a short time afterwards. This cavalry success was due, in all probability, to the treachery of two prominent Olynthians, Las-thenes and Euthycrates, who having been elected hipparchs, betrayed their trust and allowed their command to fall into the hands of Philip.²⁹

Upon the refusal of Philip to come to terms, the Chalcidians had sent an urgent request to Athens for more assistance. This was granted them and Chares was put in command of a body of citizen hoplites under orders to sail to Chalcidicè and to raise

participated in the synoecism of Thessalonica. Thus the identification of the Apollonia of Demosthenes with no. 3 or no. 4 is not without difficulty. On the other hand Strabo, VII, 331, 35, tells us that the eastern Apollonia was destroyed by Philip. As Demosthenes does not tell us where Apollonia was except that it was *ἐπὶ Θράκης*, and as the two Apollonias of the Chalcidian peninsula, if there were two, existed until much later times, it seems better to assume that Strabo and Demosthenes refer to the same city, except that Livy, 38, 41, mentions the existence of an eastern Apollonia in the year 188 B. C. His account places it between Maronea and Abdera, while the Apollonia of Strabo was situated west of the Nestos river. Thus the whole question is involved in numerous difficulties which make a positive answer out of the question. It seems probable, however, that there were but two Apollonias, the one in Mygdonia, surviving until later times and the other near the eastern Galepsos, destroyed by Philip. This seems to be confirmed by Steph. Byz.: 'Απολλωνία, γ, Μακεδονίας. . . . κβ, τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης Ἰώνων ἣν Δημοσθένης φησίν.

²⁷ Diod. XVI, 53; Front. *Strat.*, III, 3, 5.

*Diod. XVI, 53.

²⁸ Dem. IX, 11.

²⁹ Diod. XVI, 53; Dem. IX, 56, 66; XIX, 267; Suidas, Κάρανος; Hyperides, frg. 76 (Blass, 3d ed.)

the siege.³⁰ Philip's movements were too rapid for them and so, hindered by the Etesian winds, upon their arrival they found that Olynthos had been taken.³¹ This happened early in the archonship of Theophilos (348-7) some time after the Olympic festival.³²

The fate of the Chalcidians was a hard one. Olynthos and many other cities, according to Demosthenes, were destroyed so thoroughly that it was difficult to tell that their sites had ever been inhabited. He mentions Olynthos and Apollonia and says that there were thirty-two besides.³³ The number is large and it has been generally regarded as an example of rhetorical exaggeration.* This of course may well be, but the definiteness of the number would seem to speak against this supposition; moreover, we must not fail to remember that Demosthenes does not say that all of the cities destroyed were Chalcidian. On the contrary, he used the more general term ἐπὶ Θρακῆς and definitely mentions Apollonia, which we have seen was certainly not a member of the Chalcidic league. The exaggeration is probably not in the number but in the importance of the places described by the term πόλεις. Many of them could have been more accurately called *πολίσματα* or towns. It would be an almost hopeless task to attempt to give an accurate list of these thirty-two ruined cities and towns. Our evidence is very scanty and we are forced to fall back to a large extent upon pure conjecture. In the extant fragments of Theopompos³⁴ are found the names of a number of Chalcidic towns. Many of these, no doubt, suffered a fate similar to that of Olynthos. From Arrian, we learn that the Bottiaean territory furnished to the army of Alexander a

³⁰ Philochoros, frg. 132.

³¹ Suidas, *Káparos*.

³² Philochoros, frg. 132; Aesch. II, 12-15; Diod. XVI, 53.

³³ Dem. IX, 26; Strabo, VII, 329, frg. 11; Suidas, *Káparos*.

³⁴ See Köhler, *Sitz.-ber. d. Berl. Ak.*, 1891, pp. 473ff.

³⁵ Skithai, Theop. frg. 338; Assera, Theop. frg. 147; Milkoros, Theop. frg. 150; Aioleion, Theop. frg. 140; Thermè, Theop. frg. 135. It is doubtful whether Thermè was included in the Chalcidic league. The fact that Theopompos does not call it a Macedonian city might go to show that it was not considered a part of Macedon. Hence it may very well have been in Chalcidic territory, although neither Theopompos nor Seylax, 66, calls it Greek. Chytropolis, Theop. frg. 134. This town is otherwise unknown, but its settlement by Aphytis and surrender to Philip might place it within or at least near the Chalcidic borders. This town is also called Thracian.

troop of cavalry.³⁵ The natural inference from this is that the lands of the Bottiaeans were apportioned among the favourites of Philip. Botticè, however, included a large number of small towns, as we learn from an inscription of the preceding century.³⁶ The Chalcidian territory proper and the three peninsulas supported other groups of towns and these with places such as Anthemos would go far in making up the number mentioned by Demosthenes. If we add to these the other towns outside the Chalcidic peninsula that were destroyed by Philip, the list will probably be complete.³⁷

³⁵ Arrian, *Anab.*, I, 2, 5; Ditt. *Syll.*², 178.

³⁶ Hicks and Hill, 68.

³⁷ A list of the towns destroyed by Philip is a difficult thing to make with the evidence at hand. Demosthenes says that, exclusive of Olynthos, Methonè, and Appollonia, there were thirty-two in all ἐπὶ Θράκης. To make up this list we must use the indirect evidence of many authors and include Chalcidian towns that may be presumed to have survived the ravages of the Peloponnesian War. There can be little doubt that most of the cities and villages in the Chalcidic territory were destroyed and their possessions given over to Macedonian nobles or to other favorites of Philip, so that if we can show that a town was Chalcidian and existed in Philip's time, we can assert that in all probability it was destroyed by him. Strabo, X, 447, 8; cf. Theop. frg. 217b. First of all I shall mention the places for which there is some definite evidence. Diodoros says that Philip in his expedition against the Chalcidian cities captured Geira, a φρούριον, and destroyed it. Diod. XVI, 52, 9. In his next campaign he captured Toronè and Mecyberna. Diod. XVI, 53, 2. We may assume that Mecyberna was destroyed, although it is mentioned by Mela II, 3, 34, as follows: *In litore flexus Mecybernaeus (unde ipsi nomen est) Mecybernam incingit.* Pliny, *N. H.* IV, 10, 36, says merely, *sinus Mecyberna*, and Scymnos, 640f, definitely states that it no longer existed when he wrote, c. 147–75 B. C. Εἰτ' ἔστι κόλπος λεγόμενος Τορωνικός, οὐ πρότερον ἦν τις Μεκύβερνα κειμένη.

Southern Sithonia, however, seems to have been spared by Philip, for Toronè is mentioned by three writers, Pomponius Mela, II, 3, 34; Pliny, *N. H.*, IV, 10, 36, and Scymnos, 642. Theopompos, in the books that deal with the Chalcidians and Philip's campaigns against them, mentions the names of several Chalcidian towns that probably were attacked and destroyed by Philip. Chytropolis, a colony of Aphytis, and Thermè, which is called a Thracian and not a Macedonian town, are mentioned in the twenty-second book. Theop. frgs. 134, 135; cf. note 34.

It is probable, however, that Thermè was not destroyed by Philip for it, together with Aineia, Garescos, Cissos, and Apollonia, according to Strabo, VII, 330, frgs. 21, 24, were in existence at the time when Cassander founded Thessalonica. Twenty-six towns in all, situated in Crousis, participated in the synoecism which resulted in the establishment of this new city on the site or in the neighbourhood of Thermè. Thus it would seem as though northern Crousis had been spared in the general destruction meted out to the Chalcidian cities. In this connection it is interesting to note that Aineia was still in existence as late as 182, Livy, XL, 4; XLIV, 10, and also that Apollonia is mentioned in the *Acts of the Apostles*, 17, 1.

In this same book Theopompus mentions Thestoros, πόλις Θράκης, frg. 136. As book 22 deals largely with the Chalcidians and as Thestoros occurs in the tribute list of 421, *I. G.*, I, 37y, with other cities situated in or near Chalcidicè it may be possible to consider Thestoros one of the outlying possessions of the Chalcidian league. Other towns mentioned in this list, as we know, later became Chalcidian. In his next book Theopompus speaks of an expedition against Aioloion, probably a Bottiaean town included in the Chalcidic league. Frg. 140. Aioloion is also known to us from the tribute lists, and the fact that it appears in the *τάξις φόρου* of 421, *I. G.*, I, 37, Supp. p. 141, shows that it was not at that time a member of the Chalcidian league. It is probable that it entered the league with the rest of Botticè, for Theopompus definitely states that it was a member of the league; cf. chap. XIII, note 3. We know that the Bottiaean territory was confiscated from other sources, Ditt. *Syll*², 178; Arrian, *Anab.*, I, 2, 5. Assera, a Chalcidian town, and Skabala or Scabla, an Eretrian colony, known also from the quota lists of the fifth century are named in the twenty-fourth book, frgs. 145, 147. Pliny, however, IV, 10, 38, names a certain Cassera, which has been generally identified with Assera, and Ptol. *Geog.*, III, 12, 33, gives us the location of an Asseros in Mygdonia. The value of this evidence is questionable, for the Cassera of Pliny seems to have been situated on the peninsula of Actè, near an unknown and somewhat doubtful Apollonia, while the Asseros in most manuscripts is called Assoros and is evidently situated in the interior, near the Mygdonian Apollonia. The Assera of the quota lists was situated on the east coast of Sithonia and in the district known to Ptolemy as Chalcidicè. Cf. Hdt. VII, 122. Herodotos knows Assera as Assa but there is little question of the identity of this place with the Assera mentioned by Theopompus, as πόλις Χαλκιδέων and by Aristotle, *Hist. An.*, 519a, 14. Therefore I think it rather probable that the mistake of Ptolemy and Pliny was due to the fact that the city was no longer in existence and its location unknown. Frg. 338 speaks of Skithai as a place near Potidaea. This is probably to be identified with the Kithas of *I. G.*, I, 243. Frg. 150 definitely assigns Milkoros to the Chalcidians. Frg. 141 mentions Brea, originally a colony of Athens, and frg. 144 mentions an Okolon, a colony of Eretria and as these fragments come from the same book as the reference to Skabala, cited above, it is possible that Okolon was also ἐπὶ Θράκης, and that the two towns were destroyed by Philip. In this connection we may perhaps mention Pharbelos, called by Stephanus Byz. a settlement of the Eretrians. It is also found in the quota lists. *I. G.*, I, Supp., p. 141, no. 37. Stolos, Tindè, and Scapsa were all Chalcidian towns according to Stephanus. Kampsä, which is to be identified with Scapsa, is called by Herodotos, VII, 123, Krossaian. The passage of Pliny, IV, 10, 37, which has been amended to read *Torone, Siggos, Stolos, fretum quo montem Atho Xerxes * * * absceidit, etc.*, can hardly be taken as evidence for the existence of Stolos in his time. Stolos was not situated on the coast between Singos and the peninsula of Actè, but somewhere in the interior. The very mention of Singos in conjunction with Stolos throws Pliny's evidence out of court, for in Strabo's time Singos had been long destroyed. Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 31. It is hardly probable, moreover, that a city in the heart of Chalcidicè should have been left standing by Philip, even though he spared others on the coast for commercial reasons. As for Singos, Strabo states that it had been destroyed. Although he does not say by whom we may assume that Philip was responsible for its ruin.

Having mentioned the fact that Singos occurs in Pliny, I may state that Ptolemy, III, 12, 9, also gives its location. We may take this as a warning not to lay too much stress upon the evidence of these two writers, for the fact that they give us the names of cities long destroyed shows that towns mentioned by them were not necessarily in existence when they wrote. The men

tion of Meeyperna by Mela, cited above, and that of Potidaea, II, 2, 33, indicates that the same thing is true of him.

The confiscation of the territories of Sinos and Spartolos is shown by Ditt. *Syll.*,² 178. Arrian tells us that Anthemios as well as Apollonia and the Bottiaeans furnished a troop of cavalry to the Macedonian army, *Anab.*, II, 9, 3. We know that it formed a part of the Chalcidian league at this time and it is probable that it is another of the ruined cities. The fact that Anthemios is mentioned by Pliny, IV, 10, 36, proves nothing as to its existence in his time, as I have shown above, especially as he locates it in or near Pallènè, in *Pallenensi Isthmo quondam Potidaea, nunc Cassandrea colonia, Anthemus, Olophyzus, sinus Meeyperna*, etc. Potidaea also is to be included in our list of cities destroyed by Philip. It was first captured by Philip and then handed over to the Chalcidians after it had been destroyed and the Athenian colonists had been driven out. Diod. XVI, 8; Dem. VI, 20 and scholion, *ἀγας*; Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 25. The destruction of Stageiros is mentioned by Plut. *Alex.*, 7, and we know from other sources that it was a member of the Chalcidian league, Strabo, VII, 331, frg. 35; Dion Chrys., XLVII, 9. Whether Sanè was a member of the league is not known, but Frontinus, *Strat.*, III, 3, 5, says that it was captured by Philip. The destruction of the eastern Apollonia and of the eastern Galepsos is mentioned by Strabo, VII, 331, frg. 35. When the town of Philippi was founded, inhabitants were taken from the neighbouring cities. Daton suffered in this way, Philoch. frg. 127; and it is probable that Apollonia and Galepsos were also dismantled for the same reason.

In this connection Pliny and Mela are to be considered again. Both mention Apollonia. Mela II, 2, 30: *Ultra Nestos fluit, interque eum et Strymona urbes sunt Philippi, Apollonia, Amphipolis*. Pliny, N. H., IV, 11, 42: *In ora a Strymone Apollonia, Oesyma, Neapolis, Datos. Intus Philippi colonia*. Of these Ptolemy, *Geog.*, III, 12, 7, 28, names only the maritime cities Oesymè and Neapolis together with Amphipolis and Philippi in the interior. The same is true of the metrical geography of Seymnos, vs. 656-9. For Daton, cf. the following additional references: Theop. frgs. 44a, b; Scylax, 67; Strabo, VII, 331, frgs. 33, 36; Diod. XVI, 8; Appian, *B. C.*, IV, 13, 105; Harpocration, *Δάτος*; Steph. Byz., *Φίλιπποι*. On the whole while the evidence as to the destruction of Daton, Galepsos, and Apollonia is not absolutely certain, I think that we can include them in our list.

So far we have only mentioned cities for which there is some evidence. Now I wish to consider a number of towns that survived the ravages of the Peloponnesian War and probably existed until the time of Philip, then to be destroyed by him. The existence of Sermylia about the middle of the fourth century is proved by the fact that Scylax, 66, mentions it. That Sermylia lay on the west coast of the base of Sithonia in the very heart of the league and is nowhere even mentioned by later geographers makes it probable that it too was destroyed.

We know that Strepas was in existence during the first half of the fourth century, Aesch. II, 27, but beyond that our evidence does not go. We have now to consider certain Bottiaean towns, whose existence in 420 makes it probable that they survived into the fourth century, for after the Peace of Nicias there were no great disturbances in Chalcidic during the Peloponnesian War. These towns are Kamakai, (*I. G.*, I, 260; Hicks and Hill, 68), Tripoiæ, (*I. G.*, I, 37γ; Hicks and Hill, 68), Kalindoiai, (Hicks and Hill, 68). A Kalindoiai of Mygdonia is mentioned by Ptolemy, III, 12, 33, but this can not be identical with the Bottiaean town of that name. To these I would add, Pistasos or Istasos, Othoros, Pleumè, and Sernè, although we are not certain that all of these places were in the Chalcidic peninsula, *I. G.*, I, 37, frg. γζ", Supp., p. 141. Bromsikos was also tributary to Athens at this time, but whether it existed until the time of Philip is open to question

In addition to the complete destruction of Olynthos and its Chalcidic neighbours, the inhabitants were sold into slavery, given away by Philip to his friends, or sent to work upon the royal domains.³⁸ Perhaps some of them were transported to upper Macedonia and there compelled to assist Philip in his scheme of colonization by swelling the population of his newly established towns. A number of Athenians were taken prisoners in Olynthos³⁹ and with them Menelaos and Arrhidaeos, the step-brothers of Philip.⁴⁰ These latter Philip immediately put to

for it is not mentioned in the contemporary geography of Scylax, *loc. cit.* Alapta otherwise unknown, is mentioned by Scylax as a town seemingly north of Acanthos and as his work preceded the destruction of the Chalcidian cities, and as Alapta is nowhere mentioned by a later writer we may add it to our list.

I have omitted all towns from the foregoing list mentioned in the Athenian quota lists, unless there is evidence that they survived the period of transition during the first years of the Peloponnesian War, likewise all towns of Pallênê, except Potidaea, all places of southern Sithonia, cities on the peninsula of Actê together with Acanthos, and certain towns in the neighbourhood of Thermê. In this point I have differed with the list offered by Böhnecke, *Forschungen auf dem gebiete d. Attisch. Redner*, pp. 154ff.; *Dem. Lyk. Hyp.* p. 398. That Toronê, Mendê, Seionê, Aphytis, Acanthos, and the towns of Actê existed until later times can be readily shown. Pliny, IV, 10, 36f.; Mela, II, 2, 30ff.; Livy, XXXI, 45; (Dem.) XXXIV, 36; XXXV, 10, 35; Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 27. The towns of northern Crousis, Thermê, Aineia, Garescos, and Cissos have been omitted because of the fact that they survived to participate in the foundation of Thesealonia. Livy, XL, 4; XLIV, 10; Strabo, VII, 330, frgs. 21, 24.

The smaller towns of southern Crousis, such as Smilla, Gigonos, Haisa, Kombreia, and Lipaxos, seem to have disappeared before the fourth century, for they are not mentioned by Scylax nor any later writers except the lexicographers. Hdt. VII, 123; Steph. Byz. *Αἰσα*, *Σμίλα*, *Αἰραῖος*. Dicaea may still have been in existence when Pliny wrote, IV, 10, 36. The other towns of this region I have considered above.

It is noteworthy that our list contains the names of thirty-six cities and villages on the borders of Thrace that probably existed during the fourth century, but of whose later existence we have no proof. This list is offered only by way of suggestion and no finality is claimed for it; for the evidence upon which it is based is largely negative and therefore inconclusive. Towns have probably been included that were not destroyed by Philip or perhaps perished before his time. In fact the very location of many of these places is unknown or doubtful. It is also possible that the names of other cities that should appear in our list have been omitted. In one respect, however, the list is of value, for it shows clearly that there were a great many towns and villages on the Chalcidic peninsula during the fourth century and therefore makes it probable that the number thirty-two given by Demosthenes is not an exaggeration but an actual statement of fact.

³⁸ Diod. XVI, 53; Aesch. II, 156; Hyperides, frg. 76; Dem. VI, 21; XIX, 145, 305f, 309; cf. 139.

³⁹ Aesch. II, 15.

⁴⁰ Justinus, VIII, 3.

death. Some of the Chalcidians, however, managed to flee and make their way to Athens and to these the Athenians gave the privileges of ἀτέλεια.⁴¹ The lands of the Chalcidic cities were confiscated and given with a lavish hand to all who had been able to please the fancy of Philip. A few Macedonian nobles came into the possession of the farms of many Greeks.⁴² It would seem that these grants were not made in fee-simple but depended upon the rendering of some service, military or otherwise.⁴³ Thus the whole of the Chalcidian territory was made a part of Macedonia, inhabited in large part by Macedonians and enjoying the same rights and privileges as the rest of the country. The Chalcidian league had made its last stand and had succumbed to the same force that was later to conquer the remaining Greek cities.

The career of the league had been eventful. Almost from the very day of its foundation it had to encounter strenuous opposition and a large part of its eighty-five years of existence had been spent in fighting for its life. It had shown itself to be founded upon sound political principles. Its adherents had remained faithful until an outside power gave them their freedom and even then rejoined the league when the trouble had blown over. Greek cities and Barbarian were alike appreciative of the generous terms upon which they had been admitted. There was opposition, of course, but the gradual extension of the Chalcidian boundaries shows that the innate force of the league, the justice of the conditions it offered for admission, and the satisfactory way in which the government was managed, were able in the end to convince the majority of the opposing party. Absolute annihilation was the only thing that could keep the Chalcidians from extending their league. Time after time they received a check such as other unions have not been able to overcome. Its members were taken from it and it still survived and grew, in a short time winning back more than it had lost. Beset with en-

⁴¹ Suidas, Κάρανος; cf. Aesch. II, 155; Harpocration, s. v. ἰσοτελής; Hicks and Hill, 138a.

⁴² Diod. XVI, 53; Dem. XIX, 145; Ditt. *Syll.*,² 178; Koehler, *Sitz.-ber. d. Berl. Ak.*, 1891, pp. 473ff; Theop. frg. 217b.

⁴³ Arrian, *Anab.*, I, 2, 5; 12, 7; II, 9, 3. These passages refer to troops of cavalry recruited from the territory confiscated.

emies that wished to stop its growth, the league had become a power to be reckoned with.

The history of the fourth century shows that the Greek city state had reached the limit of its usefulness. If Greece was to remain a force in the world politically or to resist the encroachments of her neighbours, it was necessary for her to enter into some form of permanent union. Conditions were such that the *πόλις* was unfitted for the duties of statehood. The growing restlessness of the Greek people, their development towards individualism, and the consequent impatience under authority and refusal to undertake the duties of citizenship made it impossible for Greece to remain an aggregate of independent cities and survive. Greek wealth and commerce was one of the chief factors in bringing about this state of affairs. No longer was the state regarded as of prime importance, for which it was the duty of every citizen to sacrifice his own pleasure and interests. The rights of the individual were becoming paramount; and with this change of thought went an unwillingness to undertake personal military service and other political burdens. This naturally resulted in the employment of an increasing number of mercenaries and in the creation of bodies of free-lances, ready at all times to create disturbances, to desert to a master offering better pay, and to embarrass the whole Greek world generally. With such problems to solve, Greece was in need of all her political acumen. As a body of independent cities, it found the problem too difficult to solve. Union would have given it greater stability and greater strength to use in maintaining order within its territories. This, however, was distasteful to nearly the whole Greek people and every effort was made to maintain the principle of local city autonomy. This same particularism had proved ruinous to the Chalcidians and in turn was to prove ruinous for the remainder of Greece.

The Chalcidians, however, had solved the problem and were making the experiment on a small scale, gradually extending it as the union proved to be successful and in working order. It is true that their union was the result of the necessity of combination, so that they might be able to resist Athens with success; but the fact that their form of confederation was so popular in

their immediate neighbourhood and existed with them until the whole country became an integral part of Macedonia shows that it was admirably suited to the conditions. Although the problem that faced the Chalcidians was by no means as large or as difficult as that of the Greek cities in the south, it was essentially the same problem. Conditions were very similar. These cities, conservative and adhering to their worn out political theories, could not be expected to appreciate the excellent example placed before their eyes by the Chalcidic league, and so allowed it to go to its ruin without even gaining a lesson from its history.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHALCIDIC LEAGUE

It will be interesting, I think, to consider how the Chalcidians solved so satisfactorily the internal problems of union. Our materials for this are of the scantiest, but nevertheless the attempt must be made to put into some sort of coherent relation the scattered information that we possess. It is extremely unfortunate that the treatise on the polity of the Thracian Chalcidians, written by the Stagirite Aristotle, has not come down to us.¹ He was in a position to know from personal observation what the constitution was and how it was administered. He was born at a time when the Chalcidians were expanding and it is possible that Stageiros then became a member of the league. In any case the aims of the league and its ideals, its political experiments, successful or otherwise, must have been a matter of common talk in the birthplace of Aristotle, less than thirty miles distant from the center of the movement.

¹ *F. H. G.*, II, 153, Χαλκιδέων τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης πολιτεία. For Stageiros, see Strabo, VII, 331, frg. 35: ἐν δὲ τῷ κόλπῳ πρώτη μετὰ τὸν Ἀκανθίων λιμένα Στάγειρα, ἔρημος, καὶ αὐτῇ τῶν Χαλκιδικῶν, Ἀριστοτέλους πατρίς. Dion. Hall., *ep. I, ad Amm.*, 5, calls Aristotle's mother a descendant τινὸς τῶν ἐκ Χαλκίδος τῇν ἀποικίαν ἀγαγόντων εἰς Στάγειρα. Dio. Chrys., *Or. XLVII*, 9. Philip and Alexander at the request of Aristotle allowed the restoration of Stageiros, τὰ δὲ Στάγειρα κώμη τῆς Ὀλυνθίας ἦν. Cf. Plut. *Alex.*, 7; Ael. *Var. His.*, XII, 54. This may be a mistake but it is noteworthy that Aristotle was born in 384 just when the Chalcidians were extending their power in the peninsula and even in Macedon. Probably Stageiros became one of the members of the league at that time. If it is true that it had a Chalcidian element in its population, this is not at all unlikely. We know moreover that Aristotle had relations in Olynthos. Callisthenes, born about 360, the historian of Alexander's court, was his nephew or cousin and an Olynthian by birth. If the city was destroyed by Philip, we have additional evidence that it belonged to the league in the time of Philip. Strabo definitely states that it was Chalcidian and we may assume not that it was a Chalcidian settlement primarily, although with perhaps some Chalcidian elements, but that it later became a member of the κοινὸν τῶν Χαλκιδέων.

Political union was by no means unknown to the Greeks at the time when the Chalcidic league came into existence in 432. It had already appeared in various forms. For religious political unions the Greeks had their Amphictyonic leagues. Sparta had her loose but effective Peloponnesian Confederacy and Athens her Delian Empire. These were none of them entirely satisfactory. The bond of union was either too weak or too artificial to be permanently effective; and this condition of affairs naturally resulted in the employment of force against the unwilling and dissatisfied members. Still another form of political union was found in Boeotia. Although even here coercion was at times necessary to maintain the existence of the Boeotian State, the ties binding the members together were real ones and in large part dependent upon lasting community of interests. Thebes, moreover, did not have so powerful a control over the other Boeotian cities as did Sparta and Athens over their followers. Thus the relations of the states participating in the Boeotian league more nearly approached equality and for that reason it tended to be more stable. A further and more primitive form of union was to be found in Attica, viz., the synoecism. This had proved so strong that all thought of the original component elements had been lost. A city had been formed and not a federal state. The primitive *κοινόν* of the Aetolians may be used as another type. In this the tie was racial. Thus we see that race, natural geographical boundaries, necessity, policy, and fear, all played their part in bringing about union among the Greeks.

Which of these forces or what combination of them was active in bringing about union among the Chalcidians and what was the form of union produced? According to the ordinary view the city of Chalcis founded many colonies upon the peninsula jutting out from the Thracian coast and these colonies, as it would seem, maintained, throughout their existence, a consciousness of their common origin and relationship. So numerous were these colonies and so strong was this feeling of kinship that the place in which they were settled has become known as Chalcidicè. Even with conditions favourable for union, it was impossible for the Chalcidians to accomplish anything in that line so long as Athens kept a firm hand upon the reins and held them

as tributaries to the Athenian league. All early attempts at union, however small, proved futile. We find traces of such a primitive union in the early coins, in Herodotos, and perhaps in the quota lists, but under Athenian supremacy every effort was made to resolve this union into its elements. Freedom from Athens was necessary for union and conversely union was necessary for the maintenance of this freedom. Aside from Athenian opposition, however, nothing stood in the way. The Chalcidians were of the same race and were engaged in similar pursuits.

The revolt of Potidaea and the encouragement and support offered by Perdiccas gave the Chalcidians the very opportunity they needed.² Not content with a mere union of cities, weak because of its excessive division, they decided to dismantle many of their seacoast towns and remove the inhabitants of these towns inland to Olynthos or to a place to be loaned them by Perdiccas. In this we see that the Chalcidians recognized the value of synoecism and were determined to make use of it as a foundation for their nascent state. Their purpose, however, was not to create a city state nor to make the position of Olynthos in Chalcidicè analagous to that of Athens in Attica. This is made plainly evident by the history of the league in the early years of the fourth century. Cities and towns were then incorporated in the Chalcidic *κοινόν* without losing their corporate individuality. The same thing is shown just as clearly in the fact that the name given to the state was not that of the city, Olynthos, but that of the race. Inscriptions, coins, and Thucydides prove that the state was officially known as the *κοινόν* of the Chalcidians on the borders of Thrace.

It is clear, however, that Demosthenes believed the league to be in reality Olynthos.³ With one exception he always speaks of the Olynthians, never even mentioning the Chalcidians.⁴ The explanation is simple. He has confused the synoecism of Olyn-

² Thuc. I, 58ff.

³ Dem. XIX, 263ff. This passage speaks of the strength of the Chalcidic league, calling it Olynthos.

⁴ *Ibid.* The phrase οὕτω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἓν συνωκισμένων shows that he confounds the city with the league.

thos with the formation of the state and has given Olynthos a position in Chalcidicè similar to that of Athens in Attica. This, however, is not borne out by the facts we know concerning the league. The analogy of Athens applies only in a very limited degree. None but seacoast towns, and these of no great size, participated in the synoecism. Therefore, if the formation of the Chalcidic state had confined itself to these, there could have been no valid reason for choosing the more general term, Chalcidian, in preference to the name of the city to which the strength of the small seacoast towns had been added. From the words of Thucydides,⁵ moreover, we infer that there were Chalcidic towns inland and from the history of the league and from the use of the name Chalcidian we see that these inland towns also were members of the *κοινόν*. Stolos, a town of approximately half the importance of Olynthos before the war, is perhaps the most noteworthy example of a Chalcidian inland town, not destroyed, but still a member of the newly formed state. Hence one can say that Demosthenes is wrong in describing the formation of the Chalcidic state as a synoecism. It was more than that.

We must now inquire as to the manner in which this union was perfected and what were the principles upon which it was based. We have noticed before that the Chalcidians were conscious of a racial unity and that this was one of the factors which tended to promote political unity among the Greeks. Our typical example of a league in which the ethnical element exerted a powerful influence for unification is that of Aetolia. The Aetolian league, however, in its early stages was not a union of cities but rather a federation of clans, dwelling in small and unimportant villages. Thus if we accept the traditional view as to the origin of the Chalcidians we cannot consider the Aetolian league analogous to the *κοινόν* of the Chalcidians, for the Chalcidians had reached a higher degree of civilization and were settled in cities, each with its own highly developed political life and its feeling of independence.

If then we are to find an early analogy in Greek history, we must look for it in some union of city states. Of the unions we

⁵ Thuc. I, 58.

have mentioned, the Peloponnesian and Delian leagues and the Boeotian state are yet to be considered. The first was not a state in any sense of the word but merely a loose organization. The Delian league, or in its later form, the Athenian Empire, was practically an hegemony in which Athens was the center and held the executive power. In its developed form, it was composed of cities bound to Athens by separate treaties and owing allegiance to Athens and not to the league. Such a position for Olynthos among the Chalcidians is scarcely conceivable. Such a union results not in the formation of a state but in that of an empire. In an empire, however, centrifugal tendencies are always apparent, and these must be counteracted by the superior force of the hegemonic state. With such tendencies at work stability is almost impossible to maintain. If the rule is mild and just, a gradual loosening of the bonds takes place, resulting finally in a loose confederation as in the second Athenian empire. If, however, the rule is autocratic, discontent will break out and rebellions are bound to occur, as happened in the first Athenian empire. Stability was one of the most noticeable qualities of the Chalcidic league and for this reason it seems best to look elsewhere for the pattern of the Chalcidian constitution. In considering the question of the confederation of Greek cities, one must constantly keep in mind the universal attitude of the Greeks towards the city state, and one must always expect to find in the various cities of any league a reactionary party, favouring separation and city autonomy. Hence it is remarkable that this party in the cities of the Chalcidic league was of no greater consequence. Only once did it show its head, and then only for a short time under the influence of external pressure and in cities that had been recently united with the league. This happened in the year 382, at the time when Peloponnesian troops entered the Chalcidic peninsula for the purpose of breaking up the power of the *κοινόν*⁶. Success, however, was only temporary. In a few years' time the league regained all that it had lost. This recuperative power of the Chalcidian state proves its stability and shows that it was based upon sound political principles. Equal-

⁶ See Chap. X.

ity and some form of states rights are thus to be looked for in the Chalcidic constitution.

As our sources give us little direct knowledge concerning the organization of the Chalcidic league, it is advisable to make use of the principle of analogy as far as possible. The constitution of Boeotia at the time of the Peloponnesian War may be taken as the general type of a confederation, embodying the principles of equality and of states rights. Local city autonomy and proportional representation were two important elements in this constitution.⁷ Now Xenophon tells us that the cities of the Chalcidic league used the same laws and had sympolity⁸ or in other words, were members of one state. From this statement of Xenophon that the Chalcidic state was composed of cities using the same law, we may infer that local administration was entrusted to the cities, as in Boeotia, but was carried out in accordance with principles laid down by the state itself. The words of the Acanthian envoys at Sparta state this in a different way, *viz.*, from the standpoint of the cities that refused to join the league. The reason given for this refusal is that they wished to use their own ancestral laws and to be *αὐτοπολῖται*. Included in this body of common law in common use among all the cities of the league we find *ἐπιγαμία* and *ἐγκτησις παρ' ἀλλήλοις*, *i. e.*, *connubium* and *commercium*. This clearly amounts to the establishment of a national citizenship.

There can be no doubt that the *πόλις* still remained the unit of administration, even though its sphere was more limited than that of the city in the later leagues, *e. g.*, Arcadian, Aetolian, and Achaean, or than that of the state in the constitution of the United States. Xenophon's description of the principles upon which the Chalcidic league was based is so very cursory that it is impossible to tell within what limits the local city government was restricted. The use of common laws, however, does not necessarily mean that there was no freedom of action in city affairs. The constitution of the United States makes certain things obligatory upon each of the states and requires of them constitutions

⁷ *Hell. Oxyrhynch.*, *Oxon.*, Chap. 11. For a discussion of the Boeotian constitution see Bonner, *Cl. Ph.*, 1910, Vol. V, 405-417.

⁸ *Xen. Hell.*, V, 2, 12, 14, 19.

conforming to a certain general type, and yet there remains to them a large amount of freedom in the choice of details. One can still say of the people of the United States, in the words of Xenophon, that they are using common laws. Some such arrangement as this probably existed among the cities of the Chalcidic κοινόν. The constitutions of the many πόλεις were made to conform to a certain type, beyond which there was a field, large or small, in which their autonomy was not restricted. In this way then the constitution of Boeotia seems to have been followed, either consciously or otherwise, by the Chalcidian statesmen in organizing their newly formed state.

When several city states unite to form a federation, the question immediately comes up, what shall be the executive and law making bodies, how they shall be composed and what shall be the method of representation. For one educated in a Greek πόλις and imbued with the idea that the citizen body alone has the right to make the laws, it is difficult to conceive of government by duly elected plenipotentiary representatives. Two ways were ordinarily used by the leagues to free them from this difficulty. In the more loosely organized, the acts passed by the council of delegates were afterwards ratified κατὰ πόλεις. In the later confederations, except perhaps the Achaean, a primary assembly passed upon all important measures. In this all citizens who were present might cast their votes. Here, however, the voting was usually by cities, each city casting one ballot. The first method caused delay and was unsatisfactory. The second was unwieldy and gave an undue influence to the smaller cities and the richer citizens, who alone could afford to attend the meetings of the assembly, especially if it was held at a distance from their home towns. Both of these methods were theoretically democratic, giving to the people the ultimate control of affairs.

The Boeotians, however, proverbially stupid as they were, used neither of these methods. Their senate or Boulè was purely elective and representative, and to it and the Boeotarchs was entrusted practically sovereign power. The Boeotians had found a substitute for the national primary assembly and for the referendum. Boeotia, moreover, was divided into constituencies and

each of these was represented in the national assembly in proportion to its size and importance. Thus we find in Boeotia the forerunner of the modern parliament. While the Achaean and Aetolian leagues were essentially democratic and embodied democratic principles in their constitution, Boeotia was a limited aristocracy; and it is to this difference that we must look for an explanation of the fact that the sovereign assemblies of the first were primary, and that of Boeotia representative.

Unfortunately our sources for the Chalcidic league are so scanty that it is impossible to tell how closely its constitution followed that of Boeotia. The relations existing between the two states were from the beginning friendly ones. Before the Peloponnesian War, Boeotia was as hostile to Athens as were the Chalcidians and we have seen how the latter at various times, sought alliance with the Boeotians. Their interests were common during the first years of the war. After the treaty of 421 and the ensuing alliance between Athens and Sparta, Chalcidian ambassadors endeavoured to draw Boeotia into a coalition with Corinth and Argos, but this attempt failed, not so much because of unwillingness on the part of the Boeotians as because of a misunderstanding of the Lacedaemonian position.⁹ In the following years Boeotia was again with the Chalcidians in their hostility towards Athens. Later during the Corinthian War the two were in alliance,¹⁰ and again in 382 attempts were made to cement more closely the friendship of the two peoples.¹¹ This, however, was forestalled by the Spartan attack upon the Cadmeon. Thus we see that the relations existing between the Chalcidians and the Boeotians were very close indeed. It is worth while, moreover, to note that the Athenian oligarchs at the time of their supremacy in 411 set up a constitution in Athens modelled in certain particulars after that of Boeotia. This goes to show the high regard in which the Boeotian constitution was held. Thus, inasmuch as we know that Boeotia and the Chalcidians were on very friendly terms indeed and since the Boeotian constitution served as a model to be copied by the moderate aristocratical gov-

⁹ See Chap. VIII.

¹⁰ See Chap. IX.

¹¹ See Chap. X.

ernment of Athens, we will not be surprised if we find resemblances in the constitution of the aristocratic Chalcidian state to the contemporary constitution of Boeotia. It has already been mentioned that both states were confederations of cities. It remains to be shown that the government of the Chalcidians was aristocratic.

Boeotia, as we have seen, was governed by a mild form of aristocracy. This government made use of the principles of proportional representation, which is to be explained, perhaps, by the fact that representative institutions are more in accord with an aristocratic form of government than with a democratic one. The reason for this is that the citizen body is more homogeneous. Its interests, therefore, are common; its political and commercial views are more likely to be harmonious; and the chances are that the opinions of any given number of individuals will coincide with those of the citizen body as a whole. Hence there can be but little objection to a representative assembly. Wherever the interests of the individual coincide with those of the community to which he belongs, the community will have little hesitation in allowing any collection of members to represent it. In a democracy one always finds the *demos* in opposition to the few. Their interests are not the same and for this reason delegation of power to individuals is by no means so satisfactory.

Even before the time of the formation of the Chalcidic league, political theorists were beginning to feel that the pure democracy of Athens was not the best possible form of government. People were realizing the unreliability of the *demos* in political affairs, and thinkers of the time were turning their minds towards a consideration of the advantages of aristocracy. Scarcely a writer, except the Athenian orators, had a favourable opinion to express concerning democracy. Even in Athens, the very bulwark of democracy, this aristocratic tendency was strong. Distrust of the *demos* is shown only too clearly in the pseudo-Xenophontic Constitution of Athens and in the oligarchic revolution of 411.¹²

It is not surprising, then, that the Chalcidians adopted a limited form of aristocracy at the time of their revolt from Athens.

¹² Cf. Beloch, *Att. Pol.*, p. 11.

That they did this is not directly stated in any ancient authority, but several considerations lead one to this conclusion. First of all there is the natural supposition that a revolt from Athens would be followed by a change in government from democracy to aristocracy. Various passages in Thucydides¹³ show plainly that this was the general tendency and that, on the one hand, Sparta encouraged the movement and, on the other, that the oligarchically minded were almost universally those who desired separation from Athens and alliance with the Lacedaemonians. In the second place, while we have no definite evidence as to what happened in the Chalcidic state, there are plain indications that the aristocrats of the neighbouring cities worked in harmony with the Chalcidians and that revolt from Athens was followed by a change in the government of the revolting cities. When Brasidas came into Chalcidicè, it was at the invitation of the Chalcidians and of Chalcidian partizans in the neighbouring cities.¹⁴ When he made his attempt to win over Acanthos, Thucydides tells us that there was a stasis in the city between the demos and those who, together with the Chalcidians, had invited Brasidas to come to their assistance.¹⁵ From the speech of Brasidas it is evident that the division was upon the question of democracy versus aristocracy.¹⁶ This is also clear from the fact that it was the "few" who were opposed to the demos. Acanthos finally revolted and allied herself closely with the Chalcidians. At Toronè and Scionè there was the same feeling,¹⁷ but from the troubles at Mendè we can see best how affairs stood in the rest of the peninsula.¹⁸ The oligarchs, either by force or persuasion, brought about the revolt, and forced the democrats to act contrary to their wishes. After the revolt, however, the stasis continued and finally the demos rose against the Peloponnesian commander and the oligarchic party. Opening the gates of the city the people handed it over to the attacking Athenian forces. Because of this they were treated with clemency by Athens and were allowed to

¹³ Thuc. I, 19; III, 82.

¹⁴ Thuc. IV, 79.

¹⁵ Thuc. IV, 84.

¹⁶ Thuc. IV, 86.

¹⁷ Thuc. IV, 110.

¹⁸ Thuc. IV, 123, 130.

bring to trial the oligarchs who had been the cause of the revolt. In no other case was such clemency shown. It is distinctly stated, moreover, that the old constitution was restored. Thus it is clear, that in Mendè, at least, an oligarchic or aristocratic constitution had been set up at the time of the revolt. We may consider this a typical example of the course of events in the other cities of that region. First the oligarchic party, aided from without, and working with the Chalcidians, forced the city to withdraw from the Athenian alliance. After this had been accomplished, the next step was the formation of an aristocratic government. We have evidence that this was done in Mendè and the supposition is strong that Brasidas established aristocracies, when he reorganized the constitutions of the cities newly acquired by him.¹⁹ Taking into consideration all these facts, we are forced to come to the conclusion that the oligarchic party in the cities of the Chalcidic peninsula, working at the suggestion of the Chalcidians, in reorganizing the constitution, merely followed the example set at the time of the establishment of the Chalcidic league, and conversely, that the Chalcidians adopted an aristocratic form of government at the beginning.

To the question, what were the qualifications for full citizenship, we can only give a probable answer. In Boeotia a property qualification had been established,²⁰ with probably a hoplite census as the lowest limit. Certain considerations lead us to believe that in the Chalcidic state, likewise, the possession of a certain definite amount of property carried with it, *ceteris paribus*, the rights and duties of citizenship, and that the same limit, *viz.*, the hoplite census, was adopted. The aristocratic government founded by the Chalcidians must have been a moderate one. Otherwise its stability could not have been maintained as successfully as it was during the many periods of disturbance through which the Chalcidians passed. A limited aristocratic form of government of this nature does not differ radically from a democracy and satisfies all except the lowest classes, those who, having little at stake, are lacking in that sense of responsibility which is so necessary a qualification for good citizenship.

¹⁹ Thuc. IV, 107, 116. .

²⁰ Cf. Bonner, *Cl. Ph.*, 1910, p. 407.

In a Greek state, where citizen soldiery was the rule and mercenaries the exception, service in the army played a much more important part than at present; and ability to take part in the protection of the state was a more necessary qualification for citizenship. Those that could not provide themselves with a suit of hoplite armour were neither able to fulfill the chief duty of the citizen, nor had they sufficient at stake to be entrusted with the responsibilities of government. Thus the citizens of the state, in the first instance, were those who had something to protect and could share in its protection. In the fifth century Boeotian citizenship was based upon these principles, and in Athens²¹ at the time of the overthrow of the Four Hundred, they were further employed for the selection of the Five Thousand. Thus it would be not at all strange if the moderate aristocracy in Chalcidicè should adopt them as a part of its constitution. For evidence we must go to Demosthenes who gives us some figures for the Chalcidic league at the time of Philip.²² In speaking of the strength of Olynthos, he says that the Olynthians were in all more than ten thousand in number, and had a body of one thousand horse. It is evident from the context that this refers to the fighting strength of the town; and yet the wording would imply that the number of citizens is meant. This would go to show that our previous suggestions were correct, and that the citizen body was coextensive with the army. Now the proportion between hoplites and cavalry was ten to one in the Boeotian army and we have every reason for supposing that the Chalcidians used approximately the same ratio.²³ Thus Demosthenes is probably speaking of the hoplite levy. We have just seen that the citizen body was limited to approximately ten or eleven thousand, and since this was probably the number of the hoplites, we can not be far wrong in assuming that citizenship was possessed only by those who could provide themselves with hoplite equipment.

In this passage of Demosthenes, Olynthos is credited with the impossible number of 11,000 of hoplite census. The total levy

²¹ Thuc. VIII, 97.

²² Dem. XIX, 266.

²³ Cf. note 30, Chap. XV.

of Boeotia early in the fourth century was only 11,000 hoplites and 1,100 cavalry.²⁴ Taking this into consideration and also the fact that Demosthenes almost invariably speaks not of the Chalcidians but of the Olynthians when he is patently referring to the whole state, we are forced to the conclusion that the numbers given in this passage are applicable not to Olynthos but to the *κοινόν* itself. One more reference is to be considered. Theopompus²⁵ tells us that eight hundred Macedonian *ἐταῖροι* possessed as much land as ten thousand Greeks, *τοὺς τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ πλείστην χώραν κекτημένους*. It has been suggested and with good reason that this is a reference to the Chalcidic confiscations after the destruction of Olynthos and the other cities of the league. The wording may be significant. The Greeks mentioned were those that held the best and the most land, that is to say, the richest. The others were not taken into consideration. It is noteworthy that the numbers given by Demosthenes and Theopompus are approximately the same and we may assume that the ten thousand of the latter were the full citizens of the league, those who held sufficient property to make up the required census and to be enrolled in the army as hoplites. This is additional evidence in support of our interpretation of Demosthenes.²⁶

We have shown to all probability that the Chalcidic state was aristocratic and that either unconsciously or consciously in this it had followed that principle on which the Boeotian constitution was based. In Boeotia, moreover, we have seen that there was a logical connection between the moderate form of aristocracy and the principles of representation expressed in the formation of its national assembly. Inasmuch as the Chalcidic state had similar problems to face, being a union of Greek cities, homo-

²⁴ *Hell. Oxyrhynch*, Chap. 11. Eleven thousand is too great a number for Olynthos alone and would be more nearly what we would expect from the league as a whole.

²⁵ Theop. frg. 217b; Cf. Koehler, *Sitz.-ber. d. Berlin. Akad.*, 1891, pp. 473 ff. In Diod. XXXII, 4, Olynthos is called *πόλις μυριάδρος*.

²⁶ Only once does Demosthenes use the term Chalcidian (XIX, 263). This is a difficult passage. It speaks of the strength of Olynthos at the time of the Spartan invasion in 382 and says that the synoecism of the Chalcidians had not yet taken place. This is a confusion of the city with the league and places Olynthos and the Chalcidic territory in an analogous position to that of Athens and Attica.

geneous in race, civilization, government, and economic life, it would not be strange if it had followed the example of its southern ally and had formed its national assembly or Boulè by means of a system of proportional representation. For a centralized government of any wide territorial extent, primary assemblies are unsatisfactory; and such assemblies, moreover, are in accord with democratic rather than aristocratic principles.

Unfortunately, however, the constitution of the κοινόν can be made out only in its broadest outline. As to the details of organization, we are left in almost complete ignorance and can only make suggestions here and there. One would like to know whether the Chalcidians had the political acumen to recognize the fitness of a representative assembly for their peculiar conditions. Likewise it would be interesting to learn more of their legislative and administrative bodies. A chance remark of Theopompos tells of a Boulè of the Olynthians.²⁷ This, in all probability, refers to the assembly or the Boulè of the κοινόν, inasmuch as the question concerns a prisoner of war. Even so, from such a statement no information can be gained. Concerning offices of the state we have again as little knowledge. Euthyrates and Lasthenes held the military post of Hipparch.²⁸ On the Chalcidic coins we have the names of a number of magistrates, but what the magistracy was or what duties fell to its lot it is impossible to say.²⁹

Finally a summary of the rights of the central government will be advantageous for our discussion. All foreign relations were in its charge, the making of treaties and alliances, and the appointment of ambassadors and proxenoi.³⁰ It also had control of exports and imports.³¹ From Thucydides we see that the army was centralized. Coinage also was under the control of the central government. Thus there was a national and not a

²⁷ Theop. frg. 139.

²⁸ Hyp. frg. 76; Dem. IX, 66. Demosthenes here confuses the Olynthians with the Chalcidians. The hipparch would naturally be an officer of the state and not of the city. Hyperides makes the same mistake. Heraclides (*F. H. G.*, II, 222) tells us that no one was allowed to become a Chalcidian magistrate or ambassador until he had reached the age of fifty years.

²⁹ *B. M. C. Maced.*, pp. 66ff., nos. 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 25.

³⁰ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77, 121; *I. G.*, II, 17; Thuc. IV, 78-79, 83.

³¹ Ditt. *Syll.*,² 77.

city coinage. The admission of new members was likewise controlled by the state under uniform regulations. We may even assume that a national court existed, although Demosthenes with his usual metonymy, speaks of the Olynthian court in this connection.³² At least we know from Aristotle that there were federal laws concerning murder and inheritance.³³ This is the best confirmation of Xenophon³⁴ that the Chalcidians had a common body of law, and it shows to what extent the centralization had been developed. The fact that *ἐγκτησις* and *ἐπιγαμία παρ' ἀλλήλοις* were allowed suggests that the laws concerning property and marriage were also under state control.

Thus the Chalcidic state was, in its elements, a union of cities, but a union so close and centralized that it approached very near to the territorial state in form, such as Great Britain or Canada for example. Its government was stable and aristocratic, and the league, although beset with vicissitudes, showed so great and inherent a power of resiliency as can only be found in a state based not only upon justice and equality, but also upon sound political principles.

³² Dem. IX, 56, 66.

³³ Arist. *Pol.*, II, 12, 14. Androdamas of Rhegium, otherwise unknown, was the *νομοθέτης* for the Chalcidians.

³⁴ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 12; 19.

CHAPTER XV

POPULATION OF THE CHALCIDIC PENINSULA

The base of the Chalcidic peninsula during the fifth century was fringed with Greek settlements. The country inland had not been developed to any great extent; but the three promontories had offered themselves to the Euboeans as places suitable for colonization. Eretrian colonies were planted on Pallènè and later on Actè, and the land of the Sithonians, or Sithonia, was chosen by the Chalcidians.¹ On the eastern coast Andrian colonies found a home for themselves.² In the west the Bottiaeans had settled, after having been driven out from their original home on the Thermaic gulf.³ The colonists, however, seem to have kept fairly close to the sea. There the land was fertile and the harbours were good, while the interior was more or less hilly and covered with heavy forests. It was not until the time of the Persian wars that the Chalcidians obtained possession of Olynthos. Before that time the Bottiaeans had held the city and the adjacent territory.⁴

That the mainland at the time of the Peloponnesian War was relatively sparsely settled can be seen from an inspection of the Attic tribute lists. The area of the mainland is approximately three times as great as that of the three peninsulas, and yet it paid only one third as much tribute.⁵ No city, moreover, at the base of the peninsula was large enough to pay the small sum of four talents, while upon Pallènè alone there were cities paying six, eight, and fifteen talents. Finally, if the country had been

¹ Strabo, VII, 329, frg. 11; X, 447, 8.

² Strabo, VII, 330, frg. 31; Thuc. IV, 84, 88, 103. Andros was at an early date an Eretrian possession. When Eretria began to decline Andros sent out her colonies.

³ Hdt. VII, 123, 127; VIII, 127; Thuc. II, 99.

⁴ Hdt. VIII, 127.

⁵ *J. G.*, I, 242-244.

at all developed, Perdiccas could not have thrown open to Chalcidic settlement a large tract of land south of Lake Bolbè.⁶ The reason for the scarcity of towns in the interior of Chalcidicè is not hard to find. Pallenè, Sithonia, and the shores of the mainland were capable of supporting a large population. The Greeks, moreover, preferred the seacoast for the purposes of commerce. Their settlements were thus placed wherever they could find good harbours. It was only as time went on that the Greek population spread into the fertile territory inland. Before the Peloponnesian War, as we have seen, this movement towards the interior had taken place only to a small degree. However, when the seacoast towns were destroyed and the inhabitants moved to Olynthos and to the region in Mygdonia, given to them by Perdiccas, the development of the "Hinterland" commenced. Later, the capture of Potidaea in 429 and that of Seionè in 420 placed a large number of the inhabitants of these towns in a position where it was necessary for them to seek new homes. Without doubt many of them settled in the sparsely settled Chalcidic territory.⁷

Beloch has estimated the number of the citizens of the whole Chalcidic peninsula at about twenty-five thousand at the time of the revolt in 432.⁸ This number seems to be excessively large for that period. Attica at the time of her greatest prosperity had only about ten thousand more. Beloch has based his figures, in part, upon those given by Xenophon and Demosthenes for a much later date.⁹ According to this estimate Olynthos alone had five thousand citizens. This number is manifestly far too great for the period of the Peloponnesian War. For the three small peninsulas Pallenè, Sithonia, and Actè, we can accept Beloch's figures as more nearly correct, since they are based upon contemporary evidence. Beloch estimates that Pallenè had approximately seven thousand citizens; but this number is but two thousand more than he ascribes to the city of Olynthos alone. Pal-

⁶ Thuc. I, 58.

⁷ Thuc. II, 70; IV, 123. The women and children of Seionè had been conveyed to Olynthos for safety at the time of the revolt.

⁸ Beloch, *Bevölkerung d. Griech. Rom. Welt*, pp. 202-206.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* V, 2, 14; 3, 1; Dem. XIX, 263-266.

lenè, however, had four cities, each of which paid more tribute than Olynthos, and the total tribute of Pallenè was fifteen or twenty times as great as that of Olynthos. It is evident that a city paying only two talents tribute can not support a population five-sevenths as great as the combined population of other neighbouring cities which pay thirty to forty talents.¹⁰ Five thousand, moreover, for the combined forces of Apollonia and Acanthos is equally preposterous.¹¹ Apollonia was not yet in existence, or, if so, was of no size nor importance,¹² and Acanthos, judging from the tribute lists again, was about as large as Olynthos.¹³ For the peninsulas Beloch has worked out a ratio between the amount of tribute paid and the number of citizens in any given city or territory. The conditions could not have been so very different in the base of the Chalcidic peninsula and approximately the same ratio ought to hold good for both. This ratio, however, Beloch has failed to use for the mainland. According to this ratio the thirty-five or forty talents tribute of Pallenè was paid by a citizen body of about six or seven thousand. Sithonia,¹⁴ paying about fifteen talents, would then have from two thousand five hundred to three thousand citizens, and one thousand more were found in Actè. Thus for the three peninsulas we obtain the rough average of from five to five and

¹⁰ The amount varied from year to year as the following table shows:

Potidaea	15 T.	436	<i>I. G. I.</i> , 244.
"	6 T.	438	" 242.
Seionè	9 T.	427	" 259.
"	4 T.	428	" 256.
"	15 T.	438	" 242.
"	6 T.	443	" 237.
Mendè	8 T.	437-428	" 243-256.
Aphytis	3 T.	428	" 256.
"	1 T.(?)	438	" 242.

¹¹ From the cavalry estimate in Xenophon, *Hell.*, V, 2, 14 and 3, 1, Beloch assumes that Apollonia and Acanthos together were about equal to Olynthos. *Op. cit.*, p. 205.

¹² See note 17, Chap. IX.

¹³ The tribute of Acanthos in 427-6 was three talents. *I. G.*, I, 259.

¹⁴ Sermylia	4½ T.	437	<i>I. G.</i> , I, 243.
"	1 T.	430(?)	" 255.
Toronè	6 T.	428	" 256.
"	12 T.	427	" 259.
Singos	3 T.	438	" 242.
"	2 T.	437	" 243.
"	1 T.	436	" 244.

one-half talents per one thousand citizens. We may use this as a basis for attacking the problem of the population in the rest of the Chalcidic peninsula. Conditions were very similar so that the results obtained by using this ratio, up to a certain degree of accuracy, will be correct. The whole base of the peninsula paid about eighteen talents tribute, about a third as much as Pallènè, Sithonia, and Actè combined.¹⁵ The citizen body of these three peninsulas numbered about eleven thousand. Using our ratio then, we may assume that the remainder of the peninsula held no more than four thousand citizens. If we include northern Sithonia with the cities Singos and Sermylia we must add one thousand to this number.¹⁶ This is in accord with what has just been said concerning the sparsely settled condition of the greater part of that region. The hills and the woods and the distance from the sea acted as a hindrance to dense settlement. We may conclude, therefore, that, both relatively and absolutely, there were no towns of any size upon the mainland.

Five thousand citizens in a country such as Chalcidicè would be able to maintain about two thousand hoplites.¹⁷ How does this compare with what we know of the forces of the Chalcidians and their neighbours? Taking part in the expedition against Arrhibaeos there were three thousand Greek hoplites.¹⁸

¹⁵ Aineia	3 T.	428	<i>I. G.</i> , I, 256.
Acanthos	3 T.	428	" 256.
Spartolos	3 ¹ / ₁₂ T.	436	" 244.
Olynthos	2 T.	438	" 242.
Mecyperna	1 T.	436	" 244.
Stolos	1 T.	437	" 243.
Strepsa	1 T.	437	" 243.

The smaller towns of this region contributed together three or four talents more.

¹⁶ I have included Singos and Sermylia in this discussion for the sake of completeness. These two cities were at this time members of the Chalcidian league and their military levies were a part of the Chalcidian forces. Thus when we speak of Chalcidian hoplites or peltasts we have to reckon with contingents from all of the members of the league.

¹⁷ Of five thousand citizens about 90% ordinarily would be subject to military service. The ratio between hoplites and light armed soldiers is approximately 43-57. Thus of five thousand citizens, four thousand five hundred are enrolled in the army. Of these four thousand five hundred nearly two thousand are able to supply themselves with the heavy armour of a hoplite. Cf. Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, pp. 53-54 and p. 25.

¹⁸ Thuc. IV, 124. The Chalcidians also sent a body of cavalry upon this expedition.

These were Peloponnesians, Greeks settled in Macedonia, Chalcidians, Acanthians, and others *κατὰ πόλεις*. We may assume that, of these, about one thousand were from the Peloponnese under Brasidas. He had brought with him about seventeen hundred but had detached some for garrison duty.¹⁹ Five hundred he had left for the protection of Scionè and Mendè under the command of Polydamidas.²⁰ Macedonia probably furnished one thousand and Chalcidicè the other. The expedition was Macedonian and one would expect to find that the Macedonian contingent formed a large part of the whole. The Chalcidians, moreover, would send only a part of their troops away for foreign service. A little later, at the time of the battle at Amphipolis, nearly two thousand hoplites were present.²¹ The Macedonian contingent was absent, and this fact explains why the number was smaller. Of these two thousand, perhaps one-half came from the Chalcidic peninsula. There is no reason for thinking that Brasidas did not have with him all of the available Peloponnesian forces, probably about one thousand hoplites, and hence we must conclude that the native hoplite forces made up about half of the whole number. Thus in both expeditions there was a body of about one thousand hoplites from the Chalcidic state, Acanthos, and the neighbouring allied cities. It is not to be expected, however, that these cities would put into the field, for such expeditions away from home, more than half of their full strength. Beloch shows us that the age for military service in the field was between twenty and fifty years and that youths between eighteen and twenty and men between fifty and sixty were reserved for garrison duty. He estimates that 63 per cent of the males over eighteen years were between twenty and fifty years of age.²² Thus out of two thousand hoplites about twelve hundred might have been with Brasidas. Probably, however, the full levy was not called out. Cities on the western coast would

¹⁹ Thuc. IV, 78.

²⁰ Thuc. IV, 123.

²¹ Thuc. V, 6. We have assumed one thousand as the number of the Macedonian contingent in the first expedition, because of the fact that at Amphipolis where that contingent was absent the hoplite forces numbered approximately one thousand less.

²² Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, pp. 53f, and p. 163.

be loath to send a large proportion of their forces to Amphipolis. The Chalcidians needed soldiers to protect themselves against surprise from Pallènè and Sithonia. On the other hand full quotas from Acanthos and Amphipolis were probably with Brasidas on this occasion. Thus, knowing that the population of the base of Chalcidicè was large enough to support about two thousand hoplites, we are not surprised when we find one-half of this number under Brasidas in the Macedonian expedition and at Amphipolis. Besides the hoplite forces at Amphipolis, there was a body of three hundred Greek horse and one thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts.²³ In Greek warfare, it must be remembered, a man's property determined whether he should serve as a horseman, a hoplite, or as a light armed soldier, and in an army serving πανδημεί the usual ratio between light and heavy armed troops was about 57-43.²⁴ In this ratio the cavalry is included among the heavy armed troops, inasmuch as the horsemen came from the richest class in the state. At Amphipolis, as we have seen, there were about thirteen hundred of hoplite census, not counting the troops of Brasidas. Of the other class, there were one thousand Chalcidians and Myrcinians. Of these probably not many came from Myrcinus. Thus the Chalcidian peltasts were about eight hundred in number. Of the hoplites and the cavalry, probably, not more than one-half were Chalcidians, making about six hundred in all.²⁵ Our ratio would therefore be eight hundred light armed troops to six hundred hoplites and cavalry. This, however, is almost equal to the ratio given above, 57-43.

²³ Thuc. V, 6.

²⁴ Cf. note 17.

²⁵ By this time Sermylia and Singes had probably enrolled themselves in the Chalcidian league. With these two cities the Chalcidians could easily have furnished as many troops as the rest of the peninsula. The other half came from the Bottiaeans, Acanthians, Argilians, Amphipolitans and other cities. At this time Mendè had renewed its allegiance to Athens. Toronè had been recaptured and Scionè was in a state of siege. In the Macedonian expedition small contingents from Toronè and from Actè may have been included. On the other hand the levies from the cities in the eastern part of Chalcidicè were probably greater at the battle of Amphipolis. Thus the two counter-balance one another. It is to be noted also that at the time of the Macedonian expedition 300 Chalcidian peltasts were acting as a garrison for Mendè and that Chalcidian horsemen were serving with the Macedonian cavalry. Thuc. IV, 123f; cf. note 16.

The battle of Amphipolis was a very important one and every effort was made by both sides to increase their armies. Hence we may assume that **all** of the Chalcidian troops that could be spared were with Brasidas. It is not too much to suppose that one-half of the army had been sent on this expedition. One thousand hoplites from the cities at the base of the Chalcidic peninsula is not too large a number for a citizen body of five thousand and fits in with our hypothesis. If then by using Beloch's ratio between tribute and population, we come to the conclusion that the citizens of the cities of the mainland numbered five thousand, and if we gain the same impression from a consideration of the allied troops at Amphipolis and in Macedonia, our estimates can not be very far wrong. Five thousand then is amply sufficient for the period of the Peloponnesian War.²⁶ A citizen body of five thousand represents approximately a population of fifteen thousand, metics and slaves excluded. We can distribute the population approximately as follows. Spartolos which was the chief Bottiaeian city paid a tribute of about three talents. The Bottiaeians then numbered perhaps two thousand. Aineia as we learn from the quota list was about equal in importance to Spartolos and probably had about the same number of inhabitants. The other towns of the western coast paid about three talents in all. Thus we see that about three eighths of the population was centered to the west of the territory held by the Chalcidian league. Olynthos, MeeCyperna, and Stolos with the smaller towns in their neighbourhood paid five or six talents, and probably numbered about four thousand inhabitants. With the Chalcidians we must include MeeCyperna and Singos. Their combined population was perhaps four thousand and more. Another two or three thousand were to be found in Acanthos and the other Andrian settlements on the east coast.²⁷

In the next century conditions were changed. Olynthos, as the capital of a flourishing league, had increased materially. At

²⁶ Beloch estimates the citizen body of the whole peninsula at about twenty-five thousand. My estimate is five thousand for the base of the peninsula, including Sermylia and Singos, and six thousand for Pallènè, Sithonia, and Aetè, not including the two cities of northern Sithonia already mentioned. This makes a total of eleven thousand citizens.

²⁷ Cf. notes 15-16.

the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, before its enlargement, a citizen body of four or five hundred is all that can be assumed for it. This would make it a little village of about two thousand inhabitants, slaves and metics included. By the time of the Spartan invasion in 382, it had grown larger. For this period we have two puzzling statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes. Demosthenes states that the citizen body was five thousand,²⁸ while Xenophon says that it could put into the field eight hundred hoplites and many more peltasts, besides a body of six hundred cavalry.²⁹ According to Demosthenes the cavalry was not more than four hundred in number, but this discrepancy of two hundred is a small matter and need cause us no trouble. How are we to reconcile the five thousand citizens of Demosthenes with the eight hundred hoplites of Xenophon, and is one true and the other false, or are both true?

Xenophon, without exception, makes no distinction between Olynthians and Chalcidians. He always speaks of the Olynthians, even when he is patently referring to the whole body of Chalcidians. Except for the context, we have no means of distinguishing in any given passage whether the word Olynthians refers to the inhabitants of the city alone or whether it has a wider meaning and embraces all of the Chalcidian state. Since we have these two meanings for the term it is not surprising if confusion results. Such carelessness can not fail to lead to faulty interpretation. This is probably what has happened with regard to the passage under discussion. Editors have generally questioned the manuscript reading, thinking that the number eight hundred is far too small. They were unable to reconcile it with the five thousand of Demosthenes, and they felt that the number of the cavalry was too great in proportion to the rest of the army. Are we to reject the figures of Xenophon because they seem too small or are we to analyze them further and see whether they can not readily be explained?

First, let us turn to the eight hundred hoplites with which Olynthos is accredited by Xenophon. No one will question for

²⁸ Dem. XIX, 263.

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 14; 3, 1.

a moment that this is too small a number for the army of the whole Chalcidic state, for if the Chalcidians had had no more than this in 382, the Peloponnesians would not have had such difficulty in conquering them. Editors, moreover, have generally made this assumption and have therefore been forced to question the reading as it stands. If, however, we assume that Xenophon is speaking of the military force of the city of Olynthos alone, we come to an entirely different conclusion, and it is quite unnecessary to suppose that we have a corrupted text. A body of eight hundred hoplites means a city of from six to eight thousand people. This would make the city three or four times as great as it was during the early period of the Peloponnesian War and would give it a reasonable and fairly rapid rate of increase in population. There is then no objection to taking Xenophon's statement as correct and applying it to Olynthos alone.

With regard to the cavalry the case is different. It is worthy of mention here that the raising of horses was one of the important pursuits of the Olynthians, if one may judge from their early coin types; and from this one might expect to find in the army a comparatively large proportion of cavalry.³⁰ This, however, does not seem to be the true explanation. Too much stress can not be laid upon the fact that Xenophon confuses the Olynthians and the Chalcidians. His universal use of the term Olynthians, now in the narrow sense, and now in its wider application, was bound to lead to confusion and to mistakes, even in the mind of the writer. It is not surprising, then, that in one and the same passage he uses it in the two senses. We have seen that his hoplite estimate referred to the city. Evidently he knew no figures for the league as a whole. He did know that, in one engagement, six hundred Chalcidian cavalry took part.³¹ Inasmuch, however, as he did not distinguish between the forces of the league and the city, it was natural for him to connect the six hundred cavalry with the eight hundred hoplites. This he did

³⁰ The theoretical ratio between cavalry and hoplites in the Boeotian army is about 1-10. Cf. Boeotian army at Delion, Thuc. IV, 93; Boeotian levies, *Hell. Oxyrhynchia*, 11, 4; Athenian levies, Thuc. II, 13. The Chalcidian cavalry seems to have followed the Boeotian ratio, for in both countries cavalry seems to have played a rather important part in military operations.

³¹ *Xen. Hell.*, V, 3, 1.

in a more or less rhetorical way; for he says, in the words of Cleigenes, the Acanthian envoy to Sparta, that if the Acanthians and Apollonians should join Olynthos, the combined cavalry would amount to one thousand in number. Xenophon realizes that the number is unduly large compared with that of the hoplite forces, for he seems to place his emphasis upon the cavalry. The whole context of the two passages where Xenophon mentions the Olynthian cavalry and especially the fact that he speaks of the hypothetical addition of the cavalry of Acanthos and Apollonia shows that he is referring to the cavalry levy of the whole Chalcidic κοινόν. To conclude, it is fair to presume that Xenophon has given us the figures as he knew them; but that his lack of knowledge of the political conditions existing in the Chalcidic state and his supposition that the city of Olynthos was the state has caused him to combine two different sets of figures. He knew the hoplite estimates for the city, but not those for the league. In the same way he knew the cavalry estimates for the league, but not for the city. Thus, not realizing that his information was faulty, he combined the two. If the cavalry of the league numbered six hundred, the hoplites probably numbered about six thousand. Assuming then that Xenophon is correct, and that the Chalcidian army mustered six hundred horse and ten times that number of hoplites, let us now consider the figures offered by Demosthenes.³² At a first glance they will seem highly inflated.

He assumes for Olynthos a citizen body of five thousand and a cavalry force of four hundred. The numbers of the cavalry agree nearly enough with those given by Xenophon, and one may assume that Demosthenes, just as Xenophon, is here speaking of the cavalry levy of the Chalcidian league.³³ We must remember that Demosthenes when speaking of the Olynthians is subject to the same inaccuracy which we have detected in Xenophon. He uses the name in both senses and in this case he seems

³² Dem. XIX, 263.

³³ The numbers given by Demosthenes for the cavalry and for the hoplites are only approximately in the ratio of 1-10; but this small divergence need not disturb us. He is writing many years after the occurrences mentioned, and the ratio is not absolutely fixed and unalterable.

to mean the whole body of the Chalcidians, for he goes on to say that the synoecism of the Chalcidians was not entirely complete. He shows by this not only that he was ignorant of the true condition of affairs in the league but also that he confused Olynthos with the league itself. Further proof is unnecessary, for in no other case does he ever speak of the Chalcidians by name, although he refers to their affairs many times. To him the Olynthians are the Chalcidians. If my previous assumption is correct, that a moderate aristocracy was formed in the Chalcidic *κοινόν* and that the citizen body is made up of those possessing a hoplite census, we may assume, from the five thousand citizens of Demosthenes,³⁴ a Chalcidic army of approximately eleven or twelve thousand, of which about five thousand were hoplites and cavalry and the rest peltasts. Considering that it took a Peloponnesian army of ten thousand men to conquer it, one could not expect to find a smaller Chalcidic army. That Olynthos should furnish eight hundred hoplites out of a little more than four thousand is not surprising; but it is scarcely conceivable that there were five thousand citizens of the town at this time. It is improbable that a town of two thousand inhabitants, as it was in 432, should have become in 380 a city of at least forty thousand.³⁵ Beloch has recognized the confusion shown by Demosthenes between the part and the whole, that is to say, between Olynthos and the league, but he has failed to see that in this case Demosthenes was perfectly consistent with himself and is referring both to the citizen body of the league and to the cavalry of

³⁴ In this passage he is speaking of the strength of the Chalcidians. He says that they only possessed four hundred horse and all told were no more than five thousand in number. It is evident from the context that this refers to the fighting strength of the town, and yet the wording, by itself, merely gives the number of Olynthian citizens. These figures are probably a rather conservative estimate. In my chapter on the constitution I have given my reasons for believing that we are dealing with a citizenship based on a hoplite census. I wish to add that a body of four hundred cavalry is consistent with a hoplite force of five thousand but not with one of less than half that number. Thus it seems that the five thousand of Demosthenes refers only to the hoplites, or perhaps to the men of hoplite census.

³⁵ If we take the number five thousand to be the free men of Chalcidian birth in the city, the population of Olynthos would be about twenty thousand. Even this is a greater growth than the facts seem to warrant.

the league.³⁶ Beloch saw that the cavalry figures given by Demosthenes belonged to the *κοινόν*, but he did not consider the possibility that the five thousand citizens were Chalcidian and not merely Olynthian.

The explanation that has been given harmonizes the contemporary statement of Xenophon with the later one of Demosthenes and fits the facts of the case. The figures to which we have arrived give to the Chalcidian territories for this period a population of approximately forty thousand free inhabitants, excluding metics.³⁷ Its territory included the western part of the Chalcidic peninsula, Potidaea, most of Sithonia, and a small part of the Macedonian country. Considering the ravages to which all this territory had been exposed, the transfer of inhabitants from Sithonia to the interior and back again, and the foundation and rapid growth of Apollonia, such a population is almost what one would expect. What was the population for the rest of the peninsula not included in the league? We have but little on which an estimate can be based. Using Xenophon's estimate of the cavalry which the Acanthians, Apollonians, and Chalcidians mustered,³⁸ we may assume that Acanthos and Apollonia numbered with their dependencies about two thirds as many inhabitants as the Chalcidians, or about twenty-five or thirty thousand. Thus we have a total for the Chalcidian peninsula of about seventy thousand free inhabitants not including metics.³⁹ The population had doubled since the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

By the time of Philip, according to Demosthenes, the population had again doubled. There were then ten thousand Chalcid-

³⁶ Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, p. 205, note 3 on Dem. XIX, 266. See p. 206. The cavalry of the Boeotian league was theoretically one hundred for every thousand hoplites. Thus, using the same ratio, the four hundred cavalry of the Chalcidian state is about what we would expect for a force of five thousand hoplites. This is further evidence that Demosthenes has in mind merely the heavy armed forces of the Chalcidian army.

³⁷ If Olynthos furnished eight hundred hoplites it must have had a population of Chalcidian birth of about six or seven thousand.

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 14; 3, 1.

³⁹ Acanthos seems to have exercised some sort of hegemony on the eastern coast and in Aetê; the Chalcidians held most of the territory, if not all, in the south and west, and Apollonia was the only important city of the interior. Thus our estimates for these three states give approximately the population of the whole Chalcidian peninsula.

ian citizens with full franchise.⁴⁰ This shows a great increase in prosperity and commercial importance. Beloch's estimate for this time of about thirty thousand citizens for the whole extent of the Chalcidic peninsula seems to be more nearly correct. Even here we are without sufficient data; and we must remember that the number ten thousand does not refer to Olynthos alone and that this is the number of the hoplite census or of the citizens with full franchise. Doubling this will give us twenty thousand for the number of free men of Chalcidian birth in the territory of the league. We may conjecture that the remainder of the Chalcidic peninsula had about five thousand more. This, however, is very uncertain. Beloch estimates that one hundred thousand free inhabitants lived in the Chalcidian peninsula at the time of its conquest by Philip.⁴¹ This gives an average density of twenty-five to the square kilometer. If we include slaves we may estimate it at thirty or forty.

Between 380 and 350 an era of development had taken place⁴² in Chalcidic territory. The "Hinterland" had been settled, the forests cut down and agriculture more widely extended. Thus the increase in population is merely due to the natural development of a rich country. The fact that Philip considered it worth while to make presents of wood for house-building purposes to Chalcidians shows that the forests of Chalcidicè had been ruthlessly cut out, as in every new and rich country, and the country was now forced to rely upon imports, to some degree, at least, for its building material.⁴³ This is indicative of the state of the forests and of the spread of agriculture in that period.

The inhabitants of Chalcidicè were mostly Greeks, although in certain parts of the peninsula there was a considerable part of native intermixture. The Bottiaeans in the west were presumably of Greek extraction with a strong admixture of Thracian

⁴⁰ Dem. XIX, 266.

⁴¹ Beloch's figures for Attica, excluding the population of the city, are fifty to the square kilometer. The free population of Boeotia in 424 was approximately one hundred thousand, inhabiting about 2500 square kilometers. Thus it was more densely populated than Chalcidicè. Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, pp. 101, 161ff, 212.

⁴² See chapter on the economic condition of Chalcidicè.

⁴³ Dem. XIX, 265.

blood. They had originally been settled in Macedonia near the Axios river, but the growing Macedonian power had driven them out to take refuge in Chalcidice.⁴⁴ In Mygdonia a Thracian stock was to be found, while upon Actè⁴⁵ there were remnants of the original population, the so-called Pelasgians and Thracians from the tribes of the Bisaltians, Crestontians, and Edonians. These had kept their native tongue but used the Greek language as well. Euboeans and Andrians had shared in the settlement of the peninsula. The latter had kept to the east and had founded Sanè, Acanthos, Stageiros, and Argilos.⁴⁶ Of the Euboeans, the Eretrians had been responsible for the settlement of Pallènè, and the Chalcidians had placed the majority of her colonies upon Sithonia.⁴⁷ The western coast also came into the possession of Greek settlers. Thus we see that the peninsulas of Pallènè and Sithonia, together with most of the coast-line, were completely Hellenized at an early date. Actè and the interior kept its native inhabitants and only gradually did the Greeks encroach upon their territory.⁴⁸

The official dialect of the Chalcidic league was a form of Ionic, as we see from the treaty with Amyntas.⁴⁹ That the Ionic dialect was quite generally adopted in this region is shown by an Amphipolitan inscription of the time of Philip.⁵⁰ This Amphipolitan decree is especially noteworthy, since Amphipolis was originally an Athenian colony, and the adoption of the Ionic shows that it was in general use in the cities of that neighbour-

⁴⁴ Cf. Köhler, *Ber. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1897, p. 271; cf. notes 3 and 4 *supra*.

⁴⁵ Thuc. IV, 109. In Atke there was a slight mixture of Chalcidian blood.

⁴⁶ Thuc. IV, 84, 88, 103, 109.

⁴⁷ Thuc. IV, 110, 114, 123; Strabo, VII, 329, frg. 11; X, 447, 8.

⁴⁸ By the time when the geography of Scylax was written, about the middle of the fourth century, even the cities on the peninsula of Actè were considered Greek. In fact all of the cities on the coast of Chalcidice commencing with Aineia are called by him Hellenic. Thermè, however, on the north western border was evidently in his estimation not a Greek city. The cities mentioned by him are as follows: Aineia, Potidaea, Mendè, Aphytis, Thrambeis, Scionè, Olynthos, Mecyperna, Sermylia, Toronè, Dion, Thyssos, Cleonae, Acrothooi, Charadrous, Olophyxos, Acanthos, Alapta, and Arethousa. He goes on to say that there were many more towns inland which he does not mention. Scylax, 66.

⁴⁹ Ditt. *Syll.*², 77.

⁵⁰ Ditt. *Syll.*², 113. Aristotle tells us that there had been considerable emigration of Chalcidians to Amphipolis, *Pol.*, VIII, 3, 13, 1303B; 6, 8, 1306A.

hood. Both of these inscriptions are of the fourth century and give little information as to the usage of the fifth.⁵¹ We have, however, a number of fifth century coins from Chalcidicè that must be noted here. The use of the Ionic omega was introduced at the time of the revolt from Athens in the coins of almost every city of the Chalcidic peninsula. The coins of Acanthos alone retain the older omicron, and this use continues throughout the coinage of the city. The other cities, however, when they gave up the Euboic-Attic standard, adopted the Ionic alphabet. The Bottiaians and Chalcidians did this about 432, Amphipolis about 424, and Toronè a little later. Toronè is a very interesting example, for its coinage ceases practically at its destruction by Athens in 422.⁵² Thus we may say that the use of the Ionic alphabet was officially adopted in Chalcidicè about thirty years before it came into general use in the rest of continental Greece.

⁵¹ The dialect of these inscriptions has certain affinities with that of Eretria and Oropos, though it lacks the most striking feature of Eretrian, the rhotacism of intervocalic σ . On the fifth century coins of Mendè and Toronè we find the inscriptions Μινδᾶον and Τερωνᾶον with the suppression of ι . This reduction of ai to a is found in many forms of Ionic and occurs in names from the Euboean Styra. See Harrison, *Cl. Qu.*, 1912, pp. 169f. An early fifth century coin of the Chalcidians shows the form for Λ . This form is peculiar to Chalcis and does not occur elsewhere in Euboea, and in Greece proper only in Boeotia and Attica, *Numis. Chron.*, 1897, p. 276, pl. XIII, 6. Taking everything into consideration it is highly probable that the features which show a connection between Olynthos and Eretria were common to Eretria and Chalcis.

⁵² *B. M. C. Mac.*, p. xxxiii. Coins minted after the restoration of Toronè are few and do not concern us here.

CHAPTER XVI

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The strength of the Chalcidic league was upon a sound economic basis. The country was rich and could supply the needs of a large population. Its position, moreover, was excellent for the maintenance of a large trade, for its three peninsulas offered good harbours and its proximity to Macedon gave the Chalcidians an opportunity to exploit that country to their own profit. They were quick to see the advantages which they had, and prosperity was a natural consequence.

Agriculture was one of the most favoured of occupations.¹ The country was fertile, capable of producing much grain, and hence it was possible for it to sustain a fairly dense population. Pallènè was the first to be brought into a high degree of cultivation. It was the least hilly of all the peninsulas and the most suited for agriculture, and for this reason it soon became a rival, so far as numbers were concerned, of the more densely populated districts of Greece. An interesting statement of Aristotle concerning Aphytis may be taken as illustrative of the conditions in the rest of the peninsula.² He says that although the citizens of the town were many, and its territory small in extent, nevertheless all of them were tillers of the soil.

The mildness of the climate allowed the cultivation of the olive and the fig.³ Another of the chief products of the region was wine.⁴ Mendè was the center of its production and the Men-

¹ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 16; Appian, *B. C.*, IV, 13, 102.

² Arist. *Pol.*, VII, 4, 9f, 1319A.

³ Theop. frg. 230.

⁴ [Dem.] XXXV, 10, 20, 35; *F. H. G.*, II, 301, 30; Athen. I, 41, 53; IV, 4; VIII, 67; Hippocrates, *de intern. affect.*, 17; Hesychios, *Μίσκελλος ολῖος*; Steph. Byz., Mendè; Varro, *R. R.*, I, 14: The coins of Mendè and other cities of Chalcidicè show Dionysiac types.

dean wine was famous for its peculiar flavour. Scionè also was a wine producing city, but the culture of the vine was by no means confined to Pallenè. In Sithonia there was a promontory called Ampelos,⁵ and at the time of the expedition of Brasidas against Acanthos, as we are told, the vintage had not yet occurred, and fear for the destruction of the crop was one of the determining factors in the revolt.⁶ Pallenè also had a reputation for the production of honey, as the name *Melissurgis* shows.⁷ Besides all this, however, the Chalcidic peninsula was a great grain producing region,⁸ and Egyptian beans seem to have thrived well in the region about Toronè.⁹

Grazing must have been important in the less settled portions of Chalcidicè. On the early Olynthian coins we find the horse portrayed and throughout the history of the Chalcidian league, cavalry plays an important part in the operations of the army.¹⁰ Later, after the destruction of the league, Macedonian cavalry was recruited from this territory.¹¹ The bribes given to various Chalcidians by Philip show us something of the nature of agriculture in the later years of the league.¹² Horses, cattle, and sheep are among the gifts mentioned, and we may assume from this that stock-raising was an important part of Chalcidic farming, although it was by no means so important as to exclude the more intensive side of agriculture. Grazing goes hand in hand with the formation of large estates; but the rapid increase in population and the general prosperity of Chalcidicè show that the formation of large estates had not, in the fourth century, increased to such an extent that it was detrimental to the country. The plateaus and hills of the interior were well suited to grazing and probably it was chiefly confined to that part of the peninsula. After the conquest of Philip grazing and large estates became the rule. The country was parcelled out among

⁵ Hdt. VII, 123; Steph. Byz., "Αμπελος.

⁶ Thuc. IV, 84, 88; Athen. I, 56.

⁷ Cf. Dionys. *Orbis Descriptio*, 327 ff.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 16.

⁹ Athen. III, 2.

¹⁰ Thuc. IV, 124; V, 6, 10; Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 14; 3, 1; Polyæn. III, 10, 7; Dem. XIX, 263-6 *et al.*

¹¹ Arrian, *Anab.*, I, 2, 5; 12, 7; II, 9, 3.

¹² Dem. XIX, 265.

his favourites in large blocks and the raising of grain fell off so that it had to be imported.¹³

The natural resources of Chalcidicè were great. In the north-eastern portion of the peninsula there were rich deposits of iron, silver, and lead.¹⁴ The region about Acanthos was noted for its salt¹⁵ and Pallenè had a reputation for the peculiar stones found there.¹⁶ The base of the peninsula was heavily wooded and Athens was dependent upon this region for the wood necessary for the maintenance of its fleets. After the revolt of Amphipolis, Athens was at a loss for ship-building material. Brasidas immediately turned the forests of the country to good account and commenced the formation of a navy.¹⁷ Xenophon also tells us that there was plenty of wood in the country, of which the Chalcidians were not slow to take advantage.¹⁸ In the period of the Chalcidian growth, when the league had expectations of becoming an important power in Greek politics and was planning to establish a navy, it took into its hands the forests and restricted the exportation of wood. This is shown by the Chalcidian treaty with Amyntas.¹⁹ According to this treaty no timber could be exported to Macedon unless the *κοινόν* had no need of it.

We learn also that there was an abundance of fish in a little stream that flowed by the cities of Olynthos and Apollonia into Lake Bolbè.²⁰ In certain months of the year the fish went up the river as far as Olynthos and were caught in quantities sufficient to supply the needs of the inhabitants.

The fact that Philip used wood for house building as bribes for the Chalcidians gives one an interesting sidelight upon the conditions existing in the years immediately preceding the destruction of the league.²¹ This shows that at that time wood was a valuable commodity and the natural inference is that much of

¹³ (Dem.) XXXIV, 36; Theop. frg. 217b.

¹⁴ *Pauly-Wissowa*, Chalkidike. May not the mineral resources of the country have had something to do with its early settlement by the Chalcidians?

¹⁵ Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXI, 85.

¹⁶ Dionys., *Orbis Descriptio*, 327 ff.

¹⁷ Thuc. IV, 108.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 16.

¹⁹ Ditt. *Syll.*, 77.

²⁰ *F. H. G.*, IV, 420, Hegesandros of Delphi.

²¹ Dem. XIX, 265.

the forest had been cut down and the country given over to grazing and agriculture. This would be the natural consequence of the increase in population and the consequent extension of the settlements in the interior.

The trade of Chalcidicè also played a very important part in its development. The Chalcidian relations with Macedon were on the whole intimate and every effort was made to increase the commerce between the two countries. Without doubt, from the very first settlement of the Chalcidic peninsula, the Greeks settled there had their share of the trade to and from the neighbouring parts of Macedonia. This, however, was hampered, to a certain extent, by a difference in the coin standards in use in the two countries. During the period of her supremacy, Athens favoured a uniform coinage throughout her empire.²² Hence up to 432 the cities of Chalcidicè employed, for the most part, the Attic standard, while in Macedonia the Pheonician standard was in use. When the revolt from Athens occurred in 432, the Chalcidians, without any hesitation, changed from one to the other. This is an indication of the fact that they saw the importance of friendly commercial relations with the interior and looked upon Macedon as their chief market. Towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Macedonian Archelaos I espoused the side of Athens, and, as it would seem, broke off relations with the Chalcidians. Archelaos was desirous of strengthening Macedonia, unifying it, and extending its influence. Among other things he wished to make it commercially independent of the Chalcidians. To do this he changed his system of coinage so as to handicap the Chalcidian traders.²³ This went hand in hand with his development of the roads and the sea-coast towns, and all of this must have reacted unfavourably upon the trade with Chalcidicè.

Early in the fourth century, after the murder of Archelaos and the abandonment of his plans, friendly relations were renewed with the Chalcidians and commerce once more went on uninterrupted. For this period we are fortunate enough to have

²² Cf. Weil, *Zeitschr. f. Numis.*, XXV, pp. 52 f.

²³ Archelaos gave up the Phoenician standard and adopted a Persian stater of 170 gr.

a commercial-political treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidic league.²⁴ In addition to the clause relating to timber and ship-building material, there was one that guaranteed to each party the right of export, import, and transport of all goods through the country of the other upon the payment of the usual duties. In this way Amyntas gained the use of the Chalcidic harbours and a market for the raw products of Macedonia, while the Chalcidians obtained the necessary means for an increase in trading operations among the less civilized inhabitants of the interior. Without doubt they reaped a rich harvest from the trade. Besides the fact that the Chalcidians became the middlemen for the Macedonian trade and increased their individual profits thereby, the revenues of the state were greatly benefited. This was not free trade.²⁵ Export and import duties were collected on the articles of commerce destined for Macedonian use and a greatly increased revenue must have resulted.

Although the treaty was not of long duration, the supremacy in Macedonian trade probably remained, to a greater or less extent, until the time of Philip. Demosthenes speaks of the Macedonian discontent at being shut off from the Chalcidian markets because of the war.²⁶ So important was this trade to the Chalcidians that at one time (368) they interfered in Macedonian politics and attempted to place upon the throne a king that would be favourable to their interests.²⁷ Under Philip, however, friendly relations were renewed and their commerce received a new lease of life. For a time in the early part of Philip's reign he did all in his power to conciliate the Chalcidians and to win their favour. It was at this time that he entered into an alliance with them and gave them Anthemos and Potidaea. The change that Philip introduced into the Macedonian coinage is indicative of the importance of the Chalcidians in the commerce of Macedonia. Since the time of Archelaos I, the two countries had maintained different coin standards, but now Philip returned to the

²⁴ Ditt. *Syll.*, 77.

²⁵ Cf. Xen. *Hell.*, V, 2, 16. This indicates the importance of Chalcidian commerce.

²⁶ Dem. II, 16; cf. Appian, *B. C.*, IV, 13, 102. This passage tells us of the mutual benefit derived from the Chalcidic trade with the Thracians.

²⁷ Cf. Chap. XIII.

standard in use in Chalcidicè. The reason for this change has been referred to a desire on the part of Philip to regulate the ratio between gold and silver.²⁸ Without doubt, he purposely adopted the coinage that was in use by the merchants who held the balance of Macedonian trade. Whatever may have been his reasons this change simplified and expedited commerce with Chalcidicè and tended to increase it. Considering these evidences of friendship on the part of Philip and the profits that accrued to the Chalcidians from Macedonian trade, it is no wonder that a strong pro-Macedonian party was formed in the league. The causes that are given by Demosthenes for the formation of this party are unimportant in comparison with the perfectly legitimate economic factors at work.²⁹ Bribery works very well with individuals, but commercial opportunities, given or taken away, influence the attitude of whole classes. The economic union of Macedonia and Chalcidicè had already taken place, and the merchants, realizing that a break with Macedon would deprive them of their logical market, were quick to resent any attempt on the part of the national party to renew relations with Athens. They saw that, so far as the prosperity of the country was concerned, a peaceful incorporation in the Macedonian kingdom was preferable to independence with a consequent diminution of the Chalcidian trade. The land-holding elements in the state, naturally conservative and nationalistic, were not influenced by these commercial considerations. Their interest lay chiefly in agriculture; and without doubt they could not be brought to see the economic importance of trade with Macedon. Thus it was natural for them to be influenced by patriotism and to strive to maintain the independence of the

²⁸ Hill, *Hist. Greek Coins*, p. 81. The fact that after the destruction of the Chalcidian league the Phoenician standard in Macedonia gave way to the Attic seems to be an added reason for supposing that commercial grounds were at the bottom of the change made by Philip. After the Chalcidian coinage ceased when the towns were razed, the reasons that had impelled Philip to maintain the Phoenician standard disappeared. The commercial activity of the Chalcidians was no longer to be considered and the change to the Attic standard was dictated by a desire to place Macedonian trade in touch and competition with that of the great commercial cities of Greece.

²⁹ Dem. XIX, 265.

Chalcidian state. In the end, patriotic considerations won the day and dictated the policy of the country to its destruction.

Little more is to be said of the economic side of Chalcidic life. In the Chalcidian territory, two elements, agriculture and trade, played almost equal parts and their development progressed side by side. As the country became more thickly settled and more generally cultivated, commerce increased. There was room for both and neither infringed upon the other until the end, when the commercial party was forced to sacrifice itself to patriotism, and when, as a result both commerce and agriculture were almost completely destroyed in the territory of the league.

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